Commentary on the Manley Panel on Canada's Future Role in
Afghanistan
A Call for Stronger Canadian Leadership
ROLAND PARIS
The Globe and Mail
January 23, 2008
John
Manley and his fellow panelists have done this country a tremendous
service. Their report is the single most useful contribution in the
past two years to the debate over Canada's role in Afghanistan. Its
honesty and clarity stand in stark contrast to the Conservative
government's overly managed messaging strategies and the opposition
parties' lack of credible analysis of the Afghanistan mission.
While the panel's recommendations will be debated over the coming
weeks, its unvarnished description of conditions in Afghanistan and
lucid assessment of the options facing Canada are, in themselves,
important and welcome. If these descriptive elements of the report
help to foster a more informed political debate on the future of our
mission, the panel's work will have been a success, even if its
specific prescriptions are contested.
But surely we should expect more from our party leaders. There is
too much at stake in this mission - for Canadians, our allies, and
the Afghan people - to accept anything less than a serious effort,
at least between the government and the Official Opposition, to find
common ground on Canadian policy for the period following February,
2009.
Nor is there any need for an immediate vote in Parliament on
Canada's future in Afghanistan. The panel wisely suggested deferring
such a vote until after next April's NATO summit in Bucharest. The
alliance recently launched a major review of its strategy, and the
results of this review are expected to be discussed at that meeting.
Canada will be in a much better position to make judgments about the
future of the international effort - and the prospects for
additional commitments from our NATO partners - after that meeting
has taken place.
Indeed, NATO urgently needs to conduct this strategic review. The
security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating since 2005.
Failure to reform key Afghan government institutions, including the
deeply corrupt national police, is reportedly having a demoralizing
effect on the Afghan people. Neighbouring Pakistan, where insurgent
training camps are located, has become even more unstable in recent
months. While there are some signs of improvement in Afghanistan,
particularly in development indicators, the overall picture is
distressing.
The
panel is unsparing in its description of these problems, but it also
correctly notes that the situation in Afghanistan is not hopeless,
and that a return to chaos and civil war would have grave
consequences for regional and international security - not to
mention for the people of Afghanistan itself, who have suffered
through three decades of conflict. The good news is that the Afghan
people continue to strongly support the international presence (yes,
including NATO combat troops), and that neither Kabul nor any
provincial centres are on the verge of falling to the Taliban, who
are still too weak to operate openly in most parts of the country.
Given
all this, the panel made an interesting choice. Rather than focusing
narrowly on Canada's specific role in Afghanistan, they framed
Canada's policy choice within the context of the larger
international effort. If NATO cannot get its act together by
February, 2009 - specifically, by sending reinforcements to
Kandahar, and by developing a strategy that has a reasonable hope of
success - Canada should leave. The ingenuity of this recommendation
is that it is simultaneously a self-interested and public-spirited
ultimatum to our allies. On one hand, it would reduce the risk of
our troops being mired in a hopeless mission without adequate
support. On the other hand, it would also be an inducement to the
rest of the alliance to do what NATO needs to do: face up to the
urgency of the situation in southern Afghanistan and adjust its
strategy and resources accordingly.
We can
debate whether Canada's main "ask" - the deployment of at least
1,000 additional International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
troops to join the Canadians in Kandahar - is enough. We might also
wish to seek assurances that Canadian forces in Kandahar will be
fully replaced by another country at a specific later date. Liberal
leader Stéphane Dion is not being unreasonable when he talks about
the importance of rotation among NATO contingents. The key question
for the federal parties - and for Canada's dealings with NATO - may
ultimately be the timing and circumstances of this rotation, rather
than the principle.
In
short, Mr. Manley and his colleagues are calling for stronger
Canadian leadership. The Prime Minister should, himself, spearhead a
diplomatic effort aimed at pressing for a more effective NATO
strategy. We should use our impending decision to exert leverage,
not just for the sake of being influential, but to help NATO and to
help ourselves.
At home,
too, greater leadership is needed, according to the panel. The
government should provide Canadians with regular, detailed and
honest reports on the progress of the Afghan mission, recognizing
that no strategy is worth its salt without reliable and relevant
benchmarks.
While
their report will not end the controversy over our role in
Afghanistan, the members of the Manley panel have captured and
articulated the essence of the problem we collectively face. For
doing so in an extremely short time - and over the Christmas
holidays to boot - they deserve our thanks.
Roland Paris is
director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the
University of Ottawa