

**Why Did Canada Sit Out of the Iraq War?
One Constructivist Analysis**

Srdjan Vucetic

The Ohio State University

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Marc J. O'Reilly (Chair and Discussant), @heidelberg.edu
William Hogg, @ubishops.ca
Andrew Johnson, @ubishops.ca
Nelson Michaud, @enap.ca
Armando R. Balderrama, @itesm.mx**

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ABSTRACT (117 words)

Why did Canada stay out of the Iraq War in 2003? This decision is not only puzzling considering Canada's recent foreign policy record, but it also confounds the logic of a number of International Relations theories. In this paper, I offer a constructivist explanation of Canada's Iraq decision. In this account, national identity is a function of state-to-society relations, meaning that the dominant discourse at the societal level in a given period will shape foreign policy choices. I argue that the dominant discourse on Canadian identity, as recovered in a discourse analysis of popular texts in Canadian society in 2002-3, enabled Ottawa's non-participation in the US-led coalition of the willing.

KEY WORDS: Canada, Iraq, identity, discourse, agent-structure problem

In a speech to the House of Commons on March 17, 2003, after months of considerable debate and ambiguity, Prime Minister Chrétien announced that Canada would not join the “coalition of the willing” and go to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.¹ The rationale behind the refusal was not so much the principled opposition to the war, but the fact that the United Nations Security Council failed to pass a resolution authorizing military intervention. And so for the first time in history, Ottawa simultaneously turned down both the US and Britain – Canada’s foremost and historical “friends and allies.”²

The announcement was a bolt from the blue for many, especially in Washington. Canada had hitherto supported all US interventions in the post-Cold War period, including three against the same dictator in Iraq, in 1991, 1996, and 1998. In light of Canada’s recent foreign policy record, the Iraq decision was called “anomalous” (Harvey 2004: 200), “surprising” (Massie and Roussel 2005: 69) and “mystifying” (Coulon 2004: 142). In addition, and perhaps ironically, unlike a number of members of the coalition of the willing, Canadian troops were actually sent to the theatre of operations in Iraq. The point, therefore, is not that Canada said no because it was militarily “unable” to partake in the war, but that it was politically “unwilling” to say yes.

The Iraq decision poses a puzzle for several theoretical perspectives in International Relations (IR). Various forms of realism cannot explain the variation in behaviour of similarly positioned units in the international system over Iraq: some states chose to “bandwagon” with the US; others, like Canada, decided to “hide.” This case

¹ For written comments and criticisms, thanks go to Emilie Becault, Yoram Haftel, Ted Hopf, Richard Herrmann, Jennifer Mitzen, Kim Richard Nossal, James Rosenau, Don Sylvan, and Alexander Thompson. The paper also benefited from the presentation at CEU Summer University, Budapest in July 2005. Errors remain entirely the province of the author.

² In my analysis, conventional measures of “interest similarity” among pairs of states, such as UN voting indices (Gartzke and Jo 2002) or alliance-based indices (Sweeney and Khesk 2005), confirm Canada’s special affinity towards the US and Britain.

similarly confounds asymmetric interdependence, for which US-Canadian relations are a textbook example. According to this logic, Canada should follow the U.S. lead because “less vulnerable states will use asymmetrical interdependence in particular set of issues as a source of power” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 32). As *The Economist* succinctly put it, “How could the superpower’s neighbour and biggest trading partner be against?”³

Domestic process theories, which emphasize the domestic political constraints on foreign policy decisions, seem to fall short too. Because it faced a provincial election in Quebec in April 2003 as well as a federal re-election in 2004, the ruling Liberal Party of Canada desired to pander to public opinion by distancing itself from the unpopular Bush administration over Iraq. But, as Frank Harvey notes, this explanation is “seriously flawed” because “foreign policy is ranked quite low in Canadian elections, even lower in provincial elections, and is almost insignificant in Quebec politics” (2004: 204-5).

So how can we explain this puzzle? In this paper, I will provide one explanation based on one constructivist understanding of national identity.⁴ I say one because in IR, constructivism – like all “isms” – should be seen as a family of theories; not all constructivist approaches can explain Canada’s Iraq decision. Take the security communities approach: under favourable conditions, it submits, the process of state-to-state interaction leads to interdependence, integration, and even a communal identity (Adler and Barnett 1998). This sense of communal identity, in turn, influences the states’ foreign policy choices, such as military interventions against third parties. Since the US-

³ Using conventional measures (e.g., Russett *et al* 2000), I found no statistical correlation between interdependence and membership in this particular US-led coalition.

⁴ In IR theory, the concept of identity has been colonized by constructivism. Constructivists assume that the political system, domestic as well as international, is a social construction, whereby the structure is primarily cultural or ideational, rather than material. National identity, for constructivists, refers to the social constructions of statehood. It can be defined as set of meanings that a state attributes to itself while relating to significant “others.” For a discussion, see Wendt (1999: Ch. 7).

Canadian security community is seen as one of the most “mature” in the world (Shore 1998), the lack of a common front on Iraq is at least somewhat puzzling.

I argue that while two countries might be extremely interdependent and integrated and while they might share similar liberal democratic traditions and other traits, their national identities – and thus their foreign policy interests – can significantly differ. A key disagreement in the constructivist family of theories concerns the logic of national identity-construction. A state, like every social actor, has multiple identities that define its interests. In the security community approach, state identities relevant in international relations are established in state-to-state interactions. When they interact with other, states “learn” international identities – friend, rival, enemy.⁵ In this paper, I will apply a model developed by Ted Hopf (2002), which is based on the assumption that a state’s identity is constituted not only in its interaction with other states, but also in its relationship to its own society. This model problematizes the assumption that the key significant “others” for national identity are external.

In this view, the Canadian “self” is established not only through Canada’s interactions with its friends, rivals, and enemies in the international system of states, but also through state-society relations within Canada. The unit of analysis is not the discourse of identity in intergovernmental interactions, but the discourse of identity at the societal level.⁶ Like domestic process theories, this account disaggregates the black box of the state, but sees domestic political constraints as primarily ideational, not material.

⁵ Constructivists agree that foreign policy and national identity are mutually constituted. For various models, see Campbell (1998) and Kubàlková, ed. (2001).

⁶ For other constructivist understandings of the role of discourse in foreign policy, see Barnett (1999) and Skonieczny (2001).

