

Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 13-54.

I

The Origins of Peacebuilding

As the Cold War was coming to a close in 1989, the United Nations launched its first major peacebuilding mission in Namibia, following the negotiation of a peace settlement in that country's decades-long civil war. At that time, few observers predicted that postconflict peacebuilding would become an international growth industry, but over the next decade, operations were deployed to no fewer than thirteen other territories that were just emerging from internal conflicts.

Ostensibly, these missions provided "technical assistance" to local actors in war-torn countries – assistance aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence and establishing a stable and lasting peace. In practice, however, these operations were more than merely technical (or ideologically neutral) exercises in conflict management. As we shall see, they all promoted a particular model of political and economic organization: liberal market democracy. Why did peacebuilders embrace democratization and marketization as strategies for preventing renewed violence? And why did this brand of peacebuilding proliferate so rapidly in the 1990s? Answers to both of these questions can be found in the peculiar political and ideological conditions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War, when peacebuilding came into being.

The Cold War's End and the Rise of Peacebuilding

During the Cold War, the UN's main security activity was "peacekeeping," which typically involved the deployment of a lightly armed military force to monitor a cease-fire or patrol neutral buffer zones between former combatants.¹ The first major peacekeeping operation was deployed to Egypt in 1956, following the invasion of that country by Britain, France, and Israel. With the agreement of all of the parties, including Egypt and the

¹ See the Appendix of this chapter for a glossary of key terms, including "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding."

invading countries, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) oversaw the departure of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, and then took up positions along the Egypt-Israel border. UNEF was prohibited from using force (except in self-defense) and from interfering in the domestic politics of Egypt. The mission's mandate clearly stated that UNEF should "refrain from any activity of a political character in a Host State" and in no way "influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict."² An "after action" report written two years later by then-UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reiterated the importance of these principles to the mission's success: Any future peacekeeping operations, he argued, "must be separate and distinct from activities by national authorities," and must limit their role to addressing the "external [that is, international] aspects of the political situation," or else "United Nations units might run the risk of getting involved in differences with local authorities or [the] public or in internal conflicts which would be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the operation."³

The principles that guided UNEF in Egypt provided a template for future peacekeeping operations conducted during the Cold War, including missions in Cyprus and Lebanon and on the India-Pakistan border. Most of these operations involved lightly armed contingents deployed to monitor cease-fires and prohibited from intruding in the domestic affairs of the host states. The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for instance, stated bluntly that "UNIFIL, like any other United Nations peacekeeping operation, cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the Government of the country in which it is operating."⁴

Before 1989, only two UN operations deviated from these "traditional" principles of peacekeeping. The first was an ill-fated mission to the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s, which set out to provide the government of the newly independent Republic of Congo with limited security assistance, but got caught in a power struggle between the president and prime minister, and ultimately took over many of the functions of the Congolese government, including the task of forcibly suppressing a revolt in one of the country's provinces. The second was the United Nations Security Force

² "Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force" (February 20, 1957) and "Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force," November 6, 1956 (UN doc. A/3302), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, pp. 40 and 4.

³ "Report of the Secretary General: Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force," October 9, 1958 (UN doc. A/3943), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, p. 52.

⁴ "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425," March 19, 1978 (UN doc. S/12611), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, p. 216.

in western New Guinea, which governed the territory from October 1962 to April 1963, between the end of Dutch colonial rule and the territory's transfer to Indonesian sovereignty.⁵

Apart from these two exceptions, peacekeepers went to great lengths to stay out of domestic politics, for several reasons. First, the United Nations Charter – the legal basis for UN peacekeeping – expressly prohibited the organization from intervening in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."⁶ Second, expanding the role of peacekeepers beyond the relatively limited task of monitoring a cease-fire would have required a more intrusive role for international personnel than the parties to a conflict were normally willing to accept. Third, the permanent members of the Security Council – including the Cold War enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union – were generally opposed to UN involvement in the domestic affairs of their respective allies and client states. Both the Soviets and Americans were concerned with maintaining the integrity of their own spheres of influence and did so partly by insulating these spheres from outside meddling. Achieving Security Council agreement for the deployment of a new peacekeeping mission was therefore possible only when both veto-wielding "superpowers" believed that their strategic interests were not threatened. In cases where civil unrest endangered the stability of a client state, the superpowers typically preferred to deal with these situations directly, rather than through the United Nations, in order to maintain greater control over the outcome.

Fourth and finally, even if the Soviets and Americans saw little threat to their strategic interests, Cold War ideological differences made it impossible for the United Nations to promote any particular model of domestic governance within the borders of individual states. The United States and most of its allies promoted liberal democracy and market-oriented economics, whereas the Soviet bloc championed a different version of democracy – communist "people's democracy" – which emphasized public rather than private ownership of the means of production and control of the state by a vanguard communist party on behalf of the working class. Some developing countries espoused their own brand of "guided" or "developmental" democracy, which rejected both the competitiveness of liberal market democracy and the class orientation of communist people's democracy, and instead advocated single-party rule as a means of carrying out the "general will" and of promoting national unity and economic development. So while support for democracy was nearly universally shared among UN members during the Cold War, there was fundamental and heated disagreement over the

⁵ The administrative arm of the operation was known as the Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).

⁶ Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.

meaning of democracy itself, which in practice prevented the organization from promoting any particular model of democracy as the "proper" model and reinforced the tendency of UN officials to distance themselves from questions of domestic politics.

"As a universal organization neutral in big Power struggles over ideology and influence," wrote Hammarskjöld in 1960, the UN's impartiality on matters of ideology and domestic governance allows the organization to "render service which can be received without suspicion."⁷ In all of these ways, the political and ideological conditions of the Cold War era helped to restrict the functional scope of peacekeeping to narrowly defined and predominantly military tasks, such as cease-fire observation, and worked to limit the involvement of these operations in domestic affairs.

Many of these conditions changed suddenly when the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the decline in East-West tensions, neither the Soviet Union (later Russia) nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in parts of the world that were now perceived to be strategically inconsequential, such as sub-Saharan Africa. This allowed international organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in efforts to bring an end to several long-standing conflicts. The erstwhile rival superpowers, seeking to disengage themselves from costly foreign commitments, were now quite happy to have international agencies assume responsibility for these tasks.

The end of the Cold War not only created new opportunities for mediation in countries that had been proxy battlegrounds for the superpowers; it also sparked new civil conflicts in several other countries. Some regimes, such as those of Zaire and Somalia, had depended on foreign aid in order to monopolize political power in their countries by doling out patronage and ruling with an iron fist. When the flow of external aid diminished, their ability to squelch internal dissent slipped away and long-suppressed resentments came to the fore, sometimes violently. Perhaps the most vivid example of this phenomenon was Somalia, where the government of Said Barre was driven from office by its political enemies, who ultimately fought among themselves in what became an enduring and brutal civil conflict that blurred the boundaries between warfare and criminal violence. Meanwhile, dormant ethnic tensions reasserted themselves and sparked internecine violence across a band of formerly communist states stretching from Yugoslavia through the Caucasus to Central Asia. With Russia and the United States no longer willing to devote the resources and energy that would be needed to rehabilitate these "failed states," such international organizations as the United Nations were increasingly called upon to take action, particularly when

humanitarian crises in these states drew the attention of the international media.⁸

For all of these reasons, the "demand" for new multilateral peace operations swelled at the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, the United Nations and other international organizations were more willing and able to "supply" these new missions, and a new collegiality in the UN Security Council raised the possibility of reaching consensus (or at least avoiding vetoes) on proposals to deploy new operations to countries that were experiencing, or just recovering from, civil conflicts. The result of this combined growth in demand and supply was a sharp rise in the number of multilateral missions launched in the years immediately following the Cold War. In the decade from 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed thirty-three peace operations, more than double the fifteen missions that the organization conducted in the four preceding decades.

Some of the UN's new operations undertook tasks that resembled the traditional peacekeeping missions of the Cold War. In 1988, for example, the organization deployed fifty military observers to oversee the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Although this was the first time that a UN operation had monitored Russian forces, the nature of the assignment itself – verifying a cease-fire and troop movements – was something that the world body had done several times before.

Other operations, however, required the United Nations to perform more complex and less familiar tasks. In 1989, for instance, the UN was called upon to monitor the conduct of local police and to disarm former fighters in Namibia, while preparing the country for its first democratic election and assisting in the preparation of a new national constitution. These functions went well beyond the constraints that had traditionally been imposed on peacekeepers, including the prohibition on involvement in the domestic affairs of host countries. In 1991, new missions were also launched in Angola, El Salvador, Western Sahara, and Cambodia, which involved the organization of elections, human rights training and monitoring, and even (in Cambodia) temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country. In 1992, the UN deployed personnel to Bosnia and Somalia in the midst of ongoing civil conflicts, with the formal Security Council authorization to use armed force for purposes other than simply self-defense – which contrasted with the traditional practice of deploying peacekeepers only after the cessation of hostilities. Also in 1992, a new mission was sent to Mozambique with wide-ranging responsibilities that paralleled the operations in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia, including the preparation and supervision of democratic elections.

⁷ Quoted in Urquhart 1972, pp. 458–459.

⁸ On "failed states," see Helman and Ratner 1992/93. On the role of the international media in the creation of new peace operations, see Jakobsen 1996.

