srdjan vucetic

Sumantra Bose. Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention.

London: Oxford University Press, 2002.

In Bosnia After Dayton, Sumantra Bose, a professor in conflict management at LSE, provides a comprehensive analysis of Bosnia’s post-Dayton political system. This book is noteworthy for two major reasons. First, it is probably the most level-headed account of the post-war international involvement in Bosnia in English to date. Second, it cogently uncovers various contradictions of the twin processes of state-building and democratization in international protectorates, which are fast becoming a salient feature of world politics today.

Bose builds much of his analysis on the premise that the conflict in Bosnia was “about antagonistic national identities and an underlying dispute over the legitimate unit of sovereignty” (p. 249, also see p. 4, 47). Most Serbs and Croats – i.e., two of the three constituent communities – continue to dispute the state’s legitimacy. While we certainly cannot speak of “ancient hatreds”, we must recognize that differences among the three groups are not just the product of the last war. In one example, Bose strongly suggests that the famous high rates of ethnic inter-marriage are dangerously decontextualized and overblown (p. 16-7; fn. 23). In Bosnia, tolerance and hate are two sides of the same coin. 

The focus of the book, however, is on the “gigantic” international effort to build Bosnia and democratize it. Between 1996 and 2000, $5.1 billion were poured into the country, which qualifies as the largest per capita reconstruction effort in history. The result is a s  country with the highest government minister per capita (140/3 million) ratio in the world. The so-called post-Dayton Bosnia – “a state by international design and of international design” (p. 60). For non-specialists, the emergent political system in post-Dayton Bosnia looks like a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Here is why: Bosnia is currently the most decentralized state in the world and probably the most heavily bureaucratized. ‘Dayton’, the critical word that refers to the peace agreement that ended the war in 1995, introduced a constitutional model of shared (also “cascading” and “layered”) sovereignty designed to provide equality and parity representation of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (p. 52, 62). So we get an institutional maze: post-Dayton Bosnia is essentially a tri-national confederal union which consists of 2 Entities – Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation – and 1 special district. The confederation is responsible for things such as foreign affairs and air traffic. Monetary policy and the critical Constitutional Court are controlled by the internationals. The Entities run the rest of show, including things such as defence and the cultivation of the respective “special relationships” with the neighbours – Croatia and Serbia. The Bosniak-Croat Federation – the bigger entity and the fundamental building block of Dayton – is also divided into 10 cantons, which run things such education and police. The lowest level of the government consists of 2 city administrations and 145 municipalities

Wherein, then, lies the supreme authority? The answer is none of the above. The High Representative, who is a foreigner, has the final word: he can make decisions (as most executives are semi-paralyzed) and pass new laws (as legislatures are mostly “talking shops”).  But he can also dismiss elected officials, including Entity presidents.

For this reason, my first-door neighbour in Sarajevo calls him the “king”; for The Economist, the HR is just a “proconsul.” While one can argue, as Bose does, that democratization is at odds with state-building and that state-building is ultimately more important (p. 90), it clear that the international community sometimes promotes democracy in ways that are no doubt authoritarian.

In this respect, the international community can regarded as the fourth constituent community in Bosnia (p. 6, 267). If this is so, then one can suggest that Bosnia’s legitimacy is not just largely a result of “juridical recognition” (p. 25, also see p. 214), but it is derived from the strongest constituent community of all, which for Bose, is a “shorthand for Western governments and multilateral institutions controlled by those governments (p. 6). In a sense, Bose might have also added that Bosnia is a state for the international community. This point can also be derived from the “experimental” nature of post-Dayton Bosnia. For the international community, Bosnia is useful testing ground for trying out new “methods and mechanisms” of conflict management.

Bose is exceptionally patient with the Dayton morass and the reader will learn in detail about every organ of the state at every level. The author also shows how in order to avoid “hard” partition, the Bosnian state had to swallow the bitter pill of consocationalism again: “consociational rules and norms are built into every aspect and every level of the Dayton system” (p. 216).[i] This polysyllable usually describes democracies in which extensive power-sharing (reflected in strict parity, veto rights, grand coalitions, segmental autonomy) is introduced to build and stabilize divided societies (e.g. Lebanon, Northern Ireland). Bosnia’s PR electoral system, for example, is supposed to both reflect and support consociationalism (p. 217).