At any given time, there are many identities in a society, yet they tend to synthesize into discourses. These, in turn, vie for defining a state's "self." Different discourses imply different national identities: a democratic state, a capitalist state, a trading state, a middle power, Western state, a Northern state, a multicultural state, and so on. And while we should expect multiple discourses on Canadian identity, in a given context, one discourse tends to prevail. This dominant or "hegemonic" discourse enables some types of understandings and constrains others. These ideational structures not only reward/punish actions that are consonant/deviant, but also delimit what is possible, i.e., imaginable and thinkable. In this way, identities imply interests. A multicultural national identity, for example, will render impossible an interest in racist immigration policies. In this paper, discourses of identity are the explanans, foreign policy choice is the explanandum.

My contention is that everyday identity-talk in Canadian society has implications for Canadian foreign policy. I will argue that the predominant discourse – here labelled as "liberal" – implied a foreign policy committed to the maintenance of multilateral international institutions and international law, even if it meant shunning the superpower neighbour and the biggest trading partner over Iraq. A first challenger to the dominant "liberal" discourse – which I call "North American" – called for support in the US-led military attempt to rid the world of Hussein. Had this discourse proved predominant in Canada in 2002-3, Ottawa would have been more likely to join the coalition. The second challenger – named "feminist" – strove for a more extensive realization of human rights at home and abroad, but it occupied a limited foreign policy foothold.

This paper breaks into four sections. In the first section, I outline the theoretical and methodological framework. In the second, I conduct a discourse analysis (DA) of self-other relations in Canada in 2002-3 and stipulate the foreign policy implications of each discourse. In the third, I compare my findings to those derived from other evidentiary foundations. In the fourth, I relate my analysis to the agent-based alternative and offer my take on the agent-structure debate in foreign policy analysis.

Discourses of Canadian Identity

In political science, identity has come to be treated as one of the “most normatively significant and behaviourally consequential aspects of politics” (Smith 2004: 302). In IR theory alone, identity has been used to explain anything from war to peace to human rights.⁷ Not surprisingly, there are many ways in which national identity can be conceptualized, operationalized and measured. But any attempt to theorize any collective identity must consider two elements – content and contestation (Abdelal *et al* 2006). “Content” refers to the intersubjective meaning of a collective identity can be normative (who or what we are), purposive (who we are depends on what we want), relational (who or what we are not), and/or cognitive (what and how we know what we know). “Contestation” means that a collective identity is not a fixture, but a process. Within any collective, the level of agreement on the content of identity varies.

In this paper, the content and contestation of Canadian national identity are empirical questions. In what follows, I seek to demonstrate how a deep look at the discursive contestation of the Canadian “self” can help us account for Ottawa’s Iraq

⁷ On the theories linking identity to foreign policy, see Hopf (2002: Ch. 6), Macleod (2004), and Telhami and Barnett (2002: 11).

decision. One way to “measure” national identity is to conduct a DA of a wide range of popular cultural texts with a goal of discovering and evaluating its content and contestation. My approach rests on five assumptions, some of which I mentioned earlier:

- 1) structure is material as well as ideational (i.e., social and cognitive);
- 2) society is the key ideational structure for national identity;
- 3) contestations of national identity aggregate into discourses; one will dominate and win the contest;
- 4) national identity is discursively recoverable because it is always shared by a large community of people and is relatively stable and enduring over time;
- 5) a state’s identity politics shapes its foreign policy because both operate in roughly the same intersubjectively shared social milieu. Elites who make foreign policy decisions belong to the same society, the same ideational structure. I will return to these assumptions below.

My DA consists of analyzing a sample of the texts Canadians were producing and consuming from January 2002 to March 2003, i.e, in the relatively brief juncture of Canadian history to the Iraq decision.⁸ The objective is to find out which identities of Canada are present and which predominate, both in terms of their frequency and across sources. Because of the immense amount of relevant texts in this moment of history, I deploy an auxiliary (and perhaps heroic) assumption that sampling is possible in such analysis. Identities are first contextualized, i.e. interpreted and coded as present in an individual text; then they are intertextualized, i.e. interpreted and coded across the entire

⁸ In addition to Hopf (2002: 23-38), my inspiration here is Marc Angenot’s “story of the year” approach (Angenot 1989). For the sake of brevity, I will not discuss DA as a methodology further in this paper.

sample of texts. In the second step, the interpretation and coding are binarized across “distance” (similarity/difference) and “value” (positive/negative).

Two of my sources are works of literature. Carol Shields’ *Unless* is a bestselling novel written by a Canadian author in the period under study.⁹ A volume of short stories – *The Journey Prize Anthology* – was chosen because it deals with potentially important identity relationships captured by Canada’s “new writers,” whose stories “make place for the day-to-day” (x).¹⁰ The selection strategy employed by the editors of the collection mirrors my sampling strategy: “[t]he stories we’ve chosen are the raw material from which versions of our country (its sensibilities, its possibilities...) and our time (its morals, its culture...) might be reconstructed” (xi).

For a survey of non-fiction, I turned to a history of Canada for children (Hacker 2002) and about three hundred articles from newspapers and newsmagazines. *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) and *The National Post* (Toronto) are Canada’s national daily newspapers. I randomized the sample by closely reading Wednesday editions (as a random day in the week) of both newspapers for the second and third weeks in the first quarter of 2002 (January 16, January 23, February 13, February 20, March 13, March 20, April 17, April 24). The French-language texts were represented by a random sample of articles from *Le Devoir* (Montreal) in the same time period. I also included *Maclean’s*, which sells itself as Canada’s national newsmagazine and is widely read. I surveyed thirty issues of this newsmagazine, in a reverse chronological order, starting with the second week of March 2003. In the attempt to capture discourses within which Canadian

⁹ By the second week of March 2003, the book had been on *Maclean’s* national bestseller list for 46 weeks and on *Globe and Mail’s* list for 40 weeks.

¹⁰ Leah Postman “Being Famous;” Robert McGill “The Stars are Falling;” Neil Smith, “Green Fluorescent Protein;” and Emma Donoghue, “What remains” in *Alexis et al* (2002).

identity is situated, I analyzed sections and articles that do not deal with foreign policy topics, such as “Arts and Life”, “Globe Review”, “Closing Notes”, or “Obituaries” (I also supplemented the sample by locating articles by inserting such keywords in simple database searches).

