

Blurry Boundary between Peacebuilding and R2P

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Abstract

Policy practitioners and scholars have tended to treat the responsibility to protect (R2P) and peacebuilding as separate domains. This chapter, in contrast, argues that these two domains are more closely connected than both the policy discourse and much of the academic literature would suggest. Peacebuilding appears to be an integral part of R2P, and peacebuilding strategies aimed at reducing the risks of conflict relapse are core strategies for preventing atrocity crimes. Further, the use of coercive military force to stop an imminent or actual atrocity crime creates its own requirement for post-crisis peacebuilding. Thus, closer analysis of the relationship between peacebuilding and R2P would benefit both practitioners and scholars.

Keywords: responsibility to protect, peacebuilding, United Nations, mass atrocities, post-conflict reconstruction, Libya

Policy practitioners and scholars have tended to treat the responsibility to protect (R2P) and peacebuilding as separate domains.¹ There are, indeed, important differences between the two concepts: peacebuilding normally refers to creating the conditions for lasting peace and preventing the recurrence of large-scale violence in countries emerging from conflict,² whereas R2P focuses on averting mass atrocities. In this chapter, however, I argue that these two domains are more closely connected than the policy discourse and much of the academic literature suggest, and that closer analysis of the relationship between peacebuilding and R2P would benefit both practitioners and scholars.

Some of these links are clear. Because mass atrocities are most likely to occur in the context of armed conflict, for instance, successful peacebuilding should help to reduce the incidence of such crimes.³ The connections, however, run deeper. As we shall see, studies of R2P and peacebuilding often produce very similar policy recommendations, including calls to strengthen justice systems, conduct fair elections, and address underlying grievances in vulnerable societies. Strangely, however, these and other links between R2P and peacebuilding remain largely underexplored.

One explanation for this relative silence may be the manner in which R2P gained prominence. The connections between R2P and peacebuilding were explicit in the landmark 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which presented a tripartite model of R2P consisting of a responsibility to *prevent* mass atrocities, a responsibility to *react* if such atrocities are imminent or ongoing, and a responsibility to *rebuild* after an intervention.⁴ The responsibility to rebuild, moreover, included a duty ‘to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with

recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert'.⁵ This was, in effect, a call for post-crisis peacebuilding. However, when the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (p. 510) gave its formal endorsement to the R2P concept in 2005, it focused on the responsibilities to prevent and to react, but did not mention the responsibility to rebuild.⁶ Since then, the UN Secretary-General has issued several reports and statements on R2P and peacebuilding, respectively, but has rarely treated them in the same document, or considered either concept in relation to the other. This separation, I shall argue, is unwarranted on both conceptual and practical grounds.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. First, I provide a brief overview of peacebuilding and its purposes. Second, I examine the ICISS report and the responsibility to rebuild. Third, I contend that since 2005 R2P and peacebuilding have been treated as two solitudes within the UN. Fourth, I make the case that these two domains not only deal with overlapping issues, but are contingent on each other. Finally, I use the 2011 intervention in Libya to illustrate the dangers of treating R2P and peacebuilding as separate issues.

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding entered the policy lexicon of the UN in 1992 with the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*, which defined it as 'action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'.⁷ At that time, immediately following the Cold War, the UN was becoming involved in several complex missions in countries that were just emerging from civil conflicts, including Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. In contrast to the traditional peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era, which had typically involved the deployment of lightly armed military forces to oversee ceasefires or to separate former combatants, these new missions were more complex and multifaceted. They involved demobilizing former belligerents, helping to draft new constitutions, training police and judges, overseeing elections and the formation of new national governments, supporting basic services such as water, sanitation, and health, transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions, and economic reforms, among other things.⁸ By 2000, peacebuilding was established as one of the UN's principal peace and security activities. In that year, the report of a major panel on UN peace operations chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi reaffirmed the value of peacebuilding, which it defined as 'activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war'.⁹

Viewed from another perspective, the rise of peacebuilding reflected and responded to the shifting patterns of violent conflict in the world. The vast majority of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been civil (intra-state), not international (interstate), wars. In 2014, the last year for which full data are available, only one of the 40 armed conflicts underway was interstate.¹⁰ Whereas consolidating peace at the end of an interstate war may

require little more than a ceasefire and international monitoring of a buffer area between the formerly warring parties, peacebuilding at the end of a (p. 511) civil war tends to be more demanding and complex. Groups that have recently been killing each other in intra-state conflicts typically continue living within the same borders, thus creating a need for different kinds of assistance, such as institutional reform and reconciliation programmes.

