External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

Tajikistan

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External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

An Introduction To The Project

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The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can - to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition? While much research effort has been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has so far been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence, but succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity. Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical with regard to the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. The empirical evidence seems indeed to suggest that countries rarely emerge from war as democracies. When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after WWII (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission or not), we find little reason for optimism. Only 10% of the countries that experienced civil wars reached a polity score of +7 or higher (approximately like Kenya, Moldova or Mali) two years after war ended. 53% all war-affected countries show a polity score of -5 or lower two years after the end of civil war, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. 37% have a polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan (all data is from Sambanis, Nicholas, with Michael Doyle, 2000: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, in: American Political Science Review 94: 4, 779 - 801). The picture looks similarly gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52% have a polity score of -5 or lower; 39,4% have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10,6% have a score of +7 or higher. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia or Macedonia in the post cold war period, to name only a few. What made these cases of post-war democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.
The study of post-war democratization is a relatively new field, and there is surprisingly little empirical scholarly work devoted to the factors that allow a post-war country to become both stable and democratic. This can partly be explained by the fact that the two bodies of literatures, which are relevant for such an endeavor, are concerned with only one half of the problem. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peace building is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy or not is typically not of interest to this body of literature. This division of labor may explain why there is only a very small literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes which are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or is it perhaps a consequence of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that post-war countries are in essence a sub-class of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases sui generis.

The researchers involved in this project think that post-conflict cases are fundamentally different from transition cases, and they assume that these differences may have an impact on the factors which affect peace and democracy. If this is true, then it is necessary to account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same, or do not necessarily have the same impact, in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy respectively do not necessarily simply add up, but that they may cancel each other out. One implication of this is then that we have to disaggregate the concept of “success” into sub-concepts. One way of doing this is to individually look at “absence of war”, “democratic quality of the regime” and “state capacities”. While these three concepts may merge in the case of fully established democracies, we argue that for countries emerging from war we need to disaggregate them in order to be able to empirically explore which sequences and combinations are most conducive to the normatively desirable outcome: stable democracies at peace.

The Research Design

Given these challenges, we opted for a case study oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms. Case studies allow researchers to treat cases a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causation and which may lead to the identification of typological sub-classes. Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons; and finally, small-n research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets, because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data which they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We collaborated with an international team of country experts, who prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2008 and December 2009. Our sample covers cases on Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Haiti. We deliberately chose cases from the post cold-war period only,
because our main interest is the contribution of external actors to post-war democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peace building missions became fashionable and feasible after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s.

**The Universe of Cases**

The universe of cases consists, theoretically, of all civil wars that came to an end after 1989. We count 52 cases (Data from Doyle/Sambanis 2000). Our main interests is the question of whether and how countries that were affected by large-scale violence can emerge as stable and democratic polities, and we are particularly interested in the impact of external support to this outcome. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war; post-conflict countries can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic polities; and post-conflict countries could emerge as democratic, yet unstable polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in our sample. Furthermore, we also want to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the amount of external support for democracy. Hence, we have four different outcomes, and two different values on our main independent variable. This can be depicted in a table with 2 x 4 cells. In order to group the cases into the cells, we have to define measures for stability, democracy and external support. Because this is not for analytical-descriptive purpose, but for sampling, we do this in a fairly rough and ready way. We classify countries that are still at peace five years after the war ended as stable. We classify countries as democratic when they reach a polity IV score of 10 or higher five years after the war ended. We proxy the amount of external support by the type of UN mission. Countries in which a complex peace building mission, or a peace enforcement mission, took place are coded as having received high external support. For all coding we rely on a data set compiled by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Sambanis 2000).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stable and democratic</th>
<th>Stable and undemocratic</th>
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<td><strong>Low or no external support</strong></td>
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<td>India-Sikh</td>
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The next table groups all cases in the eight cells. Case in bold were included in our sample:
In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. Only then did the authors shorten the studies turning them into condensed analytical narratives. The original versions of the reports are accessible at the project’s webpage.

The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security”, “democracy” and “state capacities” into sub-concepts: With regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? By security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of organized violence (e.g. criminal violence). By state capacity, we refer to the capacity of the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement them. In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and redeploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input

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1 The Template is available here: [http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html](http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html)

legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors (such as long-term economic development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy), about war-related factors (such as duration and type of war, numbers of fractions, level of war-related destruction, and quality of any peace agreement) which may have had an impact on the countries’ capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy such as linkages and integration; it then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention focusing on both military and non-military aspects. We are interested in state-reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures, and in the question of how intrusive these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure and/or persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences and constraints. These questions allow us to reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of external intervention; we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows in the conflict country and to assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. This section inquires about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid where available. Experts provided annual figures for: elections and political processes; rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights; institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administrative capacity); civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform. Please note that these are our generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the OECD-DAC, and that this data should be treated as illustrative rather than complete for most case studies due to a lack of availability of such information. Finally, we asked our experts to indentify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

**The Case Studies**

The case studies are available from our website. We think that they provide a valuable source of fine-grained data which help us to better understand the processes which lead to a much desired, yet rare outcome: A successful transition from war to peace and democracy.
TAJIKISTAN CASE STUDY

Anna Matveeva

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tajikistan is a case of a conflict remote from international politics and low-profile on the geopolitical agenda. Juxtaposed between Russia and Afghanistan, seemingly high-level priorities, Tajikistan nevertheless found itself as backwater of both. Low significance of the country meant that the international community’s commitment and resources have been lukewarm. It followed only a light footprint in Tajikistan and its ability to decisively shape post-war political arrangements was limited. Thus, in our continuum it is an interesting contrasting case of a fully-fledged civil war with massive displacement and destruction which received relatively little international attention. It enables us to study post-war processes in a relatively pure form, unmarred by external intervention. Virtually stripped of international post-conflict mantra, inter-Tajik war and peace provide us with a number of insights.

Firstly, a hurting stalemate does happen and can lead to a power sharing agreement. For this to happen, the war should be a relatively short affair, so that the parties do not lose sight of political agendas and before warlordism creates an alternative social and security order to that of a central state. It is also important for the protagonists to either go after attainable ideological goals or to have aspirations amorphous enough for them not to obscure the protagonists’ material interests.

Secondly, it is possible to rebuild a state after a devastating war and regain its strength in control of territory, provision of security and of a modest welfare. However, when regime stability is rebuilt after a war, democracy is not really on the agenda. By contrast, staying power of the inherited Soviet institutions, and habits and expectations shared by the population of what ‘normal life’ looks like, was a key variable, which enabled the process of state-building.

Thirdly, understanding of what democracy is varies hugely depending on circumstances. Initially, it was regarded as an alternative to the Soviet system, which was seen as a failure. Democracy had been equated with prosperity, liberty and national expression. Popular demand for democracy per se in a sense of orderly political competition did not exist, neither among the elites nor population. At the outset of the civil war democratic aspirations of the elite were present, but as violence broke out, pro-democracy agenda was quickly surmounted by Islamic slogans, which had a much wider appeal and mobilisation power. The society that emerged out of the war had few reasons to care about democracy. A brief experiment with democracy was seen as bringing about the civil war, poverty and rise in intergroup tensions. On the contrary, the Soviet period of ‘no democracy, but of peace and welfare’ came to be viewed as positive.

Fourthly, when the efforts of external players are disjointed at a crucial post-war period and the regime is skilled in political manipulation, it can get away with significant gains in power concentration. In Tajikistan the peace process was mediated both by the international community and Russia, with the latter exercising moderate
pressure on parties to compromise. Remarkably, after the signing of the Peace Accords Russian and international community’s involvement were absolutely disconnected. The decision not to work with Russia which had significant leverage over the Tajik government resulted in depriving the West of a chance to form a common agenda and eventually led to the emergence of an alternative pole of attraction the government could turn to in an hour of need.

As a result, once the deal was in place, external actors did not exercise much influence over the unfolding process, which saw the strengthening of the winners grip on power, and the emergence of an authoritarian regime. The international community was ill-equipped to deal with the Tajik government on its own and lacked tangible sticks and carrots which Russia had. Thus, failure to engage Russia in an immediate post-conflict phase led to a situation when the government was in a position to effectively undermine the power-sharing deal during the first five years after peace was agreed upon.

Fifthly, the security-democracy nexus is a central dilemma for the leadership. Since the civil war was prompted by the presidential elections of 1991 and social forces it unleashed, the leadership learnt a bitter lesson that an uncontrollable expression of grievances cannot be allowed and opposition should be kept firmly in check. This perception is largely shared across the board by the elites and the population.

Sixthly, democracy is a hostage to reputation of those who promote it. As the ‘West’ was seen in positive terms during the Soviet collapse, its moral message had some resonance. Following the changed international climate and revival of the Cold War rivalries, democracy-promotion merged with geopolitics and was no longer regarded as a value in its own right. Although the US policy in Tajikistan was less proactive than in other contexts, its democratic crusade was received as pursuit of interests in disguise and as determined to push Russia out of its backyard. ‘Coloured’ revolutions brought the message home that democracy promotion can lead to regime change.

In the period under scrutiny, the main bulk of donor assistance in non-humanitarian field went into governance and institutions strengthening. However, implementation capacity remains weak, relationship to democracy is at best unclear and it is doubtful to what extent the government is dedicated to the ‘reform agenda’ that the international community seeks to promote. Overall, it does not appear that there was much relationship between how democratic the country is and how much aid it receives. In the 2000s the democratisation agenda became intermingled with geopolitics and western security interests to the extent that it started to lose meaning in its own right. Seemingly workable alternatives to democracy became available.

Evaluating external influences on democratic development, the conclusion is that they were fairly negligible. The reasons are as follows.

- Timing was not right. The period between 1997 when Peace Accords were signed and 2001 when international engagement scaled up, was the crucial period during which the domestic politics shaped up, yet it experienced only low-key external involvement.
- Goals of the interveners were intermixed and at times conflicted with each other. Different actors involved in Tajikistan were involved for different
reasons and sought to project their own vision of what situation in Tajikistan is about. Initially, the main goal was internal peace and stability, giving way to the ‘peacebuilding’ approach. Democracy-promotion was seen as a part of this approach, but not perceived as a goal in itself. After 2001 intervention into Afghanistan the matters were further complicated by the emergence of the security agenda relevant for the West, which necessitated cooperation with the government.

- Understanding of how Tajik government and regional elites in reality work, and what are the power equations and interests at stake was deficient among the international community. Often, external recipes and demands made little sense within given conditions. The government could not possibly implement them, as they would have jeopardised serious interests of influential groups and individuals.

Affected by the post-Communist transition paradigm, the international community attached exaggerated significance to the formal attributes of democracy, such as elections and political party development. It seldom engaged in political education, consultation and capacity-building, beyond reconstruction and humanitarianism, on the district and local levels where the state control has been looser, where the administrations need to secure cooperation of the population to get things done, making them more responsive to people’s needs and where the need for international development assistance is the greatest.

The argument that more democracy leads to more inter-group tensions in Central Asia still holds true, as demonstrated by the 2005 ‘revolution’ in the more democratic Kyrgyzstan and continuous turmoil the country experienced thereafter. Given free choice, the population in Tajikistan is likely to vote on grounds other than merit and according to kinship/regional affiliations, the process which can pit groups against each other. The difference with the past is that at present money plays a more important role than before and rich people would be the likely beneficiaries of democratic politics. Tajik nationalism is a more tangible commodity and can be used against minorities, further decreasing their stake in politics and business. If democracy is ever to have a chance, a transition period starting with the local level may be the way forward.

Despite authoritarian tendencies of the central state, there are still important achievements. Warlordism is over and security is firmly entrenched. Tajikistan has the only Islamic political party among the post-Soviet states represented in the parliament. The capacity of the state institutions has increased and they fulfil an important function of maintenance of social order, even if they hardly promote development.

In the end, external actors cannot substitute domestic demand for democracy with funds or know how of democracy promotion. If post-conflict situation calls for stabilisation and it is being delivered by the regime, ‘democrats’ can be easily viewed as enemies of stability. Citizens on the whole have low expectations on the leaders’ conduct while in power and anticipate that they will be corrupt and bring relatives into politics. Changing one group for the other does not make huge sense. Democracy will only take root when politics would be about ideas and policies rather than competition for power and money. Security and welfare come first, and that is what matters.
The case study will analyse the situation of Tajikistan, a small and landlocked post-Soviet country located on the borders of Afghanistan and China. The period under scrutiny is from 2003 to 2008, but covers events since 1991 when independence was established.

SECTION A: DEFINING INTERVENTIONAL SUCCESS OR FAILURE

A Democracy: How democratic is the regime that has emerged after the intervention?

The state that emerged out of the remnants of the civil war is neither democratic nor inclusive, but as a development engine it works somehow. Since 2001 it has reinstated itself and has been continuously expanding its power, leaning towards full-scale authoritarianism. It is still a hybrid regime with an unreliable security apparatus which can go either way if the regime is seriously challenged. There is little state interference beyond the surface in outlying areas of the country. However, national political sphere has grown progressively more authoritarian throughout the decade since the Peace Accords were signed in 1997.

Both formally and informally, power is concentrated in the hands of the president. The 1994 constitution and 1999 amendments give great power to the presidency, making the president head of state, head of government, guarantor of the constitution, supreme commander and head of the Security Council. He also controls the judiciary by virtue of his right to propose the judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Economic Court and the Supreme Court, as well as the procurator-general and the military prosecutor. In June 2003 a constitutional referendum allowed the president to be elected for another two 7-year terms, meaning that the incumbent Imomali Rahmon can rule legally until 2020. He won the November 2006 presidential elections without challenge.

\[ Ai \] The rule of law

The rule of law in Tajikistan is weak and is affected in great measure by the Soviet legacy when interpretation of legislation could be bent according to the political authority. Tajikistan automatically inherited the civil and criminal codes from the USSR era which have been in a process of evolution and adaptation ever since. Constitution and legislation concerning political matters has been modified substantially. In politically sensitive cases the courts rule the way they are instructed by the ruling group. The illustrative cases include prosecution of former civil war opponents on the Islamic side for crimes amnestied under the Peace Accords, prosecution of political opponents for corruption (although the corruption cases were real, law was applied selectively) and convictions in 2004 – 2005 to lengthy jail sentences of President’s most loyal supporters (such as Yakub Salimov, Gaffur Mirzoyev) and prominent opponents. In non-political cases corruption severely undermines administration of justice.

Throughout the period, the leadership became more concerned with rampant corruption, and undertook attempts to apply the rule of law, albeit selectively. This,
however, ran into problems in the judicial system itself, especially to do with corruption and confusion among the judges on who should be prosecuted and who is to be let off the hook. In politically-charged situations, such as disputes over parliamentary elections in 2005 in all court appeals by the losing candidates to contest the declared results the courts invariably ruled as told by the executive.

Otherwise, property and contract law is rather enforced by the informal conventions, patronage system and degree of access to the security apparatus. Law are not publicly known, and in some case when laws are known, disobey is widespread. For example, it is known that Tajikistan does not allow dual citizenship, but many people aspire to obtain Russian passports as well, and some succeed in doing so. Application of law is fair only in one respect: it can be applied arbitrarily to anybody irrespective of ethnicity, regional affiliation or gender.

Aii Participation

Presently, the state in Tajikistan is less representative of regional and ethnic groups and interests than it was when the civil war broke out. Rule is largely based on the First Family, incorporating relatives and personal associates of the President whose loyalty he can trust. The ruling group arbitrates between different interests and groupings in society, ensuring that nobody becomes too powerful. It appears that the President only appoints those whom he can personally trust not to undermine him and whose personal enrichment appetites he can control.

Throughout the period, political participation has decreased. This is largely due to the diminishing standing of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the main protagonist during the civil war. Throughout the period personalities associated with the IRP (and former opposition more broadly) have been consistently loosing their positions in the government, and none has been left in the official appointments by the end of 2006. The death of Said Abdullah Nuri, the IPR first leader, in 2006 produced a negative impact upon the party’s internal coherence and fundraising capabilities.

During the civil war opposition parties were outlawed, but in 1999 the ban was lifted and independent parties began to reappear. However, they faced considerable difficulties in establishing a viable electoral base. Most were small, under-funded and dominated by a single individual. They were unable to satisfy the strict criteria for official registration (a prerequisite for participation in elections). Yet six parties did qualify for registration and in February 2000 they fielded candidates in the elections to the newly created Lower House of parliament. The conduct of the elections, however, was marred by numerous irregularities.¹ Three parties eventually emerged as viable organisations: the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (the party of government), the IRP and the Communist Party.

The IRP used to be the second party in terms of representation, but have lost seats in every election (in the 2005 parliamentary elections it has only had one seat, held by Mugutdin Kabiri, its chairman), as well as losing ministerial appointments in every government reshuffle. Consequently, the Communist Party became the second party

in the parliament, although the IRP claimed that it gained more votes in the 2005 elections than it was credited for.

It is inconceivable that free and fair elections would be allowed in 2006. The outcome was predictable well in advance. Nevertheless, the campaign played a role of expansion of participation and forced some debate of the developmental agenda. The executive is completely monopolised by the current president Imomali Rahmon. In June 2003 a constitutional referendum allowed the president to be elected for another two 7-year terms. Neither IRP nor the Communists fielded candidates in November 2006 presidential elections, therefore there was virtually no debate or electoral promises on behalf of the officialdom. This caution is explained by the fact that the previous would-be contenders, such as Mahmadruzi Iskandarov were accused of crimes and locked in jail for life.

Basic rights to form and join political organisations exist and to an extent are exercised on a grass-root level. According to Mugutdin Kabiri, the IRP’s chairman, support for the party is growing in seemingly unlikely places, such as Kulyab. More women join the party, perhaps motivated by hardship of everyday survival. In the provinces the IRP branches operate openly, and so do the Communists. Still, developments in the time of peace show a decline in the role of political parties. Since 2001 a popular passivity towards political parties has started to develop: in 1999 only 9% of respondents felt that parties were not needed at all, but by 2003 this figure had risen to 19%. A growing constituency of party rejectionists who do not believe in the validity of political competition reflects the fact that social apathy and alienation tend to develop as authoritarian tendencies settle in.

Civil society organisations are tiny and mostly staffed by urban intelligentsia supported by donor funds. On a popular level, discussion, critique and communication take place mostly at the mosque or chaikhona (tea house). Social affiliations appear to play an important role. Traditional form of territorial organisation is mahalla (European equivalent is ‘quarter’, ‘parish’ or neighbourhood). Unlike in the neighbouring Uzbekistan where mahalla is the smallest administrative unit, in Tajikistan it remains an informal structure. Typically, a village contains several mahallas. It has its leader who regulates relations within a mahalla, sets norms of acceptable behaviour and mobilises social support from within a mahalla for those in need. Mahalla tries to keep its affairs within itself. Crime unless it is serious, is seldom reported to law-enforcement agencies, but is typically solved within the mahalla which condemn the perpetrators.

Another important element of social organisation are gaps and gashtaks which are male clubs. Gaps are male networks based on personal affiliations, i.e. professional, 

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2 Formerly known as ‘Rahmon’, Rahmon was elected as the Chairman of Supreme Council in 1992 (the highest executive post in the country), then, when presidency was re-introduced, he became president in 1994. The Constitutional amendment made his de facto a president for life.

3 Author’s interview with Mugutdin Kabiri, Mashad, February 2006.

4 Olimovy, Saodat and Muzaffar, Мусульманские Лидеры: социальная роль и авторитет (Muslim Leaders: Social Role and (Degree of) Respect), Sharq Centre and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Roundtable, Dushanbe, 2003, p. 20.

co-educational, shared experience etc. They are a feature of northern Tajikistan. Men organise regular gatherings (weekly, bi-weekly or monthly) in a local *chaikhona* (tea house), taking turns to arrange and pay for a party. Men can belong to more than one gap. In the south there was no *chaikhona* tradition, with *chaikhona* being a feature of the northern, more urbanised life (large villages resemble small towns in terms of their internal organisation). So gashtaks in the south fulfil the same function as *gaps*, but are organised at one’s home (men gather in turns in somebody’s house rather than in a public place).

Gaps and gashtaks are horizontal networks in society capable of maintaining solidarity and solving problems informally. Information was traditionally passed on orally via *gashtaks* and *gaps*. This mechanism was utilised by IRP for mobilisation of supporters gashtak networks which brought together ‘people of influence’ both from officialdom and the underworld. Another affiliation is based on blood ties. *Avlod* is an extended family, or a kinship/ patronymic association. It unites blood relatives and is hierarchically organised from junior to older members. Each avlod is headed by a leader, mostly male, but it can be an old woman. Avlods form a cast system, i.e. there are nobler and prominent avlods, upper middle, middle, lower middle etc. There is no universal or written codification of the avlod hierarchy, but it is no secret in society. As each avlod originates from a certain locality, it is known at its original place whether a certain avlod is prominent and respected, or a common one, even if many members migrated to other places.

**Aiii  Competition**

There is no free and fair electoral competition between different political parties, although there exists a legal and constitutional order which guarantees these notions. Active and passive right to vote for all citizens again exists, but remains on paper, since although elections function as a procedure, the outcome is determined in advance by the executive.