While I strongly believe that pure induction is impossible, I also deem it a matter of methodological discipline to separate the evidence of Canada’s identities and discourses from that of foreign policy outcomes. The textual sources of Canadian identity were distinctly analyzed from those dealing with foreign policy, such as interviews with government officials or relevant editorials. I do this because the three discourses on Canadian identity in 2002-3 – “liberal,” “North American” and “feminist” – have discrete foreign policy implications that need to be distilled separately from the analysis of foreign policy outcomes. These implications can take the form of falsifiable hypotheses not unlike those derived from other theoretical approaches. As such, they should be tested against the empirics collected independently from the evidentiary base which effected these implications in the first place.

As I said, the identities that emerged in my readings of these sources aggregate into three broad discourses – “liberal,” “North American” and “feminist” (the reader may prefer other labels, e.g., “nationalist,” “continentalist,” and “critical”). These discourses can be seen as discrete inasmuch as they differently evaluate different identity themes of the Canadian “self.” As I will show below, “liberal” and “North American” can be seen as strands of a single discourse. In the period under study, “liberal” discourse emerged as the strongest, both contextually and intertextually, followed by a weaker “North American” challenger as well as much, *much* weaker “feminist” one. In this section, I

illustratively describe the content of the three discourses and discuss their foreign policy implications.

Both “liberal” and “North American” discourses can be said to stem from a single “master” discourse, which can be called “liberal democracy.” This discourse encompasses individualism, universalism, capitalism, middle class, secularism, industry, and equality. In this sense, “liberal democracy” is not exclusively Canadian, but it certainly well-established in Canada. According to *Kids History*, Canada was the first among British colonies to have “responsible government”: “Basically, Canada still has this system today.” Judicial independence, as editorialized in *Globe and Mail* (March 20, 2002), is a “hot issue today in the developing world and in some former Communist regimes. Canada’s got it.” Ostensibly, in other liberal democracies, judicial independence is also not an issue. Canada, in this view, not only belongs to the liberal democratic world, but it is one of its leaders. Importantly, in this discourse, law and order are associated with social justice. Economic rights are as seen important as social and individual rights, but they are not automatic. One obituary states that “retirement dreams came true when they were able to buy property.”

But while the will of the majority is critical, individual liberties and group rights must be recognized and protected. In the right-of-centre-leaning *National Post* (March 20, 2002), seven letters to the editor react to an editorial on pot (“It’s agreed: Decriminalize Pot,” March 15). All seven authors, including a retired police officer, support the decriminalization. Re-writing the law on drug addiction is “Canada’s next big social experiment” (*Maclean’s*, January 20, 2003). In *Unless* – a story of a translator and writer whose daughter suddenly drops out of university to become a panhandler in

downtown Toronto – the parents decide against forcefully trying to bring their teenage daughter back to home and school, to safety. Legality trumps family. Obeying and otherwise upholding the law is not only a civic duty but a simple matter of habit. An interviewed historian observes: “In nationalist myths about Canada, we are supposed to be polite and civil, but look at hockey. Hockey is essentially one long rant where Canadians vent the emotions they are supposed to repress.” The norm, as in “supposed to,” is to repress “long vitriolic complaints.” While the real Canadian likes to rant, the ideal Canadian puts the “civil” in civil society – she or he is composed, civil, tolerant, and respectful of others (Heer 2002).

In the “liberal democratic” discourse, Canada is firmly rooted in North America and the Atlantic. The East and the South are simply too distant. In *Unless*, there is some inability to distinguish among traditional dresses of Muslim women - a chador, a veil, and a burka (p. 79). Waking a sleeping person is clearly seen as a violation of human rights, but it is unclear where it took place - “in China, or was it Argentina?” (p. 75). The “liberal democratic” discourse also values cultural diversity. In Canada, multiculturalism famously became an official government policy in 1971. A rather large multiculturalist lens is used in reading of history, particularly in *Kids History*. Multilingualism is not as nearly as desirable as (also official) bilingualism, especially if fully fluent (see *Unless*, McGill).

The discourse which I here label “feminist” probes the limits of “liberal democracy.” As intertextualized in this study, it makes a double critique. It challenges both “liberal democracy” and its counterdiscourses – various forms of authoritarianisms (but surely it does not see them as equivalents) – because they overlap in several gender-

biased or class-biased areas: asymmetrically distributed material wealth, consumerism, militarism, misogyny and so on. As such, the “feminist” discourse is mostly inward-looking and has no obvious implications for Canada’s alliance choice over Iraq.

In contrast, the “liberal democratic” discourse clearly has a bearing on the realm of foreign policy, albeit on a most general position: Canada should side with other democracies. This hypothesis comes as no surprise to the proponents of the “democratic peace.” This research program finds that, among other things, democracies tend to ally with each other as well as go to war on behalf of democratic allies (Bueno de Mesquita *et al* 1999: 791). Democracies also tend to perceive non-democratic governments as potentially threatening, which increases the likelihood of “liberal war” – war waged by democracies against illiberal governments (Farnham 2003: 396). But when the world of democracies is divided, this discourse offers no clear foreign policy implications. So for all intents and purposes of this study, the main discursive battle is between its strands - “liberal” and “North American.” They themselves entail sufficiently distinct collections of identity relationships to be regarded as separate discourses.

The splintering of “liberal democracy” occurs over the understanding of the US. In the “liberal” discourse, Canada, while no doubt part of the Western world of liberal democracies, is “different” or even “unique.” This difference is a scarce value. The main threat, of course, lies in the Americanization of Canada. In this discourse, the US is an “identity threat” to Canada. As I will show below, the “North American” discourse strongly disagrees.

“Liberal” vs. “North American”

The US is ubiquitous in Canadian texts; it is the elephant “other” of Canadian identity. In *Kids History*, no explanation is given about Newfoundland’s trilemma in 1948: why was a union with the US an option almost as feasible as those of independence or a union with Canada? Similarly, why was, in 1962, a Canadian satellite launched aboard a US rocket, and not some other rocket? The presence, power, and interest of the US are simply assumed, as it is that Canada, more than any other country in the world, is deeply and extensively influenced by the American way of life.

In the “liberal” discourse, the proximity of, as well as the similarity with the US are sources of considerable anxiety. Let me begin with an extreme illustration. Writing in the *Globe and Mail*, a Canadian traveller on a Vegas-style cruise ship in the Gulf of Mexico describes them as “brash”, “excessive,” “very frazzled,” and a “bit much right now” (Dwyer 2002). Apparently, they are “no longer just public-spirited and patriotic, but also supporting Bush...sporting America-the-Beautiful lapel pins and high-school marching bands belting out God Bless America.” It is easy to “immerse” oneself in the “mindlessness of it all.”