Peacebuilding has also been in demand because countries emerging from civil wars are at higher risk of backsliding into conflict, and of falling into a pattern of chronic violence and state failure. Indeed, *repeat* civil wars are now the most common type of conflict. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 90 per cent of new wars erupted in countries that had previously experienced a civil conflict, a higher proportion than in previous decades.¹¹ Given the serious risk of conflict relapse, peacebuilding has therefore sought not only to transform fragile ceasefires into durable peace, but also to break self-perpetuating cycles of violence.

Responsibility to Rebuild, 2001–2005

The ICISS was created to provide advice on something other than peacebuilding: namely, how to respond to ‘gross and systemic violations of human rights’.¹² As noted earlier, the Commission recommended a three-part model of R2P based on the responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild. This represented, in the words of Carsten Stahn, a ‘multi-phased conception of responsibility’ that envisaged a failure of prevention triggering the need for a reaction, and a reaction producing the need for rebuilding.¹³ The ICISS was particularly explicit about the link between intervention and post-crisis rebuilding: ‘[I]f military intervention action is taken—because of a breakdown or abdication of a state’s own capacity or authority in discharging its “responsibility to protect”—there should be a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable development.’¹⁴ Part of the rationale for rebuilding was the imperative of preventing the recurrence of mass atrocities, including by addressing the underlying sources of such violence: ‘The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the conditions that prompted the military action do not repeat themselves or simply resurface.’¹⁵ The report also specified a number of focus areas for rebuilding efforts, including:

After setting out this vision, the ICISS report then addressed several concerns that might emerge during the rebuilding phase, including the possibility that the (p. 512) ‘continued presence by the intervener in the target country in the follow-up period’ might undermine the sovereignty of the target state.¹⁷ Any suspension of sovereignty, the Commission explained, would need to be temporary and *de facto*, not *de jure*, because the goal of rebuilding must be to ‘sustain forms of government compatible with the sovereignty of the state in which the enforcement has occurred’. A second concern was that local actors might develop an ‘unhealthy dependency on the intervening authority’, which would ‘stultify the regrowth of local institutions and the economy’, and that a sudden influx of large sums of money could

have ‘distorting economic effects’ on fragile economies. Finally, the Commission emphasized that a ‘process of devolving responsibility back to the local community’ was ‘essential to maintain the legitimacy of intervention itself’.

All of these points would have been very familiar to students of post-conflict peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the ICISS’s discussion introduced one new element: the notion that interveners also had a moral obligation—a responsibility—to conduct post-crisis rebuilding.¹⁸ Many scholars and policy practitioners, going back to *The Agenda for Peace* in 1992, had highlighted the importance of peacebuilding in states emerging from conflicts, but the ICISS’s portrayal of peacebuilding as a post-intervention *duty* was novel.¹⁹

Four years would pass from the publication of the ICISS report in 2001 until the UN General Assembly approved a version of R2P at its 2005 World Summit, which affirmed that all states have a ‘responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ and that the international community should help individual states to carry out this responsibility, including by building the capacity of states to fulfil their protection responsibilities.²⁰ UN members also indicated that they were ‘prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate or national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’ from atrocity crimes.²¹