Informal competition unfolds among the elites which are vertically organised with roots in their geographical locality. Their functioning is underpinned by patronage links leading to patrons at the provincial and central levels. However, as the ruling Dangara group expanded its power at the level of central government, the autonomy of other regional groupings became gradually subordinated to the state and they had to accept the new rules of the game, where winner takes all.

**Aiv & Av  Vertical and horizontal accountability**

Accountability of the government to the citizens does not really exist on any level other than municipal where distances between the local authority and other significant stakeholders are not very great and where the head of the municipality has to rally upon the population to get things done, e.g. to run communal services or attract labour migrants’ money for maintenance of infrastructure and emergencies. There are formal control mechanisms of horizontal accountability inherited from the Soviet past; for instance, the Prosecutor’s Office oversees the actions of the Ministry of Interior and the prison system. However, they are weak and subject to political pressure. Each agency is often dominated by representatives of the same *avlod* which undermines their independence further, even if pressure from the top would be alleviated.
Is it a democracy on any level? (your question: is it a full democracy? Which areas lack democracy?)

According to NGOs surveys, it is not. Tajikistan scores as follows:

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Tajikistan is a mimicry of democracy: it is an autocratic state which maintains a democratic façade. It has adopted Constitution and legislation which guarantee basic rights and freedoms, laws on participation and competition, has parties other than the ruling one represented in the parliament. It goes through the motions of adopting Constitutional amendments by a popular referendum, conducts nation-wide elections at regular intervals and conducts consultation fora (for example, Public Council) with representatives of civil society and dignitaries. At the same time, these measures are devoid of meaning of political competition: decisions are made elsewhere and by other means.

To use Thomas Carothers’ terminology, the state has entered a political grey zone: it developed some of the attributes of democratic political life, including a limited space for opposition parties and civil society as well as a quasi-democratic constitution. Yet it suffers form serious democratic deficits, such as poor representation of citizens’ interests, frequent abuse of law by state officials and elections of uncertain legitimacy.6

However, there are more features of participation and accountability on the jamo’at (municipal government) and on occasion at hukumat (district) levels. Control by the state does not penetrate deeply into these levels, especially in the mountainous areas. There local politics is complex and an array of forces is at play. These forces include representatives of the higher authorities, but also local formal (rais – head of jamo’at, head of police, representative of the prosecutor’s office) and informal power-holders (businessmen including drug dealers, former field commanders, mullahs, former rais and retired kolkhoz director, in some places school headmaster). Women are especially important at the local level, as they have a significant if covert, influence

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on husbands and sons. As a result, local and district elections are not allowed, because there is more danger that they can turn into real competition.

Aviii  *Is democracy the only game in town and what are the popular perceptions?*

The author’s field interviews in Tajikistan revealed that on the popular level three ideas are associated with the notion of ‘democracy’:

- Democracy is a positive commodity because it is equated with ‘peace’ and is a ‘good thing’ which is in line with the official propaganda;
- Democracy is imposed upon us by the West in its efforts to dominate and control our country, which is in line with unofficial propaganda.
- Electoral democracy on the local level (it is not possible to seriously discuss elections of higher powers) should not be allowed because people would vote for a candidate with whom they are affiliated by locality or ethnicity, rather than for the one who could do the job better. They would vote for ‘their own lot’ even if they are in full knowledge that the other candidate has more merits. ‘Voters’ are quite relieved that such decisions are taken out of their hands.

Countries of Central Asia move towards a similar pattern of governance which make their political systems look increasingly alike. In the early 1990s they were all affected, to a varying degree, by a process of democratisation. However, the attempts at democratic reforms, both homegrown and externally supported, brought civil war (Tajikistan), interethnic tensions (Kazakhstan), rise of Islamism (Uzbekistan) and social turmoil (Kyrgyzstan). The overarching theme has emerged that the weakening of the state leads to a failure to provide security, growth and welfare. In response to the state weakness, perceived to be brought about by democratisation prompted by ‘external forces’, an alternative model of governance started to develop. Its rests upon political monopoly by the ruling group over the system, restricts expression of dissent and freedom of media and tightly controls elections.

Russia and Kazakhstan are the best examples of functioning alternatives to democracy. In this model, population is fairly passive and the majority is prepared to get along with the regime. Where protests do occur, the state proved resilient to challenges. In the eyes of the population, the state got much better in providing security, growth and welfare, and this is what matters most. When they look at democratisation/electoral process in fragile states, they despair.

There appears to be a number of factors which account for such trajectory of political development, with their interplay producing the effect:

- Skill of political leadership to co-opt, suppress or marginalize opponents
- Response to the rise of political Islam in conditions of a secularist state
- Existence of a source of income in the hands of the state (cotton, gold and aluminium) which allows it not to rely upon income from taxation
- Control over security apparatus to put down dissent
- Effect of contagion – role models of Russia, Kazakhstan and China where such ‘models’ seem to work and which are increasingly active in the region
- Resentment of western lecturing on how these countries should be ruled and what are the right values.
Thus, democracy is not the only game in town. Although the rulers still dress their actions in the language of democracy or go through imitation of it, they increasingly position themselves as having found a workable alternative model which bears good results. This is evidenced through their public statements and policy line in regional organisations, such as towards the OSCE. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) generates its appeal because it started to advance this alternative model of statehood.

The questions for further research are:

Is there a real alternative to democracy which provides stability to the post-conflict countries, or is it a mere stage in their political evolution which will pass when the current rulers exit political scene?

Is it sustainable, does it strengthen the state as it claims it does, or is it vulnerable to internal pressures and challenges which could spell the end of stability very fast?

\textit{Aix Is it the same old state?}

When the conflict unfolded in 1992, Tajikistan was not yet a state in any meaningful sense, but rather one of the pieces that fell out of the Soviet collapse and was struggling to come to terms with independence. A nation-state was established in the course of the war and became its by-product. However, the continuity and persistence of Soviet traditions was remarkable. This continuity worked both from the top down and bottom up: the state expected to rule in a certain fashion, and the population broadly accepted this familiar pattern of governance. The ‘state-building approach’ that one can observe in Tajikistan rests upon three pillars: firstly, basic security has been provided; secondly, public institutions function, albeit imperfectly and with local mechanisms for the distribution of power; thirdly, the population is exhausted by the war and has a stake in establishment of a recognisable order. Habits and expectations from the time of peace that were not entirely forgotten – the war did not last long enough for that – underpin this approach.

There are a number of differences from the Soviet system though. Firstly, new bodies, such as Constitutional Court, were established, and there is a multiparty system which created vehicles for political organisation should the demand for it arise. Secondly, the government had to assume full responsibility for the state of affairs in the country and as a result had to outsource to the population or external actors those areas which it could not deal with, e.g. welfare. Thirdly, it acquired the need to comply, at least publicly, with global norms of political representation, if not actual behaviour, to be accepted as a partner in international system.

\textbf{Security}

\textit{Bi Security Situation}

The five-year period since 2001 witnessed a gradual improvement of the security situation both at national and local levels. It was also marked by expansion of power of security agencies which the population is scared of. This fear of security and law-enforcement agents varies: in the mountainous parts of the country, such as Gharm
and Gorno Badakhshan there is more freedom in general and less apprehension of security officials who also are aware of limitations of their power. In cotton-producing areas of the south, by contrast, local population is terrified of the Ministry of State Security and police.

In general, civilian control over the military and other power agencies is firmly entrenched. This in itself is an important achievement of the post-war period. Gradually, leaders from the (former) pro-government and opposition sides who had prominent appointments in security sector have been either detained or forced out of the country. The rapid reaction regiment of general Sukhrob Kasymov, is the last detachment directly originating from the civil war. Kasymov is one of the last remaining field commanders on the governmental side. His unit is based in Varzob, about 40km from the capital.

Three sources of insecurity remained. First and potentially most serious is the threat posed by Islamist/jihadi militant groups with ties across the wider region, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. All attacks have been sporadic, separate incidents and none has marked the start of a sustained campaign. Soughd province in the Ferghana Valley where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan meet, has been the scene of most incidents and arrests, but the groups gradually proliferated across the country.

Secondly, there is a security threat posed by drug trafficking and competition among drug networks, unsurprising given the country’s location on the border of Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s, Khorog in GBAO was a major entry point of drugs, which were then shipped on to Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan; more recently Panj and Moskovskii in Shurobod district of the Khatlon province have become key entry points. Drug trafficking has not led to armed violence apart from clashes between drug traffickers and the Russian border troops when the latter had been stationed on the Tajik/Afghan border until 2005. Since their withdrawal episodes of violence and shoot-outs at the border decreased. However, bomb explosions in Dushanbe (capital of Tajikistan) demonstrate that stability can be easily disrupted.

Thirdly, incidents of violence involving former field commanders in Gharm and Karategin Valley have not subsided completely, and periodically flared up. In February 2008 an incident took place in Gharm when colonel Oleg Zakharchenko of the OMON (riot police) was shot dead, as he and his men tried to arrest the head of organised crime squad of local police Mirzohoja Ahmadov, an ex-UTO field commander. The Ahmadov’s men refused to surrender their weapons when they were first ordered to do so. Then a unit commanded by Zakharchenko was sent to Gharm to disarm them, and resulted in fatal consequences. However, the incident did not appear to have nation-wide implications, although its timing in the height of the energy crisis during an extremely harsh winter seems ill-conceived.

Bii Phases of political instability

First stage 2001 – 2004

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7 ‘Murder Invokes Ghosts of Tajikistan’s Past’, IWPR Reporting Central Asia, No. 533, 20-Feb-08.
Field commanders and DDR process. Significant insecurity subsided in 2001, when the last sizeable bandit formation of Rahmon Sanginov (aka Rahmon Hitler) was suppressed by the government troops. Since then score-settling and revenge killings did take place on small scale. ‘‘Disarmament’ took place after the peace agreement, but has been usurped by the recycling of small arms by the regime under the authority of ‘the state’, and ‘demobilisation’ has been precluded by a process where commanders who seek to retain their independence as political actors are destroyed. What has been paramount was a process of ‘reintegration’ where those who are prepared to sacrifice their political and military independence [or who did not care about politics from the start – AM] have been incorporated into the elite networks existing under the name of the state.’’

Former field commanders could have been spoilers, but in fact became part of the consolidation of an authoritarian peace. In 2001 - 2004 any local support commanders had for operating independently was waning as their ability to command powers of patronage and protection declined. Ex-commanders came to hold senior positions in the capital in the military formations of the MCHS, Ministry of Interior (MVD), or the State Border Guard Committee (KOGG). Tajikistan’s most experienced and effective military forces got spread primarily across these organisations rather than in the army. This has dispersed military power between several commanders, rather than providing a single power base which might mobilise against the President. With their formal integration into state structures, commanders, even the powerful ones such as Mirzoe Ziyoev, have been unable to remain entirely independent and have had to accept strict limits on what they can do.

Second Stage 2004 - 2006

Elimination of political rivals and ex-commanders In 2004 – 05 some major drug barons-turn-politicians have been arrested and prosecuted, but not on drug-related charges, while some were detained in Moscow and extradited. Arrests of a number of powerful figures in Tajikistan were possible only with the backing from the Kremlin and the Russian military stationed in the country. Mirzoyev and Salimov were believed to have been instrumental in the seizure of the rival group under control of Boim (real name Ibrohim Kalonov) in Soughd province.

A serious test to the regime came in January 2004, but it proved resilient to the challenge. The events unfolded as such. When the Tajikistan President moved to dismiss Gaffur Mirzoev from his position of Head of Presidential Guards in January 2004, he was confronted by a rebellion of his former comrade-in-arms, who would not leave without a prestigious appointment. Mirzoev and the President settled on a position of the head of the Drug Control Agency (DCA) which was offered to Mirzoyev to the dismay of the international donors who funded it, since he was one of the main drug dealers in the country. How such an appointment would affect the fight against drugs was not a consideration for the regime concerned with finding a way out

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8 MacFarlane and Torjesen, SAS
of a delicate political situation. During Mirzoev’s period in charge drug seizures by DCA dropped some 40%. But the situation could not last for long. The President could not afford to leave in power a commander who threatened to take up arms, as he may become unruly in future. Russian security backing was instrumental in prompting Rahmon to act. Mirzoev was arrested in August 2004, after which he was put on trial.

**Border Management** Since the Tajik/Afghan border was a major scenery of penetration of drugs, weapons and fighters in the 1990s, maintenance of the border security has been a paramount concern. Following a friendship treaty signed in 1993, Russian troops had continued to patrol almost the entire length of the 1,344-kilometre frontier. By 2004, Russia had approximately 11,000 troops in Tajikistan, which were withdrawn by summer 2005. After the handover the border is guarded by the Tajik border service troops. They now belong to the State Committee of National Security structure, as it used to be the case the Soviet days. However, poor food, living conditions and widespread bullying lead to draft evasion by families during government conscription campaigns.

**Jihadi groups** is the challenge the government fears most. IMU is treated later in the paper in part 2. Other groups are Bayat (Oath), Hizb-ut-Tahrir and maybe other splinter cells, viability of which is hard to assess and which may prove to be no more than a group of teenagers with an access to Internet. Visibility and spread of Islamist groupings is growing. Hizb-ut-Tahrir appears to command the largest following.

The government banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 2001 (before 9/11) and was quick to associate them with the ‘War on Terror’ following the attacks on America. As early as October 2001, the then Minister of Security, Khayridin Abdurahimov, noted that Hizb-ut-Tahrir was ‘undoubtedly connected with those terrorist centres being prosecuted by world community.’ While up to 2001, Tajikistan had arrested just 120 members, far fewer than its neighbours in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the suppression of the organisation intensified. In 2006 the Ministry of Interior of Tajikistan claimed that up to 4,000 supporters of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir members are active in the country.11

Episodes of violence periodically take place. In January 2006 gunmen believed to be IMU militants stormed a jail in Tajikistan’s Soughd province, freeing prisoners. The fugitives were last seen heading toward Kyrgyzstan, where clandestine groups now have more freedom to flourish, as the IMU used to do in the conditions of lawlessness predominating in Tajikistan in the 1990s. In May 2006 an armed group staged an attack from Tajikistan on Tajik and Kyrgyz border posts, killing troops and seizing weapons and ammunition. Thirteen personnel, including a Kyrgyz colonel, died during the raid and the subsequent chase in the mountains. Security officials claim the attack was carried out by a well-trained Islamist unit.

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10 Allegedly, the internationals got together and were very concerned that such appointment is about to be made. The US Ambassador called the President to advice him that the US funding to DCA would stop if Mirzoyev would come to head it. The President did not care. Around the same time the Commander of the Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan called Mirzoyev and advised him against revolt, saying that he will have to face the Russian army if thing would get out of hand, and that taking presidential offer is his best bet. The situation in Dushanbe got very tense, but in the end Mirzoyev accepted the DCA appointment.

Biii  Has the country relapsed into war after the beginning of the intervention?

No, it did not, although security incidents occur, as described in the section Bii.

C  State capacity, legitimacy, service provision

Ci  Autonomous Decision-making and Bureaucratic apparatus

The bureaucratic apparatus has been largely inherited from the Soviet times, but has experienced continuous degradation since the Soviet collapse. One of the many factors responsible is poor ability to recreate professional bureaucratic cadre and the problem of attracting educated people to staff governmental jobs, especially at the middle level of government. The consequence is ageing of civil service.

After disintegration of the authority during the civil war, re-centralisation of authority has been a consistent process on-going since 2001. It is most visible at a local level. This has formal, informal and performative dimensions. Tajik laws determine that the expenditures and administrative functions of local government, including staffing levels and wages, which are set by the centre (Urban Institute 2003). One of the most direct is the President’s power to dismiss and appoint heads of provinces and district. This constitutionally enshrined function of the presidential office was used frequently throughout the period from 2001 to 2006. Regular turnovers keep appointees loyal to their patrons and prevent too much power from being accumulated by any particular local fief. Central control over the general functioning of local government serves to bolster control by elite networks over economic goods, foremost of which is cotton.\(^{12}\)

Cii  Military, policing, economic, regulatory capacity

The leadership in Tajikistan combined both predatory and developmental aims. In circumstances where the state controls – either directly or by proxy – most important productive assets, the leadership has a rational interest in ensuring that the developmental agenda is not entirely neglected, otherwise it would undermine both its sources of revenue and the legitimacy of the ruling group. Informal patron-client networks serve a central feature of governing, and often act as a substitute for the retreating welfare state inherited from the Soviet era.

On balance, police capacity to deal with crime is rather remarkable: crime statistics have been consistently going down and violent crime has reduced considerably.\(^{13}\) In contrast to the recent post-war period, fresh in the memory of many citizens, Tajikistan has become a safe place to live again. However, the way security is provided is itself increasingly becoming a conflict-generating factor. Because the police – in the same way as other ministries – is desperately underfunded, it has to turn to any source of income available; and since the police works directly with population, its ability to levy various ‘taxes’ on individuals and on businesses is considerable (unlike the Ministry of Defence), especially since it possesses the means of extortion.

\(^{12}\) Heathershaw, p. 259.

\(^{13}\) Minister of Interior Khumdin Sharipov reported that over 130 criminal gangs and bandit groups have been suppressed, - Asia-Plus, 22 October 2004.
Economic regulation and management is the government’s weakest spot where capacity remains much to be desired. The mainstays of the Tajik economy are cotton, aluminium and mining; all areas that require significant investment, the sources for which could not be found inside the country. It is the poorest of the former Soviet republics and ranks 122nd on the Human Development Index in 2007.\textsuperscript{14}

Military and policing capacity is untested, as drug market is divided between major players with connections to the elite and there is little unorganised trade which could have led to wars between drug mafias. On the whole, the police authorities are rather apprehensive to use force for a fear of consequences. In February 2008 a change of administrative jurisdiction of six villages in Gorno Badakhshan to Tavildara district led to demonstrations and shooting at the police station in Khorog by an armed militia. The government resorted to negotiations, as a result of which the protesters agreed to lay down their weapons.

Ciii state’s capacity for providing services and public goods (security, law and order, infrastructure, welfare)?

The state does not deliver both because of the reason of deficient capacity and because it lacks the political will. It can be questioned whether the state is seeking to develop capacities in the fields it considers unimportant, like social protection for vulnerable elderly population, while concentrates on strengthening the areas seen vital for successful governance, e.g. internal security and policing.

State capacity started to improve slightly in mid-2000, at least some investments were made into urban infrastructure of major cities. Public transport started to operate more regularly and coverage of public transport in the rural areas has increased. As population acquired money through labour remittances, migrants started to partner with the local authorities (depending on the state of their relationship) to repair the infrastructure.

However, the Axilles heel of the government is energy supply and water sanitation. These areas deteriorated to the point that the quality of water in Dushanbe is worse than in Kabul. Energy situation has deteriorated during the winter of 2007 – 08 when rural areas received between two to no hours of electricity per day; there is virtually no gas and no coal. It is believed that hundreds of infants and old people died because of cold, but no figures were reported officially. Humanitarian crisis was aggravated by the rise of staple food prices, especially wheat which Tajikistan has to mostly import, and frozen land which makes planting cotton very difficult.

As a result of humanitarian crisis in 2008 protests erupted in Dushanbe, as well as in cities of Kulob, Panjakent and Khorog. Previously, the country had very low levels of social protests before due to a fear of repression. The authorities did not crush the protests by force in a sign that they recognise their own failure to fulfil their social promise and indirectly admitting responsibility for allowing the crisis to reach the point when basic needs were unmet.

\textsuperscript{14}http://www.untj.org/SituationUpdate/index.php?id=1702
Although positions which give access to assets are distributed through informal networks, there is little evidence to suggest that informal structures are involved in provision of services on a major scale. Mosques are often engaged in collecting money for charitable purposes, e.g. funerals of poor people, and occasionally a mullah helps the local authorities to mobilise people for *hashar* (communal works). However, this practice is far from universal and depends on a particular local setting. Foreign NGOs and international organisations are also involved in provision of services; these are discussed in sections below.

The popular evaluation is rooted in the recent experience of a functioning Soviet state, to which citizens had been accustomed and to which they compare the present. Against this background, the current state is a poor replica of the past. At the same time, there is a belief that it was the state that enabled the process of normalisation and regeneration to happen. The civil war did not last long enough for the ordinary people to forget the things that they associated with peaceful life, such as a functioning local authority, police, schools and hospitals. With the end of hostilities they sought to recreate familiar patterns and expected the state to do the same. Moreover, since the war ended, living standards have been improving largely because of removal of security threats.

In conditions of fake elections, no free media and opinion surveys, and fear of the security apparatus, it is hard to be certain on what the population really thinks. On the one hand, discontent is widespread and many voices condemn actions of the president, his personnel policy, government’s corruption and waste of money on prestigious projects. On the other hand, it would be unfair to conclude that the regime is illegitimate. Its pervasive legitimacy derives from three pillars:

- the Soviet legacy; the current leadership seen as a Soviet successor (the idea that the Soviet Union was a good thing and when the regime acts in a Soviet manner, this therefore has to be good),
- the experience of the civil war (the present is better than the recent past) and
- the comparison with the neighbouring Afghanistan (where the state barely functions and the country is in turmoil).

