

## Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies

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**Abstract** *The article argues that global security should be seen as synonymous with human security, and that strategic studies should be located within that broader rubric. Mounting such an argument means meeting the charge of those who see the broader construction of strategic studies as vague and meaningless, and as detracting from the ability to make good policy. The article attempts, therefore, to map human security in as inclusive and systematic a way as possible. It attempts to show that the concept is neither vague nor meaningless, and is suitable, therefore, to be the basis for a comprehensive account of global security.*

How should global security be conceptualised? For example, should our focus remain restricted to the familiar politico-strategic (interstate/militarist/diplomatic) approaches to the subject? Or should it be broadened to incorporate more cooperative and collective, comprehensive and ultimately human concerns? (Baldwin 1995; Baldwin 1997; Krause and Williams 1997; Jones 1999; Smith 2000; Peou 2002/3; Waever 2004.)

It is not unusual now for analysts to go beyond politico-strategic accounts of global security to talk in politico-economic (market-specific) terms, or politico-social (civil identity) ones. Neither is it unheard of for them to talk of Marxist, neo-Marxist and constructivist critiques of such accounts, or for analysts to talk of the views from the margins that Western thinking explores. At times, even, analysts will talk in terms of the politico-cultural and politico-sacral contexts of current security concerns.

Are the questions posed above concerning human concerns any longer of use, therefore? Are the answers likely to do anything more than document a fait accompli?

The problem is that those who talk of security in the more restricted sense generally continue to see all other ways of viewing the subject as detracting from our understanding of it. For example, in 2001 Roland Paris argued, in *International Studies*, that the concept of human security distracts us from a proper understanding of strategic affairs (Paris 2001, 88). He wrote that human security as a concept was 'sprawling and ambiguous', a 'hodgepodge of principles and objectives', and 'so vague' that it verged on the meaningless (Paris 2001, 92, 101, 102). He said that it did not help policymakers who wanted to know what to do. More specifically, in seeking to define global security in terms of global development, human security provided a sort of psychedelic umbrella under

which the proponents of all kinds of developmental causes were able to gather. It was this, he noted, that stopped policymakers from formulating good policy. The concept was inexact on purpose, in that it was a conscious ploy, he concluded, to change what policymakers considered worth making policy about (Paris 2001, 88).

### **Global Security as Human Security**

In 2003, the co-chairs of the United Nations Commission on Human Security (UNCHS) presented a written report to the United Nations Secretary General entitled *Human Security Now* (UNCHS 2003). This report directly endorsed the concept. It chose to cast global security in 'human' terms, and to provide a working definition of human security, namely, as the safeguarding of the 'vital core' of all human lives from 'critical' and 'pervasive' threats, in ways consistent with their long-term fulfilment. It also reviewed a number of the issue areas it saw as constituting human security, such as the protecting and empowering of people in violent conflict situations, in post-conflict situations, 'on the move', in unfair trade and market circumstances, and without basic health care, education, and intellectual property protection facilities. It subsequently related this reading of global security to what it saw as universal needs; for example, the need to be free from fear and free from want.

Though the work of the United Nations Commission on Human Security, and other cognate entities, has helped legitimate efforts to revise the dominant conception of global security,<sup>1</sup> Paris-type reasoning continues to inhibit the general acceptance of such a conception. While the Commission's report has helped make human security sound less vague, Paris would insist there are critical questions about the specification of chains of cause and effect that remain unanswered, and equally critical questions about what policymakers should prioritise. Does this mean that advocacy of the human security concept really does amount to no more than an ill-defined attempt to complicate matters, to no productive purpose?<sup>2</sup> Paris certainly thinks so; which is why he suggests that we deal with all such attempts by encysting them. To this end, he constructs a matrix that categorises security studies in such a way as to acknowledge that while the concept of human security does exist, it should be kept separate from, and by implication secondary to, discussions about the security of states. In the process he downplays 'human' issues (as vague, unscientific and poorly prioritised), in the hope that he might stop them from distracting (neo)realists from articulating what he sees to be our primary strategic concerns (Paris 2001, 96).