The term “peace operations” emerged as a generic label for the wide variety of missions that the UN began to conduct at this time, since many of these interventions no longer seemed to fit the traditional mold of peacekeeping. In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a policy statement entitled *An Agenda for Peace* that offered a new taxonomy of peace operations for the post-Cold War era.⁹ Among other things, Boutros-Ghali differentiated between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and postconflict peacebuilding. Peacekeeping involved the deployment of UN military personnel to the field with mandates that largely complied with “the established principles and practices” of traditional peacekeeping.¹⁰ Peace enforcement referred to something relatively new: the deployment of missions that resembled peacekeeping operations in many respects, but that were more heavily armed and authorized to use armed force for purposes other than self-defense.¹¹ The operations in Bosnia and Somalia, both of which were authorized to use armed force to accomplish their goals, represented early applications of the peace-enforcement concept. The third category of peace operation – postconflict peacebuilding – sought “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace” in the aftermath of “civil strife.”¹² Boutros-Ghali offered examples of particular tasks that peacebuilding might entail: “disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”¹³

As it turned out, most of the UN’s peace operations after 1988 focused on the task of postconflict peacebuilding. These missions differed from traditional peacekeeping not only in their functional complexity but also in their composition. The United Nations had virtually monopolized the practice of peacekeeping in the preceding decades, in part because the relatively straightforward tasks of traditional peacekeeping – such as cease-fire monitoring – could be performed by military personnel acting largely alone. But the more expansive and diverse functions of postconflict peacebuilding lent themselves to a new division of labor between the UN and other international agencies. In some missions, for example, military tasks were delegated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while various specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the UN Development Program (UNDP), increasingly shared authority with regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the realm

of economic reconstruction, important responsibilities were delegated to international financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional development banks – along with the EU, national development agencies, and a host of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

The precise constellation of international actors varied from one mission to the next. Some organizations were regular participants – in particular, the United Nations and its specialized agencies – while other actors made rarer appearances, so that a distinct alphabet soup of organizational acronyms constituted each mission. The peacebuilding operations of the 1990s, in other words, were not “run” by the United Nations – or by any other single organization. Although “lead agencies” were designated for some missions and for certain tasks, there was typically little central coordination of each agency’s activities in the field; there was always considerable room for individual peacebuilders to define their own objectives and initiatives.

Given the multiplicity of peacebuilding agencies and the absence of a centralized peacebuilding authority, perhaps the most remarkable feature of the peacebuilding operations in the 1990s was that they all pursued the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states: democratization and marketization. The typical formula for peacebuilding included promoting civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of association and movement; preparing and administering democratic elections; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for state functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent “civil society” organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy. Another recurrent feature of these operations was their emphasis on *rapid* democratization and marketization. Planning for elections began immediately in every mission. Although in a few cases violence reignited before elections could be held, in all the remaining cases, elections took place within three years of the beginning of the operation. The same was true of economic reform: Comprehensive marketization programs were usually initiated right away.

The fact that these agencies tended to promote liberalization as a remedy for civil conflict reflected another major change that occurred in world politics at the end of the Cold War: the perceived triumph of liberal market democracy as the prevailing standard of enlightened governance across much of the world, including places where it had been anathema only a few years earlier. Few commentators had predicted the sudden collapse of

⁹ Boutros-Ghali 1992. ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

¹¹ I say “relatively” new because UN peacekeepers in the Congo operation during the Cold War were given extraordinary enforcement powers as well. See Abi-Saab 1978.

¹² Boutros-Ghali 1992, pp. 11 and 32. ¹³ Ibid., p. 32. See also United Nations 1996a.

liberalism's principal ideological competitor, Soviet-style communism. As recently as the mid-1970s, one prominent American political observer, the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, had expressed pessimistic thoughts about the long-term prospects of liberal democracy. "Liberal democracy on the American model," he wrote despondently, "increasingly tends to the condition of monarchy in the nineteenth century: a holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated or peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."¹⁴ Moynihan listed the symptoms of liberal democracy's alleged decline, including the seeming strength of communist ideology in many parts of the world, and the failure of liberal democratic experiments in several developing countries, such as India, the "largest and most important experiment of all," which temporarily abandoned democracy for dictatorship in 1975. These developments, he argued, gave liberal democracy "a fateful air of a transitional arrangement."¹⁵

As it turned out, however, Moynihan's pessimism about the future of market democracy soon gave way to heady optimism as the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate in the late 1980s and formerly communist countries instituted elections. From 1990 to 1996, more than three dozen countries adopted liberal democratic constitutions for the first time, raising the total number of liberal democracies in the world from 76 to 118.¹⁶ By the mid-1990s, 61 percent of the world's countries were holding competitive, multiparty elections for major public office, as compared with only 41 percent a decade earlier.¹⁷ These developments prompted several commentators to declare that a "democratic revolution in global politics" had taken place,¹⁸ or, in the even loftier words of one pundit, "Democracy's won!"¹⁹ In a much-discussed article, U.S. State Department official Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the "end point in mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governance."²⁰ Although Fukuyama seemed to overstate both the finality and the extent of liberalism's new ascendancy,²¹ the Western liberal conception of democracy did seem to have emerged as the "the only model of government with any broad legitimacy and ideological appeal in the world."²²

¹⁴ Moynihan 1975, p. 6. ¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. ix; and Diamond 1997, p. xvi.

¹⁷ Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. ix.

¹⁸ Roberts 1990, p. ix; Gershman 1990; and Ledeen 1996.

¹⁹ Krauthammer 1989. ²⁰ Fukuyama 1989, p. 4.

²¹ If history is any guide, new political and economic ideologies periodically sweep across human societies, displacing contemporary orthodoxies. On this historical tendency, see Lasswell 1935.

²² Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, p. x. In the words of Manuel Pastor (1998, p. 154): "With the Cold War's end, the norm of free elections as the legitimate basis of governing has become almost universal."

To be sure, the principles of political liberalism were not observed universally – there continued to be significant pockets of resistance, both within the Western liberal democracies (among certain groups of commentators, who believed that "democracy" connoted not only elections and civil liberties but also social and economic rights)²³ and from the governments of a few resolutely antidemocratic countries (such as in China, Iran, and Cuba). Furthermore, some states that formally adopted democratic constitutions and conducted elections continued to behave "illiberally" by refusing to grant their citizens basic civil and political rights.²⁴ But what was striking about the post-Cold War period was the relative absence of disagreement in world politics over the definition and desirability of "democracy" itself. Whereas during the Cold War the meaning of democracy had itself been a lightning rod for ideological conflict, there now seemed to be widespread agreement – even in the former Soviet bloc and in much of the developing world – that the liberal definition of democracy (emphasizing elections and political liberties) was the "correct" definition.²⁵

The global shift to liberal democracy took place along with an equally impressive movement toward market-oriented economics. "By the mid-1990s," observed the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, "almost the entire world had adopted the fundamental elements of a market economy, including private ownership at the core of the economy, a currency convertible for international trade, shared standards of commercial transactions . . . , and market-based transactions for the bulk of the productive sectors of the economy."²⁶ Even such putatively socialist countries as China and Vietnam moved away from central planning and toward marketization in the aftermath of the Cold War.

One indication of this economic revolution emerges from the *Economic Freedom of the World* report for the year 2000.²⁷ The report, sponsored by fifty-five economic research institutions, annually rates the economic openness of most countries in the world on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most open. Every country (for which data was available) is assigned a score, based on the composite index of economic openness, for each year from 1970 to 1997. According to these figures, economic openness declined by an average of 9.9 percent in 1970–1975, increased at just over 2 percent in 1975–1980 and 1980–1985, and rose by 4 percent in 1985–1990, reflecting the trend toward market-oriented economic reform in many parts of the world during this period. But in 1990–1995, the increase in economic openness was striking, with average scores climbing by over 16 percent. In the words of Claude Ake, market-oriented economics quickly became "something

²³ For example, Hyland 1995; Robinson 1996; and Peeler 1998. See also Gould 1988.

²⁴ On the phenomenon of "illiberal democracies," see Zakaria 1997 and 2003.

²⁵ Schmitter and Karl 1991, p. 75; Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1994, p. 161; and Held 1998, p. 11.

²⁶ Sachs 1999, p. 28. See also Cline

close to a global theology" in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.²⁸ This was the political and ideological milieu in which the first flurry of peacebuilding operations were launched at the very end of the Cold War – and it was the context that shaped the design and conduct of these operations in fundamental ways, as we shall see.

The Agents of Peacebuilding

When faced with the task of postconflict peacebuilding, the world's leading international organizations seemed almost predisposed to adopt strategies promoting liberal market democracy as a remedy for conflict. Many of these organizations had, in fact, become active and vocal proponents of liberal democracy, market-oriented economics, or both, at the end of the Cold War. This ideological reorientation took place not only in the United Nations but also in other major organizations – including the UN's specialized agencies, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAS, the IMF and World Bank, national development agencies, and many international NGOs engaged in relief and development tasks – in short, the principal practitioners of peacebuilding.

United Nations

The UN had been nominally committed to upholding the principles of representative democracy since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, stating that "everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives" and that the "will of the people . . . expressed in periodic and genuine elections . . . shall be the basis of the authority of government."²⁹ In practice, however, Cold War disagreements effectively turned the organization into a "battleground between two opposing ideologies and power blocs,"³⁰ which prevented the UN from emphasizing its commitment to the principles of representative democracy and civil rights.³¹ But a remarkable change took place within the organization at the end of the Cold War. "Suddenly," writes Carl Gershman, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights relating to democracy were "dusted off and presented to the international community as the foundation for a new world order."³²

The turning point came in 1989, with the launching of a UN mission to Namibia that set a number of precedents for the world body: For the first time, a UN field operation not only observed a cease-fire but also actively assisted in the creation of democratic political institutions within a sovereign

²⁸ Ake 1997, p. 287.

²⁹ Article 21. A similar passage also appears in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

³⁰ Jakobson 1993, p. 23. ³¹ Forsythe 1996, p. 111. ³² Gershman 1993, p. 9.

state. Shortly thereafter, the organization created a permanent Electoral Assistance Division to provide countries making the transition to democracy with technical advice and outside observers for the holding of elections.³³ The General Assembly underscored the organization's more active support for representative democracy by passing a resolution in December 1991 declaring that "periodic and genuine elections" are a "crucial factor in the effective enjoyment . . . of a wide range of other human rights."³⁴ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also began to provide states with advice on electoral laws and other election-related legislation, and helped to train public officials filling key roles in the administration of national elections.³⁵ Further, in April 1999, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which had been one of the principal ideological battlegrounds of the Cold War, adopted a resolution affirming that "democracy fosters the full realization of all human rights" and defining democracy in clearly Western-liberal terms, emphasizing elections and civil liberties in particular.³⁶ The resolution passed by a vote of 51–0 with two abstentions: China and Cuba.