Legitimacy is also reinforced by economic output (there is modest prosperity and the overwhelming majority of society has a stake in stability, which the regime personifies) and by reverence to status and tradition.

Moreover, the President is still ultimately regarded as a peacemaker. There are no viable alternatives readily available: Mugutdin Kabiri, the IRP Chairman, and Islamic moderates have no experience of governance while many people hate and fear Islamist hardliners, rivals from within the ruling elite are expected to perform not better than the president and perhaps be even more corrupt, and the old Soviet
northern nomenklatura has been out of power for too long to be seen as a viable and visible contender.

However, the regime is vulnerable to rumours and scandal. In authoritarian state which is so concentrated around the leader, has a conservative social culture and where there is little else in terms of political events, family disputes can get a major bearing upon how the regime is perceived by the population. Feud in the ‘First Family’ seemingly got out of control. In May 2008 his brother-in-law Hassan Sadulloyev, head of Orienbank and in control of other companies, disappeared, believed to have been shot (and killed) by one of the President’s sons a dispute over assets.

Regardless of what exactly took place, the mere existence of the rumour has the potential to inflict a blow on Rahmon’s leadership. An important element in any authoritarian regime is the aura of invincibility. The Sadulloyev controversy created an impression that the presidential family is gripped by dysfunction. Within the post-Soviet context, a leader who could not control his own relatives (e.g. Boris Yeltsin), or who shows any sign of weakness, has faced serious challenges to his authority.\(^{15}\)

**Cvii Is the country de facto independent from outside interference?**

The country largely survives due to the export of its labour force and remittances from migrants. According to polls, 95% of young men are willing to become labour migrants\(^ {16}\) as they see few opportunities at home. High reliance on remittances from abroad leads to the creation of an economy that is heavily dependent on imports. The population has acquired cash, which the government cannot tax, and its consumption capabilities grow. It is cheaper and easier to buy imported goods than struggle to develop domestic production. As a result of labour migration, the “actually existing” economy is dependent on shifts in Russia’s migration policy which also holds an important leverage upon bilateral relations.

On a more formal level, Russia provides the main market for Tajik goods, e.g. raw cotton, fresh and dry fruit, and prospectively electricity. Since late 2004 Russian companies, e.g. RAO UES rendered investment and initiated large-scale construction projects in hydropower energy which created local jobs on a scale unseen since the Soviet times. The other source of major investment is China which puts funds into energy and infrastructure projects, but the Chinese companies bring their own workers and do not practice local procurement unlike the Russians. Apart from economic benefits, Russian investment gives a moral boost to the population that “finally Moscow started to take care of us”.

The social protection is also dependent on Russia, as labour migration is the main safety valve for the population. One migrant provides up-keep for between 3 to 10 relatives. Given strong kinship bonds within Central Asian groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks and rural Kyrgyz), the state assumes that the extended family or mahallah would mobilise funds from its labour migrants to cover urgent humanitarian or healthcare needs. Care for those vulnerable groups (urban poor and European minorities, the

\(^{15}\) Najibullah, ‘Ambition’

\(^{16}\) Idiev, p. 132.
groups that often overlap) which do not have extended families is outsourced to the international community. Information and cultural space for the elites is also tied up to Russia’s news outlets and popular culture, while elites make efforts for their children to attend schools with Russian as a medium of instruction, despite the fact that the number of ethnic Russians in the country has dramatically reduced.

External security has been largely outsourced to Russia which until 2005 provided border troops on the border with Afghanistan. Russia also has the largest military base in Tajikistan. The 201st MotorRifle Division (previously peacekeeping force) was transformed into a military base in 2004. In the words of the Russian Ambassador, Russian troops would be the first to render help in case of danger, while the base serves as a major security guarantee for the region.\(^{17}\) The Russian presence in Tajikistan, which involves ground troops and an air surveillance facility at Nurek is robust, unsurprising given the former’s location in proximity to Afghanistan. However, the Tajik government’s expectations that the US and its European allies would provide a similar type of commitment to guarding the border with Afghanistan following the Russian withdrawal failed to materialise and the state had to assume more responsibility for external security and anti-narcotics effort since 2005.

**Di Interdependence between the three**

*The security democracy trade-off. How did a lack of security hamper democracy? How did more democracy affect security? Use counterfactual thinking - what would happen if the regime allowed for more democracy? For example, ruling elites in Tajikistan argue that more democracy would lead to more insecurity. To what extent is this a credible argument?*

The provision of security remains the regime’s trump card, upon which much of its legitimacy rests. War fatigue and the desire for peace at almost any cost make the population accept presidential rule however unrepresentative and unjust it may be.

Standing of the regime is related to its ability to provide security, growth and welfare. At the onset, security was key after the population experienced the horror of the civil war and was prepared to ‘endure peace’ almost at any cost.\(^{18}\) War fatigue acts as a powerful brake on the expression of protest, however legitimate grievances might be. In 2003 – 2006 the economy experienced impressive growth, albeit from a very low base (6.7% in 2005 and 7.1% in 2006). Prices for Tajikistan’s main commodity export, aluminium, have been supported by high demand in countries such as China. Global prices for cotton, Tajikistan’s second-largest export, have strengthened, while the global output has declined.\(^{19}\) Although a fair share of funds has been embezzled or wasted in construction of prestigious projects such as building of the new presidential palace, some money has been spent on infrastructure and development agenda. The population is aware that social welfare is outsourced to labour migrants and the

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\(^{17}\) Interview with Ramazon Abdullatipov, Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan, by Valerii Guk, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 23 October 2006.

\(^{18}\) ‘I have lived through the civil war and am prepared to put up with Rahmon and with his relatives in power until my dying day, if to change this means going back to violence,’ – author’s interview with a senior IRP politician, Dushanbe, 2004.

internationals, but since standards of living are gradually rising, it lives in a hope that things would get better.

Nevertheless, many vulnerabilities remain. Firstly, the regime is less and less inclusive since the President trusts less and less people outside his own patronage network. Thus, the ruling group is narrowing and there is an increasing number of aggrieved groups and individuals who are hugely dissatisfied with being excluded from power. If an unforeseen crisis occurs and opens a window of opportunity for change, an elite revolt is a likely prospect. Secondly, interethnic tensions between the majority Tajiks and the minority Uzbeks are mounting, reinforced by an expanding zeal of the regime which increasingly promotes nationalist ideology as a cornerstone of the state-building project. A change of a leader in the neighbouring Uzbekistan who can give a boost to Uzbek nationalism or be simply interested in its kin over the border can be detrimental for stability. Thirdly, energy and infrastructure crises over winters are becoming more and more severe. So far, no major protests have occurred, but a social crisis can trigger a wider political discontent. Fourthly, Islamism is a growing phenomenon among the less secularised younger generation which has a different historical experience than their Sovietised fathers. How this would develop and which repercussions it would have for stability, is hard to predict.

The lesson the Tajik leadership has learnt is that the public expression of grievances is the quickest road to instability and chaos, and it should not be permitted. A vertically-organised system of governance, relying on a strong executive and formidable security sector, is, on the contrary, a recipe for success. This, however, is qualified against limited state capacity, in some measure because the state is poor and has few sources of income under its direct control that allow it to maintain the loyalty of its agents. Nevertheless, it is a notion that the leadership aspires to. According to Heathershaw, in the official discourse ‘the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘authority’ are twinned to provide an account of the Tajik subject – at once savage and submissive – where the strength of the state is required to control the public sphere and to gain prosperity and stability.20

Kyrgyzstan example illustrates the counterfactuals fairly well. A repetition of a full-scale civil war of the early 1990s is unlikely, as it would be more difficult to mobilise large groups of population to fight; the government would be more prepared to use force at an earlier stage than the Communist leadership was. Were democracy allowed, it would quickly lead to abuses of the system: those with money and many relatives would get elected, as such individuals would be able to buy or attract votes through kinship network. Women and minorities whose fate is already unenviable, would lose out.

The likely pattern would be as such: only rich and powerful people would venture into electoral office, many of them with criminal connections ranging from outright drug dealing to misappropriation of state funds. No doubt that the Communists will get a larger share of votes, and so would Social Democrats, but the former are getting old and the latter have a following only among urban professionals. Current moderate and well educated leadership of the IRP is likely to be replaced by people of cruder interests and forces behind them to make these interests felt. In particularly devout

20 Heathershaw, p. 158
areas of the country, such as Isfara district, IRP can achieve a genuine victory, but otherwise will be likely to resort to voter manipulation. Drug barons could be expected to increase their direct influence on politics.

On the whole, the system would become more volatile. Power would come in many forms, but in low quantities, will be easily gained and lost. As the elected representatives of the people would bring little political agenda into the parliament and provincial legislature, the policy-making process would be chaotic. Appointments would quickly change hands as there will be less obstacles to job-buying as compared to the present. Frequent by-elections at district and municipality levels may be a regular occurrence, forcing one kinship network from an office to be replaced by another one. In such cases, when an official in charge changes, his whole network would have to go to be replaced by representatives of a different avlod or a regional grouping. A general deterioration in security situation with a number of festering conflicts would be a likely outcome rather than an outright war between two parties. The North would try to achieve a viable autonomy from the centre, keep a lion’s share of its income in the province, block the deployment of southerners to positions in the North and be more assertive in its dealings with the Kyrgyz neighbours, with a possibility of pursuing territorial claims, currently suppressed by the regime.

SECTION II: PRE-WAR AND WAR VARIABLES MOST IMPORTANT IN EXPLAINING EXTERNAL DEMOCRATIZATION

A Long-term, structural factors

AI Type of Regime before the war

Before independence Tajikistan was one of the Union Republics which constituted the USSR and was ruled by an authoritarian Communist secular regime based on the homegrown Tajik elite.

The state legitimacy was maintained officially via uncontested elections, and informally through distribution of material goods and benefits. This was supplemented by a social contact where the state took responsibilities for the citizens’ basic needs, while the citizens did not question the authority of the state. In Huntington’s words, the system ‘did not provide liberty, but it provided authority’. At the same time, the concept of institutional multiplicity where individuals and organisations appear to operate simultaneously in multiple institutional systems, governed by a different set of rules and incentives, is well-suited to explain how the Soviet system worked in less developed and more traditional parts of the USSR. Underneath the formal rules and institutions lay a plethora of networks and patronage relations which often enabled citizens to ensure livelihoods, get jobs done and soften the impact of authoritarian system.

Aii Previous attempts at democratization

There were no such attempts.

Aiii  **Level of economic development**

Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet republics, heavily dependent on the central government for subsidies and development aid. One third of the total population lived in urban areas. A share of urban population was as such: in 1960 33% lived in towns, 35% in 1980 and 32% in 1990.\(^{23}\) Period after the Second World War witnessed a gradual growth of urbanisation. The population was young (45% under 15 years of age) and there was a high rate of demographic growth.\(^{24}\) 1980s witnessed a rapid population increase: growth rate was between 3.3 to 3.5%.\(^{25}\)

Aiv  **Structure of the economy**

Compared to its non-Soviet regional neighbours (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), Tajikistan enjoyed developed physical and social infrastructure. It had a mixed economy, although most people were engaged in agriculture. Tajikistan had defence industry developed around uranium mining in the North, hydropower capacities on major mountain rivers which allowed the republic to supply the neighbouring Soviet republics with electric energy in exchange for oil and gas, and for wheat and consumer goods, and hosted aluminium production facilities which require a considerable input of energy. Agriculture was dominated by cotton-production at the expense of growing fruit and vegetables, but in the mountain areas unsuitable for cotton cultivation fruit and vegetables were grown for consumption and even for wine production on the border with Afghanistan.

The republic has been rather resource-poor and was dependant on inputs from the centralised Soviet state to keep the economy going. Officially, the economic assets were state-owned (although on paper ‘kolkhoz’ which meant ‘collective farm’ was supposed to express communal rather than state ownership) and individuals only had control over their land allotments and livestock on a small scale. Informally, areas outside of cotton plantations had control over land and production from land, and petty enterprises in trade and consumer goods.

Av  **Elite cleavage structures**

Avlod, or cast structure (avlod is explained in Section 1Aii), is essential in understanding the elite cleavages. The Soviet state did not challenge, but rather adapted the traditional avlod system to its needs and drew upon its resources to recreate educated cadre. Most managerial and professional, as well as clerical elite came from higher avlods which typically occupied lucrative niches. All Soviet leaders of Tajikistan came from the prominent northern avlods. In the 1970s more Kulyab and Hisar (centre of the country) were drafted into the administrative and

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\(^{24}\) Demographic data from the 1989 Soviet census. The average crude birth rate was estimated at 41.8 per thousand, infant mortality (within first year of life) 46.7 per thousand. Average life expectancy was 69.7 (source: *Vesnik statistiki*, no. 7, 1991, relevant sections).

\(^{25}\) In Leninabad (presently Soughd) province growth was 4.8% - Soviet Statistics’ Committee, 1990, results of 1989 census.
managerial elite, while Pamiris were heavily represented among cultural circles and later – in police. By contrast, poorer and mostly rural areas of Kurgan-Tyube and Gharm had little standing. By the time of independence, the KGB and Interior Ministry were under Pamiri influence, and the army was under the command of Ashurov, a Gharmi.

Roy stresses the importance of *kolkhoz* (state farm) in social organisation of Tajikistan and significance of rural elites. The kolkhoz and rural administrative districts were the places where the Soviet notables had their power base, and where factions and political networks were set up. This was a result of low level of urbanisation, the weakness of the urban elites, and the correlation between the structure of the Party and the administrative structure. The kolkhoz provided protection for its members beyond the confines of its territory, for example when they migrated to towns. A member could rely on kolkhoz solidarity or on the kolkhoz director’s networks within the party or administration as a way of finding work or resolving difficult situations when they were outside of kolkhoz territory.27

The period saw the rise to prominence of alternative economic elites which developed in shadow agricultural business in the south of the country and in Karategin Valley. They had been benefiting from exploitation of the centrally-commanded economy which left many loopholes in the periphery. Having accumulated significant funds, they had no access to political power and few means to influence decision-making. As the state power weakened, their frustration became more pronounced.28 Such groups became especially prominent in Gharm which was the region least controlled by the state. This happened since most of the attention of the republican authorities was dedicated to cotton-producing regions (Kurgan-Tyube, Soughd and parts of Kulyab) because of the necessity to fulfil the plan for cotton production, the main export of the republic, and to account for meeting targets to Moscow.29

Avi  

**Ethnic structure**

The Union Republic of Tajikistan was multi-ethnic: Tajiks constituted 62, 29 % of the total population; other sizeable groups were Uzbeks (23.5 %) and Russians (7.6%, all Slavic groups were 8.58%). Uzbeks live mainly in the areas bordering Uzbekistan: 38% in Soughd province, 35,7% in Khatlon and 20,6% in Karaghen Valley. Uzbeks and Kyrgyz experience the highest degree of ethnic self-identification. Russians and other Slavs moved to Tajikistan mainly in the post Second World War period and were largely urban. In 1989 they constituted 36% of 601,5000 population of Dushanbe, the capital. In the period of 1950 – 1971 235,700 representatives of European groups were resettled in Tajikistan, mainly in cities.

26 Literally, *kolkhoz* means ‘collective farm’, while *sovkhоз* is a state farm. In reality, there was little distinction between the two.


28 Saodat Olimova in Межтаджикский Конфликт: Путь к Миру’ (Inter-Tajik Conflict: Road to Peace), Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences and Sharq Information and Analytical Centre (Dushanbe), Moscow, 1998.

29 Fattoev, p. 39.
Turkic-speaking Uzbeks constitute a minority in Tajikistan and a majority in Uzbekistan, the largest country in Central Asia. During the ethno-territorial delineation of Central Asia of 1920s, the territory of the modern Tajikistan first became an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan from which it was separated in 1929 and upgraded to a status of a full Union Republic. This division left Tajikistan without its major centres of urban civilisation, namely Samarkand and Bukhara which were allocated to Uzbekistan, and was followed by exodus of Tajik families into the newly established Tajik republic.

As a ‘compensation’, western part of the Ferghana Valley in the north (Soughd province) was included into Tajikistan. The area is heavily populated by the Uzbeks. This northern region is the most developed part of the country due to its location on the transport routes, good irrigation opportunities from Syr-Darya and cultural and educational heritage of the ancient centres of Central Asian civilisation. Under the Soviet rule, ethnic Tajiks from the mountain regions have been moved to this area, thus making the population of the northern region more mixed.

However, the main tensions which led to the civil war, developed mostly within the Tajik group. Akiner notes that the development of the country was shaped by its physical geography. Such features as high mountain ranges, scarcity of arable land and uneven distribution of natural resource endowments (especially water) have determined agriculture practices, as well industrial development, transportation systems and construction of infrastructure in the Soviet period. They also accounted, in part, for the centrifugal regional tendencies.

Four geographic zones are distinguished. Historically, each of these had distinctive patterns of trade and transport ties with adjacent regions. The largest zone is province of Gorno (Mountainous) Badakhshan in the east, mainly comprised of high mountains across the river Pyanj from Afghan Badakhshan. Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO) is a home to small groups of Eastern Iranian peoples (collectively known as ‘Pamiris’), whose languages are not mutually comprehensible with Tajik. The second zone lies in the centre of Tajikistan and is dominated by massive mountain ranges that together represent a formidable north–south barrier. It splits into Karategin Valley and Hissar region. The third zone (Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube, making up the Khatlon province) is in the southwest. Traditionally, this area constituted the divide between the mountain-dwellers and the plain-dwellers. The fourth zone (Soughd province) encompasses the lowlands to the north of the central mountain ranges.

The Soviet system practiced large-scale resettlement initiatives from mountains into plains, motivated by development projects which required labour force, and difficulties to sustain growing population in the mountain regions. This was a typical practice in the parts of the USSR with similar geographical settings and economic development patterns. Thus, highlanders from Zeravshan were moved to the Ferghana Valley in the north, and those from GBAO, Karategin Valley and highland areas of Kulyab province - to cotton plantations in Kurgan-Tyube province in the southern plains. Tensions and rivalries between lowlanders and highlanders persisted throughout the post-Second World War era. Subsequently, several of the leading opposition figures in the civil war came from these ex-highlander communities.

**Avii State’s pre-war capacity to autonomously make decisions**
The state’s pre-war capacity to autonomously make decisions was rather weak as most policies were set up in Moscow and the republican leadership rather corrected and advised upon the policy initiatives than create them independently. However, it was more effective in implement them, as it had an array of stick and carrots, formal and informal, at its disposal. Some functions - such as defence and security, - were taken out of the hands of Tajik leadership completely. There a well-developed bureaucratic apparatus, solid for implementation of centrally-made decisions, but it presupposed the locus of power in the centre to fill it with the authority and for the citizens to comply. When the central power was gone, the apparatus lost orientation and an incentive structure.

Aviii Pre-war capacity with regard to military, policing, economic and regulatory capacities

Prior to independence, Moscow determined most policies and supervised implementation. This included security, dominance of the Communist party, administration, legal system, economy and the educational system. As the main security challenge came from Afghanistan, it was met by the Border Troops which belonged to the KGB (Committee of State Security) structure. The army was in central command and in responsibility of the Ministry of Defence in Moscow, including a developed surveillance system to oversee the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. Police was the responsibility of the republican Ministry of Interior, and was recruited and administered from Dushanbe.

The Communist Party ensured political control over all spheres. The position of a First Party secretary of a republic, province, district etc. was a position of real power, the second in command was the chair of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) and number three was the head of executive (Council of Ministers). Informally, a head of local KGB branch carried significant weight, and, depending on personality, a head of the executive could have been more important than the head of legislature. When the authority of the Communist Party weakened in Tajikistan, other parts of the governing system got into disarray. The Soviet legal system was not meant to be literally a guide for actions, but rather served as an aspiration of how the state wants to be seen by its citizens.

Moscow made the most important decisions and set policy parameters. It directly ruled defence enterprises with practically no involvement from the republican authorities. These enterprises mostly employed Europeans in professional and managerial positions. Otherwise, there were three tiers of subordination in economic management: Union, republican and local. Union enterprises were answerable to the relevant ministries in Moscow (for example, the aluminium smelter or hydropower stations), republican ones were a responsibility of the government in Dushanbe (cotton production and processing) and district authorities were in charge of small enterprises in service and food industry, retail trade etc.

Aix Pre-war capacity for providing services and public goods
Essential social services, particularly in education and healthcare had been funded by the Soviet central government. Education and healthcare were free and universally available; there was also a range of welfare benefits - for children, mothers who gave birth to many babies, handicapped, the elderly etc. - and rewards fostering achievement in sports, arts and science etc. Allworth however claims that as late as in 1977 only 80% of school-age children actually went to school in Tajikistan. Policy of korenizatsia (‘indigenisation’ or establishment of national cadre) favoured the development of local elites.