What if we address the Paris logic by inverting it, however? What if, rather than designating human security as subordinate to strategic studies, we take the UN's lead and construe strategic studies as subordinate to human security? What if we proceed from a general concept of global security (as human security) to a particular concept of global security (as state-centric strategic studies)? What if we

<sup>1</sup> The Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia is producing an annual *Human Security Report* to try to consolidate the concept's global standing (Centre for Human Security 2004). See also Human Security Network (2004) and UNCHS (2004).

<sup>2</sup> For example, there is the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In 1994 the UNDP published a *Human Development Report* on the 'new dimensions of human security'. Ever since, it has equated security with people (not just territories), and with development (not just arms) (UNDP 2004).

acknowledge the connections between the (human) whole and the (state-centric) part as not reducing our understanding of that part, but as augmenting it?

Exploring the connections between global warming and state-centric security, for example, or between religious loyalties and (neo)realist accounts of the balance of power, does not mean losing sight of the significance of 'the state'. Inviting a more extensive empirical purview of more diverse issues, in other words, does not mean ceasing to articulate conventional state-centric security concerns. It does mean taking a more critical perspective, though, as well as a willingness to manifest a (postmodernist) capacity to listen to a range of analytic languages, as well as a willingness to call into question the authority of the meta-discourse of Rationalism itself (Klein 1988).

We are still faced with the argument that the concept of global security, construed in terms of human security, is sprawling, meaningless and vague. The first of Paris's charges remains unmet. So is Paris correct? Must this charge stand uncontested?

Since it is possible to provide a concise, comprehensive and systematic account of human security, it would seem not. This does mean casting the concept in terms of a systematic map of the analytical languages currently used to describe, explain and prescribe for world affairs, and in terms of the critical accounts we have of these diverse languages as well. What follows tries to show that there is no substance to the key Paris critique, therefore. It attempts to do this by showing how we can have precise and meaningful purchase upon human security as a concept by couching it in the context of a concise, comprehensive and systematic account of world affairs.

The scale of this task means moving well beyond the Parisian matrix, with its limited range of analytic languages, its limited articulation of assumptions about human nature, and its part truths (Paris 2001, 98). It requires casting human security first of all in the politico-cultural terms that are dominant in our day, namely, the terms set by Rationalism (that is, the attempt to know by prioritising the human capacity for reason). It means articulating human security in the terms set by the analytical languages that Rationalism provides, and in the terms set by the ways of being and knowing that Rationalism does not provide. This includes the sacral context in which Rationalism first arose, namely, Christianity, and is a mind move that leads to radically competing accounts of human security, as well as to articulations of human security from the perspective of the margins that Rationalism makes.

### **Human Security as a Modernist/Christian Concept**

Rationalists grant reason untrammelled exercise, though Rationalism requires a particular kind of individual—one able to objectify in such a way as to give reason as free a rein as possible. This kind of individual has to be taught, and a Rationalist life is in no small part about learning to become this particular kind of self (Taylor 1989).

As a specifically Rationalist concept, human security is articulated in terms of the assumptions that underpin this meta-discourse. For example, it articulates the way of being—the objectifying, de-communalised, disembodied form of

the self—that makes this way of knowing possible (with outcomes as explicit and internally consistent as possible, and cast in compelling empirical terms).

Yet, by discussing human security in Rationalist terms, we make it harder to understand how human security feels in non-Rationalist terms. More importantly, we make it harder to understand how human insecurity feels. This is why human security is said to be about the young child that did not die of neglect, the serious epidemic that did not break out, the job that was not cut, the gun that was not run, the ethnic prejudice that did not result in violence, the dissident voice that was not made silent, the landmine that was not sold and installed, the woman who was not trafficked across state borders and sexually abused, the agricultural product that was not dumped to the detriment of poor farmers, the short-term capital investment that was not allowed to wreck an infant industry, the addictive drug that was not produced and shipped, the refugee who was not forced to flee or remain abroad, and so on. Conclusions like these all have an emotional charge of a kind that only a subjectifying narrative can convey (Pettman 2000, 57–64). The Rationalist mindset eschews this charge. It seeks to install a less engaged and more detached mental view, one less likely to be swamped by what the mind feels, and one with a manifest preference for the systematic use of individual reason. This creates its own illusions, however, illusions that can only be dispelled by proximal research techniques, that is, by getting close enough to listen to whatever is being analysed, and by taking part—rather than by simply observing. The cycle of knowing is only complete when we stand back to look in the Rationalist way again, though what is seen then is usually rather different, being informed by all that the analyst has heard and done by attempting a more participant form of understanding (Damasio 1994).