However, there was no mention of the responsibility to rebuild. Of the three elements that had comprised the ICISS’s conception of R2P, only the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react were included in the General Assembly’s 2005 formulation. Some suggest this outcome may have been due to a ‘fear of the tremendous costs attached to a rebuilding commitment’,²² but one person who was directly involved in the negotiations of 2005 document, Allan Rock, then Canada’s permanent representative to the UN, offers a different explanation: ‘Achieving a consensus on the contents of paragraphs 138 and 139 [dealing with R2P] was a difficult, delicate process, and some negotiators concluded that mounting an additional argument in an already fraught process for the explicit inclusion of the responsibility to rebuild might have prolonged and further complicated that process.’²³ He adds: ‘It would also have meant increased attention to those cases where intervention would already have occurred. Given the hyper-sensitivity to intervention on the part of many member states, inviting such a result was not seen as good negotiating strategy.’²⁴

On the other hand, the more familiar language of post-conflict peacebuilding appeared elsewhere in the World Summit document, which called for the creation of a (p. 513) Peacebuilding Commission (and an associated Peacebuilding Fund) to serve as a new ‘dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the

foundation for sustainable development'.²⁵ Thus, while the World Summit dealt with both R2P and peacebuilding, it did so separately, and gave no indication that these two subjects might be connected.

R2P and Peacebuilding: Two Solitudes, 2005–Present

The estrangement of peacebuilding and R2P at the UN continued in the ensuing years. This was clearly visible in the UN Secretary-General's periodic reports on both subjects, which covered much of the same material, but almost never acknowledged the overlapping content of these two domains.

Between 2009 and 2014, the Secretary-General issued four reports on peacebuilding, providing updates on UN activities in this area and discussing the principal challenges facing societies emerging from war.²⁶ The 2009 report, for example, highlighted issues such as the importance of 'national ownership' of peacebuilding processes.²⁷ It also pointed to a number of activities of particular importance in peacebuilding, including support to:

Many of the same themes—including the emphasis on legitimate, accountable, capable, and inclusive governance as a foundation for durable peace—also appeared in the three subsequent peacebuilding reports.²⁹

By contrast, the Secretary-General's six reports on R2P have focused on preventing and reacting to atrocity crimes.³⁰ The 2014 document, for instance, outlined various (p. 514) ways in which external actors could assist states 'in fulfilling their responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'.³¹ However, when it came to providing advice on how best to accomplish this goal, the document echoed the language and substance of the Secretary-General's reports on peacebuilding. Specifically, it underlined the importance of fostering 'effective, legitimate and inclusive governance'³² and 'participatory and accountable political institutions, respect for the rule of law and equal access to justice, and mechanisms for the fair and transparent management of economic resources and assets'.³³ It also called for strengthening the rule of law and security sector reform, independent and impartial judicial institutions, and mechanisms facilitating local dialogue and reconciliation.³⁴ The resemblance was uncanny. Much of what counted as R2P appeared to be peacebuilding by another name.

Table 27.1 UN Secretary-General reports on R2P

Year of report	Words	Mentions of peacebuilding as an activity	Mentions of the Peacebuilding Commission or the Peacebuilding Fund
2014	9,820	0	2

Year of report	Words	Mentions of peacebuilding as an activity	Mentions of the Peacebuilding Commission or the Peacebuilding Fund
2013	8,427	1	0
2012	8,559	0	0
2011	6,303	1	1
2010	3,769	0	0
2009	16,767	3	4
TOTAL	53,645	5	7
Average (per report)	8,941	0.8	1.2

Perhaps these similarities were to be expected. If, as noted previously, atrocity crimes are most likely to take place during armed conflicts, efforts to transform a ceasefire into a stable and lasting peace—the essence of peacebuilding—should help to reduce the incidence of mass atrocities. Peacebuilding, in this sense, can be simultaneously post-conflict and preventive, because it seeks to prevent the resurgence of violence in countries emerging from war.

Considerably more puzzling, however, was the fact that R2P reports barely ever referred to peacebuilding, and vice versa, even though they covered much of the same material, raised many of the same concerns, and made similar policy recommendations. Table 27.1 shows the number of references to either peacebuilding or the Peacebuilding Commission (and the related Peacebuilding Fund) in the Secretary-General’s six reports on R2P. These reports were long, averaging nearly 9,000 words each, but they barely mentioned peacebuilding at all. This was also true, in the converse, for the (p. 515) Secretary-General’s reports on peacebuilding. As Table 27.2 indicates, these four reports totalled almost 40,000 words, but included no mentions of R2P at all (and only two references to the related concept of civilian protection³⁵).