Pre-war capacity for providing services and public goods was somewhat good, but the problem was that this was not appreciated by the population which felt that the state can and should do more. Regions competed for centrally-distributed benefits, as there were virtually no legal sources of autonomous income available locally. In the run up to independence and civil war, there was an acute sense in the country that benefits were distributed unfairly, and that other regions benefited disproportionally, while one’s own region was unjustly deprived. As the assets and benefits were distributed centrally (from Moscow) and on the republican level (Dushanbe), there was a widespread perception that the state has assets which it is withholding from citizens (of certain regions) and that they can be redistributed justly. It came out later that this perception was largely based on a false premise: there was very little wealth in the republic per se, Tajikistan’s coffers were empty, as most resources used to come from Moscow in a form of direct or indirect subsidies.

B War-related factors / Factors referring to the peace process

1 Type of war and warring parties

B1i Type of war

The war in Tajikistan was a civil war. It was fought mostly along regional and religious lines, but had a significant ethnic ‘add-on’ to it, since the minority Uzbek group identified with the secular lowland Tajiks as opposed to Islamist – highlander alliance.

B1ii Parties in the war

The forces which opposed the ruling establishment consisted of conglomeration of excluded regionalist groups mostly of highlander origin: Gharmis from Karagetin and Kurgan-Tuybe, people from Romit and Kofarnihon, Darwazis, Pamiris and people from Zerafshan. Their opponents were largely lowlanders: Kulyabis (combination of low and highlands), Leninabadis, Hisoris, people from Shahr-i-Nav, Tursun-Zade, Lenin and Varzob.

While the ‘highlander’ side consisted of a number of different parties including the IRP and several disunited democratic parties, there was a lack of political organisation

30 In 1991, the central government subsidy to Tajikistan was greater than Tajik revenue from taxation (Kaser and Mehrotra, op. cit., p. 49).  
on the government (Kulyabi) side. After the authority of the Communist Party collapsed and its last leader was forced out of office, it lost legitimacy and the political machine associated with the ‘party of power’. This vacuum was filled by warlords who established their own movements, originally to organise defences. The main movements were the Headquarters of Fatherland’s Salvation led by Sangak Safarov in Kulyab and the Popular Front of Hissar led by Safarali Kenjaev in Hissar. On 6 October 1992 they merged into the Popular Front (PF) under Safarov’s leadership. The PF declared itself the only legitimate armed force. The Uzbek minority was organised mostly around its ethnic Uzbek commanders, most prominently Faizali Saidov and Madmud Khudoberdiev, who sided up with the secular lowlander (Kulyabi – Hissari) side.

B1iii **Spill-over effects**

The war originated from inside Tajikistan, but the neighbouring country of Afghanistan was involved in its beginnings and subsequent course. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, pressure from the mujaheddin on the Soviet-backed Najibullah government in Kabul mounted, and it fell in April 1992. The weakening of the Soviet system also resulted in the relaxation of border defences, and the border with Afghanistan become porous. This enabled the forging of connections between Afghan field commanders and Islamic political groupings in Tajikistan. Such alliances led to the penetration of weapons and ideas from across the border.32

B1iv **Cleavages and issues of conflict**

*Perestroika* freedom of the 1980s unleashed many grievances suppressed in the society and attempts at democratization were made. Intelligentsia was concerned with assertion of Tajik culture and identity over Uzbek and Russian ones, while pro-religious constituency sought a greater role for Islam. There were popular grievances over corruption, living standards, extensive cotton cultivation and environmental degradation. Autonomous Region of GBAO (Gorno Badakhshan) demanded an elevation of status of its autonomy from region to republic.

As the conflict gained momentum, the issues started to change and included regional identity cleavages, distribution of power which allowed access to state assets and enabled patronage networks to function, and religious or secular character of the state. Secession and territorial division was not an original issue of conflict, but a secessionist aspiration in the north (Soughd province) developed as a response to the violence in the rest of the country. Revenge and score-setting quickly emerged as major drive for those immediately engaged in fighting.

*The role of ideology*

The overarching goals of Tajik intellectuals were similar; they all wanted the democratisation of Tajikistan, but they became bitterly divided over the question of the role of Islam in politics. This split the democratic intelligentsia into

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‘Islamophobes’ and ‘Islamophiles’. Still, despite these ideological differences, Tajik intellectuals shared a strong attachment to an independent Tajikistan, a feeling which the Soviet system helped to create. They shared a vision of national history similar to the one that was proclaimed by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Bobojon Gaffurov, in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{33}

Whether Islam in Tajikistan was a real ideology or a veneer masking regional greeds and grievances is a very obscure subject. Research suffers from dearth of primary sources.

\textbf{B1v Entrepreneurs of violence and their private economic interests}

The war had a lot to do with greed, as much as it had with grievance. The perception that there was wealth to be had, if one manages to get hold of positions (petrol station owner) or opportunities (head of a police station, which enables to take bribes) drove the course of the war after initial violence erupted.

At the time when the civil war erupted the state almost collapsed and the distinctions between state and societal actors became blurred. Entrepreneurs of violence pursued their private economic interests and some of them evolved into government officials, while several officials descended into outright criminality.

\textbf{WARLORDS OF THE INITIAL PERIOD}

Prominent personalities evolved rather in response to violence which often started sporadically, and many were not visible before violence started. Every region tried to set up its own defence systems, and ‘headquarters’ were established in each area. They were usually comprised of the party and Soviet administrative officials, who were still serving representatives of law-enforcement agencies, heads of prominent \textit{kolhozy} or agricultural associations, and leaders of the ‘new forces’ – i.e. political parties/movements representative of the area, and strongmen or power barons.\textsuperscript{34} The latter two categories often overlapped. Sometimes initiatives came from the grassroots: prompted by his fellow kinsmen, an ethnic Uzbek military officer, Mahmud Khudoberdiev, established an HQ financed and manned by the local Uzbeks in Chapaevsk, located in the Kurgan-Tyube district. When war reached the town of Kurgan-Tyube, he hijacked several tanks of the 201\textsuperscript{st} Division and formed a militia to protect Uzbeks who were being subjected to ethnic cleansing. He claimed that the Uzbeks appealed to him to organise and teach them to fight after 60,000 of them were killed in the district alone.

The proliferation of warlords often prevented the scaling down of hostilities through negotiations, given that no side could control these rogue groups who recognised no authority other than their own. Many of these warlords were attracted not so much by ideological causes as by control over lucrative local assets, such as cotton plantations, oil refineries and motor depots.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Nourjanov.
The origins of the warlords were diverse. Faizali Saidov, an ethnic Lokai Uzbek and a prominent commander on the Kulyabi, came from a sovkhoz near Kurgan-Tyube. Sangak Safarov, on the other hand, was a high-profile criminal who had spent 23 years in jail. Nominally working in a bar, Safarov carried considerable informal weight in Kulyab and headed a number of gashtaks. The only commander with a real military background was the ethnic Uzbek colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiev from Kurgan-Tyube. Some prominent Soviet officials became warlords, such as Safarali Kenjaev, a former Transport Prosecutor and ex-chairman of Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan who emerged as a warlord in Hissar, or colonel Amirkul Asimov who had worked in the State Procuracy. The only warlord who has survived intact to this day is Suhrob Kasymov, a former school teacher and inconspicuous commander with little power base of his own, who owes everything to the President.

Criminal groups played a considerable role. In the late 1980s, four of the major criminal groups in Tajikistan were a valuable resource for those politicians who were unhappy with the leadership of the then First Secretary, Mahkamov, and enjoyed high-level political patronage. These ties were activated in the moment of danger. When President Nabiev saw that the Islamic opposition had arms and was getting stronger in Dushanbe, he panicked and allocated some weapons to Safarov, who distributed them through his network. Safarov’s associates included the racketeer Yaqub Salimov, Rauf Soliev’s top henchman in Dushanbe in the 1980s. Ibodullo Boimotov (an ethnic Uzbek) was a client of Salimboi-bacha, a leading criminal boss from Uzbekistan. When protests erupted in the capital in 1992 the Youth of Dushanbe - in reality the city’s thirteen main criminal gangs – organised an on-going rally at the Aini Square. This showed the rising influence of mafia groups on politics. The trend spread to the provinces when prisons were opened in Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab and many former inmates joined self-defence militias.

B1viii Recruiting mechanism of the warring parties

The recruiting mechanism of the warring parties was driven by the power of regional and avlod affiliations. As the civil war progressed, Islamist ideology started to play more of a role in recruiting fighters from the refugee camps in Afghanistan. In parallel to this, an unorganized loot-driven process of recruitment also continued throughout the war. The fact that different people fought to different reasons led to a high degree of tensions within each side.

Mobilisation is a scarcely covered theme in academic literature. Bushkov and Mikulskii explain mobilisation with reference to the features of a traditionalist society, in which individual consciousness is underdeveloped and, when it comes to fighting, archaic collective appeals resonate with the community. Nourjanov writes that when regional and ethnic cleansing, rape, murder and land seizures started, the normative core of Tajik traditional culture (nang, or ‘dignity’) came to the fore. It required all males in a patronymic association (avlod) to exercise vengeance and self-assertion. It was claimed by the pro-government side that the opposition forces’

36 Kenjaev was of complex origins: of Yaghnobi (Pamiri) origin and born in Hissar, he was raised by the father of Qazi Turajonzoda, pursued a career as a judge in Leninabad and adopted its regional identity.
practice of raping girls was meant to destroy the enemy’s honour, which was paramount in a culture where a woman’s honour is an important asset.

Tajik scholars Saodat and Muzaffar Olimovy also consider avlod structure to be one of the main drivers of mobilisation for fighting during the conflict. According to their interviews with former war participants, many fought because they were prompted by the avlod leaders and had little or no sense of politics behind fighting. The ultimate goal was to exterminate the rival avlods to the root, hence atrocities against women and children from the enemy groups were committed.

Another mobilising factor was revenge. All sides exhibited extreme violence and perpetrated terror against enemy groups. This led to the resurrection of blood feuds as a result of patronymic associations. Personal vendettas were waged at all levels, starting with Davlat Usmon, one of the IRP leaders whose relatives were killed by Kulyabis. Faizali Saidov’s 65-year-old father was mutilated and burnt to death, in violation of an agreed deal to exchange him for hostages duly freed by Saidov. Saidov then unleashed a campaign of atrocities against the enemy group.

**B2 War variables**

**B2i War Start**

In the late 1980s, when tensions in society had come to surface, the role of the intelligentsia in the politicisation of grievances became crucial. In an atmosphere of increasing openness unleashed by the policy of glasnost, the expression of grievances and aspirations became widespread. There was a strong sense of cultural identity that had been suppressed in the Soviet times and was now looking for expression. The process, although turbulent, was largely peaceful. In February 1989 between 60 and 70 intellectuals formed the Ru-ba-Ru (Face to Face) civic initiative, which began to promote public dialogue between representatives of the state and society. Helsinki Watch Report notes that "on the official side, the chairmen of various committees, including MVD [Interior Ministry], KGB, and youth leaders, were active."

With the awakening of cultural identity a rapid political mobilisation occurred, leading to creation of parties (although not all became registered as such) of a democratic orientation, such as Rastakhez, the Democratic Party, Lal-e Badakhshan, and other less formal political groupings of intelligentsia. The civic organisation Rastokhez was established on 14 September 1989 to promote national culture and

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38 Live pregnant women’s bellies were carved out to extract unborn babies and children’s bellies were cut open and manure was put inside.
39 Nourjanov.
values. Rastokhez adopted the Zoroastrian motto "Noble thoughts, noble words, noble actions." Members could and did retain their membership in the Communist Party.

The language issue became an important focus for politicisation. On 22 July 1989, six months after thousands of people attended a public meeting to demand state recognition for the Tajik language, state authorities responded and made Tajikistan the first Central Asian state to raise the status of its titular language.

The first violence erupted in Dushanbe in February 1990. It was prompted by anti-outsider protests prompted by the resettlement of Armenian earthquake victims in Dushanbe. Unintentionally, Rastokhez provided impetus for these protests. It gained public attention by calling for the banning of the Communist Party, as its leaders operated out of loyalties to their own clan and region and demanded rectification of the injustice of northern dominance. In January 1990 it organised demonstrations against CP First Secretary Qakhor Mahkamov. Subsequently, the rumour that Armenians would be resettled into newly built houses in the centre added fuel to ongoing demonstrations, exacerbating a grievance held by people from the Hissar region close to the capital, where hundreds of Tajiks remained homeless after an earthquake in January 1989. Many Hissaris participated in the demonstrations.

When riots started in the capital, there did not appear to be much protection on offer by the republican authorities; nor did the Soviet troops stationed in the republic intervene. Residents began to set up self-defence units as demonstrations collapsed into riots in which between 9 and 22 people were killed. The Soviet security system was unprepared for dealing with urban rioting and mob violence, as it had never experienced these events in the past.

The presidential elections of November 1991 became a prelude of the civil war. The election featured nine contenders and bitterly split the country into supporters of Rahmon Nabiev, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and opposition candidate Davlat Khudonazarov, who was backed by the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Democratic Party. With 57% of the vote, Nabiev won the elections against Khudonazarov by some 35% – which the opposition refused to accept as fair – and formed a government heavily dominated by representatives of the northern Soughd and southern Kulyabi regions, to the exclusion of others. This

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43 It was joined by other small informal organizations such as Vahdat in Ura-teppe, Oshkoro (glasnost) in Kulob and Ehyeyi (Renaissance) in Khujand. These other groups were incorporated into Rastokhez in December 1989. Aziz Niyazi, ibid.


election set in motion the train of events that led to the civil war. It underscored the danger of conducting elections in divided societies which are only at the very beginning of independence, with no culture of compromise and a ‘winner take all’ attitude. These events still serve as a powerful reminder of dangers of unleashing the forces in society which can get out of control and impacted upon the popular will to further pursue democratization project.

Violence between the pro-government side and the opposition started in April and May 1992 in Dushanbe. The defining incidence that triggered the war was the departure of rival groups from Kurgan-Tyube province to their homes, after demonstrations in Dushanbe were disbanded. They brought their passions back to their districts which provided a conflict terrain. There both parties quickly mobilised supporters from their respective regions and formed rogue armies. ‘Islamists’ (Gharmis and Pamiris) in Kurgan-Tyube took their frustration out on the Kulyabi residents of the area. The war moved to the south. The first sizeable casualties of the war happened in June 1992 when serious fighting broke out after negotiations at the Kurgan-Tyube airport failed. Islamists were sent to ‘punish’ the Kulyabis and created a ‘Salvation of Motherland’ Headquarters. On 27 June they attacked kolkhozy and villages of the Vakhsh districts where resettlers from Kulyab lived and destroyed their self-defence units. Many people died and estimated 140,000 fled violence, becoming IDPs as a result.

B2ii Battle-related deaths

The total amount of dead is not known and no official figures exist. The estimates range from between 50,000 to 300,000 dead, mostly among civilian population, but since the conflict was largely fought by irregular forces at the period of most acute violence, a division between combatants and civilians is blurred. Destruction of the capital city and the areas in the south was severe, and most of the industrial capacities have been disrupted.

According to Falkingham, between 1991 and 1998 government expenditure as a share of GPD fell by two-thirds (from 50% to 16%). The incapacity of the government to mobilise resources resulted in public expenditure on health and education being less than a quarter of pre-independence level in real terms. Most of the poor were concentrated in GBAO (39.1%, despite the fact that it contained less than 6% of the country’s population) and in the most populous province, Khatlon (26.8%). 7% of households reported that their home was damaged by war. The city dwellers were the worst hit by the crisis, as they could not grow their own food, had no traditional heating facilities (most people lived in blocks of flats and had previously relied on central supplies) and had few skills that were tradable in the new circumstances. At the same time, the Tajik Aluminium Plant in Tursun-Zade, a flagship of Tajikistan’s economy, continued to operate throughout.

48 The province was later abolished and merged with Kulyab to form a larger Khatlon province.
50 Jane Falkingham.
51 Falkingham, p. 35.
Health and sanitation conditions deteriorated, and diseases that had been largely eliminated in the Soviet era started to come back. A cholera epidemic broke out in the rural areas around Dushanbe in 1993 and diphtheria followed in 1995. Hundreds of people died.\(^{52}\) Drug trafficking transformed from a trickle to a flow: in one seizure in Shurobod district (Kulyab) bordering Afghanistan 10 tonnes of drugs were discovered in one hide-out.\(^{53}\)

### B2iii Other casualties apart from battle-related deaths

In the summer and autumn months of 1992 a large number of people were internally displaced in the south. The regional and local authorities could not cater for refugees or ensure supplies, and warlords have stepped in and fulfilled this function by performing maraudering raids. Some 700,000 people were displaced within the country itself. Camps were set up for fleeing Kulyabis in Kulyab and for Pamiris and Gharmis in Pamir, but they were short-lived. At the same time, massive internal displacement did not last for very long – on 31 May 1993 the head of UNHCR, Pierre-Francois Pirlot, estimated that between 70% and 80% of IDPs had returned to their homes, with the rest staying in Gharm and Badakhshan, areas that are difficult to access.\(^{54}\)

The PF victory in December 1992 unleashed a campaign of reprisals that created massive displacement of Gharmis and Pamiris. Faizali Saidov produced terror in Kurgan-Tyube, forcing them into Afghanistan. In Hissar the cleansing of Gharmis and Pamiris also took place, but they had nowhere to flee, as the border with Uzbekistan was closed. Around 700,000 refugees fled from to Afghanistan across the Amu-Darya river. In 1993 it was estimated that further 145,000 refugees from Tajikistan were in Russia, and a comparable number in the other countries of Central Asia. During the conflict, one sixth of the population (over 778,000 people) fled Tajikistan.

Quite remarkably compared, a large share of refugees who found shelter in Afghanistan went back in a relatively short period of time; this was despite widespread harassment, the expropriation of housing and land, and the occasional killings of returnees that were recorded in Khatlon province.\(^{55}\) Meanwhile the Taliban’s northward advance in 1997 forced almost all Tajik exiles to return home. Some refugees from Tajikistan still remain in Russia, but the implicit understanding is that they will not try to return.

After the victory, the chief warlord Sangak Safarov sponsored a repatriation programme for refugees from the enemy’s side to the Kabodiyon district (Kurgan-Tyube province) and visited the area to reign in rogue commanders who were harassing returning Gharmis. The returnees perceived Safarov as having been on their side.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{52}\) Bushkov and Mikulskii, p. 79.

\(^{53}\) Bushkov and Mikulskii, p. 68.

\(^{54}\) ‘Human Rights in Tajikistan’, p. 34.


B2iv Highest number of casualties

The war caused the highest number of casualties during the initial phase of June – December 1992. The period of 1993 – 95 was the time when military actions were localised, but the general break down of law and order exacerbated insecurity. The war activities mostly took place in the mountainous rural areas and in the district bordering Afghanistan.

B2v Dynamics of the War

The course of war was the most ferocious in the Kurgun-Tyube province where initial violence between Gharmis and Kulyabis had erupted in 1992 (see section B2i). The situation in the south was further complicated by the fact that ethnic Uzbeks in Kurgan-Tyube, the main indigenous population of the area, suffered indiscriminate attacks from the ‘Islamist’ forces who suspected them of siding with the government. In September 1992 when opposition militias re-took the town of Kurgan-Tyube, they attacked the Urgut quarter, where Uzbeks of Samarqandi origin lived, and began a massive slaughter. Civilians rushed for the protection of the Russian 191 Motor Rifle Regiment, which was located at a nearby Lomonosov village. Uzbeks and others fleeing violence started to assemble in the village, while Russian officers tried to organise defences. However, on 25 September 1992 they were overpowered by Islamist militias who unleashed mass murder.57

The security sector quickly became divided. Police developed regional loyalties and disregarded the central government. In May 1992, police in Kofarnihon distributed weapons to an armed group of Mullo Qiyomuddin who planned to block the road to Kulyab in full knowledge that it would lead to further escalation. Police officers joined different paramilitary groups either individually or as units under the command of a local authority. An elite Ministry of Interior battalion made up of Pamiris was sent to Kurgan-Tyube from the capital as a separation force between Gharmis and Kulyabis, but abandoned its orders and attacked the Kulyabis instead.58

Members of opposition parties started being harassed in Kulyab and many left the region. In Dushanbe, meanwhile, the opposition forces seized most of the capital. Reportedly, Gharmis and Pamiri paramilitaries received payments for their services.59 Residents of Dushanbe had little information about the fighting in the south, since the mass media was in crisis and the remaining media outlets based in Dushanbe and Khujand did not cover events in the south.60 In September Dushanbe’s criminal youth groups forced Rahmon Nabiev to resign at gunpoint, and only the deployment of heavy armoury by the Russian 201st Division saved the first President of independent Tajikistan from certain death.

On 10 December 1992 PF troops entered Dushanbe and destroyed opposition defences, after which a campaign of reprisals started against the Gharmi and Pamiri residents of the capital. Kofarnihon, the last opposition stronghold, fell on 27 December. With this, the active phase of the civil war was over. Acute hostilities

57 Bushkov and Mikulskii, Anatomiya, p. 64.
58 Nourjanov
59 Author’s interviews with Dushanbe residents at the time, Dushanbe, January 2007.
60 Author’s interviews with Dushanbe residents at the time, Dushanbe, January 2007.
continued only in the mountainous north-east: in Karategin (Gharm, Romit), Darvaz and Tavildara.