The Rationalist requirement that we be individuated and objectifying tends to result in the valorisation of such a self, and the promotion of the idea that individuated individuals are ends in themselves, and that they are calculating. As a result the history of the Rationalist project is, in part, a history of the extension of an individuated concept of humanity to the entire species, including those in 'other' cultures and social sectors not considered wholly 'human' before. In its liberalist articulation in particular, Rationalism promotes the idea of the self as not having the sort of qualities that regularly get used to discriminate against 'others' (qualities like skin colour, age, sex or gender, mental or physical disability, class or caste status, or political or religious belief). Liberalists promote the idea of people as defined by their universal attributes instead.

Since individual autonomy means eschewing social conformity, and emphasising the security of the self (rather than the security of the community as a whole), Rationalists downplay the perspectives on human security that non-Rationalist societies articulate. It therefore downplays the significance of human security construed as a communalist concept, that is, security cast in terms of the safety and well-being of the community as a whole. Communalist perspectives are articulated by those called 'pre-modernist' in Rationalist parlance. They are the kind of perspectives the self-centred discourse of Rationalism actively discounts, and that its various articulations are meant to transcend. However, a comprehensive account of human security will allow for communalist views regardless, and will include as a consequence the thinking of so-called 'traditional' ways of living (Clifford 2004). It will include concepts of human

security couched in terms of social conformity, as well as those couched in terms of individual self-assertion.

A comprehensive account of human security will also document its sacral dimension. The modernist Rationalism that was used to articulate the concept of human security arose in 17th-century Europe, in the context of Christianity. Though it was ultimately defined as the secular opposite to the sacralist perspective that Christianity provides, it still bears many of the marks of its sacral origins. Not the least of these is a penchant for a sense of moral responsibility strongly attached to the sinful self (White 1967; Milbank 1990; Philpott 2000; Jones 2001).

Most people in the world are not Christian, though. They live in politico-spiritual thought-worlds different from the Christian one. As such they encounter modernist Rationalism in divergent ways, and as a result we now have hybridised forms of this hegemonic doctrine, not one homogeneous one (Eisenstadt 2000).

The consequences of sacral diversity for human security are clear. A comprehensive account of human security will be one that allows for non-Christian contexts, and for the perspectives that they provide. For those who profess 'other' faiths, it may be Christianity (and its secularising culture-child, Rationalism) that is marginal, or even malign. They might, for example, ask: What does human security mean to the Buddhist, in whom the point of human awareness is the realisation of a sense of non-self that does not suffer any more? What does human security mean in the context of the Islamic umma, or the spiritual community that promotes and protects the idea of the self as one primarily in the care of a supreme entity, Allah? What does human security mean where the idea of karma is paramount and caste is a major determinant of human behaviour? What does human security mean where filial piety is the norm, and where Confucian respect for those who govern predominates, at least as long as they do so in terms that serve the common good? What does human security mean to the Taoist, in whom harmony is the core value, and *wu-wei*, or 'no unnatural action', is deemed the best way to behave (Pettman 2004)?

The contemporary analysis of security is usually conducted in Rationalist terms alone. Questions like these are a salutary reminder, therefore, that the Rationalist mode of analysis is ideologically loaded, and that modernist Rationalism does not convey the range or depth of experience that human security issues involve. Nor does it convey a sense of the communal context in which many of these issues are played out in the world. Nor does it do justice to the significance of the various sacral discourses that inform most people's lives. Rationalist policymakers can only be satisfied with strategic assessments that do not cover these concerns, or that fail to include the relevant empirical data, if they are prepared to misread the world, therefore, or if they are prepared to risk creating the very problems they fear most.

### **Human Security: Modernity's Margins**

Modernist Rationalism has been immensely successful. It has made possible, for example, forms of industrial technology and military power that are truly revolutionary. The Europeans who first promoted this project created world empires with this power. These empires collapsed only after two world-spanning

wars, and a long Cold War between two of the subsequent sovereign powers. We live in the political environment these Old World peoples continue to dominate, in association with their New World protégés in North America. Euro-American modernists continue, that is, to promote their preferred forms of order, production and identity, and they fully expect to see these forms realised worldwide.