In this discourse, the monotony and simple-mindedness of “Hollywood” is a particular aspect of this identity threat. In the opinion of one *Maclean’s* film critic-in-residence, in Hollywood, the premise on which Pedro Almodóvar build his *Talk to Her* would “only serve as fodder for high-concept comedy.” Similarly, *Adaptation* is “[t]he year’s wittiest and most warmly entertaining American movie...[because it] mocks Hollywood while making the best of it” (December 30, 2002, p. 83). According to one entertainer, “Sitcoms follow a very simple format in America. Canadians are willing to

go out on a limb with you a little further” (Cullen 2003). A *Globe and Mail* critic follows this line of argument: “This country is well used to being served steaming slabs of American glamour drama accompanied by dollops of unpretty, quality CBC-made starch”; Canadian television connoisseurs would gladly substitute some of “the money, the music, the flash, the hot bodies” of “North American TV drama” for a “British soap” with some “character-led grit” (McLaren 2002).

With free trade, the maintenance of Canadian difference has become even more difficult. Major Canadian media houses customarily restrict the hours of TV and radio programming made in the US or the percentage of magazine ads about American goods and services. *Kids History* explains that “opponents” to Free Trade Agreement of 1989 were worried that “Canada would become like the United States and lose its unique culture, along with other Canadian things such as medicare” (p. 67). As a rule, Canadians are likely to sacrifice productivity to protect their identity (Simpson 2002).

The “liberal” discourse asks for prudence in Ottawa’s dealings with Washington. The US is a threat, but not in the sense of GI-s marching over the Niagara, but in sense of turning Canadians into a nation of Elvis impersonators. The foreign policy implication for the “liberal” discourse is clear: Canada is a sovereign and independent state and Ottawa should behave accordingly – which means making its foreign policy *different* from Washington’s.

Like in its “liberal” counterpart, in the “North American” discourse, Canada belongs the democratic West. But it critically regards Canada’s claim to uniqueness as grossly overstated, particularly when it is deployed against the US. In this view, the

danger lies not in “becoming too much like the Americans”; rather and to put it crudely, it lies in delusions of grandeur. One *Maclean’s* analyst asks

how does a nation that is one-tenth the size of another in population, with a vanishing military, an economy smaller than a couple of large U.S. states, and a dramatically different political system imagine it is like its much more powerful neighbour? (Cruikshank 2002)

The references to the military and economy in this passage seem to suggest that Canadians might as well find succour in the security and prosperity provided by the proximity to the US. The difference between the two political systems is enough to underwrite Canada’s distinction. So instead of complaining about being misunderstood, taken for granted, or even swallowed up by the US, Canadians should worry about appearing absurd in the eyes of the world.

Transnational cultural ties over the Canadian-US border – measured in almost any social categories – are as close as over any other border in the world. In “North American” discourse, such high cultural interaction is a value: it goes a long way in reducing possible tensions between the neighbours. That interaction such leads to identification is given, but identification is not the same as Americanization. In two dozen texts, the possessive “our” clearly refers to “North American”, not “Canadian.” A professor of African-American history at the University of British Columbia contends that “our collective North American prosperity has been built on a series of injustices, from land grabs and slavery to cheap immigrant labour” (*Maclean’s*, December 30, 2002, p. 38). In newspapers’ automobile sections, a “domestic vehicle” refers to one built in “North America” and is contrasted with “Japanese” or “European.” In *Unless*, the book’s

main protagonist distinguishes “our North American paper clips” from the “chic” ones from France (p. 176).

The aforementioned professor of African-American history at the University of British Columbia offers that Canadians are only “outwardly more civil” about race. Similarly, while Canadians may be better able to “grasp the absurdity” in art than Americans (Cullen 2003), but the difference is merely in degree, not in kind. North American audiences (again, “we” means Canadians and Americans) simply do not get (continental) European expressionism (Taylor 2002, Conlogue 2002). A Canadian in New York observes: “On my way home to theatre, three people apologized to me when, lost in thought, I bumped into them. I used to think that only happened in Canada. Fuck you! I said to them happily” (Kingwell 2002). Canadians, in the “North American” discourse, are not seen as all that different – i.e., more sophisticated, more civil – than Americans. Besides, Canadians could do worse than “becoming like the Americans.” *Kids History* maintains that two of Canada’s nineteenth century leaders, William Lyon Mackenzie and Louis-Joseph Papineau, wanted Canada to be more democratic, like America (p. 34-5). Being on America’s side in the Gulf War in 1991, like peacekeeping, can bring Canada “great prestige in international affairs” (p. 69).

The Hollywood threat is simply overblown. Its values “did not change Kentucky, Arkansas or Massachusetts” (Cruikshank 2002). A character in *Unless*, “loves Oprah,” but still watches Canadian “ten-o’clock news” religiously (p. 199, 13). An American-born Canadian character in “What remains,” reaches an illumination on her nationality: “it occurred to me that I was a Canadian. Not that I’d ever got around to filling in the forms; on paper I was – as I still am – a US citizen. But sometimes things about you

change without you noticing (p. 135).” Identification is not Americanization: two identities – “Canadian” and “American” – can co-exist without the former being subsumed by the latter.

“North American” understanding of “liberal democracy” is generally the same as in the “liberal” discourse. But its view of Canada’s place in the world, including the common North American home differs from the “liberal” view. The “North American” discourse offers an alternative Canadian “self” in which the US is not a threatening “other.” In fact, *similarity*, not difference with the US, is understood as desirable. Thus acting in unison with the US in international relations – including joining the coalition of the willing – is implied in this discourse. Had this discourse proved predominant, Canada would have probably supported the military action against Hussein.

Public Opinion, Values and Elite Texts

In this section, I will first examine whether the results of my DA corroborate findings in public opinion polls and survey research on values. Then I will try to confirm my assumption that the “mass” and “elite” share the same intersubjective milieu, by way of a survey of “elite texts” – defined as those produced by media commentators, foreign policy scholars, and parliamentarians.

The linkages between national identity, discursively understood, and public policy are most obvious in legislation enacted through mechanisms of direct governance, such as referenda and plebiscites. It is somewhat less obvious in public opinion polls. *Public opinion* is different from national identity because it refers to issue-specific, often short-term, values and attitudes of citizens. Direct questions, even if open-ended, cannot

capture the depth and complexity of discourse. For most constructivists, measuring national identity through public opinion surveys is superficial at best.