The opposition, having suffered defeat in the lowlands, still had supporters in the mountainous areas of the country. By early 1993 the opposition was dominated by the Islamic forces, who relocated to their bases in northern Afghanistan and formed a Council of Islamic Resistance based in Toluqan. They employed guerrilla tactics from across the border. Forces consisted of smaller sized units, often using hit-and-run tactics, and they did not have a regular army. Each field commander had his own regiment loyal to himself.

Most refugees in Kunduz and Takhar received aid only from Arab and Pakistani Islamist sources, as UNHCR had withdrawn its staff due to problems with the local authorities triggered by its refusal to provide aid that indirectly supported military training. UNHCR insisted that aid sites could not be used by mujaheddin to recruit fighters among the refugees. Between 3 and 5,000 young Tajiks had undergone military training under IRP auspices in different parts of Kunduz and Takhar. The SCN trained guerrillas in Toluqan and Amir Chagai in Kunduz, while Hikmatyar commanders provided training in Imam Sahib. Training was financed by Arab and Pakistani Islamist funds.\(^\text{61}\)

After an initial period of disarray, the opposition forces re-grouped and started to penetrate Tajikistan’s territory. From spring 1993 fighters launched a number of successful attacks from across the border. In May they downed a Sukhoi-24 jet fighter using a Stinger missile, and in July raided a border post in the Shurobod district in Kulyab, killing up to 200 and taking local hostages. Opposition groups became better armed and their sense of military tactics improved, with mujaheddin commanders from Afghanistan sometimes supervising major operations.\(^\text{62}\)

Hostilities picked up around 1996 landmark, as the opposition acquired better fighting skills, weapons and external funding. The fighting came to a deadlock around 1996-97, when government troops were in control of the lowlands but could not eliminate the continued threat of the opposition coming from the mountains. The opposition, in its turn, made considerable advances in Karategin Valley and in the central region. By the end of 1996 it had taken Gharm, Tavildara and Komsomolabad, at one point advancing as far as 60km from Dushanbe and threatening the city itself. However, in the words of Ali Akbar Turajonzoda, the deputy chairman of the IRP, although the opposition was capable of taking the capital, it did not want a massive bloodletting and open confrontation with the Russian troops.\(^\text{63}\) The war lasted for seven years (1992 – 1997) when the Peace Accords were signed. The major opposition forces (United Tajik Opposition) laid down their arms after that.


\(^\text{62}\) For instance, commander Kori Hamidullo led a major attack on 12th border post in July 1993, in Bushkov and Mikulskii, p. 67.

\(^\text{63}\) Quoted in Erkin Rahmatulloev, Миротворчество ООН в Таджикистане и Перспективы Превентивной Дипломатии (UN Peacemaking in Tajikistan), Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, Moscow, 2001.
B2vi Where did the war activities mainly take place

The war erupted in the capital city (Dushanbe) and suffered from an unsuccessful (October 1992) and successful (December 1992) attempts to re-take it, after which massive reprisals were unleashed. During the acute 1992 war phase the main activities took place in the plains and lower hills of the south (Kurgan-Tyube), and after 1993 moved to the mountainous areas (Gharm, Pamir and areas of Kulyab alongside the border with Afghanistan). In 1996 opposition forces managed to move out of the mountains and came to control hilltops around the capital.

B3 War end / Peace Process

B3i How long did the war last? When did it end?

Officially, the war lasted for five years (1992 – 1997), although there was violence before and after that period.

B3ii Was there a final month of violence or did the war drag on at a low level for a long time?

The activities of the military and guerrilla groups towards peace continued to be a liability even after the General Agreement was signed. Exclusion of the North and the Uzbeks led to a series of violent episodes in 1996-97 in the Khujand district and culminated in 1998 in the armed raid and seizure of Khujand (the second city of Tajikistan) by a rebel colonel, Mahmud Khudoberdiev, who attacked from Uzbekistan. This presented a serious military challenge for the government. The attack was repelled, but fear of Khudoberdiev and his forces, believed to be in hiding in Uzbekistan, persists to the day. The revolt was crushed by the combined forces of Gaffur Mirzoev (former commander on the government side) and Mirzo Ziyoev (a former opposition commander).

Radical Islamists who took the idea of the Islamic state seriously, were not satisfied with a compromise with a secular state. When the mainstream UTO leaders signed the Peace Agreement with the Tajik government, the Muslim fighters, mainly ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley who fought alongside the Tajik opposition, set up their own organisation – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) about 1997 and embarked on a new crusade from their bases in Tavildara (Tajikistan) and in Afghanistan. Under a considerable pressure from the Uzbek government IMU fighters were persuaded to leave their bases in Tajikistan and moved to Afghanistan with the help of the Russian military, where they eventually joined Taliban in its fight against the US-led coalition. After September 11th the IMU was put on the US Terrorist Designation List under Foreign Terrorist Organisations. Following the defeat of Taliban and the death of Juma Namangani, the IMU leader, the surviving militants led by Tahir Yuldash fled to mountainous regions of Pakistan, around the city of Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province. IMU was believed to have been weakened after it fled to Pakistan, but still maintains a number of branches in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

In addition to the activities of die-hard Islamists, the criminality that flourished as a result of the war was a major issue. Racketeering, armed raids and robberies, kidnappings, drug trafficking and gun running did not go away easily after the
Agreement was signed, and presented serious obstacles to peace in the initial post-settlement phase. A number of second and third-tier commanders bent on criminality refused to disband and continued to terrorise the population. The government only achieved full control of the whole territory at the end of 2001 when the last major bandit group, that of Rahmon Sanginov was eliminated.

B3iii  How was the war terminated? Was there a military victory by one party? If so, was this military victory facilitated by external military support to one side? Or did the war rather end due to low or no war activity (war fatigue)? Was there a stalemate?

The war was terminated through a peace negotiations’ process, as both parties came to realise that they cannot win an ultimate military victory and entered a mutually hurting stalemate. The government could not eliminate the opposition by force, and the opposition realised that it could not retain control of a sizeable part of lowlands, conquering an entire province from which it could launch an alternative bid for power. Thus, the prospect was either protracted guerrilla warfare or a compromise with the government. External military support was rendered to both sides: by Russia and Uzbekistan to the government and by Islamic solidarity networks through Afghanistan to the Islamist side (see Part 3), but did not play a decisive role in the desire to reach peace. External support rather created a balance in which a military victory seemed very difficult, if not impossible.

B3iv  Did the war parties sign a truce or a ceasefire arrangement? If so, were these facilitated by external support or pressure? What was the scale of the external diplomatic efforts?

A Protocol on Military Issues, setting out the conditions and modalities for the disarmament and re-integration of opposition forces into government units, was signed during the seventh round of talks in March 1997. Russia, Iran, and the international community provided diplomatic support, and Russia also exercised a degree of pressure.

B3v  Did the war parties engage in comprehensive peace talks? And if so, did they sign a comprehensive peace treaty at the end of this process? Was there external support or pressure involved? On what scale? This question partly repeats B3vii and Part 3 on external intervention. The relevant information is below, but can be also used in these other sections. I have avoided pasting the same text again on the grounds of readability - AM

In June 1997 the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed by Imomali Rahmon, on behalf of the secular government and Said Abdullo Nuri on behalf of the UTO, formally ending the civil war. The Agreement provided for 30 per cent UTO representation in government executive bodies, the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), disarmament and the reintegration of opposition forces into government power structures, constitutional and electoral amendments, the adoption of an Amnesty Law,

the establishment of a date for new parliamentary elections, and reform of the
government. The immediate issues were the establishment of a joint Central Election
Commission, the reform of national and local government on the basis of a 30 per
cent UTO quota, the lifting of restrictions on opposition parties, and the freeing of
imprisoned opposition members. In July, a Pact on Mutual Forgiveness was signed
and endorsed by the newly formed Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR).65
Russia, Iran, and the international community provided diplomatic support, and
Russia also exercised a degree of pressure (see Part 3 on Intervention).

The government entered into formal talks in April 1994 under the UN and Russia’s
aegis. This was preceded by the informal Inter-Tajik Dialogue within the Framework
of the Dartmouth Conference which was initiated in 1993.66 It was organised and
facilitated by a joint US/Russian team from the Kettering Foundation (USA) and the
Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

External actors have played crucial roles in facilitating the peace process and in
stabilising the security situation. The geopolitical setting was favourable to reaching a
compromise. The sudden absence of rivalry between Russia and the US, which had
been replaced by a sense of a new historical opportunity for working together towards
peace, created a sense of common purpose. Russia, although officially supporting the
government side, was able to reach out to the opposition. As a result, Russia, US, Iran
and anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan pulled broadly in the same direction, playing
important roles at critical junctures of negotiations. Diplomatic pressure upon allies
was ‘robust’, with an overall message that compromise is inevitable if the country is
to pull itself out of the war.

Moscow was slow to react to the developments in Tajikistan due to its preoccupation
with more urgent problems, but in 1993 it sought to play a stabilising role. While
backing Rahmon’s secular government, it projected the message that the Tajik
leadership needed to find a compromise with the political opposition and that sole
reliance on repression would not bring peace. In August 1993 a summit of Central
Asian heads of states took place in Moscow, where presidents Yeltsin and Karimov
pressurized Rahmon to start negotiations with the opposition.

The MFA tried to impress upon Rahmon that it was his responsibility to seek
compromise with his opponents. In 1993 Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign
Minister at the time, stated that ‘Russia will not try to make up for the lack of political
will for a reconciliation in Tajikistan with the blood of its soldiers as it did once in
Afghanistan’.67 Moscow allowed the various opposition groups (mostly Democrats) in
exile in Russia to operate freely when they had to flee the country. After 1995,
Russian diplomacy also engaged with the opposition in exile in Iran and Afghanistan.
Eugenii Primakov, an orientalist by background who succeeded Kozyrev, took a
hands-on approach to negotiations and played a much more active role in the peace

66 I explore the process in greater detail in ‘Tajikistan: Peace Secured, but is this the State of our
Dreams?’, in Michael Lund & Howard Wolpe (eds.) Catalytic Engagement: Leadership Networks for
Transforming Intra-state Conflicts (provisional title), project of Woodrow Wilson International Center
‘Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States’, forthcoming.
67 Andrei Kozyrev, Interview in Izvestiya daily, 4 August 1993.
process, even entering into direct consultation with the UTO. In mid-1996 Primakov called for a Rahmon-Nuri summit, which occurred in December. 68

The MFA also included other Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan in the negotiation process, and conducted a meeting with Sayed Abdullo Nuri in November 1993 in Tehran. On these foundations the first round of Inter-Tajik talks took place in April 1994 in Moscow, under Russian and UN mediation. In June 1994 the MFA secured a four-month ceasefire, and the third round of talks in Islamabad in October 1994 negotiated an extension of this ceasefire monitored by a joint commission. In February 1996, the two parties agreed to create an All-Tajik Consultative Forum. Moscow hosted the most important rounds of talks: the first one in 1994 and the two final ones, when the General Agreement was signed and witnessed by the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Uzbekistan played a significant yet ambivalent role in the Tajik civil war. Initially, Tashkent backed the government side, motivated by a strong fear of the rise of political Islam – given that Islamists were becoming active in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley – and of the spread of the ‘holy war’ into its territory. Military assistance, especially air support, greatly facilitated the Popular Front advances. Uzbek troops were engaged in armed combat and bomb raids in the Gharm region, 69 although Tashkent denied any such involvement. In September 1992 President Islam Karimov initiated the UN involvement in peacemaking when he publicly appealed to the UN Secretary General to address the crisis and acted as an official observer in the Inter-Tajik negotiations. Since 1993 Tashkent has officially participated in the CIS peacekeeping operation, but also pursued its own political agenda.

However, as Uzbeks and northerners became ostracised, Tashkent grew increasingly hostile. From 1995 onwards it regularly interrupted gas supplies to southern Tajikistan. The relationship between presidents Karimov and Rahmon deteriorated and has been characterised by a high degree of distrust and disrespect. To the dismay of the Tajik leader, Karimov invited Sayed Abdullo Nuri for talks in Tashkent on two occasions in 1995, after which the Uzbek President urged Rahmon to seek accommodation with the Islamists. Karimov proposed the formation of a Tajik State Council with equal representation from all parties and regions after a total amnesty, to ensure access to power and public expression for the northerners and Uzbeks. 70

In Erkin Rahmatulloev’s view, the role of Uzbekistan has shifted several times: from support for ‘restoration of constitutional order’ personified by the president Rahmon, to covert contacts with the opposition, and finally to providing backing and safe havens for co-ethnic rebels threatened by the regime. 71 For example, Uzbekistan gave refuge to the rebellious colonel Khudoberdiev after a failed coup in 1998. Tashkent objected initially to the 1997 Peace Agreement and refused to sign it as a guarantor of the treaty, but later joined the Contact Group to support its implementation. 72

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68 See Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, pp. 163 – 168; Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation?
69 Author’s interviews in Dushanbe and in Gharm.
70 ITAR-TASS news agency, 4 April 1995, SU/2272, G/2-3, quoted in Dov Lynch, p. 164.
71 Rahmatulloev, p. 162.
At the same time, fear of Uzbekistan’s domination and the ‘Uzbek factor’ in internal politics was shared by the government and opposition sides, becoming a unifying factor and an important driver for peace. The opposition has noted that if Russia had not supported the Rahmon government and actively engaged in peacekeeping, the door would have been opened for Uzbekistan to enforce peace on its own terms, which would have been detrimental to the Tajik state.73

Iran has been involved in affairs of Tajikistan both for religious and kinship reasons, with the latter consideration eventually getting an upper hand. Tehran supported the emergence of the Tajik opposition in 1991-92. Ahmad Rashid claims that by 1992 Iran was backing a wide range of opposition parties and supplying them with money, food and military supplies. The Iranian mission in Dushanbe at the height of the civil war numbered twenty-one diplomats and some fifty unofficial personnel. Foreign diplomats claimed that the IRP was receiving air drops of weapons from Iranian aircraft and that Iranian intelligence officials played a major role in encouraging the opposition to move against Nabiyev. In doing this, it sought to compete against the growing Sunni funding and support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Afghan mujaheddin.74

After the secular government came to power in Dushanbe in December 1992, Iran hosted moderate opposition leaders in 1993-98; however they never publicly backed the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan. Russia’s and Iran’s interests largely coincided, as both states wished to prevent greater involvement by the Taliban, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Iran was a key sponsor of the peace negotiations and had the status of an official observer. It hosted the 2nd, 6th and 8th rounds of the negotiations and two meetings between Rahmon and Nuri.75

B3vi Were all relevant parties included in the peace process? If not, who was excluded and why? Did any actor leave in the course of the peace negotiations? Who and why? Who signed the peace treaty?

The Peace Treaty was signed by Imomali Rahmon (Rahmonov at the time) on behalf of the government and Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the UTO, on behalf of the opposition. The northerners and the Uzbeks who actively supported the government during the war, achieved few tangible benefits from the Treaty. The UN and Russia effectively supported a deal that excluded the northern region and a large Uzbek group.76

B3vii To what extent did the peace process determine the successful / not successful state reconstruction after the war? Did it have an impact on democracy?

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73 Author’s interviews with former opposition politicians, Dushanbe, May 2006.
75 Politics of Compromise, Accord, p. 92.
On security?
On state capacities?
How much of the success of post-war state building was inbuilt into the peace process?
To what extent did external actors shape the peace process? How much pressure did they exercise? — this part of the question is answered in B3v.

The peace process determined the nature of the state to come out of the civil war and enable to join forces in reconstruction. Formally, the political system underwent the following revisions: in 1999 the single chamber legislative body (Supreme Soviet) that had been inherited from the Soviet era was transformed into a bicameral system, comprising a standing Lower House of elected deputies and an Upper House of deputies elected by the regional assemblies, as well as eight additional presidential nominees. Presidential elections were to be held every five years, but this was extended to seven years along with other constitutional changes approved by referendum in September 1999. Any citizen, regardless of gender, religion or ethnic origin, is eligible to run for the presidency. The first post-war presidential election, held in November 1999, was won by the incumbent with 97% of the vote.

The chief mechanism for the implementation of the Agreement was the Commission on National Reconciliation. In the post-settlement phase, the provisions of the Agreement have been largely lived up to, and the opposition has been incorporated into the government according to a quota which is to be held until the next elections. It is an open question whether in fact the 30 percent quota was in fact democratic. Many local observers believed that in a free and fair vote UTO would have got no more than 10 percent, but this was never tested. Most importantly, this arrangement enabled to end the civil war. The fate of future democratic development was affected by overturning of the deal [between the international community and Rahmon] that the parliamentary elections would be held before the presidential ones has been overturned: the president was re-elected in 1999, giving the government an upper hand in the parliamentary elections of 2000.

The Peace Accords had a major impact on security. Large-scale hostilities were no longer going on and heavy weapons were gradually surrendered. The Accords contained provisions for the process for reintegration of the opposition units into Tajikistan armed forces and demobilisation of rank-and-file members who were to join civilian life. There was also an agreement between parties that the CIS Peacekeeping Forces will supervise de-commissioning of heavy weapons. The Law on Amnesty allowed the former warlords to enter legitimate politics and be given state appointments in the security sector, which created incentives for them to side with the government and manipulate the system in their interests rather than oppose it through the force of arms.

The General Agreement designated Tajikistan as a secular state, but allowed for a religious party to function as long as it de jure does not cross legal boundaries and does not undermine the de facto foundations of the state. This left Islamism in a subordinate position and at the mercy of the secular authorities. In Roy’s view, the defeat of the Islamist movement in the civil war had two consequences: firstly, Islamism no longer appeared as an ideological alternative to sovietism, nationalism and localism. Secondly, it also became normalised: by allying with the democrats and
nationalists, the IRP appeared a legitimate actor in Tajik political life, as it represented a regionalist group that had been systematically kept out of power. The General Agreement gave a definitive legitimacy to the Islamist movement, which had by then dropped most of its Islamist ideology in favour of references to the nation and democracy.

The peace agreement did not have a direct impact on the state capacities, but indirectly has weakened the state bureaucracy and ministerial level. In order to fulfil the 30-percent quota, the government side had to vacate senior jobs to make room for the newcomers. As a result, many northerners who constituted the backbone of professional managerial class, were removed or downgraded, and UTO members with little relevant education and experience came to fill executive jobs.

Throughout the war, the state’s capacity to enforce law and order and provide public services was weakened, but not lost altogether. As soon as basic security was ensured, state authority started to gradually reassert itself. Parts of the country have not been touched by the civil war but rather have suffered due to isolation and a law-and-order vacuum; however, these parts and indeed the country as a whole have moved towards development fairly quickly thereafter.

External actors helped to shape the peace process. The crucial role belongs to the Dartmouth Conference (Inter-Tajik Dialogue) which introduced the concepts of power-sharing, national reconciliation commission and consolidated UTO into a political force. Russia and the UN provided legitimising role for the talks and acknowledged the UTO as a legitimate political force. Moscow also gave clear messages to the Tajik leadership that it is interested in consolidation of the country in the present borders and discouraged attempts at secession by the North. The regional neighbours all pressurised the government into acknowledging the validity of the opposition as a negotiations’ partner. However, the external parties almost withdrew their influence and pressure after it became evident that resumption of full-scale war is no longer a threat. Russia was mostly interested in stability rather than in democracy or justice, and made a calculation that Rahmon is likely to deliver it. For other actors Tajikistan was a low priority to start with (more in Part 3).

**B3viii Did any party emerge as the dominant party during the peace process? If so, was there elite consensus, i.e. coherence of the dominant party with an accepted leader? Was there a principal and coherent opposition or was the opposition fragmented and weak?**

Gradually, most power went to the Kulyabists who became a *de facto* dominant party. The governing the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, led by Rahmon, inherited the organising patterns of its model predecessor, the USSR Communist Party. After 2001 when peace became entrenched, the President came to promote his own – previously inconsequential – Dangara clan from the Kulyab province, sidelining other Kulyabi clans (Parhor and Vakhsh) from which many key personalities came. Finally, as described by Jonson, ‘as a result of the president’s appointment policy the

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77 Roy, p. 157.
Leninabadis [Soughdis] withdrew from politics, Pamir fell into obscurity, the Karategins were sidelined, and the Kulyabis became frustrated.\(^{78}\)

As negotiations proceeded and the settlement started to take shape, the opposition leaders showed remarkable interest in positions of state power which enable access to assets. These allowed them to sell lucrative appointments, control corruption opportunities and acquire a sizeable share of the drug market in the redivision which made up an unwritten part of the peace agreement.\(^{79}\) The ‘indivisibility’ of their stakes thus gradually diminished, and with it so did their support base. The ensuing statebuilding process witnessed a number of former Islamists switching their loyalty to the government. For example, Turanjonzoda, Nuri’s number two during the war, in September 1999 appealed to the party to support the candidacy of Imomali Rahmon at the presidential elections. When the party refused to do so, he resigned from the IRP. Likewise, Davlat Usmon and Karim Rahimov (known as Mulloh Abdurahim) left the party and for a while held prominent positions in the government.