The UN Development Program, the world's largest multilateral grant-making agency, also embraced the goal of democratization after the Cold War. Although the UNDP's mandate was to promote "sustainable human development," primarily through measures aimed at eradicating poverty,³⁷ in the early 1990s the agency began to argue that the promotion of "good governance" in developing countries could help to achieve this goal. According

³³ As of July 2002, the Unit had received formal requests from a total of 103 member states for electoral support. ("Member States' Requests for Electoral Assistance to the United Nations System," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/assistance.by.country/ea_assistance.htm, accessed in May 2003.)

³⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 46/137 of December 17, 1991, "Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections," reprinted in United Nations 1992, pp. 588–589.

³⁵ "Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies," UN document A/53/554, October 29, 1998, para. 37.

³⁶ UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/57 (April 27, 1999). According to the resolution, democratic rights include: "(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought, conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and assembly; (b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media; (c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens' rights, interests and personal security, and fairness in the administration of justice and independence of the judiciary; (d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as free voting procedures and periodic and free elections; (e) The right of political participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; (f) Transparent and accountable government institutions; (g) The right of citizens to choose their governmental system through constitutional or other democratic means; [and] (h) The right to equal access to public service in one's own country."

³⁷ United Nations Development Program, "Mission Statement," <http://www.undp.org/info/discover/mission.html>, accessed in March 2002.

to the UNDP, good governance meant "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority" in ways that are "participatory, transparent and accountable."³⁸ In practice, this definition included support for democratic elections, which the agency views as "a major mechanism to promote accountability."³⁹ The promotion of good governance could also include efforts to help "establish and operate" national executive, legislative and judicial institutions in developing countries, on the grounds that

[s]ound national and local legislatures and judiciaries are critical for creating and maintaining enabling environments for eradicating poverty. Legislatures mediate differing interests and debate and establish policies, laws and resources priorities that directly affect people-centered development. Electoral bodies and processes ensure independent and transparent elections for legislatures. Judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to social, political and economic relations.⁴⁰

For these reasons – and because the UNDP believes that "democracy, human rights, and good governance are indivisible" – the agency came to view the promotion of good governance as one of its central goals.⁴¹ In the period 1997–2000, for example, the UNDP devoted 46 percent of its regular budgetary resources to good-governance programs, such as training election personnel in the Philippines and helping elected officials in Gambia to implement the administrative and legislative provisions of their country's new democratic constitution.⁴²

If there were any doubts that the UN had, in fact, embraced a distinctly Western-liberal conception of democracy, the organization's post-Cold War secretaries-general – Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan – dispelled these doubts in their public statements. In 1996, Boutros-Ghali defined a democracy as a state that observed the following principles:

that the will of the people is the basis of governmental authority; that all individuals have a right to take part in government; that there shall be periodic and genuine elections; that power changes hands through popular suffrage rather than intimidation or force; that political opponents and minorities have the right to express their views; and that there can be loyal and legal opposition to the Government in power.⁴³

In 2000, Kofi Annan similarly described the "principle of democracy" as "the right of all people to take part in the government of their country through free and regular elections."⁴⁴ Such endorsements of liberal democracy by the UN secretary-general would have been virtually unthinkable during the

³⁸ UNDP 1997, pp. 2–3. ³⁹ UNDP 2000c, chap. 5. ⁴⁰ UNDP 1997, p. 14.

⁴¹ Cheema 1999.

⁴² UNDP 2000a. For an overview of the UNDP's role in promoting democracy in peacebuilding operations, see Santiso 2002.

⁴³ Boutros-Ghali 1996, para. 21. See also Boutros-Ghali 1994. ⁴⁴ Annan 2000.

Cold War. Yet, as Annan characterized the UN's new values and priorities: "Support for democratization has become one of our major concerns."⁴⁵

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

A similar evolution took place in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Prior to 1990, members of the OSCE (which was then known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) operated on the principle of "respecting each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."⁴⁶ This meant that all forms of government – both democratic and nondemocratic – enjoyed equal legitimacy within the organization. But after popular revolutions swept across Eastern Europe in 1989, the organization passed a resolution in June 1990 declaring that "the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe."⁴⁷ To minimize ambiguity, the resolution included a list of specific governmental structures and processes that the organization would promote, including representative government in which the executive is accountable to the voters, either directly or through the elected legislature; the duty of government to act in compliance with the constitution and laws; a clear separation between the state and political parties; a commitment to consider and adopt legislation through regular public procedures; publication of regulations as a condition of their validity; effective means of redress against administrative decisions and the provision to the person affected of information about the remedies available; an independent judiciary; and various requirements in the area of criminal procedure.⁴⁸

The OSCE's democracy-promoting functions were concentrated in a new Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in Warsaw, with a mandate to help OSCE-participating states "to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and . . . to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions as well as promote democracy throughout society."⁴⁹ In its field missions, ODIHR drafted rules and regulations for democratic elections (primarily in the countries of the former Soviet bloc), trained election observers and administrators, conducted voter education programs, and encouraged grassroots political organization in states undergoing

⁴⁵ Annan 1997.

⁴⁶ This is one of the ten "guiding principles" set out in the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed by members of the CSCE in August 1975. Cited in Kritiz 1993, p. 19.

⁴⁷ CSCE 1990, p. 1307. ⁴⁸ This summary is drawn from Kritiz 1993, pp. 19–20.

⁴⁹ ODIHR website, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/about.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

the transition to democracy.⁵⁰ In 1999 alone, ODIHR conducted more than fifty projects in twenty countries, and sent more than nineteen hundred observers to monitor elections in eleven states.⁵¹

European Union

During the Cold War, the European Union's efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders were limited and haphazard,⁵² but since the early 1990s, the organization has been actively engaged in fostering democracy in other parts of Europe and overseas. First, in Europe, negotiations aimed at inducting new states into the EU have included express requirements for candidate countries in Eastern Europe to consolidate their transitions to democracy and institutionalize civil liberties and the rule of law, among other things.⁵³ Economic liberalism is also a condition of joining the EU, with candidate states being required to have a "functioning market economy."⁵⁴ It appears, in fact, that these conditions have strongly reinforced the consolidation of transitional democracies in Eastern Europe that are seeking to demonstrate their suitability for membership in the Union.⁵⁵

Second, in the Balkans, the EU has been deeply engaged in the peacebuilding operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, one of the organization's primary goals has been "to establish functioning institutions and a viable democracy, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights."⁵⁶ It has pursued this goal by funding independent local media, helping to draft new laws for Bosnia that are compatible with European Union standards, and supporting a commission whose tasks include enforcing the human rights provisions of the Bosnian constitution.⁵⁷ In Kosovo, where the EU is by far the largest external donor agency, the organization has focused on developing a "modern market economy" in the territory, a task that it shares with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.⁵⁸

Third, in its relations with countries beyond Europe, the EU has not only funded democracy-promotion programs but also imposed increasingly

⁵⁰ Diamond 1995, p. 35; Franck 2000, p. 38; and the following ODIHR websites: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization.htm>, and <http://www.osce.org/odihr/unit-eassistance.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

⁵¹ ODIHR website, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

⁵² Youngs 2001b, p. 2.

⁵³ These criteria were determined at the EU's Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, reproduced in the website of the European Parliament, http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm, accessed in May 2003.

⁵⁴ Ibid. ⁵⁵ Kopstein and Reilly 2000. ⁵⁶ European Union 2001.

⁵⁷ European Union 2000a.

⁵⁸ European Union 2000b. For more on the division of institutional responsibilities in the Kosovo operation, see Chapter 10. Since 1999, the EU's activities in the Balkans have been guided in part by the provisions of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, which include the goals of democratization and marketization in Bosnia and Kosovo (see Bartlett and Samardžija 2000).

stringent conditions on states with which it negotiates commercial agreements. Revisions in 1989 were made in the Lomé Convention – an agreement between the EU and developing countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean – requiring these states to respect human rights as a condition of the agreement. A further revision in 1995 provided for the suspension of agreements with states that failed to "respect . . . democratic principles and fundamental human rights."⁵⁹ Under these arrangements, the EU suspended trade and aid relations with several countries in the 1990s, including Lesotho in 1994, Niger and Sierra Leone in 1996, and Cameroon in 1997.⁶⁰ Although some commentators have accused the EU of failing to implement these provisions fully and consistently across all states with which it has trade and aid relationships,⁶¹ the European Union nevertheless emerged as one of the world's most vigorous promoters of democracy in the 1990s.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, formally committed NATO to upholding "the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."⁶² During the Cold War, the organization's pursuit of this goal was limited to the defense of liberal democracies of Western Europe against the threat of hostilities with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO did not, in other words, actively promote democracy in states outside the area of the alliance itself. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, profoundly altered the strategic landscape of Europe. The likelihood of a military attack upon NATO suddenly seemed very remote, but at the same time a new problem emerged: Long-suppressed tensions threatened to erupt into violence in parts of the former communist bloc, including in nearby Yugoslavia, which collapsed into civil war in 1991. In response to these shifting circumstances, NATO began to reorient its activities. In June 1992, NATO foreign ministers decided that the alliance could make available its resources and expertise in support of the OSCE's conflict-resolution efforts in the former communist bloc.⁶³

Since then, NATO has accepted primary responsibility for implementing the military aspects of the Bosnian and Kosovo peace accords, missions that aim, among other things, to establish functioning democratic institutions in these war-shattered Balkan territories. Furthermore, when NATO established the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 – a framework for cooperation between NATO and the members of the former Warsaw Pact organization, along with other states – the alliance imposed the condition that any state joining the program had to commit itself "to the preservation

⁵⁹ Quoted in Youngs 2001b, p. 35. ⁶⁰ Youngs 2001a, p. 19.