Such a project creates a range of important peripheries, however. These arose in the making of modernist Rationalism itself, and a comprehensive account of human security will be one that casts it in the terms set by each one. Mention has already been made of those on modernity's communal and sacral peripheries, and how all those who do not subscribe to Rationalism as the best way to be and to know are considered (by Rationalists) to be beyond the pale. The practical consequences of this kind of marginalisation can be serious, however. They can include, for example, various forms of terrorism (this being the name for a particular policy response on the part of the unscrupulous and/or the frustrated). Coming from beyond the pale, terrorists present modernist Rationalists with the need to respond in unconventional ways. In practice, their response is often inappropriate, since it involves politico-cultural and -spiritual issues that modernist Rationalists find they are poorly equipped to address (Mueller 2004).

Modernity's peripheries are composed of those not deemed sufficiently Rationalist. They include women, environmentalists, indigenous peoples, anarchists, postcolonialists and the poor. Two of these margins will be considered briefly, to demonstrate what it means to talk of human security in terms of a peripheralised discourse. One will be the world's 'last colony', namely, women. The other will be that part of the modernist margins inhabited by environmentalists.

On women, the key point is that Rationalism was made by men, for men (Cohn 1987; Tickner 1992; Beckman and D'Amico 1994; Pettman 1996; Zalewski and Parpart 1998). Though women inhabit the whole project, they must do so in ways made inferior to those of men. The inferiority arises because women are deemed less rational than men, and more suited to such social tasks as reproduction and childrearing. As a result, in nearly every sphere of contemporary experience, women are made more vulnerable than men, and more susceptible to threat. In the main, that is, women in the world suffer more from poverty, illness, displacement and ignorance than men. As noted above, Rationalism is an individuating ideology. It puts an individual-without-qualities at the centre of the world picture, that is, it offers an important way of addressing sexism in principle. Rationalist technologies result in a great deal of sexism in practice, however. While the human security concept is able to highlight the global plight of women, providing new means for measuring global security, and new agendas for global action, getting these means accepted, these measures recognised, and their implications turned into effective policies, is no small task. It remains, after all, a male-made world, which is why any account of human security has not only to describe and explain what that means, but also to articulate its many policy implications.

On the environment, the key point is that the objectifying mind-gaze that makes Rationalism (or the pursuit of reason as an end in itself) such an effective discourse for describing, explaining and controlling the natural world is also a reifying one. It tends to make that world into a world of things seen at a distance, rather than a world experienced at first hand. This, in turn, tends to exacerbate an instrumentalist view. It reinforces the sense of this world as some-thing or -things,

to be used in practical ways, for human purposes. Environmentalists tend to talk of the world in terms of complex natural systems with their own ways of behaving. Even when these environmentalists are Rationalists, they tend to argue that people should learn to live with these ways, and should respect them if we are not to suffer some species-depleting disaster. Since environmental thinking is different from the thinking that dominates the global mainstream, it tends to be put on the margins of the global political agenda. Without a sustainable environment, however, world affairs are academic. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that the most pressing human security causes are environmental ones. The transnational nature of environmental issues makes them difficult to deal with in a state-made world, but when potable water becomes scarce, for example, its supply becomes contested and we have a potential cause for war. The same sort of thing happens when an important pest breaches bio-sovereignty controls and ravages entire agricultural industries that generate significant revenue. Equally dire can be a virus like SARS, which reduces tourist movements to near zero and reduces the income they generate to near zero too; or a virus like HIV/AIDS, which continues to decimate entire populations; or forest fires, started by slash-and-burn agriculturalists, which blanket neighbouring countries (Vogler and Imber 1996; United Nations Environment Programme 2003; United Nations Development Programme 2004; Lomborg 2004).

In all the empirical cases raised by those on the margins of the modernist project, it is relatively easy to see why it might be necessary to shift the security focus from one that privileges the security of states in military terms, to one that sees security in terms of threats other than those posed by armies or insurgents. It is also easy to see that threats like these are harder to keep from crossing borders, or to contain in the conventional way. In short: transnational challenges are difficult to meet in a world built around the expectation of state-centric competition. Since some of the environmental challenges are becoming immediate, this highlights the need to put state-centric concerns in the context of species-specific ones, thereby highlighting the need for the human security concept, and for the most comprehensive account possible of what human security involves.