Bose demonstrates how Dayton is turning into the “permanent framework of the Bosnian state, albeit with some reforms and modification” (p. 243). Using the same example again, the international community pressured Bosnians to modify its consciational electoral framework with multiple-vote amendments which was supposed not only to make Bosnia’s democracy more responsive and more representative, but also to promote political moderates (p. 218-241). In terms of the underpinning theory behind the electoral system, it can be said that Bosnia switched allegiance from Arend Lijphart to Donald Horowitz (there is no evidence that the new system brings more moderation). Other theoretical debates overviewed and discussed by Bose include institutional design and partition. When it comes to the international policy in Bosnia, the author finds, theoretical propositions are generally too abstract. In the partition debate, in Bose uses considerable historical and comparative variation (esp. with regards to South Asia) to take apart the arguments made by Mearsheimer, Van Evera, Pape, and Kaufmann. The author’s critique of Kaufman’s use of the concept of (societal) security dilemma is particularly inspiring.

The book offers an exceptionally in-depth case study: the city of Mostar. If the Bosniak-Croat Federation is the architectural foundation of post-Dayton Bosnia than Mostar is its cornerstone (or, a Bosnia’s “microcosm” and its “litmus test,” as Bose calls it). Upon readings Bose’s account, it appears that this cornerstone was placed in a quicksand. Mostar, once a primer for intercommunal life for the region, is now commonly seen as Bosnia’s most divided city. Despite the international efforts to build the common organs of government, the city’s Croat community continues to run all of its affairs separately.

There are three major omissions in the book. First, the political economy of state-building gets only a nod (p. 272). One can argue that inflexible and rushed economic policies of stabilization, liberalization, and privatization have greatly contributed to the “comatose state” of post-Dayton Bosnia. Second, the international policy in Bosnia is also carried through NGOs and civil society-building, which Bose acknowledges but does not explore (p. 91). Finally, the author provides no discussion of the multiethnic Brcko District – a neutral unit of governance run by an international supervisor, which falls beyond the control of the Entities and under the exclusive sovereignty of the Bosnian state. This omission is regrettable as Brcko is often lauded as a model of economic and democratic reform not only in Bosnia and regarded as an antipode of sorts to Mostar. But this is a testament to the challenges of the Dayton maze. Even an exceptionally wry student of comparative political institutions like Bose falls short of completing its map. 

The book is loosely structured, almost as a collection of essays. The writing is elegant and occasional excursions in personal anecdotes, literature, and film are refreshing. Even though all of his sources are in English, Bose is impressively intimate with the local knowledge on war and post-war, which greatly benefits his analysis.

How can Bosnia be saved? Bose offers several suggestions. First come the usual suspects: promoting refugee return, stopping the brain drain, fighting corruption, etc. (p. 32-8, 273-4). Second, institution-building should preceded elections and its corollary – the support of particular leaders and factions deemed to be politically moderate. Third, the habitual “opaqueness” of the bodies responsible for implementing the international policy in Bosnia should be addressed. Fourth, the legitimacy of the Bosnian state should not be seen as a zero-sum problem (p. 47). Bose approvingly cites Roger Brubaker who argues that it is the “nationalizing state” that frames entitlements as zero-sum. For Brubaker, there are three main forms of nationalism: nationalizing nationalisms and homeland/ transborder nationalisms call the shots in a shooting gallery where minority/diasporic nationalisms play the role of the duck. Too bad, then, that all three nationalisms in Bosnia are minority nationalisms (p. 259). The answer to this conundrum lies in promoting regionalism and ‘good neighbourliness’ (p. 278-9, 201), ostensibly on the European Union model. Bose is entirely right that identities (which underwrite legitimacy) are not “fixed essences” and “essentializing images and binary dichotomies…do enormous violence to complex Bosnian realities” (p. 10, also see p. 187-190). In this light, I can’t wait to see work that considers options for “complex Bosnian realities” without having to talk only about Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

© 2003 Srdjan Vucetic. This review may be distributed and reproduced electronically, if credit is given to the author.