


After the failed international operations in Bosnia and Somalia in the early 1990s, and under significant US pressure, the United Nations temporarily retreated from peacekeeping, especially in Africa.¹ A decade later, however, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told the Security Council that it was once again ‘facing a time of surging demand’ for its peacekeeping operations.² Since the catalyst for the US-led retreat from peacekeeping had been an operation in Africa, it was ironic, if unsurprising, that African wars were now responsible for the rising demand for UN peace operations. Annan’s statement prompted the Brazilian and UK representatives in the Council to declare that the UN was facing problems of overstretch just as it had been in the early 1990s.³ What the ambassadors failed to mention is that overstretch is caused not only by rising

¹ For details of the UN’s retreat and its return to peacekeeping after 1999, see Alex J. Bellamy et al., Understanding peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 75–92.
³ UN doc. S/PV.4970, 14 May 2004, pp. 8–9 and 17.

* Thanks go to Alex Bellamy and Julie Gilson for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this review article.
demand: it also occurs when the UN’s members fail to supply the organization with the resources necessary to maintain international peace and security; and, as generations of peacekeepers will testify, lack of supply has been the rule rather than the exception.

The UN’s almost permanent condition of overstretch has not prevented it from enjoying an unparalleled degree of legitimacy for dealing with issues of international peace and security. It has, however, made it easier for the relevant Permanent Five members of the Security Council (Russia, China, the UK) to create no-go zones or UN peacekeepers in what they consider domestic conflicts in Chechnya, Tibet and Northern Ireland. It has also led some analysts and practitioners alike to cast doubt upon the efficacy of UN operations and, with some justification, suggest that regional organizations, alliances, coalitions or individual states can wield military power and use military force more effectively.

Doubts about the scope and efficacy of UN peacekeeping have, especially since the late 1990s, encouraged a variety of actors to conduct military operations justified with reference to maintaining international peace and security. This trend has in turn intensified concerns about how to coordinate these disparate actors and their multiple chains of command. The three most prominent types of actor that have conducted such operations, in addition to the UN, are:

- regional arrangements, as in the African Union (AU) missions in Burundi (2003–4) and Sudan (since 2004); NATO’s operations in Kosovo (since 1999) and Macedonia (2002–3), and its command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (since 2003); and the European Union’s Operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003);
- coalitions of the willing, as in the Australian-led operation Helpem Fren in the Solomon Islands (since 2003); the French-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003); and the Multinational Interim Force in Haiti (2004); and
- individual states, as in France’s Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire (since 2003); South Africa’s Protection Support Detachment in Burundi (2001–3); and the UK’s Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone (since 2000).

For its part, the UN is currently running 16 peace operations involving approximately 62,300 personnel. In addition, plans are well advanced for a seventeenth operation to deploy to southern Sudan. If this goes ahead, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has estimated these 17 operations

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4 One prominent exception was US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who, prior to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, argued that the alliance did not need UN Security Council authorization because the North Atlantic Council, which at that time comprised 15 liberal democracies, was a more legitimate voice on the use of force than the Security Council, which included many non-democracies. Nevertheless, NATO leaders were very keen to gain UN authorization for the ground operations that followed Operation Allied Force.

5 A UN advance mission has already been deployed to Khartoum, and if the parties involved in the Machakos–Naivasha peace process conclude a political settlement a larger peace operation is set to follow. For details see UN doc. S/2000/763, 28 Sept. 2004.
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will cost an unprecedented $5.18 billion during 2004/5. The bulk of the latest surge in UN peace operations has come since 2003, in the form of the four new missions: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The four new operations all have Chapter VII powers and involve some 31,100 personnel or approximately 50 per cent of all UN peacekeepers.

Three characteristics of the UN’s new operations stand out. First, MINUSTAH, UNMIL and ONUB are returning to states previously vacated by UN operations. The need for these new operations thus provides a salutary warning of what can happen when the UN Security Council ignores violent unrest (as it did in both Haiti and Liberia in the early 1990s), or chooses not to deploy a peacekeeping force (as it did in Burundi after the October 1993 coup). Second, the majority of troops participating in these operations come from the so-called developing world. Of the 31,108 personnel involved, only 1,021 are from the P5—and 596 of these are from the Chinese contingent in UNMIL. The UK’s total contribution to these four new operations is just three troops (all in UNMIL). Third, the new operations all succeeded earlier peace operations undertaken by combinations of regional arrangements, coalitions of the willing and pivotal states: MINUSTAH followed a Multinational Interim Force deployed to Haiti after President Aristide’s departure; UNMIL took over from an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force, ECOMIL; UNOCI assumed the role played previously by a combination of UN and ECOWAS troops and continues to operate in conjunction with French soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire; and in June 2004 ONUB assumed the responsibilities of the African Union’s Mission in Burundi, AMIB. This passing of the peacekeeping baton back to the UN appears to confirm both the organization’s unparalleled international legitimacy and the exhaustion of the financial and human resources of many non-UN peacekeepers.