### **Human Security: The Naturist Discourses**

Rationalists talk about world affairs (and hence human security) in a wide range of specific analytical languages. These languages are analytic dialects with regard to Rationalism itself, but they are composed of various dialects themselves.

In the study of world affairs (and hence human security), these analytic languages represent different ways of talking about the subject. Indeed, it is not possible to talk Rationally about contemporary world politics without using one or more of these analytical languages. They are how 'we' articulate the subject to others and to ourselves, and how those on the margins engage with 'our' disciplinary concerns

There is not an infinite number of these languages. Modernist Rationalists often clump together the assumptions they make about the essential character of human nature, and human-nurturing practices. These assumptions trammel the use of reason as an end in itself, but they get made nonetheless. There is, for

example, the assumption that human nature is essentially bad. If we look first at the politico-strategic dimension to world affairs (and hence human security), that is, at the state-centric dimension, we find that those who are most pessimistic about human behaviour are the ones most likely to describe, explain and prescribe for world affairs (and hence human security) in realist or neorealist terms. (At this point we begin to see where strategic studies, as conventionally understood, might fit within the larger scheme of things.)

Realists and neorealists not only assume that human nature is essentially bad, but also assume that the state matters most. They make state sovereignty and the ungoverned nature of a state-made world their key political reference points. They highlight the way order is maintained in the world only because state makers agree not to interfere in each other's affairs. Because they are pessimistic about human nature, they see interference by state makers in each other's affairs as inevitable. Peace, they predict, is only ever likely to be a lull between wars (Donnelly 2000).

What if we make our political reference point the welfare of people and not that of states? Then we are likely to highlight the way governments are only able to claim a right to a monopoly of the means of force because of their duty to protect people's welfare. We are likely to highlight how state makers who 'fail' to keep order cause human suffering, because of the way they threaten people, both inside and outside their borders.<sup>3</sup> The Canadian government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) specifically to explore this duty, and to spell out the circumstances under which others in the state system might legitimately intervene. The report of this Commission, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, was presented to the UN Secretary General in December 2001 (ICISS 2001).

(Neo)realist analysts such as Paris reject the idea of a 'duty to protect' as an aspect of human security on a par with, or superior to, state sovereignty. They see state-centricity as superior to species-centricity. They view any attempt to diminish sovereign superiority as contravening the fundamental Westphalian principle upon which the whole modernist system is run. The idea of a 'duty to protect', or a right to intervene, suggests a duty to do so authoritatively. Who, one might ask, is to determine who should carry out this duty? Who is to say when the intervention is legitimate and warranted? How should such an authority be made to act consistently, and in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner? How could it be prevented from becoming an arm of a particular global interest? Without acceptable answers to questions like these, (neo)realists argue, the danger of unwarranted intervention remains too high (Finnemore 2003).

Those who would cast the (neo)realist account of strategic studies in the context of a concept of human security remind us how the (neo)realist assumption about human nature (as one that is essentially bad) is not the only assumption that can be made. They remind us how human nature is typically construed by Rationalists as essentially calculating, and also can be construed as essentially good (Pettman 2004, 22, 24, 26).

(Neo)realists find these alternatives too idealistic. They think of human beings as perennially consigned to a dog-eat-dog, Wild West sort of world, where it is

<sup>3</sup> See the related argument in Hikaru Yamashita, 'Fighting Terror and Fighting Humanitarian Emergencies: Two Approaches to "Elastic" Sovereignty?', in this issue.



only power preponderance, or power balancing, that can provide order. Internationalists and globalists, on the other hand, see tit-for-tat cooperation, and even altruistic collaboration, as being possible too. They see the (neo)realist notion of what is realistic as being just as ideologically loaded as any other way of describing world affairs (Grotius 1925 [1625], 11–16; Kant 1963 [1795], 98, 100–1, 111, 114; Keohane and Nye 1977; Morgenthau 1972 [1948], 16–17; Waltz 1979, 66).