Having said that, Table 1 provides an overview of Canadian public opinion polls on the themes of Iraq and the US. Opinion polls show a strikingly fluctuating public mood, but it is probably safe to say that most Canadians most of the time decidedly did not favour military action against Hussein's Iraq, at least in the period under study. In terms of opinion towards the US, *Maclean's* annual poll found a "profound cooling of feelings towards the Americans since last year's poll, taken just after the shattering events of September 11," and concluded that "[o]ur "need" to be distinct from the US today is not based on our fixation with our proximity to the Americans but on our understanding that their view of the world is increasingly different from ours" (Gregg 2002).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Survey research on *values* – beliefs about what a society believes to be good, right, and/or desirable – also seems to support my finding on the dominance of the "liberal" discourse. In his comprehensive research on social trends, Michael Adams (2003a) discovers profound dissimilarities between American and Canadian societies, where Canadians are less nationalist, less religious, less conformist, and less patriarchal.¹¹ These Canadian values approximate those in Europe and, arguably, shape social policy that resembles a European one. Values, like public opinion, should not be equated with national identity, the way it is understood in this analysis. But the research on values seems to imply the same foreign policy choices. Adams himself contends that strained US-Canadian relations over Iraq can be understood in the context of the "increasingly divergent values of the people of the two nations (2003b).

¹¹ For a values-based approach to Canadian foreign policy analysis, see Lee (2002) and Michaud (2005).

For example, Ottawa's recent moves to liberalize gay and lesbian life-style laws and legalize marijuana were met with considerable disbelief south of the border (the "North American" discourse is likely to downplay the "American" disbelief and underscore the opposition to this legislation in Canada itself). In contrast to the increasingly conservative US, Canada, in the words of a popular critic, is starting to be perceived a "hippie nation" (Klein 2003: 12). A political cartoon by Dan Murphy, entitled "Why Canadian bakers now terrify the White House" shows a gentleman in an apron asking "And your same-sex wedding cake, will that be hash or non-hash?" (*Maclean's*, December 29, 2003, p. 55). Another, Pascal Élie's "Iraq'n Roll," shows Chrétien in full hippie outfit, playing guitar and singing: "All I am saying is give da peace a chance" (Ibid.). A hippie leader is not likely to lead his (hippie) country to war. For the hippie Canada, an alliance with the conservative US was unlikely in 2003.

But how do we know if the public matters in foreign policy decision-making? In lieu of tackling this question, I turned my assumption that "mass" and "elite" worlds are intersubjectively shared into a hypothesis: one should expect to find that a majority view in *elite texts* is consistent with the "liberal" discourse at the societal level. Upon reviewing texts produced by media commentators and scholars, I suggest that this hypothesis obtains. The majority view expressed in elite texts of this period – which roughly corresponds to what Canadian scholars call "liberal internationalism" – in fact epitomized the "liberal" discourse. The minority view – which approximates "continentalism" – seems to correspond to the weaker "North American" discourse.¹²

¹² Due to space limitations, I cannot present all my findings here. As *elite texts*, I considered, first, op-ed pieces in the aforementioned daily newspapers and newsmagazines in the period from January 2002 to March 2003. Second, I looked at five relevant periodicals: *Canadian Foreign Policy*, *International Journal*, *Études internationales*, *Policy Options* and the *Canada Among Nations* series (1996-2003). Last, I reviewed recently published textbooks on Canadian foreign policy (see references). For an implicit overview of discourses in

Liberal internationalism stresses that Canada has played an important international role since the dusk of World War II. Terms used to describe this role include “middle power,” “relevant power,” “principal power,” “soft power,” “civilian power,” “peacekeeper,” “value-added nation,” “helpful fixer,” “honest broker,” “integrator,” “consensus-builder,” “mediator,” “do-gooder,” “good international citizen,” “reflexive multilateralist,” and “assertive globalist.” Under all of these terms, Canadian foreign policy is understood as “independent,” whereby independence is always defined in terms of the distinction from the superpower neighbour. For example, in explaining the Iraq decision, one observer offers that Ottawa “exercised independent judgment, and that independence has both supported and differed from the U.S. judgment of world events, especially military conflicts” (Simpson 2003, also see Kingwell 2003).

In the attempt to play an important and independent role in the world, Canada has supported multilateralism – a policy of acting through the coalitions made up of allies and like-minded actors (Harvey 2004: 50-1, 185-208, Keating 2002: 1-16, Nossal 1997: 138-70). The same applies, to a lesser extent, to the United Nations. For Canadian foreign policy, international institutions and multilateralism are major facilitating conditions. These regularities suggest that Ottawa is not likely to support near-unilateral military interventions by its allies. According to Janice Gross Stein (2002), a world in which American unilateralism is the order of the day is Canada’s “nightmare.” Writing about the Gulf War 1990-1, John Kirton offers a counterfactual: “if only America and a handful of its small associates had gone to war, Canada would have probably, as in Vietnam three decades earlier, sat the conflict out” (1992: 383).

Canadian IR scholarship, see Nossal (2000). For a comprehensive look at the work of “liberal internationalism” and “continentalism” in the recent episodes of Canadian foreign policy, see Roussel (2004).

Continentalism offers a different take on independence and multilateralism. If these reflect nothing more than a desire to distinguish the country from its superpower neighbour, then Canada's international role is profoundly miscast. First, American dominance and Canadian independence are not mutually exclusive. Second, Canada's support for multilateralism is either naïve or hypocritical (Harvey 2004: Ch. 7, Ignatieff 2003). It is naïve because it unrealistically expects a state, especially the superpower neighbour, to be altruistic and "ignore its national interest" (Knox 2003). It is hypocritical because Canada does not support multilateralism because of some high moral commitment, but because of its limited capabilities. A Canadian entertainer sees the situation thus:

Canadians are observers, not doers. When Britain and America say, "We're going to invade Iraq," people go "Oh look out!" There's trouble brewing." In Canada, we don't have the power, military or economic to affect the world (Cullen 2003).

In addition to the size, a series of spending cuts that began in the late 1980s resulted in the rise of what some have called the "Potemkin Canada": a country with a "vanishing" military, ever-decreasing levels of international aid and development assistance, and a diplomatic corps in which the attrition rate is higher than in a graduate school (e.g., Cohen 2002). In this view, a foreign policy that consists of "active membership in international clubs" or "right speeches at the right meetings" is not only "cheap," but also dishonest.