⁶¹ For example, Olsen 2002; and Kubicek 2002. ⁶² North Atlantic Treaty, preamble.

⁶³ Barrett 1996, p. 145. For an overview of changes in NATO's mission since the end of the Cold War, see Rader 1996; and Kaufman 2002.

of democratic societies.”⁶⁴ Democracy is also a condition for gaining full membership in the organization.⁶⁵ In these various ways, NATO became directly involved in the promotion of democracy in countries outside its membership.

Organization of American States

Like the UN, the Organization of American States has always been constitutionally committed to upholding representative democracy,⁶⁶ but until the 1990s, the organization's efforts to enforce this commitment were, in the words of one commentator, “modest and episodic at best.”⁶⁷ In June 1991, however, the OAS membership passed a resolution calling for “the immediate convocation of a meeting . . . in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of any of the Organization's member states.”⁶⁸ The adoption of this resolution signaled the start of a new period of activism in the promotion and defense of democratic governance by the OAS.⁶⁹ The organization has since monitored elections in Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Surinam, and imposed sanctions following antidemocratic coups in Haiti and Peru.⁷⁰

At the same time, the OAS also established a new Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to “provide guidance and support to the member states to strengthen their democratic institutions and procedures.”⁷¹ The unit's many projects have included educational courses for national politicians and officials on the workings of democracy, the coordination of OAS electoral assistance, and local-level projects to promote dialogues between ordinary citizens and their elected leaders in OAS member states.⁷² In September 2001, members of the organization signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, reaffirming their commitment to promote democracy in the Americas and to suspend the membership of any state in which an “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order” has occurred.⁷³

⁶⁴ NATO 1994. ⁶⁵ NATO 1999.

⁶⁶ In the preamble to the OAS Charter, member states express their conviction that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.” See also Articles 3(d) and 2(b).

⁶⁷ Diamond 1995, p. 36. See also Acevedo and Grossman 1996, p. 137; and Boniface 2002, p. 365.

⁶⁸ Resolution AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-o/91), cited in Franck 1992, pp. 65–66.

⁶⁹ For an overview, see Parish and Peceny 2002.

⁷⁰ See Schnably 2000; and Boniface 2002, pp. 365–367.

⁷¹ Unit for the Promotion of Democracy website, <http://www.upd.oas.org/Introduction/aboutus.htm>, accessed in March 2002.

⁷² OAS 2000.

⁷³ Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed at Lima on September 11, 2001.

Bretton Woods Institutions

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are known collectively as the Bretton Woods institutions, with the World Bank itself comprised of two main constituent units: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association.⁷⁴ Before the 1980s, the Bretton Woods institutions had clearly different roles: The IMF provided short-term “stabilization” loans aimed at helping countries overcome temporary balance-of-payments problems, while the World Bank concentrated on lending for large-scale development projects. During this period, the International Monetary Fund frequently attached strings to its loans; the World Bank generally did not. In particular, the IMF typically required recipient states to implement fiscal and monetary austerity measures – such as reductions in public spending, limits on the provision of credit, and devaluation of the local currency – in order to lower the rate of inflation and restore macroeconomic balance.⁷⁵

In the 1980s, however, the distinction between the respective roles of the IMF and World Bank gradually eroded as IMF lending packages became longer term, and as the World Bank began to impose policy conditionalities on its loans that were similar to those advocated by the IMF.⁷⁶ There was also a partial convergence in their conception of what was required in order to promote economic growth in the developing world – sometimes described as the “Washington consensus” – which held that international donors should encourage recipient states to implement economic liberalization policies, on the grounds that deregulation and privatization of these states' economies would create the most propitious conditions for sustained growth.⁷⁷ Specifically, both organizations began promoting “structural adjustment” programs in developing states, which included provisions for fiscal austerity and deflationary policies, privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, currency devaluation, and deregulation of financial and labor markets.⁷⁸ John Walton and David Seddon explain the reasoning behind these policies:

Currency devaluations make Third World exports more competitive in international trade; reduced public spending curbs inflation and saves money for debt repayment; privatization of state-owned corporations generates more productive investment and reduces public payrolls; elimination of protectionism and other restraints on foreign investment lures more efficient export firms; cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities help to “get the prices right,” benefiting domestic producers; wage

⁷⁴ The other major units of the World Bank are the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

⁷⁵ Taylor 1993, pp. 41–42. ⁷⁶ Feinberg 1988; Polak 1997, pp. 473–493; and Krueger 1998.

⁷⁷ Williamson 1989. See also Taylor 1997.

⁷⁸ Rapley 1996. See Weaver 1995 for a general description of structural adjustment, including an overview of the main elements of the “typical” structural adjustment program.

restraints and higher interest rates reduce inflation and enhance competitiveness; and import restrictions conserve foreign exchange for debt servicing.⁷⁹

Since the end of the Cold War, structural adjustment programs sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions have routinely demanded that developing states undertake not only economic liberalization but political liberalization as well – a policy shift that has been more evident in the World Bank than in the IMF.⁸⁰ In theory, the Bank is prohibited by its own Articles of Agreement from interfering in “the political affairs of any member” state, and Bank officials are required to make lending decisions only on the basis of “economic considerations.”⁸¹ From 1990 onward, however, the World Bank has effectively linked its lending to a requirement for “good governance” in recipient states, which includes “holding those in positions of authority responsible for their actions through the rule of law and due process rather than by administrative fiat” and “giving citizens a voice in governmental decisions and activities – not only through voting and representation but also through direct involvement in shaping and implementing programs that affect their lives and well-being.”⁸²

Although the Bank claims that it does not seek to impose any particular form of government on developing states, its conception of “good governance” (like that of the UN Development Program) nevertheless implies support for the principles of limited government and popular accountability through elections, which are central elements in the Western notion of liberal democracy.⁸³ In the words of Wolfgang Reinicke: “It is difficult to imagine how an independent judiciary, freedom of organization, speech, the media, and even elections, all of which are preconditions for good governance but also elements of democracy, could be operated only with reference to economic efficiency and effectiveness criteria.”⁸⁴ Nevertheless, they are. For better or worse, the good-governance agenda pursued by the Bank (and to a lesser extent by the IMF)⁸⁵ has sought to remedy “two undesirable characteristics that had been prevalent earlier, the unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems.”⁸⁶ Thus, the

⁷⁹ Walton and Seddon 1994, p. 41.

⁸⁰ Williams and Young 1994, pp. 85–86; and Shaw 1996, p. 41.

⁸¹ Article IV, Section 10 of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, cited in Skogly 1993, p. 760.

⁸² World Bank 1995, pp. 5–6. See also World Bank 1992 and 1994.

⁸³ Jeffries 1993, p. 26; Islam and Morrison 1996, p. 11; and Gillies 1996. For an overview of the various ways in which “good governance” has been defined, see Moore and Robinson 1995.

⁸⁴ Reinicke 1996, p. 293.

⁸⁵ The IMF's global governance efforts focus primarily on “the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption.” See IMF 1997. For analysis of IMF “good governance” activities, see James 1998; and Phillips 1999.

⁸⁶ Weiss 2000. See also Abrahamsen 1997, pp. 145–146.

lending practices of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1990s seemed to presuppose that Western models of economic and political organization were optimal, and that market-oriented economies and political democracies were mutually reinforcing.⁸⁷

National Development Agencies

The national development agencies of the wealthy industrialized democracies, which are among the most prominent players in the world of international aid, have also shifted toward democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War, reflecting the broader trend toward “political conditionality” in development lending.⁸⁸ The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, the world's largest aid donor, historically focused on social and economic development in poor countries, especially in the areas of health, population, and the environment, and until recently placed relatively little emphasis on democracy and human rights.⁸⁹ This focus began to change under the Reagan administration in the 1980s, when USAID initiated several programs to assist in the administration of justice and the conduct of democratic elections, particularly in Latin America.⁹⁰ In 1990, the agency identified the promotion of democracy as one of its central goals, announcing that “allocations of USAID funds to individual countries will take into account their progress toward democratization,” with the objective of placing “democracy on a comparable footing with progress in economic reforms and the establishment of a market-oriented economy, key factors which are already used as criteria for allocating funds.”⁹¹ USAID subsequently launched a series of new programs aimed at assisting developing states in the areas of free and fair elections, constitution drafting, legislatures, judicial systems, local government, anticorruption efforts, regulatory reform, civic education, and independent organizations and media in civil society (including human rights, legal aid, and women's, professional, and church groups).⁹²

Comparable changes have also taken place in the national aid agencies of other industrialized states, as virtually all major donor governments have placed more emphasis on democracy and human rights in their allocations of development aid since the end of the Cold War, including Canada, the Nordic countries, Holland, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union.⁹³ Further, the Development Assistance Committee of the

⁸⁷ Harbeson 1994, p. 7. See also Hibou 2002. ⁸⁸ Stokke 1995.

⁸⁹ Diamond 1995, p. 13. ⁹⁰ Ibid. See, in particular, n. 13 on p. 71.

⁹¹ Cited in Nelson and Eglinton 1992, p. 16. See also Nelson and Eglinton 1996, pp. 170–172.

⁹² Diamond 1995, p. 13.