Internationalists (otherwise known as liberal—or neoliberal—institutionalists) and globalists (otherwise known as global federalists or confederalists) see the issues of authoritative international rule as being dealt with at least potentially by international organisations (Weiss and Gordenker 1996). Since entities like the European Union or the United Nations are already handling such issues, internationalists and globalists see state makers as able to cooperate to achieve ends they cannot achieve alone, thus making for international governance, up to and including global governance, or even government.

Though challenges to security are certainly larger and more complex than they were when the principle of state sovereignty was first invented in 17th-century Europe, the state continues to be confirmed as a major unit of order in the 21st century. However, as the various revolutions that constitute modernity continue to spread, an individuated concept of the individual, at odds with state sovereignty, has spread too. In the light of this concept, state security can be seen more as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. Securing people (as noted above) becomes that end, not the securing of states, and state makers are assessed in terms of their capacity to secure the former as well as the latter (Tilly 1985). This, in turn, necessitates greater interstate cooperation and collaboration, as state makers become progressively more obliged to deal with the kinds of global threats the Rationalist revolutions cause, as their borders become colanders not canopies and as they find themselves obliged to respond with cooperative regional and global initiatives to deal with issues like poverty, people displacement, ecological stress, disease vectors, access to education, and drug control (Buzan and Waever 2003).

Thus while ‘the state’ continues to be confirmed as a major site in terms of the world’s ordering practices, state making cannot be seen apart from market making, for example, which is the second dimension of world affairs—the politico-economic one. This is a matter not just of the military conflicts caused by politico-strategic rivalry, causing widespread human deprivation (‘wars make for want’), but of the way widespread human deprivation causes violence, both within states and between them (‘want making for wars’). The human insecurity that is the consequence of such a world is clearly manifest, however. Not only do millions of people die annually because of inter- or intra-state violence, but millions die annually because of preventable diseases, and billions suffer significantly because of patterns of poverty-causing practice that are not immutable (United Nations Development Programme 2004).

The same assumptions about our essential human nature apply to the politico-economic dimension. Analysts who are pessimistic about human nature tend to account for human security in terms of state/market autonomy, for example, and tend to articulate various forms of economic protectionism (List 1966). Analysts who see human beings as basically calculating tend to account for human security in liberal terms, that is, as requiring the freeing up of the international flow of goods and money. Analysts who are optimistic about human nature see human

security best served by (democratic) socialism, that is, by planning the delivery of industrial production so as to meet basic human needs (Burkitt 1984; Stretton 2000).

There is a third dimension to world affairs though: the politico-social dimension. This is centred less on state making and market making, and more on the self-in-society. Like the politico-economic dimension, this is also not autonomous, with the military conflicts caused by politico-strategic rivalry invoking politico-social nationalism, for example, and with intensified feelings of national identity resulting in the call for self-determination and in violence, both within states and between them. Once again, demonstrating how and where what causes what remains problematic. While millions clearly suffer or die from war and want, millions also suffer or die from a global failure to protect their status as human rights claimants. Insecurities like these are not generally considered threats to state security (though state makers will be asked to alleviate them). They only tend to appear on politico-strategic agendas when they are seen to have state-specific military and diplomatic consequences. This does not make them any the less significant, however, and it is to win recognition of this kind of significance that we cast the global security cause in human terms.

The same assumptions about our essential human nature apply to the politico-social dimension of world affairs. Analysts who are pessimistic about human nature see the human security cause as one best served by ensuring state autonomy, that is, by articulating nationalism. Analysts who see human nature as basically calculating see the human security cause as one best served by upholding human rights and democratic freedoms, that is, by articulating individualism. Analysts who are optimistic about human nature see the human security cause as one best served by coming together in a social movement, around a common interest or cause, that is, by articulating collectivism.

### **Human Security: The Nurturist Discourses**

The muster of analytical languages does not stop here. In addition to the naturist ones, there are those discourses that articulate the sense that we are not essentially anything. These analysts tend to think that we are what we learn to be.

The main discourse here is built on the assumption that the material nature of the nurturing environment is what most directly determines world affairs. Marxists critique the whole three-dimensional reading of world affairs presented above, and every one of the particular accounts it provides. Marxists see the whole 'naturist' reading as a bourgeois smokescreen. They see the most basic division in world affairs as being the one between the owners and managers of the means of production, and the workers who sell their labour for wages. This division, they say, cuts across all states, all markets and all forms of social identity (Sayer 1991).