A prudent way to match rhetoric to practice would be to support the US, even if it means abandoning some of the multilateralist ideals. The superpower neighbour faces an enormous responsibility in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world; many expect it to lead the world, whether by example, cash, or military muscle. Canada, as a trusted insider in

Washington, could be in a unique position to insert some genuine Canadian values in American leadership. The alliance with US thus could offer a “practical” component to Canada’s “rhetorical” one. In this way, continentalism clearly resonates with the “North American” discourse, which implies that Canada plays a supportive role in the reproduction of the US’ global preponderance, ideally by providing a subtle Canadian twist to American foreign policy.

Based on my analysis of eighty four discrete texts (press conference transcripts, press releases/briefings, speeches, and publicly available interviews), I offer that the “liberal” discourse dominated among Canada’s parliamentarians. For one, Canada’s ruling Liberals, by and large, were against the war. Only one minister hinted in favour of joining the coalition (Defence Minister John McCallum). Most Liberal MPs criticized the military intervention in Iraq as unnecessary and ill-timed, using positions implied by the dominant discourse. Some loudly criticized the US’ Iraq policy as hypocritical. And a selected few opined that Washington’s goal was neither to change nor to disarm the Ba’athist regime; instead, the objective was simply the show of America’s power. Very critical remarks about the US government, including President Bush, were voiced by Brent St. Denis, John Cannis, Janko Peric, Yvon Charbonneau, and, especially, Carolyn Parish and Natural Resources Minister Herb Dhaliwal.¹³

The opposition was divided. The right-of-centre Canadian Alliance, the strongest opposition party, supported the US and continually criticized the “gutless” prime minister for turning his back on Canada’s traditional allies. The US action was understood in

¹³ Dhaliwal’s remarks and the reaction by American ambassador created an unusual stir in diplomatic relations.

terms of “North American” discursive motto: the similarities outweigh the differences.¹⁴ The centrist Progressive Conservative Party, the left-of-centre New Democratic Party and the nominally separatist Bloc Québécois generally supported the government’s decision, with the last demanding even further distancing from the war in Iraq. These more radical positions can be seen as implied in the “liberal” discourse.

To be sure, Ottawa’s decision to stay out of the war would not have been so shocking, had it been discursively predetermined. The Canadian government’s position on Iraq was inconsistent and ambiguous until the last day as it was unclear whether the existing UN resolutions against Iraq justified military action (Harvey 2004: 193-215, Massie and Roussel 2005). The majority of Liberals were not opposed to the removal of Hussein and some, like the prime minister, even suggested that the military intervention without a UN approval can be “understood.” Respect for US leadership was repeatedly reaffirmed following the commencement of military operations. Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham wished the US-led coalition ‘Godspeed’ and the prime minister, speaking on the fortieth anniversary of his first election to Parliament on April 8, 2003, expressed hope that the US “accomplishes its mission” quickly and with minimal casualties. The point, however, is that *overall*, the government position on Iraq was consistent with the dominant “liberal” understanding of what the Canadian “self” should do in this situation.

The provisional conclusion is that the “liberal” discourse was shared and fortified throughout Canadian society in 2002-3: at the mass level as well as among the elite, including the elected political representatives. It is thus not surprising that Ottawa chose a foreign policy position implied by the dominant discourse – staying out of the Iraq war.

¹⁴ See, for example, the letter sent to Americans by the Alliance’s leaders, Harper and Day (2003).

But this conclusion is provisional because I am yet to undertake the critical test of intersubjectivity of discourse: did the key foreign policy decision-makers think “liberal” in 2002-3? This question throws me into the agent-structure debate.

The Chrétien Effect

In this paper, I argue that the predominance of the “liberal” discourse in Canadian society in 2002-3 can account for Ottawa’s decision to opt out of the war. But like similar constructivist explanations, this account can be criticized as overtheorized. More specifically, it can be said that I have provided an explanation based on an oversocialized view of actors, treating them, to put it crudely, as “structural dupes.” In this section, I will try to tackle this criticism by relating my constructivist account to a specifically actor-based account of Canada’s Iraq decision. An actor-based account can provide the “ground” for my structural explanation (Hudson 2005: 2-5). One such account concerns the role of foreign policy decision-makers, that is, the prime minister and his cabinet.

Leadership is an agentic variable *par excellence* because it emphasizes the capacity and creativity of political actors and the contingency of choices. Leaders, it is said, are able to “stretch the constraints” and “nudge political trajectories in new and unexpected directions” (Samuels 2003: 2). Arguably, Chrétien had both the capacity and motivation to influence the Iraq decision. Canadian governments are usually single-party majorities, which means that foreign policy decisions are highly centralized at the top of the government’s hierarchy, with the prime minister sitting firmly at that top (Nossal 1997: 174-194). Chrétien, judging by the number of concerns voiced about the “democratic deficit” under his rule, is often described as one of the most powerful prime

minister in recent Canadian history (Savoie 2003). The beginning of the Iraq crisis roughly coincided with Chrétien's last cabinet re-shuffle and the apex of his power: having announced his retirement on August 21, 2002, the prime minister entered the crisis as a lame duck, which allowed him to be relatively unaccountable and personalistic. According to one commentator, the war was Chrétien's "loneliest decision" – a statement not so much on the prime minister's emotional state but on his vast accumulation of decision-making power (MacDonald 2002: 30).

Two interrelated factors stand out: first, the prime minister seems to have held the Bush administration in low regard, particularly President Bush. Second, Chrétien was exceptionally interested in rounding up his "legacy." *The Economist* attributed much of the strain in US-Canadian relations in March 2003 to the "barely-hidden mutual disdain" between Chrétien and Bush (also see Wilson-Smith 2003, Frum 2002). On his part, Chrétien showed little tact in dealing with the Bush administration. In the 2000 presidential campaign, he endorsed Bush's Democratic opponent. On the first anniversary of 9/11, Chrétien controversially advised the US: "You cannot exercise your powers to the point of humiliation for the others."¹⁵ Lastly, in his Chicago speech of February 13, 2003, Chrétien uttered that US motivations are "sometimes" questioned by people in other countries.

Bush retaliated in kind. First, he broke the tradition and made his first presidential visit to Mexico, not to Canada. The president visited Canada once, during the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April 2001 and met with the prime minister ten other times, but at international summits. In April 2003, Bush officially cancelled

¹⁵ Quoted in Beltrame and Lowther (2002: 16).

what would have been his first state visit to Ottawa, scheduled for the next month.¹⁶ The cancellation was officially termed “postponement” and explained by President’s increased workload due to the war in Iraq. In Canada, many observers saw it as a calculated snub in return for Canada’s non-participation in the war as well as for earlier anti-American and anti-Bush comments by Canadian officials. Bush also never invited Chrétien to his Texan ranch and never once talked to Chrétien during the Iraq crisis.