⁹³ See Uvin 1993; Robinson 1993; Leftwich 1993; Baylies 1995; Islam and Morrison 1996; Forsythe 1996; Selbervik 1997; Commins 1997; and Blair 1997.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which coordinates policy among the world's preeminent aid donors, has endorsed the objective of using development assistance to promote "democratic and accountable governance."⁹⁴ Even Japan, which has traditionally been reluctant to link aid to the policies of recipient governments, announced in 1992 that it would include progress toward democracy among the principles that would guide the future apportionment of aid.⁹⁵

International Nongovernmental Organizations

The number and variety of international nongovernmental organizations has increased rapidly in recent decades, making it difficult to generalize about the activities or ideological orientation of the international NGO sector as a whole.⁹⁶ In the final years of the twentieth century, however, a new class of international nongovernmental actors gained prominence – the so-called democracy NGOs – based primarily in the United States and in other Western democracies. Ronald Reagan's decision to emphasize democracy promotion in the early 1980s led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), modeled on Germany's *Stiftungen*, which had subsidized democratic groups in the developing world since the 1950s.⁹⁷ The NED, a publicly funded but privately run grant-making agency, has transferred funds directly to foreign organizations and democracy movements and has also channeled grants through four other U.S.-based international NGOs: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, the Free Trade Union Institute, and the Center for International Private Enterprise.⁹⁸

The British government founded the independent Westminster Foundation for Democracy, fashioned after the NED, in 1992; and the Canadian government established the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in 1989, with a mandate to "encourage and support the universal values of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices around the world."⁹⁹ Several private NGOs, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, and George Soros's Open Society Institute, were also created around this time in order to support democratic transitions and elections in developing countries and the states of the former Soviet bloc.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ OECD 1996; and Kondo 1999. ⁹⁵ Nelson and Eglinton 1996, p. 175.

⁹⁶ Rosenau 1995. ⁹⁷ Carothers 1999, pp. 30–31. ⁹⁸ Diamond 1995, p. 16.

⁹⁹ International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 2000, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ The proliferation of these international democracy-promoting organizations was, in part, the result of the shifting priorities of the industrialized democracies, which began to "contract out" the delivery of development assistance in the 1980s to NGOs. See de Wall 1997; and Barkan 1997.

To be sure, a number of NGOs were critical of the new prominence of political and economic liberalization as development goals. Some organizations in the human rights field – such as Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the International League for Human Rights – contended that too much emphasis was being placed on elections and too little on civil liberties. As the former director of Human Rights Watch, Aryeh Neier, wrote in 1993: "By and large the human rights movement would prefer not to be associated with the global crusade to promote democracy."¹⁰¹ Others claimed that aid donors should do more to foster popular "grass-roots" forms of political participation, instead of focusing so narrowly on elections.¹⁰² Still others criticized the allegedly disruptive and damaging effects of market-oriented adjustment policies on developing countries.¹⁰³

Yet these criticisms were less fundamental than they appear at first glance. Few international NGOs ever went so far as to endorse antiliberal political or economic policies – say, dictatorships or command economies. When international human rights organizations argued, for instance, that more attention should be paid to civil and political rights, they were still advocating principles that derived from liberal democratic ideology.¹⁰⁴ As David Williams and Tom Young note, most development NGOs share a "common vision of what development means which is rooted in Western notions of the state, 'civil society' and the self. The most radical part of the NGO discourse... is their emphasis on 'grass roots' participation.... But this terminology is always to be understood entirely within Western preconceptions."¹⁰⁵ This is not to say that these organizations' criticisms were insignificant but, rather, that they tend to remain committed to promoting liberal political or economic goals, albeit by different means. Put differently, most international NGOs (in the fields of human rights, development, and emergency relief) seemed to accept the view that free and fair elections, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economics are desirable objectives for developing states.¹⁰⁶

For many of these governmental and nongovernmental organizations, liberalization was an uncontroversial solution for reconstituting war-torn societies. No great ideological debates were required to reach this consensus; it emerged almost automatically and without much questioning or comment, reflecting the newfound enthusiasm for liberal democracy and market-oriented economics in the world's leading international organizations, which in turn mirrored the ascendancy of liberal political and economic ideas in world politics at the end of the Cold War. "It is clear," wrote David Chandler in 1999, "that we have witnessed a major transformation in the language

¹⁰¹ Neier 1993, p. 47. ¹⁰² For example, VeneKlasen 1996.

¹⁰³ For example, Oxfam 1995. ¹⁰⁴ Carothers 1994, p. 112.

¹⁰⁵ Williams and Young 1994, p. 98. ¹⁰⁶ Fernando and Heston 1997, p. 14.

and themes of international relations. The international policy agenda today is dominated by issues such as the consolidation of democracy and the protection of rights."¹⁰⁷ This observation applies directly to the international organizations described here, which exhibited a newfound and "unprecedented commitment . . . to the promotion of liberal pluralist arrangements" after the Cold War.¹⁰⁸ As three commentators put it in 1994, "the primary debate now taking place within governments and many international organizations centers not around whether democracy and market-oriented reforms are desirable, but rather around how they can be supported most effectively by external actors, and how best to secure and target the necessary resources."¹⁰⁹ Given all of the changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War – the increased demand for postconflict peacebuilding, the ability of the United Nations and other international agencies to respond to this demand, and the turn toward liberalism both in world politics and in the commitments of the world's leading international organizations – it comes as little surprise that peacebuilding operations would emerge as a growth industry in the post-Cold War era, and that these operations would tend to promote political and economic liberalization.

Indeed, it appears that it was a combination of changes in the power structure of international affairs at the end of the Cold War and a concurrent and related shift in the "cultural" environment of world politics that led the agents of peacebuilding to adopt the strategy of promoting liberalization as a means of consolidating peace in war-shattered states. One could argue that both the Soviet Union and the United States had been conducting their own versions of peacebuilding during the Cold War, within their respective spheres of influence. For the United States, that meant managing internal conflicts by propping up friendly regimes that were often touted as democratic (even if the real character of the regimes was different). For the Soviet Union, dealing with civil conflict within its client states meant building up socialist regimes on the Soviet model. When the Cold War ended, the power structure of world politics changed, and the American version of peacebuilding "won" and was largely adopted by international agencies for the peacebuilding operations of the 1990s. This model was, in a manner of speaking, internationalized.

But changes in the power conditions of world politics tell only part of the story, because there was a related shift in what might be called the international norms of legitimate statehood. The "world polity" school of sociology offers one set of analytical tools for examining this normative change.¹¹⁰ Like other sociologists, members of this school study the norms,

customs, and widely held beliefs – or the "culture" – of human societies, but rather than focusing on the culture of a particular national or religious group, they examine the formal and informal rules of the *international* system, or what they call the "global culture." Among other things, global culture defines who the principal actors in world politics should be, how these actors should organize themselves internally, and how they should behave. From this perspective, the modern state is itself a cultural form that is continuously reproduced because it is widely viewed as the most appropriate model for organizing human societies. At a given moment in history, some states may be considered as more legitimate than others; and it appears that the end of the Cold War gave rise to a historic shift in global culture in which liberal democracy came to be generally perceived as the most legitimate form of the state. This cultural revolution cannot be separated from the power changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War, as noted, but the global culture perspective does help to explain why international organizations seem to have willingly embraced liberalization as the "natural" solution to civil conflict and strategy for peacebuilding.¹¹¹

Liberalization as an All-Purpose Elixir

Decades from now, historians may look back on the immediate post-Cold War years as a period of remarkable faith in the powers of liberalization to remedy a broad range of social ills, from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental destruction. In the statements of government policymakers and the writings of academics, especially in the first half of the 1990s, market democracy took on the qualities of a universal antidote to misery and conflict, "almost mystically endowed with an array of characteristics that are supposed to assure both domestic and international peace and prosperity."¹¹² Writing in 1995, for example, Stanford University's Larry Diamond, coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy*, offered this paean to liberal democracy as a panacea for so many of the world's problems:

The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations

¹⁰⁷ Chandler 1999a, p. 18. ¹⁰⁸ Taylor 1999, p. 555.

¹⁰⁹ Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1994, p. 161.

¹¹⁰ Examples of this school's work include Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer 1980 and 1999; Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987; Boli and Thomas 1997 and 1999; and Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997.

¹¹¹ For an elaboration of this argument, see Paris 2002. ¹¹² Slaughter 1995, p. 1.

and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.¹¹³

At the same time that Diamond was writing these words, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was drafting a major policy statement that later became known as the *Agenda for Democratization*.¹¹⁴ In the report, Boutros-Ghali expressed a similar missionary-like faith in the many benefits of liberal democracy. Given the importance of the UN as a peacebuilding agency and symbol of the international community, and the fact that the organization had been so riven by ideological disputes during the Cold War, the *Agenda for Democratization* is worth quoting at length. According to the secretary-general, "the practice of democracy is increasingly regarded as essential to progress on a wide range of human concerns and to the protection of human rights." These "human concerns," he went on to explain, include interstate and intrastate peace, economic development, cultural enrichment, control of crime and corruption, and protection of the environment:

Because democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable through periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are more likely to promote and respect the rule of law, respect individual and minority rights, cope effectively with social conflict, absorb migrant populations and respond to the needs of marginalized groups. . . . Democracy within States thus fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. . . . Democratic institutions and processes within States may likewise be conducive to peace among States. . . . The legitimacy conferred on democratically elected Governments commands the respect of the peoples of other democratic States and fosters expectations of negotiation, compromise and the rule of law in international relations. When States sharing a culture of democracy are involved in a dispute, the transparency of their regimes may help to prevent accidents, avoid reactions based on emotion or fear and reduce the likelihood of surprise attack. . . .

In today's world, freedom of thought, the impetus to creativity and the will to involvement are all critical to economic, social and cultural progress, and they are best fostered and protected within democratic systems. In this sense, the economic act of privatization can be as well a political act, enabling greater human creativity and participation. The best way to cultivate a citizen's readiness to participate in the development of his or her country, to arouse that person's energy, imagination and commitment, is by recognizing and respecting human dignity and human rights. The material means of progress can be acquired, but human resources – skilled, spirited and inventive workers – are indispensable, as is the enrichment found through mutual dialogue and the free interchange of ideas. In this way, a culture of democracy, marked by communication, dialogue and openness to the ideas and activities of the world, helps to foster a culture of development. . . .

¹¹³ Diamond 1995, pp. 6–7. ¹¹⁴ Boutros-Ghali 1996.