On a provincial level the Islamic orientation of seemingly irreconcilable field commanders subsided substantially, even in Karategin Valley. Following the peace agreement the former *mujaheddin* became directors of state farms and heads of enterprises, or obtained appointments in the local authority. These new roles deprived them of the advantages of being in opposition, made them share the burden of everyday management with the secular authorities and forced them to act within the secular law. In this context their ideological positions and behaviour radically changed.\(^{80}\)

Apart from the government/ opposition divide, other parties started to develop. During the civil war opposition parties were outlawed, but in 1999 the ban was lifted and independent parties began to reappear. However, they faced considerable difficulties in establishing a viable electoral base. Most were small, under-funded and dominated by a single individual. They were unable to satisfy the strict criteria for official registration (a prerequisite for participation in elections). Yet six parties did qualify for registration and in February 2000 they fielded candidates in the elections to the newly created Lower House. The conduct of the elections, however, was marred by numerous irregularities.\(^{81}\) Three parties eventually emerged as viable organisations: the PDP, the IRP and the Communist Party. Although the IRP obtained 30 per cent of positions in the executive, this hardly reflected its real popular standing. According to Sharg’s public opinion poll in Dushanbe in January 1999, 5% supported the IRP, while the Communist Party scored 28%.\(^{82}\)

B3ix *Was there a charismatic leader to mobilize the popular masses and lead them through the peace process?*

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\(^{78}\) Lena Jonson, p. 130.

\(^{79}\) Ibrahim Usmon, one of the chief negotiators on the UTO side, in response to my question on what went wrong: ‘I thought that people in the UTO leadership were strong and wise. This was hardly the case.’ Author’s interview, February 2008, Mashad.

\(^{80}\) Saodat and Muzaffar Olimovy, Muslim leaders, p. 18.


\(^{82}\) Saodat Olimova, ‘Political Islam’, p. 132.
Imomali Rahmon has emerged as a charismatic leader, although it did not appear at the onset. The presidential leadership played an important role in both the peace process and state consolidation. When Rahmon took office in November 1992, he was widely regarded as a temporary figure; one of the simple country folk with no education or managerial experience to boast. But even from the onset of the conflict the president had demonstrated good political instinct and personal courage. For example, he took up the challenge of heading the republic in 1992 after a number of more prominent politicians refused to do so. He arrived in Dushanbe soon after the Popular Front victory in December 1992, while most of the government figures stayed in Khujand because it was too dangerous to venture into the capital. He also survived a number of close assassination attempts. Furthermore, after 1995 Rahmon went to Afghanistan three times to meet with President Rabbani and the UTO leader Sayed Abdullo Nuri. In Akiner’s assessment, able and decisive leadership on both sides has had sufficient authority to allow them to take difficult decisions yet retain the confidence of most of their followers.

The President mastered the art of politics, surprising his rivals and opponents and demonstrating a good capacity to learn. While military and security matters were the prerogative of a closely-knit group of Kulyabi war heroes, civilian affairs were different. Mindful of his deficient skills in terms of how to operate the government and run the economy, the president took advice from a number of retired top officials of Soviet Tajikistan who were of Kulyabi origin – notably Sultan Mirsoshoev and Izatullo Hayoyev, the former First Secretary of Community Party of Kulyab province and the Head of Cabinet of Ministers respectively. Hayoyev became the head of presidential administration and even lived next door to the President, providing informal advice ‘on the spot’. Thus, continuity with the Soviet governing institutions was preserved. The power of former Soviet politicians over the President’s decisions in civilian matters has continued into the 2000s, although gradually he has started to rely on other affiliates as well, often from his extended family.

The President acts to ensure that no contender can emerge within the recognisable political spectrum to present a challenge in the future. In an absence of genuine elections, legitimacy is hard to determined, but it would be fair to say that Rahmon used to enjoy genuine popularity during the early stabilisation period, when he was seen as responsible for bringing peace to the country. At present, popular passivity and lack of alternatives continue to work in his favour; however, frustration also mounts.

### The importance of “prepacked” solutions: How important is it to negotiate the rules of the game before, not during implementation? To what extent, in your case, were the rules of the games already written in a peace agreement or in another “contract” (UN mandate, for example’)? Similar, how important are power-sharing agreements? If, in your case, there was a power sharing agreement, was this the equilibrium outcome of a negotiating, or was it forced upon the parties by external actors? When is the bargaining power of international actor highest?

The Agreement laid ground for a viable power-sharing model which gave the opposition a real chance to provide a legitimate counterweight to the government, but it did not use it well. The decade after the Peace Agreement has been a history of the opposition’s decay. The President and his entourage were astute enough to realise that
the real interests of key opposition figures that were concealed behind their proclaimed positions lay in the fulfilment of material appetites. If these were satisfied, they would rather work to support the status quo than seek to rock the boat. This was exactly what happened. Opposition politicians started to capitalise on the opportunities offered by the governmental positions they had acquired and began to compromise their ideological credentials. Corruption became rampant and displays of wealth by formerly austere Islamists were increasingly ostentatious. Job-selling practices flourished, as a handful of opposition figures controlled the 30 per cent quota. This, however, weakened their appeal among the former constituents. At the time of the settlement, the opposition had a real chance of making a decisive impact on the post-war development of Tajikistan; but it did not use it well. Eventually, the President used the opposition’s susceptibility to corruption and enrichment to eliminate most powerful figures one by one by tempting them into opportunities that would undermine their credibility.

It is not so important whether rules of the game are negotiated before or during the peace process if there is not real mechanism to enforce them and punish for violations. In the Tajikistan case, the idea of power-sharing was so new to both internal and external parties (Russia), that nobody was quite sure how it would work. Moreover, the deal had a limited validity of four – five years to enable a political transition to a stable political system, and was not meant to create the fundamentals of the system per se. Bargaining power of the external actors was the highest before the signing (end of 1996 – first half of 1997) and immediately after, because the parties to conflict had huge mistrust of each other, and needed external actors to provide guarantees and stand for their interests if they are violated by the government. This was especially true in case of UTO which felt more vulnerable than the government.

The peace agreement was only mean to finish the war. It did not deal with other political issues and did not provide for power-sharing with the parties who were not part of the civil war. Thus, the northerners, the Uzbeks and the Pamiris (although they participated in the war, but in the end got marginalised) were not represented in the power-sharing agreement. As soon as the government managed to get the IRP out of the system, there were no other real forces to be reckoned with.

The role of elite cohesion: Most case studies seem to underline the importance of elite cohesion. Successful peace deals and subsequent democratization seem to depend to some extent on the degree of elite cohesion. Similar, chances for success seem higher when the rifts between elites and opposition are bridged by a shared vision (independence, for example). Please discuss for your case role and origin of elite cohesion / elite fractionalism.

The civil war has significantly disrupted social stratification. It was no longer apparent who the elites are. People of humble social origins and minimal education became rich and powerful while many among the old managerial and professional elite fell into misery and disarray, or emigrated. By the mid 2000s the old Uzbek elite was almost completely sidelined. As the state controlled the assets and rules of the game, it made it almost impossible for alternative elites to emerge outside parameters allowed by the leadership. Some members of the previous elites, together with their younger relatives, transferred into the new world created by the international bureaucracy.
Another feature of the new situation was fluidity of the elites. Personalities, rich and fearsome one day, could be removed and imprisoned without much protest or consequences for society. The shape of elite bargains is negotiated given a particular context in time, but provides no guarantee that the bargain would last should conditions change.

There was a degree of elite consensus among the winning Kulyabi clans, while the rest were either sidelined and unable to mount challenges, or were satisfied – at least temporarily – with what they got out of the bargain. This situation enabled the government to concentrate on fostering internal security, the task it considered the most important. The opposition was more coherent during the time of struggle against the government, and became more fragmented and weak at the time of peace, when many senior members were seduced by lucrative opportunities the access to power opened.

**B3x Did internal veto players try to impede the peace process? (Veto players are political actors that can block important political development). Who were these and to what extend were they successful?**

Although resistance on both sides existed due to high degree of distrust and resentment because of the committed atrocities, it does not appear that internal veto players were significant. Rather, those excluded from the peace deal sought to make their presence felt to get a share of power and assets which they felt was due to them.

**B3xi Did external veto players (e.g. international actors, neighbouring states) try to impede the peace process? Who were these and to which extend were they successful? Were they in principle opposed to democracy or the peace agreement or did they use their veto power for other political gains?**

This subject is hard to research as little data exists. President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov was unhappy with the shape of the Peace Agreement, as it provided no special treatment for the Uzbeks (different power-sharing options have been floated in the run-up to the Agreement, such as to give 20 percent share of power to the minorities and to the regions which did not take part in the war, i.e. the North, or to create a Council of Representatives/ Forum of Peoples of Tajikistan where delegates from the minorities would be present). However, Tashkent was unable to argue against internal government/ opposition consensus that no special powers should be given to the Uzbeks, and other external players who closed their eyes on the issue, thinking that a bad peace is better than no peace.

There were also Sunni forces abroad which were interested in Tajikistan because of an opportunity to promote the establishment of an Islamic state and provided support through Islamic solidarity networks. However, since these were non-state actors which never admitted the extent of their sponsorship and influence, it is difficult to determine whether they were in a position to be significant ‘veto players’.

**B3xii How were the root causes of the conflict addressed in the negotiations over a peace treaty?**
I have a problem with the concept of ‘root causes’. If distribution of power in the Soviet Tajikistan was the ‘root cause’, the civil war exacerbated the problem. If the place of Islam in society was the ‘root cause’, then the war addressed the issue, albeit in an imperfect way, as it provided Islam a place in political life rather than reduce it to a cultural role. Tajikistan is the only post-Soviet state which has a legitimate party based on Islamic foundations. If the root cause was an inability of the political class to cope with a sway of social forces, then the civil war and the peace process has solved the problem of management of the population quite well. If the root cause was the perils of sudden independence, the answer is more complex: formally, Tajikistan managed nearly two decades of surviving as an independent state, but its perverse dependence upon Russia did not diminish.

B3xiii **Demilitarization, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration**

The issues of demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration were addressed in the peace talks and in the peace treaty. The issue of repatriation was addressed during the earlier stages of the peace talks, but by the time the Peace Agreement was signed, most refugees fled from Afghanistan, fearing Taliban advances. Refugees who went to the CIS countries seemingly have no desire to return.

Following the General Agreement, the process of disarmament and the reintegratin of ex-combatants into the regular armed forces or into civilian pursuits followed. This demobilisation and reintegration was implemented by UNMOT (which since 2001 has been renamed the UN Tajikistan Office for Peacebuilding, UNTOP) and UNDP. Subsequently, some of the militias have been incorporated into the Tajik regular armed forces, which were trained and equipped by the Russian troops.

B3xiv **What happened to losers in the peace process? Was there some form of power sharing arrangement? Were any killed or jailed?**

Some figures were assassinated in the aftermath either for political reasons or for personal vendettas, but mostly those who feared reprisals, left for Russia. An Amnesty Law for the crimes committed during the civil war formed a part of the Peace Agreement. However, the amnesty did not cover the preceding period and the aftermath, and not all crimes have been amnestied. This gives the current government an opportunity to persecute actors who fought during the war on either side. Such cases continue to be opened even ten years after the Agreement. Typically, middle-ranking figures are being persecuted.

The Uzbek minority was a group loser. Given their significant contribution to the military victory, the Uzbeks expected to benefit more and to achieve access to the economic bloc (their traditional strength) in the new administration. Instead, they were granted next to nothing. Gradually, ethnic Uzbeks have been moved away from positions of political power and influence and in fact from government at all levels (those determined to remain have to Tajiksize their names). Few concessions are made to the Uzbek language in public, the names of Uzbek districts are being

83 Uzbek schools have survived in the Uzbek-populated rural areas as a legacy of the Soviet system, author’s experience in Tajikistan during her time as a UNDP Regional Adviser for Peace and Development.
rejected in favour of Tajik names and the very existence of an Uzbek culture is often denied (‘Tajikistan is a country of Aryans’). \(^{84}\)

**B3xy Was there ever a recurrence of violence of any kind after the official termination of the war? If so, when and why did this happen? How was the violence confined? How did these incidences affect the peace process?**

Overlap with QB3ii There was no organised resumption of hostilities between former parties to conflict and a return to war. Summarising the answer to B3ii, there were three types of violent incidents: (1) related to excluded Uzbek group and the northerners, (2) Islamist members of the UTO who rejected the Peace Accords and eventually sided with Taliban and (3) former field commanders who descended into outright criminality and saw no way out of it. Since these forces were disunited politically and geographically, the government coped with military skirmishes with a relative ease.

**B3xvi Was there a significant change in the economic structure of the country after the conflict? Who were winners and losers of this change?**

Economic structure of the country changed very significantly not so much because of the civil war, but in a large measure because of post-Soviet transition, loss of the central subsidies and all-Union division of labour. Still, the peace process provided a positive impetus for the economy. Security backed by a strong presidential authority created the initial conditions for growth. According to Akiner, since 2000 there has been progress in structural reform. Developments include land reform and the disbandment of state farms (kolkhozy), privatisation of state-owned enterprises, restructuring of the energy sector, and reform of the banking system. The implementation of these programmes has not been perfect; but progress has been made, albeit haltingly at times. The economy has also continued to grow, albeit from a very low base: in 2004, gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 10.6% in real terms.

Since the country was emerging from both state socialism and civil war, there were no independent businesses apart from petty retail and services. Economic assets and lucrative niches that did exist were largely associated with employment in state positions. In order to get rich quick, one had to either resort to overt criminality – such as drug smuggling, kidnappings and robberies – or obtain good jobs in the state system. As the government eventually managed to topple violent crime and was in charge of appointments, it could oversee the emergence of wealth and prevent independent businessmen from becoming too powerful. This central role of the state in processes of primitive accumulation means that there are large distributional consequences of state patronage and subsidization patterns. Moreover, as the asset-creation process is a very new one, violent intra-elite struggles over control of lucrative assets were characteristic of the early stabilisation period. In 2004 the presidential family had established monopolistic control over all major productive assets.

\(^{84}\) ‘Tajikistan’s ‘Year Of Aryan Civilization’ And The Competition Of Ideologies’, Pulat Shozimov, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst October 05, 2005
Foreign investors proved hard to attract, as Tajikistan was tarnished by a civil war image. The distribution of poverty was uneven, marked by regional and seasonal variations, but was particularly acute in cotton producing areas, where reform was slow and farmers had high levels of debt. Apart from agriculture, there are few jobs available for the growing population. Moreover with closed borders and low wholesale prices farming remains on a subsistence level.

High reliance on remittances from abroad leads to the creation of an economy that is heavily dependent on imports. The population has acquired cash, which the government cannot tax, and its consumption capabilities grow. It is cheaper and easier to buy imported goods than struggle to develop domestic production; hence labour migration, cotton production and subsistence agriculture have become the predominant occupations for the majority of population.

The political economy of Tajikistan is relatively straightforward. The two main sources of income are remittances from labour migrants and the drug trade. According to Tajikistan's National Bank, migrant workers sent home almost US $260 million in 2004, which is comparable with the national budget. In 2008 the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008 estimated that remittances constitute 36% of GDP of Tajikistan, one of the highest in the share of GDP globally. According to International Organisation for Migration 2008 estimate, remittances constitute USD 1.2 billion annually. Income from drug trade is not known.

Both sources of income are not taxable by the state. The cotton industry is the major occupation of the remaining rural population and cotton is the main cash crop. Land reform has taken place, with the abolishment of kolkhozy and the establishment of the rural cooperatives that were set up to replace them. In reality they inherited all the drawbacks of the Soviet kolkhoz system without its benefits, such as the guaranteed and free supply of machinery, equipment and fuel. The state orders how much cotton farmers should grow on ‘their’ land, and the state still controls purchase prices for cotton.

There are very few medium-scale independent businesses in the country, little local manufacturing and underdeveloped services. In theory, start-up capital for business development should be available locally due to remittances from labour migrants. In reality, however, money is mainly spent on consumption and ceremonies, and is seldom invested in revenue generating activities due to a lack of incentives. Thus, the new bourgeoisie consists of those with connections to the state who monopolise the lucrative niches controlled by the ruling family, or by drug barons. At times these two categories overlap.

Part 3 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

A External Intervention

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88 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/508
A1  Parameters of Intervention

A1i  When did the intervention officially start?

There was no military or peacekeeping intervention organised by the international community. Russia performed this role by the virtue of being a residue imperial power.

When clashes started in Tajikistan in spring 1992, the Russian troops were left with no operational guidance from Moscow, only instructed to maintain neutrality. The Ministry of Defence was not meant to interfere in politics, while the Foreign Ministry in charge of relations with the countries of the ‘New Abroad’ was reluctant to get involved in an internal conflict remote from Russia and was sensitive to Western suspicions over Russia’s potential meddling in the affairs of a newly independent state. This created a decision-making vacuum, with Russian military commanders on the ground taking decisions as they saw fit. During the 1992 clashes in Dushanbe, the Russian garrison served as a shelter for leaders under threat and a venue for negotiations. Trade in and seizures of weapons and armoury were also taking place.

Subsequently, Russia played a major role in peacekeeping. At the July 1993 meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin established a division of labour: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to promote conflict resolution, while the Ministry of Defence and the Russian Border Service were to ensure the protection of the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan delegated the protection of its Afghan and Chinese borders to Russia until it could develop its own forces. The Tajik-Afghan border was defined as the ‘CIS joint border’ and a treaty on its collective protection was adopted under Russian pressure.

In September 1993 the CIS Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence established the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan (CIS/PKF) composed of contingents from the Russian Federation – based on the 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan – and battalions from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. The CIS/PKF in 1993 was comprised of 25,000 Russian forces, an Uzbek battalion of 350 and a Kyrgyz force numbering 286. At the end of 1996 the CIS PKF comprised 5,500 men of the 201st Division, 500 each of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz mechanised infantry battalions, and 300 of an Uzbek battalion.

A1ii  What was the state of the war at that time?

By summer 1993 when the intervention officially started, the government side had control of the lowlands in the south, the main conflict terrain. The opposition forces were confined to highland areas of Gharm and Pamir, and to refugee camps along the border with Afghanistan. There was no large-scale fighting anymore, mostly ‘hit-and-run’ cross-border raids.

90 Bushkov and Mikulskii, p. 68.
A1iii **Did the intervention have a clear mandate?**

The 201\textsuperscript{st} Division deployed in Tajikistan was ordered to provide military assistance to the Tajik government in response to an initial request made in September 1992. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of May 1993 envisaged close military cooperation including Russian air defence of Tajikistan in case of attack from Afghanistan. After the September 1993 CIS decision was adopted, the intervention consisted of two parts: the 201\textsuperscript{st} division which constituted the bulk of the PKF, and the Russian Federal Border Troops.

UN involvement in conflict management in Tajikistan started in 1993 with the appointment of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy.\textsuperscript{92} The UN interacted with Russia in the official peace process, and negotiations were conducted with joint sponsorship. In December 1994 the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was established to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. The Special Envoys/Representatives and UNMOT military observers maintained regular contact with CIS/PKF commanders in order to discuss the military situation and explore options for securing a ceasefire.

CIS PKF had a mandate to secure the border with Afghanistan and prevent movement of troops and weapons across it. The military mandate did not go further into political domain which was a prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It did not have a mandate of separation of forces. There were episodes of rendering help to the government side in terms of supplies of weapons and ammunition, but no large-scale hostilities with the UTO outside of the districts on the border with Afghanistan. The Protocol on Military Issues signed in March 1997 gave CIS/PKF forces the important role of accompanying UTO units from Afghanistan to the assembly areas under the supervision of UNMOT, which they conducted successfully.\textsuperscript{93}

On the military side Russia was in the driving seat, although Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan contributed troops to the CIS PKF. At the same time, Uzbekistan conducted bombing raids on Tajik territory. Warplanes bombed opposition strongholds in Karategin and Darvaz, killing many civilians.\textsuperscript{94}

A1iv **Which countries or organizations were in charge of the intervention? Who was de facto the lead nation or lead agency? Did the leadership change during the course of the intervention?**

Russia was solely in charge of the peacekeeping intervention. During its course the power shifted from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as it assumed a more active stance in the peace process.

A1v **If an international organization was in charge of the intervention, which states pushed for the intervention; which states vetoed an intervention? Was the intervention hotly debated beforehand?**

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\textsuperscript{92} On the outline of the official conflict management and civil society/multitrack diplomacy see Slim and Hodizoda, Ibid., pp. 522 – 528.

\textsuperscript{93} Gorayev in Accord, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{94} Bushkov and Mikulskii, p. 65.
The intervention was discussed in political circles in Russia largely in the context of evolution of Russia’s role in the ‘Near Abroad’, how much Russia should be responsible for the fate of the former Soviet republics disemboiled into civil conflicts, what was the position on stationing Russian troops in now foreign countries, to what extent this is a temporary or lasting phenomenon and whether the loss of life of Russian citizens involved in peacekeeping can be justified domestically after the intervention in Afghanistan and public opposition to sending troops abroad.

A1Vi What were the general capacities of the intervention? Was the mission in general sufficiently equipped to meet the goals?