Once again, therefore, analysts and practitioners alike find themselves asking questions about overstretch, coordination, the appropriate limits of the UN’s peace and security agenda, and how the organization can meet the demands placed on it. The books reviewed here focus on two important challenges facing this array of peacekeepers: state-building and regionalization. Neither challenge is novel, but the recent US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and international society’s collective failure to intervene in what US Secretary of State Colin Powell called genocide in Darfur, Sudan, warrant the renewed attention.
Building market democracies

The first challenge revolves around two questions: should the UN or coalitions of powerful states try to turn war-shattered states into stable market democracies; and, if so, how is this to be done? These questions, in turn, raise issues about the appropriate limits of peacekeeping, the ethics of outsiders governing insiders, and the political visions guiding international attempts to construct systems of governance that can effectively meet local needs. As we shall see, both Simon Chesterman and Roland Paris suggest that peacekeepers should rise to the challenge of building market democracies, but they are both deeply critical of the methods currently being employed to do so. The central policy dilemma is that although state-building projects conducted by the UN enjoy a unique degree of legitimacy and are therefore more likely to win the support of the local population concerned—a crucial ingredient for the success of any transitional administration—the UN’s capacity to undertake such operations is fundamentally restricted by the way in which its most powerful members keep it perpetually underresourced.

In You, the people, Chesterman provides a detailed and incisive analysis of the history, politics and problems of transitional administrations. Drawing primarily on events in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, he highlights the many practical obstacles that would-be state-builders have tried—and often failed—to overcome in relation to peace and security, the role of the UN as government, judicial reconstruction, economic reconstruction and exit strategies (including elections).

The book makes two main contributions to understanding the challenges of state-building. First, it provides a typology of transitional administrations that usefully highlights how administrators face different challenges in different political contexts. Chesterman’s first category is missions that represent the ‘final act of decolonisation leading to independence’ such as those in Namibia (1989–90) and East Timor/Timor Leste (1999–2002). Second, there are temporary administrations designed to facilitate the peaceful transfer of control to an existing government, such as those in West New Guinea (1962–3), Western Sahara (since 1991) and Eastern Slavonia (1996–8). A third type of temporary administration is designed to help oversee the governance of a state until the holding of elections, as in Cambodia (1992–3). Fourth, there are interim administrations that form part of a peace process that is still under way without an explicit end state or exit point. Examples of such ‘benevolent autocracies’ include Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995) and Kosovo (since 1999). In practice, Chesterman argues, these administrations have suffered from peace agreements ‘that were aimed at stopping the fighting rather than consolidating the peace’ (p. 83). In Kosovo’s case this has left a territory in ‘political limbo’ that is thus likely to ‘remain an
international protectorate of ambiguous status for some years to come’ (p. 135).
The fifth category is de facto administrations where outsiders have assumed ‘responsibility for basic law and order in the absence of governing authority’, as in Congo (1960–64), Somalia (1993–5) and Sierra Leone (since 1999). Chesterman also discusses the international operations in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. He is not optimistic about the prospects for state-building conducted within the political confines imposed by the US-led ‘war on terrorism’, nor does he believe that the UN’s ‘light footprint’ model in Afghanistan can be replicated elsewhere. Consequently, Chesterman warns that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) may represent ‘the high-water mark of UN transitional administrations’ (p. 97).