Table 27.2 UN Secretary-General reports on peacebuilding

Year of report	Words	Mentions of R2P	Mentions of civilian protection
2014	8,707	0	1
2012	8,915	0	0
2010	8,956	0	0
2009	13,398	0	1
TOTAL	39,976	0	2

For the UN Secretary-General, R2P and peacebuilding seemed almost to occupy parallel but disconnected universes. Only once, in all ten of these reports, did he refer to a direct connection between these two domains. In 2009, he wrote: ‘Post-trauma peacebuilding offers a critical point of assistance relating to the responsibility to protect. The surest predictor of genocide is past genocide.’³⁶ But, rather than pursuing this observation further, he merely added: ‘Possibilities should be explored for greater involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission in helping States to fulfil their obligations relating to the responsibility to protect.’ This was hardly a rousing call to action—and, as it turned out, the Peacebuilding Commission never took up his suggestion.

Part of the explanation for this state of affairs may have been simple path dependence—a separation set in motion by the General Assembly’s handling of these issues in 2005, which not only treated the two domains as disconnected, but also produced different institutional mechanisms to implement the R2P and peacebuilding agendas. The new Peacebuilding Commission, for instance, avoided involvement in preventive action and instead focused on countries that were emerging from conflict. Nor was there any significant interest, particularly among developing countries, in shifting the Commission towards a more conflict-prevention or crisis-management role. As Necla Tschirgi and Richard Ponzio note: ‘It was not coincidental that the first two countries on the [Peacebuilding Commission’s] agenda were Sierra Leone and Burundi, already in the latter phases of their transitions from war.’³⁷ Similarly, those appointed into the new position of Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect have worked within the framework established by both the 2005 General Assembly resolution and the Secretary-General’s subsequent reports, which, as we have seen, have focused on prevention and reaction, while paying little attention to post-conflict peacebuilding. Political prudence may have further reinforced this tendency: in spite (p. 516) of the unanimous endorsement of the 2005 General Assembly decision, the consensus to approve the R2P principles and to create the Peacebuilding Commission was fragile, with many states expressing scepticism about one or the other initiative, or both. In

that context, the idea of extending R2P or the Commission into new areas may have been judged politically risky, particularly in the formative years after 2005, when both initiatives were just being implemented. Whatever the explanation, the result was a distinct and enduring separation of these two domains.

R2P Presupposes Peacebuilding

Thus far I have argued that preventing mass atrocities entails many of the same imperatives as peacebuilding, even if the UN has tended to treat them as separate subjects. These imperatives include the promotion of inter-communal dialogue, effective and legitimate justice mechanisms, and inclusive, participatory government institutions in internally-divided societies. To the extent that such actions take place in countries that previously experienced large-scale violence, they simultaneously advance the goals of both R2P and peacebuilding.

However, the connection between R2P and peacebuilding runs even deeper. Although R2P privileges peaceful over coercive measures, the responsibility to react includes the possible use of armed force by international actors to protect civilian populations from atrocity crimes under certain circumstances including, as the 2005 General Assembly resolution stated, if the government of the affected country is ‘manifestly failing to protect their populations’ and if peaceful measures prove inadequate.³⁸ But what comes *after* this type of intervention? For many scholars, there are important normative and legal questions at stake, including whether interveners are morally obliged to undertake post-intervention peacebuilding—or, put another way, is there a *jus post bellum*?³⁹ This question remains unresolved. As Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh have pointed out, international law does not provide a clear answer.⁴⁰ Nor has moral theorizing yielded any consensus about whether outside interveners have specific duties to rebuild the target countries following an intervention.⁴¹

These normative debates are fascinating, but they may inadvertently obscure a more direct connection between the responsibility to react and peacebuilding—a connection rooted in the ‘strategic logic’ of humanitarian intervention, rather than international law or morality. The strategic logic of any military operation is the assumed or expected relationship between the use of armed force and its desired outcome.⁴² Such assumptions underpin all interventions, including those with the humanitarian goal of averting or ending atrocity crimes. To date, however, there has been relatively little analysis of the strategic logic of humanitarian intervention itself. Most scholarship in this area has focused on the normative and procedural questions of whether such operations should be conducted and under what circumstances, rather than the more practical question of how such operations are expected to achieve their stated goals.