As for his “legacy,” Chrétien apparently strongly identified with Liberal leaders who valued Canada’s independence over its alliances with the US. One biographer thus describes the Iraq decision: “With this emblematic display of sovereignty and with his many recent activist domestic initiatives, he has positioned himself much closer to where he wanted to be in the Liberal pantheon” (Martin 2003). Or, in the words of Canadian Alliance MP Jason Kenney, stated in Parliament:

The Prime Minister finally has a legacy. He is the first prime minister in Canadian history to abandon our British and American allies at a time of need, and has brought Canada-US relations to their lowest level in modern times.¹⁷

The “Chrétien effect” was no doubt a contributing factor to Canada’s Iraq decision. How does this agentic explanation relate to the constructivist one offered in this paper? As “causal” variables, both “national identity” and “leadership” seem to be promising, but considered in isolation from each other, they ultimately do not suffice (e.g., Nossal 1997: 14). The “all things being equal” assumption under which all monocausal explanations operate, after all, is just that – an assumption; all other things are usually not equal. In

¹⁶ As leaders, Chrétien and Bush met eleven times, mostly at international summits. Bush visited Canada once, during the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City on April 20-22, 2001.

¹⁷ Quoted in Taber (2003).

order to overcome inferential limitations, one needs to consider, at a minimum, how leadership interacts with identity.

The leadership-or-identity question is an agent-structure problem par excellence, or a matter of an ontological debate between individualists and holists (Wendt 1999: 26). The questions of the type – what do we know for sure? what is there to be explained? what makes the world hang together? – refer to a set of “first principles” on which every theory is based. Some theories assume that the social and political world is made of structures (anarchy, interdependence, states, alliances), others that it consists of agents (prime ministers, cabinets), and still others believe in both. Constructivists belong to the last group.

That “agents and structures are mutually constituted” is a constructivist mantra: the task is to locate agents in relation to structures rather than to fixate on the choices of disembodied actors or ascribing action to exogenous “forces” beyond anybody’s control. Actors are neither disembodied nor “structural dupes;” instead, they actively participate in the social construction of reality. Subjectivity, in this view, co-determines intersubjectivity; agents constitute, and are constituted by, structures. This ontological position allows constructivist to theoretically consider how actors, the decision-makers, interact with structures – discourses on national identity. More important, it demands a close consideration of the role of politics and power in the constitution of the state “self.”

But the mutual constitution mantra often floats as an abstract theoretical ambition. For the purposes of empirical analysis, how does one do justice to both agents and structures? One way is to consider the research question twice, once using structures and again using agents. After all, because leadership and national identity are mutually

constituted, these explanatory approaches should be regarded as complementary, rather than competing. The key, then, is to temporize the ontology, isolate agentic and structural elements and see how they relate to each other. I will return to the “solutions” of the agent-structure problem in the conclusion.

On the basis of the evidence presented here, national identity seems to be the antecedent variable. Leaders can certainly be instrumentally motivated and as such they are likely to frame particular policy to legitimize their personal interest. At the same time, the framing range is discursively limited because no set of corporate actors can be said to exist independently from their social environment and its intersubjective system of meanings. For example, the prime minister was unlikely to frame Canada’s non-participation in Iraq on the basis of Canada’s “neutrality.” Thus an explanation of the Iraq decision that exclusively concentrates on the expressed preferences of Canada’s key foreign policy decision-makers will suffer from an omitted variable bias. And for me, a key omission is national identity.

Leaders are likely to frame their positions in a manner consistent with the dominant discourse in a society because this is a low-cost way to legitimize their rule.¹⁸ Consider how Graham and Chrétien use references to independence and multilateralism to justify Canada’s Iraq policy. In a speech in the House of Commons in January, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham quoted President Bush’s State of the Union address that the US “does not depend on the decision of others.” Then he said: “Canadians expect no less from their government. And why would Americans expect less of us than they expect of

¹⁸ Foreign policy is a key realm in which the legitimation of regimes and national identities takes place. See, *inter alia*, Campbell (1998: 381-3) and Barnett (1999: 7).

themselves? ” (quoted in McCarthy and Leblanc 2003b). In the following month, Graham made the following point in a public speech:

So I think we should be where we are, have our policy, which is to support the multilateral system with good arguments and to say to them, “We’re staying put. And you’re better to have an ally and friend that debates frankly than to have someone who says yes, sir” (quoted in Wells 2003).

In both speeches, Canada is independent from and equal to the US. It is capable of not only making its own policy (multilateralism), but also deliberating, disagreeing, and, ultimately, staying the course in the face of the superpower pressure.

Chrétien insisted on multilateralism and the UN authority from the outset of the crisis. In January 2003, the prime minister stated: “The position of Canada is that we were insisting right at the beginning, you remember, that Canada act through the United Nations, through international institutions. We believe in multilateralism very strongly.” (quoted in McCarthy and Leblanc 2003b). In his Chicago speech on February 13, the prime minister explained that multilateralism is a part of Canada’s “distinctive international personality.” And a week later, Chrétien confirmed his belief that any unilateral action against Iraq would “go nowhere” and then asserted that terrorism is in Afghanistan, not in Iraq.¹⁹ In these speeches, multilateralism is at the core of Canada’s distinction (from the U.S.) and thus the rationale behind Canada’s non-participation in the Iraq war. These justifications reproduce and strengthen the dominant meaning on the Canadian “self.” Canada is framed as a distinctive country as per the dominant “liberal” discourse.

¹⁹ See, for example, the *Globe and Mail* editorial of February 19, 2002. In the same month, Foreign Affairs Minister Graham gave the same message to the US Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Of course, international security policy is but one domain to which this distinction applies. Consider how Chrétien clarifies the distinction between himself and President Bush in the *Maclean's* Q&A on December 30, 2002:

Personally, I have no problem with Mr. Bush. We're not the same. His social policies are not the same type as mine. He's against abortion, he's for capital punishment and he's against gun control. I'm for a public health-care system, he's probably not for that. He's a conservative and I'm not.