Chesterman’s second main contribution to this debate is his contention that transitional administrations are inevitably plagued by three tensions: inconsistency, inadequacy and irrelevance. As he puts it, in different ways these inherent tensions challenge ‘the very idea of creating a legitimate and sustainable state through a period of benevolent autocracy: the means are inconsistent with the ends, they are frequently inadequate for those ends, and in many situations the means are irrelevant to the ends’ (p. 239). On the inconsistency between means and ends, Chesterman argues that the idea that transitional administrations depend upon the consent or ‘ownership’ of the local populations is both inaccurate and counterproductive: ‘inaccurate because if genuine local control were possible then a transitional administration would not be necessary; ‘counter-productive because insincere claims of local ownership lead to frustration and suspicion on the part of local actors’ (p. 239). On the inadequacy of the means provided, two issues stand out. First, powerful states have often failed to provide the resources (finance, civilian police, lawyers, etc.) that they have pledged, or have let them arrive late. But while resources are vital, success is not simply a matter of increasing the volume of assistance. As Chesterman points out, Bosnians received more per capita assistance than Europe did under the Marshall Plan, but it has not produced a stable liberal democracy. This is partly because of incoherence between funding programmes and partly because of a lack of a coherent political strategy. Second, transitional administrations, like other peace operations, are susceptible to what Chesterman calls the ‘attention deficit disorder’ that pervades the foreign policies of many states (p. 253). For instance, perhaps because of its geographical proximity to Europe, Kosovo has received 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a per capita basis than Afghanistan (p. 246). On the charge of irrelevance, Chesterman suggests that the administrators have often failed to find the appropriate balance between demands for high international standards—in health, education, policing, criminal justice, etc.—and the need for institutions to be sustainable when the administrators leave. Importantly, sustainability includes protecting the local economy from the ‘perverse effects’ of a considerable contingent of highly paid ‘transient internationals’ (pp. 200–202).
In spite of these tensions, Chesterman suggests that the record of past and current failure is not inevitable. If local politics are taken seriously and if diaspora communities can be harnessed to build ‘peace’ rather than ‘war’ economies, ‘the personalities of local and international staff can change the course of an operation’ (p. 6). Overall, therefore, Chesterman concludes that transitional administrations are worth undertaking despite their colonial undertones. Indeed, his primary problem ‘is not that transitional administration is colonial in character’ but ‘that sometimes it is not colonial enough’ (p. 12).

The idea that peacebuilders ‘have little choice but to act “illiberally” in the earliest phases’ of transitional administrations is also defended in Roland Paris’s important new book, *At war’s end* (p. 209). In essence, this is nothing less than a call to remake the world’s war zones in the West’s image, albeit combined with a plea that the peacebuilders change their current methods. Drawing on empirical evidence from 14 peacebuilding operations launched between 1989 and 1999, Paris suggests that all these missions assumed that turning war-shattered states into market democracies (states with a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy) offered the best means for building zones of stable peace.11 Paris supports the long-term objective of building market democracies but is highly critical of the ways in which peacebuilders have ignored the damaging and destabilizing effects of pushing this ‘naïve version of Wilsonianism’ too far, too fast (p. 7).12 For Paris, a big part of the problem has been the tendency of peacebuilders to pay too much attention to contemporary advocates of rapid marketization and democratization while ignoring the warnings of classical liberal thinkers who emphasized the importance of ‘authoritative and effective … government as a precondition for domestic peace’ (p. 152). In this sense, Paris exposes some important ‘blind spots’ in the literature exploring the liberal democratic peace: specifically, the processes through which war-shattered states can be transformed into market democracies and whether liberalization represents ‘a reliable remedy for civil violence’ (p. 56).

Although mature market democracies may well resolve peacefully their internal conflicts and external disputes with other states they consider liberal, war-shattered states embarking on the transition towards market democracy are susceptible to what Paris calls five ‘pathologies’: (1) the problem of ‘bad’ (non-liberal) groups within civil society; (2) the opportunistic behaviour of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who garner political support by exploiting intercommunal distrust; (3) the risk that elections may serve as focal points for destructive societal competition; (4) the danger posed by local saboteurs who may win

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11 The 14 operations occurred in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Paris excludes missions that involved fewer than 200 international military personnel, did not follow a civil war (such as in Haiti), or took place in the midst of a continuing conflict (as in Somalia).

12 Although he does not discuss the issue in any detail, Chesterman also suggests that the strategy behind transitional administrations contains ‘an implicit deference to the “democratic peace” thesis’: *You, the people*, pp. 205–6.
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power democratically but then sabotage the transition to democracy to perpetuate their own rule; and (5) the disruptive and conflict-inducing effects of economic liberalization (pp. 159–68). War-shattered states are especially vulnerable to these pathologies because of their recent history of intense societal conflicts, their lack of traditional conflict-dampeners such as a tradition of non-violent dispute settlement, and their lack of effective political institutions (pp. 168–75).