The concept of human security cast in Marxist terms highlights the plight of the proletariat and the peasantry. Marxists see human security as a possibility only when advanced communism has been achieved, that is, when capitalism has become so exploitative that the workers of the world have risen up and overthrown their owners and managers, have dismantled the states, the markets and the civil societies that characterise late capitalism, and have established

a plethora of technologically advanced, intensely democratic, radically humane communes.

Nurturist discourses can also be built on the assumption that it is the mentalist nature of the nurturing environment that matters most, not just the materialist one, and human security couched in these terms is constructivist. It entails talk in terms of whatever we think we can think into being. Since we learn what to think about the world, we also learn to reproduce our traditions in the world, including those traditions that manifest as this particular form of world affairs (and these particular forms of human security). Since these traditions are mentalist ones, there is no reason, constructivists say, not to see all aspects of world affairs as being amenable to deconstruction and to reconstruction. This includes its security aspects (Katzenstein et al. 1998; Ruggie 1998; Onuf 1989).

Human security in neo-Marxist terms is a mixed materialist/mentalist discourse. It entails global awareness not only of the fact of capitalist exploitation and alienation, but also of the ongoing attempts by the global bourgeoisie to confound such awareness by crafting global consciousness in self-serving ways. It means global awareness of the international division of labour, of the hierarchy of production and control that this represents, and of the need to confound the hegemonic patterns of behaviour that make these possible (Gill 1993; Cox 1995).

With the mentalist approach we complete our overview of human security. It only remains to emphasise that the nature/nurture dichotomy is not a dichotomy at all, and only appears as such because this is how analysts themselves think and speak. In practice, analysts articulate more than one assumption about human nature or nurture. Since they are not supposed to be making assumptions at all (their Rationalism precludes it), they tend to avoid the topic altogether. This deals with the issue of incommensurability, but only by a sleight of mind.

## **Conclusion**

To cast global security in terms of human security, we have to account for the latter in a way that is both comprehensive and systematic. This involves more than making a simple matrix, however, or a multi-factor list.

The key to such an account is Rationalism. Once we understand the construction of the Rationalist way of being and knowing, we can see how it creates non-Rationalist alternatives, and we can see why these must be canvassed as well. We can also see how Rationalism is articulated in terms of assumptions about our essential human nature and the essential nature of our nurturing practices, why we have the analytical languages we do and how they stand in relation to each other.

With this key it is possible to describe, explain and prescribe for human security in an inclusive and coherent way. This in turns allows us to make it the basis for a comprehensive and systematic concept of global security. Because such a mapping strategy is comprehensive, it shows us why there is more to human security than global development (Paris 2001). It shows why the conventional concept of security is so limited and limiting.

Because such a mapping strategy is systematic, it shows us how to turn the Rationalist accounts of human security from an unstructured heap into a systematic stack. This allows us to relate the conventional views of security

(mostly military and diplomatic) to other views (like those that pertain to market making, civic identity, class struggle, the environment, gender construction, cultural difference and sacral context). It also allows us to demonstrate why the concept of human security is of more benefit to policymakers than the conventional, state-centric concept of security. Finally, it allows us to locate Rationalism itself in the context of the various meta-critiques, and shows us how to compensate for its limits and distortions. Within the rubric of Rationalism, human security remains susceptible to the same limits and distortions as any other expression of this particular mindset. For example, it must deal with the problem of reflexivity (that is, the difficulty of establishing a secure ground on which Rationalism might be built). It must also deal with the problem that the post-structuralists highlight (that is, the problem that any analytic language presents because it is a language and, as such, a source of radical bias and misrepresentation).

Without an attempt to transgress the limits Rationalism sets, and to compensate for the distortions it creates, the illusions that the Rationalist perspective on human security creates will prevail unchallenged, and its use as the basis for our understanding of global security will be compromised. Our strategic assessments will suffer, and so will our policy judgements. Salutary here are memories of the spectacular failure on the part of the US to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union, the hyper-rationalist way in which its state makers studied their Cold War adversary, and how this helped cause that failure. Salutary, too, is US policy toward contemporary China, where US state makers are in danger of creating the very threat they fear most, that is, by behaving as if there was one, and by failing to appreciate the extent to which Chinese state makers are still Taoist as well as Maoist.

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