(p. 517) A closer look at this practical question reveals a number of peculiarities in the strategic logic of humanitarian intervention.⁴³ One such peculiarity—which I call the end-state problem—bears directly on the relationship between R2P and peacebuilding, and can be

summarized as follows: when outside forces set out to secure a population under threat and succeed, they are likely to face the dilemma of deciding how to end their mission without recreating the same threatening conditions that prompted military action in the first place. Establishing a protected 'safe area', for example, may provide immediate security for an at-risk population, but perhaps only for as long as the interveners remain present. In some circumstances, removing this presence could be tantamount to placing the endangered people back at risk, contrary to both the original purpose of the mission and the principles of R2P.

What, then, is to be done in such a situation? One option might be to continue the international operation indefinitely—in effect, to provide a semi-permanent protective presence. However, the intervening power would almost certainly face demands from the protected population for other forms of assistance in this case, and they might even find it necessary to provide 'transitional administration', or to temporarily govern the territory—as was the case in Kosovo, for example, after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed that territory in 1999. One way or another, if interveners remain to provide ongoing protection, their preponderant power is likely to make them the *de facto* authority of the territory, which might in turn produce pressures to provide other kinds of help—ranging from the provision of relief supplies to the direct administration of territory—all of which are forms of post-intervention peacebuilding.

A second option after an endangered populace has been secured might be to eliminate the source of the threat against them, thus allowing the interveners to depart without placing the population back at risk. If, however, the threat had come from the government of the country in question, which is likely in the case of an uninvited foreign intervention to prevent atrocities, eliminating this threat might itself entail regime change. This is obviously a much more expansive and ambitious undertaking than the initial goal of stopping an imminent or actual atrocity crime, and it might include assistance with the transition to new political arrangements and security during the interim period—in other words, peacebuilding.

A third option for interveners might be to negotiate a settlement to the crisis without removing the party that posed the initial threat—most likely, the offending government. However, this would almost certainly require ongoing protection for at-risk groups, because the former 'perpetrators' would retain their ability to inflict new harm. The terms of a new political settlement, in other words, would need to be guaranteed, probably by outside parties. Yet again, this would represent a more expansive mission than simply averting an imminent or actual atrocity crime: a long-term international commitment to peacebuilding.

In sum, while the use of military force for R2P purposes may be separable from peacebuilding in normative and legal theory, this separation disappears when one considers the practical requirements of humanitarian intervention. Regardless of whether there is (p. 518) an obligation to rebuild, some form of peacebuilding appears to be a strategic necessity in the aftermath of R2P interventions. In this sense, R2P presupposes peacebuilding.

Chaos in Libya: A Cautionary Tale

Events in Libya have demonstrated the dangers of failing to recognize the integral connection between R2P and peacebuilding.⁴⁴ The international intervention of March 2011, authorized by the UN Security Council using the language of R2P, quickly succeeded in driving the forces of Libya's then President Muammar Gadhafi away from the city of Benghazi, which he had threatened to assault. At that point, however, the intervening coalition faced the end-state problem: namely, how to terminate the air operation without placing the residents of Benghazi (and of other populated centres) back at risk. Their apparent solution was to provide further support to the Libyan rebels, who gradually gained the capability to counter-attack Gadhafi's forces, now with the assistance of outside air forces, coordinated by NATO.⁴⁵ By late August, the Libyan capital was captured. A few weeks later, the rebels located and killed Gadhafi and destroyed the remnants of his regime.