Paris’s solution to the state-building challenge is what he calls the ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’ (IBL) approach. This recognizes that the processes of democratization and marketization are ‘inherently tumultuous transformations that have the potential to undermine a fragile peace’ (p. 7). In policy terms, IBL entails delaying democratic and market-oriented reforms until effective domestic institutions have been established. During the interim period, peacebuilders should manage democratization and marketization through a series of incremental and deliberate steps ‘designed to anticipate and avert’ the five pathologies (p. 8). This includes postponing elections until moderate political parties have been established and mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with election results; designing electoral rules that reward moderation rather than extremism; encouraging non-violent and intercommunal civic associations; regulating incendiary ‘hate speech’; promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions; and developing effective security institutions and a professional, neutral bureaucracy (pp. 187–207). On the basis of evidence from peacebuilding operations in Kosovo and East Timor, Paris detects a limited shift towards IBL. In contrast, he considers the news from Sierra Leone and Afghanistan since late 2001 as indicative of regression and a failure to learn from previous mistakes—most notably those in Angola and Rwanda.

Paris anticipates three criticisms of IBL (pp. 207–11). First, in response to the charge that peacebuilders will become bogged down in endless missions, Paris maintains that longer missions are inevitable if the stated aim of peacebuilding (to create a self-sustaining peace) is taken seriously. Instead of the one to three years scheduled for peacebuilding operations in the 1990s, they should be expected to last at least five years and probably much longer. For those who grumble at the ‘excessive costs’ of these longer and bigger missions, Paris points out that they remain very cost-effective when compared to military responses to civil wars and would still require only a tiny fraction of the world’s military expenditures. For Paris, the most serious criticism of IBL is that it will encourage a culture of dependency within host populations. His response is that, for the foreseeable future at least, there are few alternatives on offer to the external management of transitions. Here, like Chesterman, Paris suggests that constructing partnerships between local liberals and foreign peacebuilders will be crucial.

Paris’s IBL solution to the state-building challenge would undoubtedly represent a significant improvement on previous practices, and At war’s end
deserves to become the essential text on peacebuilding operations for practitioners and analysts alike. Nevertheless, several aspects of how his solution would work in practice remain hazy. First, it is unclear why state institutions that can effectively provide for their citizens’ economic and security needs in the aftermath of civil war should then undergo further market reforms. Paris’s implicit defence of building effective institutions and then liberalizing them seems to rest on his faith in the liberal peace thesis. However, he does not engage with the extensive political economy literature discussing the pros and cons of the different forms of capitalist economies adopted in, for instance, the United States, continental Europe and Japan. In short, national economies can be liberalized in different ways, and Paris does not make his preference among them clear. In my opinion, the important point is to ensure that the tendency of market-oriented economies to generate inequality between groups—an oft-cited cause of violent conflict—is balanced by institutions capable of ensuring that no individuals fall below a basic floor of human rights standards. With this in mind, it is important to recall that the adoption of neo-liberal economic reforms in general, and the increasing marketization of land in particular, has sparked armed conflict in even relatively stable states, as the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico, attests.

Second, IBL does not in itself provide answers to important questions about the final status of territories, like Kosovo, which international society decides to adopt temporarily but indefinitely. As Chesterman points out, administrators need to be clear from the outset about the preferred final status of a given territory or the mechanisms that will decide this. Temporarily overseeing the construction of neutral bureaucratic institutions for an old or new state is a very different type of enterprise from administering a territory trapped in political limbo. In short, after civil wars, IBL does not tell practitioners what kind of governance structures they should be building.

Finally, it is unclear which agencies should direct IBL projects. Paris’s preferred option is for ‘a new central international agency (either inside or outside the existing structure of the UN) that would be dedicated to postconflict peacebuilding’ (p. 230). This is a sensible proposal which might just be able to overcome the lack of coordination that has plagued so many peacebuilding operations. However, until such an agency exists, Paris is left to ponder how ‘the international community’—a phrase he unfortunately does not deconstruct—will respond. I agree entirely with Paris that for the world’s most powerful states to ignore civil wars would be both ‘heartless and foolish’, while maintaining the status quo is suspect for all the reasons he has so ably outlined. I am also persuaded that IBL—with a bit more scrutiny of the ‘L’—is the best alternative currently available. But the question remains: who will implement it now? The parochial nature of the US political system, its aversion

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to long and costly foreign expeditions unrelated to its vital national security
interests, and its army’s dislike of peacekeeping make the United States highly
unsuited to leading peacebuilding operations. The other obvious steward for
Paris’s IBL strategy is the UN Security Council. However, given Paris’s legiti-
mate concerns about the dangers of trying to conduct IBL ‘half-heartedly’ or
‘on the cheap’, the fact that the UN’s most powerful members seem content
for the organization to exist in an almost permanent condition of overstretch is
a major problem. Indeed, the second challenge facing the world’s peacekeepers
reflects the fact that the P5 have been keener to invest in the regionalization of
international peace and security than in the UN’s universal structures.