In this text, Chrétien, as a leader and as a person, is “different” from Bush because of his beliefs. While beliefs, as features of the cognitive “self”, can of course be entirely idiosyncratic (e.g., “I am the Emperor of Canada”), it is far more likely that they come from the shared social imagination. In constructivist ontology, beliefs are intersubjectively shared meanings. Chrétien’s language on social policy contains meaning beyond his own individual, cognitive and behavioural life. To justify his position, Chrétien relies on a particular kind of discourse to make himself intelligible and resonant to the Canadian audience. Most Canadians can thus appreciate why Chrétien and Bush “are not the same” – it is because their country differs from the US in how it deals with abortion, death penalty, gun control, and universal health care. And it is this difference, epitomized in the dominance of the “liberal” discourse in 2002-3, that enabled Canada’s non-participation in Iraq.

Conclusions

Bracketing national identity or defining it by assumption is passé in foreign policy analysis. But while there is a growing understanding that identities cannot be fixed or assumed away because identities are context-bound, fluid, overlapping, multiple and so

on, there is also an accompanying sense of caution, if not impatience. In short, because there is an “embarrassment of identities” at any given time, we are dealing with a very unwieldy, potentially impossible variable. In this paper, I submitted one way of managing this problem. National identity, empirically derived from a DA of popular texts in Canadian society, offers one explanation of Ottawa’s puzzling decision to stay out of the Iraq war. I have argued that the “liberal” discourse dominated at all levels in the 2002-3 Canada, including the world of the key decision-makers. I have also suggested that Canadian leaders relied on the positions implied in the dominant discourse both justify their foreign policy choice as well as to bolster their power-hold in Canadian politics.

One would expect that the explanatory power of national identity goes beyond a single case. Canada’s action in Afghanistan is consistent with the “liberal” understanding of Canadian identity, since the West was not divided on the question of intervention. Similarly, *prima facie* evidence for an identity-based explanation is the decision of the subsequent Canadian governments to stay the course on Iraq. Also, on February 24, 2004, Ottawa officially opted out of the US Ballistic Missile Defense program. The government also announced that Canada expected to be consulted every time a missile is launched over Canadian air space. Like Iraq, this decision constitutes a precedent and a puzzle in Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Perhaps like Iraq, it too can be explained by national identity.

This analysis opens a number of further research avenues. Let me consider two. National identity, of course, is a variable. For example, how could Canada’s “remarkable” foreign policy relationship with the US since the end of World War II be explained in identity terms? The meaning of “liberal democracy” – the baseline discourse

on Canadian identity – no doubt changed over time but its general foreign policy implication remained the same: Canada is part of the Western liberal democratic world. In the Cold War, one could hypothesize that all discourses on national identity pointed to the same policy, as communism might have stood out as the significant “other” against which Canada identified more strongly than the US. Following the analysis in this paper, critical are the cases of military interventions over which the liberal democratic world was divided. Does the degree of division in the Western camp – in effect, the variation in the level of multilateralism – influence the range of foreign policy choices for Ottawa (Harvey 2004: 52)? What is the “sufficient multilateralism” for Canada: Britain and the US? The Commonwealth? The “Anglosphere”? NATO? G8? The UN Security Council?

For example, in Suez, why did Canada identify more with the US, but less with Britain? Why was the situation obverse in Vietnam? And as I mentioned above, why did Canada support American near-unilateralist bombing of Iraq in 1996 and 1998? What about the “illegal, but legitimate” intervention in Kosovo in 1999? Were different discursive configurations at play in Canadian society in each of these years? Did agency trump structure? If so, how? The examination of these questions would further specify the link between national identity and foreign policy. For one, a genealogy of discourses on Canadian identity – mass, elite, bureaucratic, regional, provincial, urban/rural and so on – would shed light both on how agents establish structures and how these structures affect subsequent political outcomes.

Another promising research avenue concerns the link between political institutions and discourses. In this analysis, I discovered a high correlation between the discursive undercurrents in Canadian society and political parties. The dominant “liberal”

discourse was represented and reproduced by the dominant Liberal Party of Canada. While the baseline Canadian identity (“liberal democracy”) is widely shared across the Canadian political spectrum, one can suggest that different governments bring different discursive strands into power with them and are able to justify different policy implications using the same discursive material. And as I illustrated in the previous section, Chrétien and his Liberals fortified the “liberal” discourse and thus helped it become “predominant” in Canadian society in 2002-3. This “institutionalization” of discourse, in turn, strengthened the Liberal hold on power in Canadian politics. In this logic, electoral outcomes are logically related to discursive struggles on the meaning of the Canadian “self.” A hard case for the theory is major political change – moments where agency destabilizes structures. Speculating on the subject of free trade with the US, why did Canadian leaders succeed in trumping versions of the “liberal” discourse in 1988, but not in 1948 or 1911?

Because discourses are entrenched in political institutions and because identities can be instrumentally used by political agents, institutional variables must be an important consideration in any identity-based explanation. For one, political institutions can be the answer to the question why some discourses are more lasting than others – some discourses are more powerful because of their location in pre-existing institutions. So like a broader historical-comparative analysis, a theorization of the links between discourses and institutions brings agents and structures closer and thus provides “solutions” to the agent-structure problem.

Major theoretical innovations are no doubt necessary if constructivist foreign policy analysis is to enter the mainstream. That my rendering of the Canadian “self” in

2002-3 is more empirically grounded than a bracketed account (e.g., “Canada is a middle power”) should be obvious. But due to a multitude of open issues with identity as a variable, many pieces of this puzzle will remain missing and the validity of this account will naturally be questioned. To cite a passage from *Unless*, “identity [is] the dominant mystery of our lives... the self can never be known. This is the calamity of our lives.”

Table 2 Canadian public opinion polls in Iraq and the US, 2002-2003		
<i>Date</i>	<i>Source*</i>	<i>Main results</i>
August 2002	Ipsos-Reid	54% opposed the war
September 2002	<i>The Economist</i>	"Majority" questions US justification for the war
December 2002	<i>Maclean's</i> (Annual Poll)	22% describe the US as "family" or "best friends" (dropped from 33% in 2001); 67% believes the US behaves "like a bully."
January 2003	Ipsos-Reid, Léger Decima, Gallup,	Between 10% and 26% support the war without UN approval
February 2003	Ipsos-Reid, Léger	67% against an attack on Iraq without proper UN approval (60% supported a UN-sanctioned attack); 50% Canadians described the US as Canada's "best friend" (25% said it was Britain)
March 2003	Pollara	56% support the war
April 2003	COMPAS	41% support "verbal support"; 31% support troop deployment
*Also see, Haglund 2005: 19, Harvey 2004: 204, and Jedwab 2003.		

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