The numbers of troops which doubled in size of the course of the intervention, were sufficient for the goals of the intervention. However, the level of skills, organisation and command may not have been adequate for a simple reason that the mission crept by default and no doctrine or tactical planning for peacekeeping existed in the Soviet military strategy. This explains that the troops were armed by heavy weapons rather than light mobile arms and vehicles which would have allowed them to cover larger swathes of territory, and confusion on how to deal with civilians, ex-combatants, Tajik government troops etc. The main flaw was that unlike during the Afghanistan campaign the military command was left with insufficient political guidance which in practice meant that political decisions had to be made on the spot.

A1vii How do you assess the coordination between the different nations and organizations who participated in the intervention?

The main issue is that military – peacekeeping - intervention and ‘democracy promotion’ ones were actually disjointed. Peacekeeping started in 1993 by Russia by default rather than by design. The state-building and democracy promotion activities have been rather weak at the time. External actors mostly concentrated on conflict mediation and on humanitarian aid. The ‘democracy promotion’ idea became actively pursued after September 11th, when significance of the region in the donor governments’ agendas has accelerated. Coordination between donors and agencies has been poor. Initially, the World Bank as the largest donor monopolised coordination of aid in its hands, but this was challenged by UNDP in 2003 – 04. Eventually, the main donors established a Principals Group to facilitate coordination.

A1viii What were the stated objectives of the intervention? Distinguish between military and non-military objectives. Was installing a democratic regime a declared /overt goal of the external actor/s?

The objective of the CIS PKF intervention was to install peace and bring lasting stability to the country. The way to ensure this was to create an environment in which the warring parties were able to negotiate and reach an acceptable compromise. Another objective of the intervention was to limit the remit of conflict to intra-Tajik issues and capacities, and cut off foreign military involvement. After the Peace Accords were signed, objectives were reduced mainly to border protection and guarding key civilian assets and monitoring of movement of heavy weapons.
Democracy-promotion did not have explicitly stated objectives of the intervention. Implicitly, there was an understanding on the US side that without democratization short-term allies are likely to turn into long-term adversaries. Other donors did not challenge this policy orientation; however, some prefer not to use the ‘democracy speak’. Although technically not a lead nation, de facto the US provided the largest financial contribution. Capacities of the development intervention were very uneven and depended on individuals in key positions on the ground. In general, since Tajikistan had low international profile and hardship of living conditions was severe, it proved difficult to attract high-calibre professionals.

A1x Did the intervention have a clear exit strategy from the beginning on, including a maximum time frame for the mission? Was the withdrawal a continuous process or was it performed abruptly and quickly?

On the Russian side exit strategy has not been defined, leading western hawkish analysts to speculate that ‘peacekeeping’ is a mere excuse to project control and maintain Russian military presence in the newly independent countries. Indeed, the Border Troops stayed on until 2005 and left only on prompting by the Tajik government. In 2004 201st Division was transformed into a Russian military base, further fuelling the discourse that the original intervention was an open-ended one and military exit was not part of the plan. Politically, Russian intervention ended quickly and abruptly, after it was obvious that peace was secured and was going to last. Shortly after (summer 1998) Russia entered a political and economic crisis culminating in August 1998 financial crush, and it had limited capacity to dedicate attention to non-urgent matters abroad.

A2 i Election Monitoring

Was the country subject to international election monitoring? If so, who carried out the monitoring of elections? Were the country’s political or human rights conditions subject to monitoring and reporting by one or more international organization, state, NGO or other external actor? Were the findings made public?

Since 1994 the presidential and parliamentary elections have been subject to monitoring by OSCE which fielded monitors around the country, security conditions permitting, and reported on elections’ irregularities. The findings were made public, causing anger and frustration of Tajik officials. The UN was also involved in elections’ monitoring and voter education via UNMOT and later UNTOP. The UN disagreed with Russia on how to qualify the presidential elections of 1994 and parliamentary ones of 1995 which the UN declared as not having even ‘the semblance of democracy’. NGOs were involved before independence, mostly notably Helsinki

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95 Eugene Rumer, ‘US Policy over Central Asia’.
96 For example, see Final Report, Elections to the Parliament 27 February 2000, Republic of Tajikistan, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw 17 May 2000.
Human Rights’ Watch. Russian NGO Memorial was engaged together with Human Rights’ Watch.

The western states which provided most funding for elections, were actively involved in monitoring of the process, including voter education, training for electoral officials and training for party observers. These activities were implemented mostly via UNTOP and via US NGOs, such as IFES, IREX, National Democratic Institute, Open Society Institute etc. Eventually, western monitoring of the elections was counterbalanced by electoral observation by the CIS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which returned positive verdicts. This was done to counterbalance criticism by the OSCE.

A3 Military aspects of the intervention
A3i Which countries provided troops for a military intervention?

Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan

A3 ii How much personnel were stationed in the country? Give figures for troops, international civilians, local civilians and observers for each year of the war

CIS PKF figures in A1. UNMOT figures are:
Initially authorized (December 1994) 40 military observers
Maximum authorized (September 1997) 120 military observers
Maximum deployed (June 1998) 81 military observers
At withdrawal (May 2000) 17 military observers

From July 1998 to May 2000 UNMOT included two civilian police officers. The mission was supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff. The mission lasted 4 December 1994 to 15 May 2000.

A3 iii Were sufficient resources made available for the military intervention? What was the overall budget? Where were these finances drawn from? Which actor provided the largest share of contributions?

The UNMOT budget amounted to expenditures from 16 December 1994 to 30 June 1999 of $49.9 million (gross) and expenditures for 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 (including liquidation costs) of $14.0 million (gross). I do not have Russian figures, and they might be meaningless at the time of hyperinflation and the fact that many resources in terms of weapons and ammunition were already in the country as a part of the Soviet legacy rather than specifically designated for intervention in Tajikistan.

100 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotF.html
A3 iv How do you assess the coordination between the different nations and organizations that provided troops?

Coordination between Russian, Kyrgyz and Kazakh peacekeepers was good because of Russia’s overall command and the fact that until recently they were all part of the same armed forces. It is an open question how well Russian command coordinated with the Uzbek one, and to what extent it was involved or informed of the decisions made by the Uzbek leadership, such as to bomb civilian targets in Gharm.

Coordination with UNMOT was good. In the view of Vladimir Goryaev of the UN Department of Political Affairs, the CIS/PKF was the only force that could be relied on to protect humanitarian convoys and strategic installations. Its presence had a stabilizing effect and helped to ensure that heavy weapons did not fall into the hands of the combatants, thus helping to prevent further destruction and casualties. The CIS/PKF, together with the Russian Border Forces, also helped to control the transhipment of massive quantities of arms, ammunition and drugs from neighbouring Afghanistan.  

A3v Was the mandate ‘robust’?

The tasks of the PKF included: to guard vital military and state installation, to provide rear support to the border troops, to deliver humanitarian aid and secure the return of refugees. They were not allowed to participate in active combat operations and declared to be impartial and neutral.  

A3vii What level of coercive capacities did the mission have? Did interveners enforce peace with military power?

The Russian forces had a significant level of coercive capacity to enforce peace with military power, but mostly they abstained from doing it inside the country. Only targets on the border were seen as legitimate. There has been an outcry from the UTO when Russian forces bombed targets inside Afghanistan in pursuit of militants implicated in border raids. More common practice was to arm and provide tactical advice to the Tajik forces which will engage in fighting. This was done, for example, when Mahmud Khudoiberdiev revolted in Khujand in 1998.

A3vii List concrete measures that were performed by the external actors. Were these measures carried out in accordance with the mandate? If not, where were discrepancies? Which measures were specified in the mandate but could not be carried out and why? Concrete measures can be: border control; DDR; executive policing …

Border control, guarding key government and military installation, protection of humanitarian convoys, training of Tajik border troops, facilitating return of refugees, and escorting uncompromising elements of the UTO out of the country to Afghanistan. Interception of drug trafficking was not part of the mandate, but has

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101 Adapted by the author from Accord.
102 Jonson, ‘The Tajik Civil War’.
been carried out nevertheless, because in reality parties in the civil war were heavily involved in drug trade, - and so did some of the Russian military.

A4 Intrusiveness
A4i Did interveners assume, formally or informally, some or most legislative power for a certain time? If so, on what scale? When and how did they transfer their powers to local authorities?

The interveners did not assume any legislative power. The international community provided legislative advice which was largely ignored by the government after the Peace Accords were signed.

A4 ii Did interveners decisively shape the new constitution and/or the legal codex? If so, on what scale?

There has been donor influence on constitutional reform, its text and the subsequent amendments, largely through civil society projects, such as Dartmouth Conference dialogue where a number of participants were constitutional lawyers and were involved in the reform process. At a later stage the Swiss Foreign Ministry project on ‘Building Confidence between Islamist and Secularists’ contributed to constitutional amendments and the Law on Religion, for instance, by clarifying the concepts of ‘secularism’ and place of religion in a secular state.

A4 iii Did interveners assume formally or informally some or most of the executive powers for a certain time? If so, on what scale? When and how did they transfer their powers to local authorities?

They did not.

A4 iv Did interveners participate in executive policing? If so, on what scale? When and how did the transfer their powers to local authorities?

UNMOT had a police adviser and so did UNTOP, but actual project worked started only in late 2004, supervised by one UNTOP staff member, a former Ukrainian police officer. Russian forces assisted the Tajik ones with raids against drug barons which the Tajiks were too apprehensive to take on, providing logistical support and a back-up in case things go wrong.

A4 vi In general, how would you assess the level of intrusiveness? To what extend was the domestic sovereignty suspended: Was it a complete take-over of state powers or rather a ‘light footprint’? Please note that one can distinguish between formal and informal means and that we are interested in the de facto level of intrusiveness which may not be reflected in the mandate.

Russian/ CIS PKF intervention on the whole was characterised by a low level of intrusiveness. At the same time, the effect of contagion was significant, since all of these states only recently departed from the common Soviet root. Firstly, the Soviet legislation formed the basis for the new legal framework which was being amended and adapted to the new circumstances. Secondly, Tajikistan looked at how other states – most notably Russia – dealt with the process of adaptation and learnt from example.
The international community paradoxically grew more intrusive when its influence was on decline and leverage unclear.

**B Diplomacy, normative pressure and persuasion**

B1i **Was there important diplomatic or peer pressure or other forms of social persuasion involved in the democratization process?**

Tajikistan was affected by post-Communist transition pressure from the international community and from the pro-democracy forces in the neighbourhood in the form of media and civil activists. Prior to September 11th, Tajikistan received a standard share of democracy-promotion assistance in the context of ‘transition paradigm’, as was allocated to all countries coming out of the Soviet bloc. In the 1990s it was believed in the West that people genuinely want democracy and some light external pressure is needed to create political will among the leadership to democratise. However, democratisation was not vigorously pursued because of lack of attention and civil war.

After attacks on America and intervention into Afghanistan focus on Tajikistan has increased, and so did diplomatic pressure on Tajikistan by the US, - Ambassador Richard Hoagland was personally committed to a democratisation, - and its allies. The sheer presence of the US NGOs involved in democratisation sphere created a momentum of its own.

Ambassador Hoagland dedicated much time to talk about democracy on different occasions. These are some quotes: ‘Prosperity is a “fertilizer” for democratic evolution. In the end, prosperity and democracy will be the twin guarantors of Tajikistan’s long-term stability.’ 103 As the government consolidates it power, as it heads towards elections, we would hope that they don’t make some of the mistakes that the other countries in the region have made in the past. We would hope that they would continue along the path of democratic pluralism. 104 Democracy-promotion was closely intertwined with the pressure to reduce Russian influence over Tajikistan; for example, a drive to bring the Russian border guard mission to a halt was most welcome and somehow regarded as helpful for democratic development.

An example of a telling speech is Amb. Hoagland ‘Democracy and Tajikistan’ lecture at the Tajik State National University on 2 March 2004 where he outlined the rights and the wrongs, and what the US expect the government of Tajikistan to do.

> What you don’t see, what you don’t hear, are the intense private conversations behind closed doors, after the journalists leave the room, when we are extremely frank with leaders about the need to establish democratic practices – for the good of their citizens and for their country’s own national interests.

> We make recommendations, but we do not dictate. I can tell you frankly from experience that dictating does not work. Democracy can never be imposed.

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DEMOCRACY PROMOTES STABILITY
Sometimes, leaders don’t listen to their people. Authoritarianism causes instability; it doesn’t prevent it. The recent “Rose Revolution” in Georgia happened precisely because the government refused to listen to the people. Georgia now has a much better chance for long-term stability than it had before.

NEXT STEPS FOR TAJIKISTAN
What are the specific and immediate democratic goals that the United States Government advocates for Tajikistan?

First, we strongly recommend that parliament pass the further amendments to the election law – long before the 2005 parliamentary election – that the majority of Tajikistan’s political parties, working with the United Nations and the OSCE, recently introduced to parliament.

Foremost among these amendments is the creation of an independent election commission with membership divided equitably among the parties, and with non-partisan members, so that people can believe in and trust the final word of the commission when it announces election results.

Second, we strongly advocate further revisions to the media laws. I recognize that within the last year the parliament has passed a number of laws in this area. Many of them, unfortunately, while relatively benign on the surface, impose further licensing requirements, especially for production studios and broadcast media. Every nation, including the United States, has national regulations for electronic media. But the purpose is to set minimum national standards, not to limit the very existence of independent media and what they are allowed to report objectively.

The role of independent – and responsible – mass media in a democracy is to serve as a check and balance to power. Independent media must be free to publicize the platforms of the various political parties, so that the people can make informed decisions when they vote.

Independent media must be free to expose corruption. It is especially pernicious to have laws that prohibit the media from supposedly insulting the honor and dignity of government officials. Such laws prevent the media from exposing corruption. There should indeed be laws to prevent the publication of lies about people – these are called libel laws – but these laws should exist only to keep journalists honest, not to hide from view the illegal actions of public officials.

WHY TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN TAJIKISTAN
To conclude, I want to tell you that I am optimistic about the future of democracy in Tajikistan. Why? First, because the government has chosen the democratic path. Although not all political parties have been registered, there is a multi-party system that includes the only legal Islamic Party in all of Central Asia. Also, very important, the peace agreement that ended Tajikistan’s civil war demonstrated a concrete commitment to power sharing, compromise, and peaceful modes of political competition.
Further, I am encouraged because the government is committed to the democratic practice of reducing central government control over local affairs. Highly educated citizens throughout the country, in both the public and private sectors, who care deeply about the people and nation of Tajikistan, are working together to form committees and associations and cooperatives on many different issues that affect their everyday lives. Non-governmental organizations have increased 100-fold in the last few years, proving that the citizens of Tajikistan are eager to take responsibility for themselves. Citizen participation in government is a fundamental building block of democracy. Citizen participation promotes fairness and justice, which are essential in democracy.

I firmly believe that democracy will blossom in Tajikistan. It has already started.\textsuperscript{105}

**B1ii What kind of verbal pressure or interaction was there? Were domestic decision-makers persuaded or shamed by an external actor? Did domestic decision-makers seek the personal approval of any external leader?**

Verbal pressure gained momentum as intervention progressed. The initial rhetoric was that of anti-terrorism, but gradually democratization, independence and fight against terrorism merged into an integrated discourse. Persuasion was the adopted approach when large amounts of aid were believed to have been promised by the US for fulfilling an American agenda. The problem however was that different constituencies in the US establishment were driven by different interests, and not all of them dedicated much attention to democratization. The Tajik leadership initially did not see the US democratisation rhetoric and support for the US ‘political’ NGOs as a threat, as it felt that the resonance in society is insufficient to generate much following.

However, ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan made the government to think otherwise. The discourse grew more adverse and Tajikistan became more assertive in raising its voice against external democracy promotion. When Condoleezza Rice publicly lectured the Tajik officials on democratization during her visit in 2006, this received a cool reaction. Likewise, the EU and the European countries involved in Tajikistan also insisted on democratization, but their stance was less public. The EU preferred the OSCE to ‘rally the flag’, while it held financial sticks and carrots to reward good and discourage bad behaviour.

Two leaders were important for domestic decision-makers: the US President Bush and Russian President Putin. Domestic actors sought Mr. Bush’s personal approval in 2002 – mid-2004, but in autumn of 2004 the balance shifted in Mr. Putin’s favour.

**C Modes of interaction between internal and external actors**

**C1i The preferences of the interveners (ending the war / creating a stable state / liberalization /democracy promotion – if so, what institutional type of democracy?). How ambitious are these goals regarding peace- and state building? Are these interests unitary or are there cleavages among the interveners?**

\textsuperscript{105} http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/sp_03022004.html#top
Russian intervention had a clear purpose of ending the war and creating a stable state. It preferred the leader to be publicly endorsed by the population and expected him to govern in a socially-responsible way, but did not care about liberalisation or democracy promotion in any great measure. Rather, it expected Tajikistan to be affected by these processes, as most post-Soviet countries had been, to one degree or another. In the context of post-conflict stabilisation democracy was not seen as important insofar as its lack did not create armed challenges to the existing rule.

The US and its allies had a purpose to create a foothold in Tajikistan, even if temporarily, in the context of the War on Terror. By being present and involved in Tajikistan, liberalization, democracy and civil society promotion crept inside the agenda and came to occupy an increasingly more prominent place. There was no explicit institutional type of democracy promoted, but the US lay an emphasis on development of multi-party system. OSCE Office in Tajikistan had a human dimension mandate which included democracy promotion and electoral monitoring, in conjunction with ODIHR, and which was a fairly standard package in the post-Soviet space.

UNTOP, by contrast, advanced a peacebuilding perspective and concentrated on dialogue between Islamic and secular representatives, and on party politics. UNTOP’s mandate also concerned security, non-resumption of hostilities and fate of the former field commanders and ex-combatants. In this respect, it somehow tended to exaggerate outstanding threats and tended to present the security situation in a worse light than it actually was. UNTOP also undertook activities in democracy promotion and human rights’ sphere, as it was running out of options of how to stay engaged, since increasingly its ‘territory,’ - such as DDR and small arms, - was jeopardised by UNDP. By the virtue of UNTOP’s mandate (it was not an operational agency), it could not run many projects independently and was forced into cooperation with UNDP, since the latter had operational capacities. UNTOP’s mandate in the country was a temporary one and it was vulnerable to the government’s acceptance of its prolongation. Thus, it pursued a cautious stance in its dealings with the government and abstained from overt criticism of its dubious democratic credentials. By contrast, UNDP in 2004 – 2006 grew much more assertive and criticised the government openly, thinking that the government values the aid and development it brings to the country and would have to swallow criticism.

In the time of peace (since 2001), there was almost no interaction between Russian intervention and that of the international community. There were a number of Russian nationals who worked at OSCE Office in Tajikistan and presumably informed Moscow about the international plans and projects. Increasingly, Russian approach concentrated on strengthening the state, with democracy promotion seen as a threat to it.

C1ii Preferences of the state elites. What do they expect to gain from the peacebuilding process (security / stability / retain their political power / economic interests)? Are these interests unitary or are there cleavages among the state elites?

The state elites had a stake in security and stability, as they came to view peace conditions as conducive to satisfaction of their material interests. The main interests
which required significant instability, were that of major drug traffickers. Apparently, assurances were made that drug market will be divided peacefully. As a result, sound cooperation in drug trafficking between former adversaries (Mirzo Ziyoev, Gaffur Mirzoev and Mahmadsaid Uboidulloyev) was ensured.

Predation was the main driver for the elites. Political power was sought to satisfy economic interests. This orientation, coupled with the vertical organisation of patronage networks (regions had their representatives in the centre and competed against each other) precluded formation of horizontal alliances among different regional sections of the elite to be able to mount a serious challenge to the central authority. This situation made it relatively easy for the President to eliminate the opponents or those whose loyalty became suspect.

An important unifying factor for the [ethnic] Tajik elite was establishment of a state of Tajikistan. The biggest fear was that the state would be dismembered and would come to be ruled from Tashkent as an Uzbek protectorate. According to this scenario, a puppet government would be created which would take its orders from across the border. Thus, different segments of the Tajik elite came to regard the President as a guarantor of resistance to the Uzbek power and influence.

C1iii The preferences of the rural/provincial/peripheral elites. What do they expect to gain from the democratization process (security / stability / maximize their political power / autonomy from the central government / economic interests)? Are these interests unitary or are there cleavages among the rural elites?

Overall, the economic interests were far more important. Those with power and influence sought to gain positions in officialdom or state-related businesses as they gave access to assets. A territorial-administrative reform was carried out without public consultation and much resistance. When the war ended, the former rural elites (kolkhoz leadership and municipal administrations) were in disarray, and the new elites started to emerge. In the war-affected regions they consisted of former local commanders who were given official positions (such as police chiefs) or came to be in charge of some local asset (petrol station, cotton gin), mullahs or other representatives of the clergy, many of whom managed to obtain control over property and retail in their areas (such as family of Qazi-Qalon Turajonzo da in Vakhdat – former Kofarnihon – district where it controls shops and restaurants) and emerging ‘businessmen’, which often overlapped with the two other categories.

Although the state local administrations were present, they could perform only limited functions, such as civil registrar. The ex-combatants could routinely ransack the administrations’ assets. In Tavildara district the head of administration was regularly beaten by a field commander just for fun. Over time, the situation has changed towards reinstating of power and respect for the local authority, while the influence of the ex-commanders diminished.