The limits of regionalization

The challenge of regionalization involves finding the appropriate relationship
between the UN and regional peacekeepers. In theory, the relationship is spelt
out reasonably clearly within the UN Charter: regional arrangements are
permitted to take the lead in the peaceful resolution of disputes within their
neighbourhood but are required to keep the Security Council informed of their
activities and seek its authorization to conduct enforcement measures. Practice,
however, has not followed the Charter’s theory. Not only has the neat division
between Chapter VI (peacekeeping) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement)
operations rarely matched realities on the ground, but regional arrangements
have engaged in enforcement activities without Security Council authorization,
as was the case with ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 and again in 2003. Since the
wars of Yugoslav succession, Europe has experienced the most intensive colla-
boration between the UN and various regional arrangements, especially the
EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). However, arguably the biggest obstacles to building regional security
have come in Africa, where four regional organizations have recently conduc-
ted peace operations involving military personnel.\(^{14}\) Sometimes these operations
have involved collaboration with the UN; sometimes they have not.

Like the evolution of UN peacekeeping, the regionalization of peace and
security has developed in an ad hoc manner in response to specific regional
crises. *The United Nations and regional security* takes as its starting point the fact
that Europe in general and the Balkan area in particular has been the site of the
most intense collaboration—and disputes—between the UN and regional
arrangements. The challenge for international peacekeeping, as Louise Fawcett
notes, is not which regional actors to empower—the UN has adopted a relaxed
attitude on this issue—‘but how to determine their remit and relationship to
the UN’ (p. 12). As the volume’s chapters emphasize, there can be no

doctrinaire answers.

\(^{14}\) The African Union (Burundi and Sudan); the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(the Central African Republic); ECOWAS (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire);
and the Southern African Development Community (Lesotho and the DRC).
The volume’s central focus is on the continuing operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and the practical questions about how the relationships among the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE and Russia can be made to work more effectively in the areas of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, law and order, and security sector reform. However, it also reflects upon the regionalization of peace and security outside Europe. Here it is quickly apparent that different strategic and security cultures have influenced the approach of regional organizations to international peace and security issues. Sometimes these cultural values have encouraged an organization’s entire membership to adopt a common policy response; sometimes they have not. The contributors suggest that in Asia and Latin America, for instance, regional organizations have acted primarily as norm-builders in the field of peace and security rather than peacekeepers as such. In contrast to NATO and, more recently, the EU, organizations in these regions have been unwilling to use force collectively, either within or beyond their borders. In the Americas, as Monica Herz observes, this tendency was exemplified by the reluctance of many members of the Organization of American States to join the UN-authorized enforcement action in Haiti in 1994 or to take tough measures to resolve Colombia’s civil war. In Asia, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum have been primarily concerned with conflict prevention and have held back from the collective use of force against one of their own members, as demonstrated during East Timor’s struggle for independence.

In Africa, on the other hand, regional organizations have been willing to use force in the continent’s wars, but their initiatives have highlighted a variety of problems ranging from the partisan interests of local hegemons to the lack of capacity for robust peacekeeping. Whether the lack of indigenous capabilities can be overcome by the EU’s latest proposal to train 20,000 AU peacekeepers and potentially deploy up to 10,000 of its own troops on peace operations in the continent by 2006 remains to be seen.\(^\text{15}\) Similarly, it is too early to tell whether the AU will assume a leading peacekeeping role or whether it will continue to defer to the continent’s subregional organizations. Article 4(h) of the new Union’s charter permits collective intervention in ‘grave circumstances’, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, giving it wider scope for action than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Rather confusingly, however, in February 2003 the Union extended the grounds for collective intervention to include the potentially conservative and undefined notion of a ‘serious threat to legitimate order’. And although the AU has been handed a leading role in responding to the crisis in Darfur, its unwillingness even to consider armed intervention suggests that its members are unlikely to make regular use of Article 4(h).\(^\text{16}\) In addition, the Union’s evident relief at handing the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) over to the