While the Libyan intervention raised a number of troubling questions,⁴⁶ in the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the international peacebuilding strategy following the collapse of the Gadhafi regime—or, perhaps more to the point, the *absence* of such a strategy. Apart from a small UN advisory mission, Libya was effectively 'left to fend for itself'.⁴⁷ The new transitional government had no coercive tools at its disposal. It was almost entirely dependent on the willingness of different militia groups to comply and enforce the new order, but these militias lacked trust in each other. Their mistrust grew into rivalry, which ultimately became hostility and open fighting. The lessons learned in so many previous post-conflict circumstances—that security vacuums must be filled and private actors demobilized and disarmed, particularly in the period immediately following the war when the willingness to build new institutional arrangements is typically at its maximum—seemed to have been forgotten.

These lessons were apparently ignored by NATO and by the individual members of the intervention coalition, who seemed quite eager to declare their mission accomplished and to disengage from Libya as quickly as possible. Although the victorious Libyan rebels also initially rejected the idea of foreign troops on their territory, their position started to change when the country's security began to deteriorate. Some speculate that they might have agreed to a small peacekeeping force—at least to maintain security in Tripoli and to create political space for the establishment of a new Libyan government and national security forces—if such a force had been offered, but we will never know. Christopher Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini estimate that fewer than 5,000 international troops may have been required to secure the Libyan capital, but that Western countries had no interest in exploring these options: 'Had Western governments themselves been more committed to deploying such a force, it is very difficult (p. 519) to imagine that they would not have been able to arrange an invitation from the Libyan government under these conditions, especially for a more limited force.'⁴⁸ In any event, Libyan authorities' appeals for help grew louder as time passed, but to little avail.⁴⁹ 'Repeated Libyan requests for assistance in restoring security were brushed off', wrote the

Washington Post three years later.⁵⁰ The result was a slow slide towards a new civil war and the gradual disintegration of the country, with potentially grave consequences for local, regional, and international security. As NATO's then Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, publicly acknowledged in September 2014: '[S]een retrospectively, I think the international community as such did too little, too late to help the new authorities in Libya build a new nation.'⁵¹

The intervening countries' apparent failure to anticipate the importance of stabilizing the Libyan capital after the collapse of the Gadhafi regime seems like negligence in retrospect, given the lessons of civil war termination and peacebuilding elsewhere. What initially appeared to be a great success for R2P—the prevention of an imminent mass atrocity in Benghazi—ended up looking more like a Pyrrhic victory. What if, instead, the very notion of R2P had been understood to include post-intervention peacebuilding, not as an optional add-on but as an integral part of the doctrine, just as the ICISS had suggested? If so, it might have been more difficult to invoke R2P to justify an intervention without also acknowledging the likely need for peacebuilding afterwards. Of course, the interveners might have reached the same decisions, walking away from Libya after the rebel victory, but at least they might have been called upon to explain their peacebuilding plans. No such explanations are required, however, if R2P and peacebuilding continue to be treated as separate domains.

Conclusion

The tendency of policy-makers in the UN and elsewhere to treat R2P and peacebuilding as separate domains is no longer sustainable. As I have argued in this chapter, this separation can be traced back to the General Assembly's decision in 2005 to endorse a version of R2P that included only two of the three elements recommended by the ICISS in 2001—the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react—while sidelining the responsibility to rebuild. Although new peacebuilding institutions were created at the same time, R2P and peacebuilding continued to be treated as separate policy areas within the UN. This is clearly visible in the Secretary-General's periodic reports on R2P and peacebuilding, which have paradoxically addressed many of the same issues and made similar recommendations without exploring—or even fully acknowledging—the close relationship between these two domains. Much of the academic literature, too, has treated peacebuilding and R2P separately. With the notable exception of those who investigate the *jus post bellum*, few scholars of R2P have delved deeply into the literature on peacebuilding—or vice versa.

(p. 520) I have taken these observations one step further: not only do these two subjects intersect, but peacebuilding appears to be an integral part of R2P. As we have seen, peacebuilding strategies aimed at reducing the risks of conflict relapse are core strategies for preventing atrocity crimes. Further, the use of coercive military force to stop an imminent or actual atrocity crime creates its own requirement for post-crisis peacebuilding. To treat these

two domains as separate, in other words, is not just conceptually flawed. It is potentially risky, particularly if decision-makers contemplate military intervention without simultaneously considering the need for follow-on peacebuilding.