By providing legitimacy for government and encouraging people's participation in decision-making on the issues that affect their lives, democratic processes contribute to the effectiveness of state policies and development strategies. Democratic institutions and practices foster the governmental accountability and transparency necessary to deter national and transnational crime and corruption and encourage increased responsiveness to popular concerns. In development, they increase the likelihood that state goals reflect broad societal concerns and that government is sensitive to the societal and environmental costs of its development policies.¹¹⁵

Boutros-Ghali concluded that the promotion of democracy was essential because "peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked."¹¹⁶

Given all these claims, it would have been surprising if the UN had *not* embraced liberalization as the grand strategy for postconflict peacebuilding, particularly since one of the core arguments in favor of liberalization is that it promotes peace. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the proposition that liberalization fosters peace – sometimes called the "liberal peace thesis" – is a very old idea, dating back to the writings of eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers. Scholars "rediscovered" this idea in the 1980s. It became a major area of social scientific research in the early 1990s, providing timely ammunition to policymakers in national governments and international organizations who were already inclined to believe that democratization and marketization represents the surest route to lasting peace in countries that are just emerging from civil wars.

But to what extent was the peace-through-liberalization proposition based on demonstrated fact? Did democratization and marketization actually create conditions for stable and lasting peace in the countries that hosted peacebuilding operations after the Cold War? These are questions that the remainder of this book will address, after we take a closer look at the liberal peace thesis itself.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., paras. 17, 18, 22, 24. ¹¹⁶ Ibid., para. 118.

Appendix to Chapter 1

The Terminology of Peace Operations

The terminology of peace operations is notoriously slippery. Some commentators use "peacekeeping" as a label for all types of military operations that do not involve outright war fighting, whereas others assign specific labels to different kinds of missions. Following is a short glossary of terms used in this book, including a definition of peacebuilding itself:

- *Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent conflicts from starting in the first place or spreading to neighboring territories.
- *Peacekeeping* is the deployment of a lightly armed, multinational contingent of military personnel for nonenforcement purposes, such as the observation of a cease-fire.
- *Peacemaking* is the attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict, either by peaceful means such as mediation and negotiation, or, if necessary, by the authorization of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict.
- *Peace enforcement* is the threat or use of nondefensive military force to impose, maintain, or restore a cease-fire.
- *Peacebuilding* is action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A *peacebuilding mission* involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a civil war.
- Finally, the generic phrases *peace operations* and *peace missions* refer to any international peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding, or preventive diplomacy operations that include a multinational military force aimed at restoring or preserving peace.

These terms are not mutually exclusive. Peacebuilding, for instance, can involve the deployment of lightly armed, multinational contingents for nonenforcement purposes, and can therefore incorporate elements of peacekeeping. Alternatively, peacebuilding missions may include troops with enforcement rather than peacekeeping duties and powers. Confusion sometimes arises from the fact that peacebuilding operations seek to prevent a recurrence of violence, which is, in effect, a type of preventive diplomacy. Furthermore, peacebuilders can become involved in peacemaking if fighting reignites during a mission.

While it is easy to become entangled in these definitions, two distinguishing features of peacebuilding are worth highlighting. First, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not synonymous. Peacekeeping is a primarily military activity that typically concentrates on cease-fire monitoring, whereas peacebuilding involves a wide variety of both military and nonmilitary functions,

including the administration of elections; the retraining of judges, lawyers, and police officers; the nurturing of indigenous political parties and non-governmental organizations; the design and implementation of economic reforms; the reorganization of governmental institutions; the promotion of free media; and the delivery of emergency humanitarian and financial assistance. The military component of a peacebuilding operation therefore represents only one element in a larger effort to establish the conditions for stable and lasting peace. Second, peacebuilding begins when the fighting has stopped. It is, by definition, a postconflict enterprise. Some commentators use the term more broadly to encompass other types of interventions, including those aimed at preventing violence from erupting in the first place, or what I have labeled preventive diplomacy. However, I have adopted the more common usage: Peacebuilding operations are deployed to consolidate peace in countries that have recently experienced civil conflict, and where hostilities have already ended.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ For example, the U.S. Army field manual on peace operations (United States Army 1994) has defined peacebuilding as "postconflict actions . . . that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict."

The Liberal Peace Thesis

Democracy contributes to safety and prosperity – both in national life and in international life – it's that simple.

– Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, 1997¹

As noted in the Introduction, the idea that liberalization is a remedy for violent conflict is not new; in fact, it was one of the central principles of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy at the end of World War I. Wilson viewed the American model of market democracy as the apogee of political development, and believed that the spread of this model would promote peace in both domestic and international affairs. "Democracy," he proclaimed, "is unquestionably the most wholesome and livable form of government the world has yet tried. It supplies as no other system could the frank and universal criticism, the free play of individual thought, the open conduct of public affairs, the spirit . . . of community and cooperation, which make governments just and public spirited."² Governments that rest "not upon the armed strength of the governors, but upon the free consent of the governed," he added, "seldom coerce their subjects" and use force only as a "last . . . resort."³

When Wilson traveled to France for the Versailles peace conference, he envisaged the creation of a world order based on the democratic self-determination of peoples, constitutional protections of minority rights, free trade and commerce, the opening up of diplomacy to public scrutiny, and the creation of a League of Nations to keep the peace.⁴ "What we seek," he stated, "is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."⁵ His peace proposals focused primarily on the problem of interstate conflict, but he also believed that these principles were essential to domestic or civil peace as well, because

people denied justice and freedom would be prone to disaffection and unrest. "The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of spirit and sense of justice, of freedom, and of right."⁶ A precondition for international peace, then, was political stability within states, which in turn depended on securing the rights of ordinary people and small nations to democratic self-determination. "If you leave a rankling sense of injustice anywhere," he argued, "it will . . . produce a running sore presently which will result in trouble and probably war."⁷ World peace "must be planted on the tested foundations of political liberty."⁸

By applying these ideas to the Versailles settlement, Wilson became the first statesman to articulate what is now called the liberal peace thesis, the notion that democratic forms of government are more peaceful – both in their internal politics and in their international relations – than other forms of government. These ideas dated back at least to the writings of such Enlightenment philosophers as John Locke and Adam Smith. But only when Wilson, a scholar of liberal political theory, became the leader of a rising great power did these principles gain their first politically powerful patron. Today, the president is often remembered for wanting to "make the world safe for democracy," but it would be more accurate to say that he arrived at Versailles wanting to make the world safe *through* democracy.

Revisiting Wilson's beliefs about conflict management is a natural starting point for an investigation of contemporary peacebuilding operations which have been based on a similar set of beliefs, including the assumption that democratization and marketization foster peace in countries just emerging from civil wars. There is, in fact, an interesting parallel between the period immediately following World War I and the post-Cold War years. In both eras, the international community faced a security threat to which it responded with a Wilsonian remedy. For the leaders who gathered at the Palace of Versailles in 1919, the principal challenge was to prevent the recurrence of general war in Europe. At the end of the Cold War, it was the "apparently remorseless rise of ethnic and communal conflict" that became a major challenge for the international community.⁹ There was no grand Versailles-like conference to define the principles for conflict management in the post-Cold War era, but once again Wilson's ideas about war and peace assumed a leading role, and international peacebuilding operations took on a decidedly Wilsonian cast.

At first glance, there are good reasons to expect democratization and marketization to foster peace in war-shattered states. Since the mid-1980s, one of the most extensively studied questions in political science has been

¹ Talbott 1997. ² Quoted in Nottter 1965, p. 109. ³ Wilson 1901, pp. 572–573.

⁴ Wilson 1965, pp. 406–414, 420–422, and 442. ⁵ Quoted in Hofstadter 1948, p. 247.

⁶ Wilson 1965, pp. 411–412. ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁸ Quoted in Knock 1992, p. 121. ⁹ Roberts 1994, p. 6.

the relationship between liberal forms of government and the incidence of both civil and international conflict.¹⁰ The bulk of the recent research is focused on the international dimension of the liberal peace thesis – that is, the relationship between liberalism and *interstate* conflict – and a general consensus has emerged around the finding that market democracies rarely go to war against one another. Several analyses of civil violence have similarly concluded that market democracies are generally less prone to *intrastate* disturbances. Given these findings, political and economic liberalization would appear to be a sensible and promising strategy for consolidating domestic peace in states that are just emerging from civil wars.

At least, this is how UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the chief administrator of the world's most prominent peacebuilding agency, seems to have interpreted this scholarship. "There are many good reasons for promoting democracy," he proclaimed in 2000, "not the least – in the eyes of the United Nations – is that, when sustained over time, it is a highly effective means of preventing conflict, both within and between states."¹¹ What is more, the secretary-general referred directly to the academic literature to back up this claim, noting that "a number of studies do show that democracies have very low levels of internal violence compared with non-democracies."¹² Annan's predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, made similar arguments about the benefits of promoting democracy in war-torn countries, including the assertion that democracy "fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built [and] is the only long-term means of both arbitrating and regulating many political, social, economic and ethnic tensions that constantly threaten to tear apart societies and destroy states."¹³

Polymakers in national governments have also subscribed to this position. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott declared in 1997, "Democracy contributes to safety and prosperity – both in national life and in international life – it's that simple."¹⁴ Indeed, one of the central tenets of the Clinton administration's foreign policy was that of "democratic enlargement," or the spread of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics, on the grounds that market democracies are less hostile in their international relations and less prone to internal violence.¹⁵

But how much do we really know about the pacifying effects of political and economic liberalization, particularly in countries that have recently experienced civil conflict? In fact, as I will argue in the remainder of this chapter, we know very little. Widespread support for the Wilsonian approach to peacebuilding has, to put it simply, rested on little more than hopeful assumptions.

¹⁰ Chan 1997, Ray 1998, and Russett and Starr 2000 review this literature in detail.

¹¹ Annan 2000. ¹² Annan 1999a. See also Annan 2001.