\(^{16}\) The exception was the Rwandan government, whose troops in the AU’s Protection Force suggested that they would use force to prevent attacks on local civilians.
UN suggests that Africa’s current division of peacekeeping labour is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Some of the reasons behind the activism of Africa’s subregional arrangements and their relationship with the UN are discussed in Jane Boulden’s very useful edited collection *Dealing with conflict in Africa*. In recent years African affairs have occupied approximately 60 per cent of the Security Council’s time, and approximately 80 per cent of all UN peacekeepers are now deployed in peace operations on the continent.\(^\text{17}\) And yet, as Chesterman notes, it is revealing that, despite these statistics and the continent’s obvious need, the Security Council has not established a major transitional administration in Africa (pp. 242–3). Instead, Africans have had to rely on more traditional forms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These are discussed in detailed case-studies of the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia–Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi and the DRC. Boulden’s volume highlights the frequently contradictory signals on African conflicts that have emanated from New York and the at times frosty relationship between the UN and regional organizations on the continent. She concludes that while the weight of African and international opinion desires greater UN leadership and involvement in the continent’s wars, two main difficulties have emerged. First, the UN has had to overcome the tainted legacies of its earlier decisions. For example, its failures in Rwanda have left a lasting impression on the Kagame regime and Africans more generally, local memories of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) mission (1960–64) resurfaced to hinder MONUC’s operations, and the UN’s late arrival in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone has not helped its attempts to build local trust.

Second, and more damagingly, the world’s most powerful states have proved consistently unwilling ‘to take on the high risks and costs associated with dealing with conflict in Africa’ (p. 314). After the Cold War, Africa’s diminished priority in the eyes of the great powers resulted in the absence of UN peacekeeping operations from several of the continent’s most destructive wars, including those in Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zaire/DRC. This, in turn, forced the continent’s regional arrangements to act; and, in the absence of an effective response from the OAU, other, subregional organizations filled the gap. Three things were noticeable about how they did so. First, as Boulden notes, the UN’s refusal to deploy peacekeepers until after a peace agreement had been signed often meant that the hardest tasks had to be performed by regional organizations with a limited capacity for, and experience of, peacekeeping (pp. 308–9). Second, the operations conducted by Africa’s regional arrangements rarely conformed to the procedures set out in the UN Charter, but the Security Council has not condemned these breaches of protocol—in stark contrast to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, which generated international uproar primarily because it was conducted without Security Council authorization (pp. 15–18). Finally, with the exception of

recent UK operations in Sierra Leone and the French-led initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and the DRC, P5 engagement with peacekeeping in Africa since the debacle in Somalia has consisted primarily of technical assistance, finance and training provided through a variety of assistance programmes. The damning verdict delivered by Eric Berman and Katie Sams is that these programmes have been ‘relatively insignificant’ and frequently have offered only ‘too little, too late’ (pp. 66–7). The EU’s recent decision to earmark battle-groups of its own soldiers for peace operations in Africa would appear to reinforce their conclusion. It also highlights the inherent limitations of regionalization.

The main voice of (persuasive) dissent against the idea that regionalization offers a panacea for the problems of maintaining international peace and security comes from Michael Pugh’s chapter in The United Nations and regional security. Pugh’s concerns are hardly novel, but they bear reiteration given the extraordinary emphasis placed on finding ‘regional/African solutions’ to what many people believe was genocide in Darfur. First, Pugh rightly notes that the logical conclusion of regionalization is to undermine the UN’s moral authority as the custodian of universal principles and, crucially, entitlements by implying that people should receive only the level of peacekeeping their own region can provide. Second, successive US administrations have clearly been less interested in regional organizations than in effective power projection—hence Washington’s post–Cold War focus on ‘assertive multilateralism’, coalitions, and ‘pivotal’ and ‘anchor’ states. In such a context, ‘regionalization’ can quickly become a façade for harnessing regions to a hegemonic agenda and what Pugh calls ‘proxy policing’. Third, the capacity and spread of regional organizations remains highly uneven, with some of the world’s most unstable areas lacking any effective regional structures for maintaining peace and security. Fourth, regional arrangements generally come with hegemons attached. Of course, the UN has five hegemons of its own; but the regional variety usually operates without the non–state inputs that Security Council decision-making now enjoys. In addition, the UN system possesses greater international legitimacy and far more practical experience of peacekeeping than any regional arrangements. Finally, Pugh cautions that debates about regionalization have done little to address the current structural inequalities within the global political economy. Indeed, he makes the important point that our collective ideas about what constitutes ‘peace and security’ have become deeply entangled with a particular, liberal capitalist construction of the global economy—so much so that it has become heretical to suggest that the liberal peace could be a possible source of insecurity as well as the self-evident solution. If this is the case, then although the challenges of state-building and regionalization may be felt most sharply by the world’s peacekeepers, they cannot overcome them alone.