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Notes:

(1.) The author wrote this article prior to becoming an advisor to the Government of Canada. Its content does not necessarily reflect the views of the government.

(2.) Peacebuilding is sometimes defined more broadly, but most often refers to *post-conflict* activities. See the definitions provided in what follows.

(3.) Valentino 2014; Ulfelder and Valentino 2008.

- (4.) ICISS 2001.
- (5.) ICISS 2001, p. xi.
- (6.) United Nations 2005. The document is discussed in greater detail in what follows.
- (7.) Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 11.
- (8.) Paris 2004.
- (9.) United Nations 2000, para. 13.
- (10.) Themnér and Wallenstein 2015.
- (11.) Walter 2010, p. 2.
- (12.) ICISS 2001, p. vii.
- (13.) Stahn 2007, p. 103.
- (14.) ICISS 2001, p. 39.
- (15.) ICISS 2001, p. 39.
- (16.) ICISS 2001, pp. 40–3.
- (17.) The quotations in this paragraph are from ICISS 2001, pp. 44–5.
- (18.) The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change echoed the ICISS on this point in its December 2004 report, stating that R2P includes a responsibility for ‘rebuilding shattered societies’ (United Nations 2004, para. 201).
- (19.) The responsibility to rebuild—according to both the ICISS formulation and *jus post bellum* arguments (see the discussion later in this chapter)—falls upon states that participate in military intervention, whereas the responsibilities to prevent and to react are general duties shared by all states. Peacebuilding, by contrast, has typically been regarded as an important activity, but not a moral or legal duty.
- (20.) United Nations 2005, paras. 138–9. In this chapter, I use ‘atrocities crimes’ as shorthand for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
- (21.) United Nations 2005, paras. 138–9.
- (22.) Schnabel 2012, p. 57.
- (23.) Personal interview, 25 February 2015.

(24.) Personal interview, 25 February 2015. Rock's interpretation was confirmed by an African diplomat who was also part of the 2005 negotiations, but who wishes to remain anonymous because of his current position (personal interview, 26 February 2015).

(25.) United Nations 2005, para. 97. The same document also called for the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund along with a permanently staffed 'peacebuilding support office' to serve the Peacebuilding Commission and Fund (paras. 103–4).

(26.) United Nations 2009a, 2010b, 2012a, and 2014b.

(27.) United Nations 2009a, paras. 7 and 12.

(28.) United Nations 2009a, para. 17.

(29.) See, for example, United Nations 2014b, paras. 27–54; United Nations 2012a, paras. 35–51; and United Nations 2010b, paras. 26–31.

(30.) United Nations 2009b, 2010a, 2011, 2012b, 2013, and 2014a.

(31.) United Nations 2014a, p. 1.

(32.) United Nations 2014a, para. 39.

(33.) United Nations 2014a, para. 41.

(34.) United Nations 2014a, paras. 45, 48, and 53.

(35.) On civilian protection, see Paul D. Williams's chapter in this volume.

(36.) United Nations 2009b, para. 48.

(37.) Tschirgi and Ponzio 2015.

(38.) United Nations 2005, para. 139.

(39.) Bellamy 2008.

(40.) Gheciu and Welsh 2009.

(41.) See, for example, Pattison 2015; Robinson 2013.

(42.) On the relationship between R2P and the use of force, see also Taylor B. Seybolt's chapter in this volume.

(43.) This section is based on Paris 2014.

(44.) For a description of the events leading up to the international intervention in Libya in March 2011, see Chapter 41 by Adams in this volume.

(45.) See Paris 2014, pp. 581–2.

(46.) The most contentious question was whether the NATO-led coalition overstepped the terms of its civilian-protection mandate in resolution 1973 by working to overthrow the Gadhafi regime.

(47.) Cohen 2012.

(48.) Chivvis and Martini 2014, pp. 71–2 and 76.

(49.) Vandiver 2014.

(50.) *The Washington Post* 2014.

(51.) Rasmussen 2014.