¹³ Boutros-Ghali 1996, paras. 17 and 122. ¹⁴ Talbott 1997. ¹⁵ See Carothers 2000.

Unanswered Questions

Few subjects have attracted more attention from students of political science in recent years than the questions that surround the liberal peace thesis. Are liberal democracies especially peaceful in their international relations or in their domestic politics? If so, under what circumstances, and why? Will efforts to promote market democracy enhance domestic or international peace? Scholars have examined all of these questions since the 1980s and early 1990s, when the liberal peace thesis returned to prominence after decades of neglect.

In 1983, Michael Doyle published an influential article contending that democratic states had seldom engaged in wars with other democracies and had thereby created a "separate peace."¹⁶ Since then, a flurry of studies has scrutinized and elaborated the relationship between liberal democracy and interstate violence.¹⁷ Most of these works have reached conclusions that broadly support Doyle's findings, prompting one scholar to note that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything to an empirical law in international relations."¹⁸ This research continued to develop and grow in new directions during the 1990s and beyond. For example, Bruce Russett and several of his collaborators produced analyses in the late 1990s and early 2000s showing that liberal economic policies also contribute to peaceful relations among democracies.¹⁹

In the meantime, a smaller group of researchers was examining the relationship between market democracy and *intrastate*, or civil, violence. Foremost among them was R. J. Rummel, who found that democracies are considerably less likely than nondemocracies to experience a broad range of domestic disturbances, including "revolutions, bloody coups d'état, political assassinations, antigovernment terrorist bombings, guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, civil wars, mutinies, and rebellions."²⁰ In democratic countries, Rummel wrote,

social conflicts that might become violent are resolved through voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation. The success of these procedures is enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision makers of competitive elections, the crosspressures resulting from the natural pluralism of democratic... societies, and the development of a democratic culture and norms that emphasize rational debate, toleration, negotiation of differences, conciliation, and conflict resolution.²¹

¹⁶ Doyle 1983. See also Doyle 1986. Similar findings had already been published by Babst 1972 and Rummel 1979.

¹⁷ See n. 10. ¹⁸ Levy 1988, pp. 661–662.

¹⁹ Oneal and Russett 1997; Bliss and Russett 1998; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999a, 1999b, and 1999c; Russett and Starr 2000; Oneal and Russett 2001. These arguments are examined in depth in Russett and Oneal 2001.

²⁰ Rummel 1997, p. 85. See also Rummel 1995. ²¹ Rummel 1995, p. 4.

Several subsequent studies reached similar conclusions. In 2001, for example, a group of scholars affiliated with the International Peace Research Institute in Norway published the most comprehensive examination to date of democracy and internal violence, finding strong evidence that well-established liberal democracies are considerably less likely than any other kind of state to experience civil war.²²

Policymakers, commentators, and academics have cited these findings as evidence that international and domestic peace can be enhanced by "exporting" the institutions and practices of market democracy to nondemocratic states, echoing the arguments made by Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Morton Halperin, for instance, has contended that "the United States should take the lead in promoting the trend toward democracy" because democratic governments "are more peaceful and less given to provoking war or inciting violence."²³ According to R. J. Rummel, "just reforming regimes in the direction of greater civil rights and political liberties will promote less violence."²⁴ Joshua Muravchik maintains that spreading democracy is not only "conducive to peace among states, but it can be the key to resolving bloody battles within them,"²⁵ and Larry Diamond has called for democracy promotion because democratic governments "do not ethnically 'cleanse' their own populations and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency," among other reasons.²⁶

Unfortunately, these arguments tend to gloss over an important distinction: Although well-established market democracies may be more peaceful in their internal and international affairs than nondemocracies, the policy of promoting democracy necessarily involves *transforming* a state into a market democracy. Most scholarship on the liberal peace focuses on states that have already made this transition, and therefore offers little insight into the war-proneness of countries that are in the process of becoming market democracies. So while we have learned a great deal in recent years from debates about the relative peacefulness of liberal states, these debates have largely skirted the relationship between *liberalization* and conflict. Those who use the existing liberal peace scholarship to assert that the promotion of democracy will foster peace, either within or between states, typically address only part of the story – the likelihood of the state experiencing civil conflict, or engaging in international conflict, once the transition is complete. Yet any careful analysis of peace-through-liberalization policies must consider both

²² Hegre et al. 2001. See also Krain and Myers 1997. These results appeared to lend support to commentators who claimed that democracy "transfers conflict from the violent to the political arena" (Zartman 1993, p. 327), "inhibits communal rebellion" (Gurr 1993, p. 138), and "encourages marginalized communities to seek justice by nonviolent political means" (Riggs 1995, p. 397).

²³ Halperin 1993, p. 105. See also Smith 1994. ²⁴ Rummel 1997, p. 52.

²⁵ Muravchik 1996, p. 576. ²⁶ Diamond 1995, pp. 6–7.

the end result of a successful transition to market democracy and the effects of the transition itself.

There is, moreover, reason to doubt that liberalization fosters peace. Although most liberal peace scholars have ignored this issue, a few have not, and their findings suggest that transitional countries may be prone to internal and international conflict. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, for example, argue that states undergoing a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule are more likely than either established democracies or nondemocracies to be involved in an international war, because political opportunists in such states often employ belligerent nationalism as a means of building domestic political support.²⁷ Others have reached similar, though more narrowly targeted, conclusions: that transitional states are particularly warlike only in the earliest phases of a transition to democracy,²⁸ or that the greatest danger of international conflict arises from "uneven" transitions (where the state effectively swings back and forth from democracy to autocracy).²⁹ The war-proneness of democratizing states remains a matter of disagreement among scholars, but there is sufficient evidence to be at least skeptical of the notion that the promotion of democracy necessarily enhances international peace.

There is also little agreement on the precise relationship between liberalization and *internal* conflict – a relationship that needs to be clarified, given the international community's propensity to prescribe political and economic liberalization as a remedy for internal violence. Some studies suggest that democratization enhances domestic peace, whereas others find the opposite. One major research project, for example, concludes that substantial changes of "regime type" – including a movement from autocracy to democracy – are often accompanied by increased civil violence.³⁰ Several other studies highlight the apparently conflict-inducing effects of political liberalization efforts in specific countries, including Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka,³¹ Algeria,³² Sudan,³³ Burundi,³⁴ Ethiopia,³⁵ and Nigeria, Uganda, Chad and Pakistan.³⁶ These works offer *prima facie* evidence that democratization may not always be a dependable means of fostering domestic peace and that the transition to democracy may be more destabilizing than the supporters of Wilsonianism contend – although this debate, too, continues.³⁷

We also know relatively little about the connections between marketization and internal violence. While it is plausible that a well-established market economy is particularly conducive to domestic peace,³⁸ some evidence

²⁷ Mansfield and Snyder 1995a and 1995b. See also Snyder 2000.

²⁸ Gleditsch and Hegre 1997. ²⁹ Gleditsch and Ward 2000.

³⁰ Hegre et al. 2001. See also Fearon and Laitin 2003. ³¹ Snyder 2000.

³² Arfi 1998. ³³ Salih 1991; and Deng 1995.

³⁴ Dravis 2000. ³⁵ Ottaway 1994 and 1995.

³⁶ Horowitz 1991. ³⁷ See Sambanis 2002 for a summary of findings.

³⁸ For example, scholars investigating the causes of civil wars have examined the relationship between a country's level of wealth and economic growth rate on the one hand, and the

suggests that marketization has increased, not decreased, civil unrest in a number of countries. After examining the incidence of food riots in several developing countries, John Walton and David Seddon conclude that there is a clear "relationship between widespread popular unrest in the cities of the developing world... and the process of economic and social transformation... associated with a renewed emphasis on liberalization and the promotion of 'free markets.'"³⁹ Other scholars have also described the apparently destabilizing effects of liberal economic adjustment policies in Egypt, Jordan, Nigeria, Burundi, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, Zambia, and Mali, among other places.⁴⁰

In sum, many questions relating to the liberal peace thesis remain unanswered, including the precise relationship between the process of economic and political liberalization and the propensity of states undergoing these transitions to engage in international war or experience internal violence. We know even less about the effects of liberalization in the particular circumstances of states recovering from civil war. Until these questions are answered, the strategy of promoting liberalization as a means of fostering peace will remain an uncertain one. Yet this fact is rarely acknowledged by proponents of Wilsonian approaches to conflict resolution, including those who present democratization and marketization as a generalized formula for peace. Perhaps the prevailing enthusiasm for liberalization as a recipe for peace will ultimately prove warranted, but at present there is little hard evidence to support such a belief.

The Disappearing Leviathan

There is a more fundamental problem with the liberal peace literature as it relates to peacebuilding: It tends to take the existence of *functioning states* as a given. Contributors to the literature have used this assumption to determine whether states with certain types of political regimes (democratic, authoritarian, etc.) or economic systems (market-oriented, state-directed, mixed, etc.) are more peaceful than others. But this methodology offers few insights into the challenges of peacebuilding, because war-shattered states typically lack even the most rudimentary governmental institutions. By taking the existence of a working government for granted, many authors have effectively "assumed away" one of the most difficult and important problems that peacebuilders confront in their field operations: namely, how to establish

incidence of civil conflict on the other, finding (as one might expect) that richer states and states experiencing economic growth are considerably less likely than poorer or recessionary states to experience large-scale internal violence. See *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2002.

³⁹ Walton and Seddon 1994, p. 3.

⁴⁰ See Haggard and Kaufman 1992, p. 337; Skogly 1993, pp. 751–778; Adekanye 1995, p. 368; Ake 1996, p. 118; Ihonvbere 1996a, pp. 196–197; Jeong 1996, pp. 155–167; Kaiser 1996, pp. 227–237; Wright 1997, p. 27; and van de Walle 1997, pp. 26–29.

functioning governments and stable nonviolent politics in conditions of virtual anarchy.

It is interesting to note that the earliest writers on the liberal peace thesis – the classical liberal philosophers of the Enlightenment – were more attuned to the challenges facing modern peacebuilders. Their starting point was typically some form of "natural state" in which a common government did not exist, and their aim was to describe the circumstances in which a society characterized by justice, peace, and prosperity might emerge. John Locke argued that the state of nature would be so "full of fears and continual dangers" – including the peril of being "constantly exposed to the Invasion of others" – that people living in this condition would be compelled to "joyn in Society with others" and create a common government.⁴¹ According to Locke, only one type of government would be compatible with a secure and just peace: a law-based regime operating under constitutional rules and established by popular consent. The creation of a government that ignored such limitations and violated individual liberties would effectively return society to a state of nature, with all of the insecurities this entailed, including fear of physical attack and lawless violence.⁴²

Locke and many of his intellectual successors were consciously responding to Thomas Hobbes's major work, *Leviathan*.⁴³ Hobbes vigorously opposed many of the cardinal principles of liberalism, including constitutional constraints on the power of government, but he pioneered the technique of considering the conditions necessary for transforming a state of nature into a peaceful, stable society – a technique that several classical liberals adopted in their own work. The answer, Hobbes argued, was to confer sovereign authority upon one individual or group of individuals: the Leviathan. Hobbes argued that the powers of the sovereign should not be limited, and that members of society should pledge "not to resist the commands of that man or council that they have recognized as their sovereign."⁴⁴ By contrast, Locke and later liberal theorists rejected the necessity and desirability of authoritarian rule, arguing not only that it unduly threatens individual liberties but also that it stifles the human spirit, violates natural rights, and spawns rebellion and civil unrest – whereas constitutionally limited government provides the basis for durable domestic peace.

However, Hobbes and Locke did have one important thing in common, beyond their shared use of the state of nature as a heuristic device. Both men believed that domestic peace presupposed the existence of governmental institutions capable of defending society against internal and external threats. Locke, for example, argued that rulers should be given sufficient

⁴¹ Locke 1963 [1698], book II, para. 123, p. 395.

⁴² Although Locke's version of the state of nature did not necessarily imply a Hobbesian state of war, he left little doubt that violence and conflict are more prevalent in the state of nature than under "civil" (that is, constitutionally limited) government. See Goldwin 1987, p. 485.

⁴³ Hobbes 1968 [1651]. ⁴⁴ Berns 1987, p. 402.

"prerogative" or freedom of action to respond quickly and forcefully to national emergencies.⁴⁵ The "good of the Society," he argued, requires "that several things should be left to the discretion" of the executive power, "since in some Governments the Law-Making Power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the publick."⁴⁶ He even wrote that the government should be permitted to act above the law in cases of emergency, provided the actions taken are for the "publick good," rather than for private gain.⁴⁷ How Locke reconciled these extraordinary powers with his conception of law-governed rule remains unclear; he seemed to believe, paradoxically, that the last line of defense for constitutional government was to permit leaders to behave as Hobbesian Leviathans – outside of constitutional restraints – in order to preserve the "lives, liberty, and property" of the governed. "In this sense," writes one commentator, "Hobbes makes his presence felt in Locke's Second Treatise."⁴⁸

For Locke, then, limited government was not synonymous with weak government. On the contrary, maintaining a free society required constitutionally constrained – but effective and functioning – governmental institutions. Other classical liberal thinkers shared this view. Adam Smith is remembered for having sought to limit the role of government in economic affairs, believing that the "invisible hand" of the market would promote prosperity and peace, and that allowing people to pursue their interests in relative freedom would foster the "harmonious interplay of very different kinds of human beings living very different kinds of lives without the social whole dissolving into chaos."⁴⁹ But Smith also insisted that government had an essential, if limited, role to play in a well-ordered society. First, it needed to protect against foreign invasion; second, government was necessary for the administration of justice, including the enforcement of contracts; and third, it was needed to build and maintain public works.⁵⁰ In particular, Smith believed that the state had a vital responsibility to establish and maintain the rule of law, without which the benefits of the free market would be lost. "Commerce and manufactures," he declared,

can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith in contracts is not supported by law, and in which

⁴⁵ Locke 1963 [1698], book II, chap. 14, p. 422. ⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 421–422.

⁴⁷ Locke: "[T]he Laws themselves should in some Cases give way to the Executive Power." Ibid., p. 421.

⁴⁸ McClelland 1996, p. 239. On Locke's conception of executive "prerogative" in times of emergency, see Seliger 1968, pp. 59–62.

⁴⁹ McClelland 1996, p. 433.

⁵⁰ Smith 1976 [1776], book IV, chap. 9, pp. 687–688 and 723.

the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.⁵¹

In *Wealth of Nations*, Smith went on to discuss the importance of a "well-regulated standing army," which was essential not only for national defense but also for domestic order.⁵² Sovereigns who could not depend on a loyal and effective army, he asserted, would be more likely to suppress liberty than rulers backed by a steadfast military, because leaders with the support of the army would feel secure enough to permit expressions of public dissent. Consequently, the "degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army."⁵³ Smith's view of a good society thus presupposed the existence of a limited yet functioning state, ultimately backed by the presence of a military force.⁵⁴

Immanuel Kant echoed this sentiment. For him, the ultimate purpose of social life is to permit individuals to develop all of their "natural capacities," which is possible only if human beings are permitted the exercise of their "freedom of will based upon reason."⁵⁵ But Kant also warned of the dangers of unrestricted liberty, or "wild freedom."⁵⁶ In the absence of the rule of law enforced by a central authority, he argued, peaceful coexistence among completely free individuals would be impossible, and would collapse into a "lawless state of savagery."⁵⁷ Peace therefore requires a powerful sovereign – a "supreme authority" – but one whose powers are limited to what is necessary in order to preserve the rule of law, because only by constraining individual liberty through the consistent (and, if necessary, coercive) application of law is it possible to preserve the security and freedom of all.⁵⁸

A final example of the dual emphasis that early liberals placed on limited and effective government comes from *The Federalist Papers*, the classic American statement of liberal political philosophy, principally written by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in the 1780s. Both men railed against "tyranny," by which they meant the invasion of personal liberties by government, and believed that the combination of individual freedom,

⁵¹ Ibid., book V, chap. 3, p. 910. On another occasion he wrote: "The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society from encroaching on one another's property, or seizing what is not their own" (Smith 1976 [1776], p. 689, n. 1).

⁵² Ibid., book II, chap. 3, p. 342; and book V, chap. 1, p. 707.

⁵³ Ibid., book V, chap. 1, p. 707.

⁵⁴ As Joseph Cropsey (1957) writes, "The freedom implicit in the Smithian principle is accompanied by restraint, and the authoritative restraint implicit in the Hobbesian formula is the necessary condition of freedom," although "Smith's principle was intended to, and did, lead to a liberal society, while that of Hobbes need not have done so" (p. 72).

⁵⁵ Kant 1991 [1784], pp. 45 and 43. ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 44–47. ⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 46 and 45.

representative government, and institutional checks on the exercise of power would produce a just and peaceful society. But Hamilton also emphasized the need for government to maintain domestic and external security in moments of crisis. "A firm Union," he wrote, "will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection," and as a guarantor of "internal tranquility."⁵⁹ He argued that a strong executive branch was especially important to public security and for the administration of law, including the protection of individual rights:⁶⁰ "A feeble Executive is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government."⁶¹ Although Madison's contributions to *The Federalist Papers* focused more on constraining than on bolstering governmental power, he echoed Hamilton's view that government was needed as "a bulwark against foreign danger" and a "conservator of peace among ourselves."⁶²

According to these and other classical liberal thinkers – including the French essayist Baron Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, and the British theorist James Mill – successful state building called for a careful balancing of two competing imperatives: limiting the power of the state in order to preserve individual liberty, and endowing government with sufficient means to uphold the rule of law and to protect the constitutional order itself against foreign and domestic threats. These writers rejected Hobbes's argument that an all-powerful ruler was needed to maintain domestic order and social life, but they did not entirely dispense with the Leviathan. They domesticated it. Lasting peace required *both* the protection of individual freedom and the existence of effective governmental institutions, since the alternative to effective government was untenable: the insecure state of nature.

Modern students of the liberal peace have taken a different approach. As noted earlier, they have tended to "bracket" or ignore the question of whether functioning governments exist. While classical liberal theorists recognized the vital role of effective state institutions as a necessary condition for domestic stability, this concern has virtually disappeared from the contemporary liberal peace literature. The Leviathan no longer lurks in the shadows of the liberal state; it is nowhere to be found.

The new character of the liberal peace scholarship limits its application to peacebuilding. For countries just emerging from civil wars, the relevant starting point is something closer to the "state of nature" of early liberal theory, in which government is largely, or entirely, absent. By taking the existence of effective states for granted, the contemporary scholarship offers scant guidance to those engaged in peacebuilding, who face the challenge of *making* governments in the immediate aftermath of civil conflict. This literature

has taught us a great deal about the war-proneness of different types of government, but has shed little light on the potential effectiveness of democratization and marketization as strategies for building peace in war-shattered states. Those who cite this literature to support the Wilsonian approach to peacebuilding – including the two most recent secretaries-general of the UN – have tended to blur the distinction between liberalism and liberalization. Well-established market democracies may, indeed, be more internally and internationally peaceful than other kinds of states, but we still know little about the precise relationship between liberalization and violence, and even less about the effects of democratization and marketization in the specific circumstances of postconflict countries.

Have modern peacebuilders operated on a faulty set of assumptions? Can peacebuilders learn anything from classical versions of the liberal peace thesis, which paid more attention to the problem of constructing stable societies out of conditions of nongovernment? By examining the record of peacebuilding, we can begin to answer these questions.

⁵⁹ Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1992 [1788] (*Federalist No. 9*), pp. 36 and 38.

⁶⁰ Ibid. (*Federalist No. 70*), p. 359. ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 360.

⁶² Ibid. (*Federalist No. 14*), p. 62.