In the north (Soughd) which was not directly affected by the civil war, the provincial elites were keen to retain as much autonomy from the centre as possible and resist the attempts to impose Kulyabi officials upon them. As the Soughd province was relatively well-off, persons of Kulyabi origin were allocated lucrative appointments which allowed opportunities for enrichment, such as to head the prosecutor’s office,
customs, police, judges etc. The preference of the northern elite was to retain the local cadre as much as possible and resist imposition of southerners into the North. In the Soviet time Uzbeks were heavily represented in the administration and official positions in the north, which has a large Uzbek minority. However, after Khudoiberdiev revolt of 1998 many Uzbeks were purged from the officialdom and this pattern continued ever since.

**Cliv Under what constraints do the interveners operate? Do they face economic / political / time /normative constraints?**

Russian intervention had a constraint of limited resources which it could dedicate to reconstruction and development, and resorted to only to direct budgetary aid and humanitarian relief, in addition to peacekeeping. Domestically, it was mindful of potential accusations of putting lives of Russian conscripts into danger. It tried to deal with this concern by increasing recruitment of contract soldiers and of citizens of Tajikistan.

The main constraint for the international community was the fact that few resources had been committed to Tajikistan due to an initial lack of attention. Quality of international personnel remained to be desired. The international community had very little expertise and understanding on what Tajikistan is and how it operates, therefore it often employed a ‘learning by doing’ method.

The internationals sometimes faced normative dilemmas, such as how far should they go along with the government’s manipulation of the electoral process, in particular 2000 parliamentary elections and Constitutional referendum of 2003. The rationale for closing its eyes on manipulation was that in the genuine elections mostly criminals, ex-commanders and power-barons would become MPs through bribing and intimidation of the electorate and a responsible parliament would never emerge.106

In Gharm there was also a security constraint (threats by former commanders upon local offices and personnel of international agencies) and a pressure from the rural elites upon international development organisations to provide funds for local ‘businessmen’, for migration to Russia and for prestigious projects or ceremonies to please the higher dignitaries. In 1996 – 1999 there were also constraints upon personal conduct and dress code in accordance to strict Islamic norms (no smoking, drinking, music etc.) in Gharm and Tavildara, but these were gradually relaxed.

**Cliv Under what constraints do the state elites interact with the interveners? Under what constraints do the peripheral elites interact with the interveners?**

The state elites faced few constraints upon interaction with international interveners. There was no real threat of aid withdrawal the government would fear. For instance, in 1997 an EC TACIS expert was kidnapped and his wife was killed in a botched attempt to free the hostages. After that the EC TACIS programme was suspended, but ECHO funding went ahead. Since most funding consisted of relief aid, it was unlikely that it could be terminated.

106 ‘Would it be better that Rahmon Hitler types would sit in the parliament and get the immunity?’ - Author’s interview with Jan Malekzade, UNTOP.
There is a view that international opinion is the only constraint upon the leadership to continue to let the IRP to operate as a legitimate political party. Therefore, if international pressure is withdrawn and the government cannot boast its ‘tolerance credentials’, the IRP would be banned or forced to drop its religious basis. An alternative view is that the state elite was not really concerned about its international image, as it did not have much to lose anyhow, and tolerates the IRP for domestic reasons.

C1vi Was there a bargaining between “interveners” and state elites with regard to the type of regime?

Moscow was not much interested in the type of regime to emerge insofar as it functioned. There was no real bargaining between “interveners” and state elites with regard to the type of regime because democracy, at least on surface, was the only game in town when peace process started. The internationals did not try very hard to get beyond the surface. A possible explanation could be that they feared that in case they press too hard, the Tajik government would shift more towards the Russian side and reduce cooperation with the international community.

A bargain between the regime and the internationals was reached in the aftermath of the peace settlement that parliamentary elections would happen before the presidential ones which were expected to be won by Rahmon [the unwritten bargain perhaps was that the internationals would go easy on flaws with the presidential elections and would bless Rahmon regardless, but this is my speculation]. The President then changed the order and by doing this, expanded his authority and legitimacy by securing the presidency, and acquired far greater leverage on parliamentary elections. This illustrates that although the elites and interveners agreed on mutually acceptable terms and thought that they found a compromise, experience showed that it could be revisited and subsequently revised. Moreover, since Russia had fewer normative constraints on how democracy should function in Tajikistan as long as peace is secured, it offered a convenient alternative when pressure from internationals would become uncomfortable.

In the political/governance field, the internationals could not offer anything in real terms which the government could not organise itself: it could conduct elections throughout the country (even if flawed), had an experience of until recently functioning institutions which it could revert to and had a model on how to run the economy, e.g. cotton production. At the same time, peacebuilders did not seek to intervene resolutely into internal politics, and when they tried, the government made its displeasure feel.

C1vii Were there “veto players” or spoilers in the domestic system – i.e. actors in the domestic arena capable of effectively blocking the bargain from going forward? Who were these “veto players” and how powerful were they in relation to those who want change?

107 Author’s interview with Mugutdin KAbiri, IRP Chairman, Mashkhad, February 2008.
Not really. There were challengers to presidential rule, but they did not try to veto the bargain, because no effective bargain was made.

C1viii Were there “change agents” in the domestic system – i.e. actors in the domestic arena that strongly supported democratic change? Who were these “change agents” (e.g. civil society, parts of the ruling elites, business elites, army or security services …)? What links do they have with the external actors promoting change? How powerful were they in relation to “veto players”?

‘Democracy’ was aspired to only by segments of urban and rural intelligentsia, a small section of society. Moreover, it is far from certain that those who claimed they wanted democracy, would continue to adhere to it, should they come to power themselves (e.g. The Communists or democrats). Those who were vocal in demanding change and claiming to stand up for it, ended up in jail (e.g. Mahmadruzi Iskandarov who used to criticise the President publicly, got 23 years in prison).

Rather, there are forces which want political modernisation (less relatives in power, more appointment on merit, more inclusivity) and better governance (less corruption, more transparency and accountability, better managerial cadre and technical skills). These include parts of the ruling elite, business elites, especially those who are involved in international operations and are aware that things can be run differently, local staff of international organisations, foreign embassies and NGOs. This latter category has direct linkage to external actors, but is also disillusioned about the limited power of the international community in the country and how it operates in reality.

**ADDED Question Domestic Demand for Democracy**

In your case, what (if any) domestic demand was the re? Was there an elite driven demand? Was democracy seen a necessary by product of independence? Or, as a solution to a hurting stalemate after a civil war? In the latter case, was democracy more than a power sharing arrangement between two elite groups? Was there a mass driven demand? Did people campaign for democratic participation? If so, what sort of participation did people want? In what instances was democracy offering a solution for the problems that the post-war society was facing? In what cases was democracy seen (rightly so or not) as solution for a problem that was seen (rightly so or not) as affecting the international community? Consider also the possibility that there was a lot of domestic demand for democracy, but a lack of capacity to implement. If so - which capacities were lacking? At what level?

On a mass level, the notion of democracy was very diffused and tended to equate democracy with prosperity, meritocracy of public officials and expression of national sentiment suppressed in the Soviet times. However, brief experimentation with democracy in late 1980s – early 1990 in the public eyes brought a colossal setback in living conditions, worse standard of public service (many ex-combatants with no qualifications for the jobs) and religious, ethnic and regional tensions for the masses. Against this background, little could be gained by demanding more democracy, while the Soviet model of political control for the elites and development for masses became more appealing.
There has been a demand for international legitimacy and recognition, and a mimicry of democracy had to be performed for this purpose by the ruling group. The international community was pressed by their own capitals and ideology to see some growth in democratisation in order to stay engaged and justify continuation of aid. It would be fair to say that the international community experienced demand for democracy and sought to identify who may be its ‘agents of change’.

C1ix **What were the “costs of adaptation” for the regime (involving loss of power, risk of criminal prosecution …)? What were the “distribution of costs” of compliance with external calls to democratize among the key domestic players? If compliance with the demands of the external actor occurs, who is likely to suffer and who is likely to benefit?**

The regime has survived a civil war and was baptised by it. The lesson it learnt that uncontrollable democratization can unleash chaos and expose divisions in the society which can rip the country apart. The leadership felt that allowing a ‘free-for-all’ is simply too dangerous and that people cannot be trusted not to use democracy for self-harm. It also did not respect its political opponents, feeling that they have little to offer in terms of making government work. The case of Rahmatullo Zoirov, a politician genuinely committed to democratic change, was telling: at one point he worked at the presidential administration, but left over a policy disagreement with the President and could not comply with the ways of how the government operates.

The paradox was that it is unlikely that the regime had much to lose, were it to adopt some democratic practices. The president most probably would have won a decisive victory in free and fair elections, albeit not over 90%, as there are no real alternatives. Allowing small democratic parties to operate and field candidates in the parliamentary elections was unlikely to make much effect, since their following has been very narrow. Harassment of opposition press and persecution of political opponents – the key demands of external actors has been to bring such practices to a halt, - would have been relatively easy to comply because their remit has been quite limited. Meanwhile, the leadership adhered to the maxim that ‘prevention is better than cure’ and sought to nip potential opponents in the bud.

If external calls to democratise would be complied with, the North and the northern elites are likely to benefit in short term. They are better equipped to make use of the opportunities which democratisation could offer and have rudimentary parties to be used as vehicles for promotion. The northerners have at their disposal news agencies, opposition press, academia and ties with the internationals. This would also be a testing event for the IRP which would prove its real strength. The case might well be that the grassroots Islamic constituency which exists in the society, would find other outlets and forms of expression. Kulyabis (especially from Dangara, the presidential stronghold) would be the losers, as well as minorities and women.

**D Linkage, integration, convergence**

**D1i Neighborhood / Geographical linkage:** Are the countries in the geographical proximity democratic?
The countries in the neighbourhood are not democratic, apart from Kyrgyzstan which is a hybrid state combining features of authoritarianism and democracy, but not being very good at either.

D1ii **Was the democratic post-war process influenced by democratic or non-democratic neighbors? Were there spill-over effects from other countries? Was the political outcome you are examining inspired by specific events in another, possibly neighboring country? If so how? Was it a democratic spill-over? A wave of democratization? Or is it an autocratic spill-over? Do neighbor states support autocrats? Do elites or the mass population consciously imitate/borrow institutional and legal models from abroad?**

Initially, the post-war process was influenced by political developments in Russia which served as a trend-setter (1997 – 2000) and democratization was seen as an integral part of the post-Soviet transition. It was the same for the neighbouring Kyrgyzstan where the leadership aspired towards democracy, but found it difficult to make it operate in practice.

There were spill-over effects from the neighbouring countries, most notably Afghanistan, which served as an adverse demonstration model. Ethnically closely related, Afghanistan did not have an experience of a functioning state and associated benefits of physical and social infrastructure and education. The population in Tajikistan has a genuine fear, reinforced by stories of those who experienced Afghanistan as a refugee, that unless strong state authority is maintained, they could descend into an Afghan-type scenario. Futility of the international intervention to bring about tangible improvements in Afghanistan only exacerbates this fear. References to Afghanistan are sufficient to ensure popular compliance.

Uzbekistan never pretended to democratize. The fact that its neighbour, the largest Central Asian country, is more authoritarian and cruel in dealing with its population, boosts the Tajik leadership’s credentials of being more ‘democratic and tolerant’ than its arch-nemesis. Against such background, Tajikistan compares favourably, as it has genuine opposition parties, occasional protest rallies and some freedom of expression. China is an example of a successful and prosperous non-democratic neighbour. Although cultural resentment of the Chinese exists on a popular level, the government began to look at the Chinese political experience with interest, especially since the latter started to provide investment.

Thus, an autocratic spill-over gains momentum in the region, when authoritarian presidents support each other’s ways of dealing with dissent and the dangers of democratization. The neighbouring states support autocrats, as all of them adhered to the same ideology of super presidential system when monopoly of political power is not questioned.

There are also demonstration examples of Russia and Kazakhstan, not strictly neighbouring countries, but states with which Tajikistan has much affinity. These are successful states and a model which the elites and society in Tajikistan adhere to. For the regime, Moscow would be the safe heaven where it could find refuge if needed (as President Akayev did after the March 2005 ‘revolution’).
Political/diplomatic linkage: What, if any, were the country’s main political and security ties to foreign governments, alliances, regional or international organizations?

The country’s main alliance was with Russia both on the government and the opposition side (democratic forces). Moderate Islamists and cultural intelligentsia were connected with Iran, while hard-line Islamists had ties with the Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan and global Islamic solidarity networks. Tajikistan was connected with other Central Asian states in ‘love-and-hate’ regional cooperation projects. After September 11th Central Asia – including Tajikistan – appeared on the US policy map. Imomali Rahmon was invited to the White House. French air maintenance facility was established in Dushanbe airport. Talks were held with the US on overfly rights, use of facilities, training and equipping Tajik armed and security forces and other forms of assistance, including budgetary support for the Tajik border forces.

The Tajik leadership acquired a sense of strategic importance for the US. Configuration of alliances started to re-shape, while the presidential entourage felt that benefits are to be had from pitting former Cold War rivals against each other. Dushanbe continues with a policy of balancing between the two poles without entering into too many concessions with either party, and tries to resist pressure on uncomfortable matters. The outcome of the balancing act is that relations both with Moscow and Washington have cooled down.

NATO sought to lure Tajikistan into Partnership-for-Peace programme offered to all post-Soviet states, but was doing this half-heartedly. However, since 2002 when NATO ISAF got more entrenched in northern Afghanistan, enthusiasm became more real. Still, more tangible projects happened on bilateral basis than with NATO as a multilateral security organisation. The EU has been an actor whom the government did not understand and therefore was unsure how to deal with. It perceived the EU as a financial backer of programmes designed elsewhere.

The international discourse which affected the assistance strategy, was misguided and significant issues were overlooked. Tajikistan was one of the theatres of Islamic solidarity operation launched from Afghanistan, but because this had been taking place prior to September 11th, it was overlooked by international experts and politicians. Instead, the debate mostly revolved around Russian peacekeeping as a possible indication of resurgence of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and desire to control the Near Abroad. Moscow, sensitive to such suspicions, was reluctant to pro-active influence Tajikistan’s internal affairs as it would have been perceived by the West as undue interference.

Economic linkage: What, if any, were the country’s main trade, investment, credit and bilateral/multilateral aid links? Is it aid dependent? Does it depend on labor migration and remittances? If so, from which country mostly?

Tajikistan’s main economic links used to be with its regional neighbours in Central Asia and with Russia. This continues informally, but closed borders, deteriorating transport infrastructure and corruption undermine these ties significantly. At the same time, economic ties with China have grown considerable. It provides loans for infrastructure projects and credits for purchases of Chinese goods.
Initially, western investors were attracted by Tajikistan’s resources. The British came to invest into gold and the Swiss (Rienhart) - into cotton. The Swiss continue to operate, while the British companies have withdrawn under pressure from warlords and poor security conditions. Iran has consistently provided aid and investment into infrastructure projects, such as construction of a road tunnel to connect the north with the rest of the country and develops Sangtuda-II hydro power project on Vakhsh river. International financial institutions (IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) and Arab charities provided financial credits. Trade with the EU countries mostly consists of sales of luxury goods to a narrow group of customers. More economic ties are being developed with India and Pakistan.

Following the initial retreat, Russia came to be a major investor in mid-2000s. Tajikistan accumulated a $300 million debt to Russia due to being subsidised in the 1990s. In a deal negotiated between Putin and Rahmon Moscow agreed to write off the debt in exchange for leasing the Nurek air surveillance facility, military basing rights and investment into hydro power sector. Tajikistan got a concession that Tajik citizens would be allowed to enter Russia using internal papers, because Tajikistan is unable to print enough international passports for everybody who wishes to travel to Russia for work.

The country is not really aid dependent. Officially, aid constitutes around 10 percent of GDP (figures in part IV), but real GDP is likely to be higher, because major sources of income such as labour remittances, drug money and proceeds of smuggling, e.g. scrap metal to China, do not enter formal statistics. The country is dependant on labour migration, mostly to Russia (70%) and Kazakhstan.

**D1v Social/cultural linkage: To what degree was there a pre-existing affinity between domestic norms and democracy prior to the transition? Which groups in society/opposition/government had this affinity and which did not? Was the external actor/environment promoting democracy viewed as “one of us” in any sense – i.e. as part of the actor’s actual or aspired group of belonging? Was the intervener seen as legitimate in making the demand for democracy?**

In the social and cultural sphere the Soviet legacy and Russian culture is paramount. Jonson notes that Russia understood itself as being culturally close to Asia, but also as having a “civilising” role and mission there.\(^\text{108}\) Russian/Soviet culture, being socially conservative, had certain rapport in Tajikistan and a means of adaptation to Central Asian setting. As independence has become entrenched, public in Tajikistan have grown more appreciative of their Soviet/Russian heritage, as fear of encroachment – or even incorporation – into the cultural milieu of Iran, Pakistan and China became more acute. Some point out that had they not been a part of the Russian/Soviet state, their development would be on a par with Afghanistan. At present, language and culture remain among Russia’s unrivalled assets. Despite reduced coverage, Russian television is the main source of news and entertainment for the elites, while renewed support for higher education and professional networks strengthens social ties.

The younger generation, less culturally affiliated with Russia, receives some attention through university placements and sponsorship for Tajik – Slavonic university in Dushanbe. Schools for families of Russian servicemen admit able local children. Such small steps serve to preserve ties to Russia for the next generation’s elite, especially since alternative offers of educational support come mostly from the rich Muslim states, of which secular elites are wary. Russian pop culture is also popular.

Russian social and cultural role and influence is seen as ‘European,’ and in this sense it is this Europeanised segment of society which perceives the demand for democracy as ‘theirs’. Otherwise there is little cultural resentment of the notion and of those who promote it, but rather a belief that the external actors who demand it are naïve, do not understand the local conditions and have an unrealistic perspective over the timeframe when democracy can be achieved.

For most of the elite which has little direct contact with the internationals and for the society at large, there is a serious doubt that democracy is a genuine value in its own right for those who promote it abroad. Neither secular, nor Islamic constituency has a deeply-felt cultural resentment of The Land Which Exports Democracy and Freedom as in the Middle East, but suspicion reins that democracy-promotion is either promotion of some selfish interests in disguise (control over resources or military/strategic facilities) or a new front of the Cold War rivalry.

There are expanding links with the Islamic countries, moderate or otherwise, which are reinforced by the US democracy-promotion crusade. This is the indirect channel through which cultural sentiment of Muslim solidarity creeps in and brings to life an anti-Western ideology.

D1vi Technological/communication linkage: What, if any, were the country’s main modes of social and cultural interactions with the external world (degree of cross-border radio, television and internet penetration and coverage)?

Since independence, the country suffers from acute isolation. As the links with Uzbekistan are halted and there is relatively little interaction with Afghan and Chinese neighbours, Tajikistan became a de facto dead end. There are few flights, hotel and accommodation facilities, reception rooms etc which makes organization of events and conferences extremely difficult. Unless visitors have a particular reason to be in Tajikistan, there are few newcomers as compared to its regional neighbours.

One medium of communication which gains momentum are audio recordings (used to be audiocassettes and currently CDs). They are used to spread Islamic propaganda in bazaars, squares, public transport etc. Uzbek minorities on the border with Uzbekistan mostly listen to radio from across the border, since there is little public broadcast available in Uzbek language in Tajikistan and coverage of rural areas, especially in the mountains, is deficient. Withering away of Russian language makes technological and communication linkage more problematic for the rural population of younger generation. Not everybody knows how to dial a landline telephone.

Otherwise, lack of electricity seriously undermines TV and Internet penetration and coverage. Internet is available only in larger cities. For the majority of population, newspapers became a thing of the past. Tajikistan has good quality news agencies
(Varorud, Asia-Plus and Avesto), but coverage reaches only the educated elites in the urban environment. There are no book shops.

Nevertheless, Tajik diaspora, mostly in Russia, is active and runs independent newspapers (Charog-i-Ruz) and internet sites. Authors from Tajikistan actively contribute to Central Asian, Russian and western websites which cover regional affairs.

**D1vii Civil society linkage: What, if any, were the main ties between civil society organizations in the country and NGOs, party organizations, advocacy and religious groups abroad?**

Civil society is perceived in Tajikistan as donor-funded media and NGOs. In this sense, it is not only connected to foreign NGOs and western governments, but presents a direct product of it. These are mostly US NGOs and foundations, such as Open Society Institute, IFES, American Bar Association, IREX, NDI, to name just a few. European NGOs also operate in Tajikistan, but unlike the US ones seldom have a presence of internationals in the country. Despite European origins, many nevertheless are perceived as American set-ups in disguise (for example, Institute of War and Peace Reporting). Human rights organizations and individuals with roots in dissident movements are integrated in the ex-Soviet networks, but these are exceptions. Otherwise, such ties are maintained by academic experts. ‘Civil society’ networks in Central Asia and in the CIS are greatly enhanced by donor-funded networking and regional projects. More recently, organizations from Russia became more active.

There are also extensive links with Muslim advocacy and religious groups, educational establishments and foundations, but these are seldom advertised openly and are hard to draw conclusions on their exact extent and nature.

**D1viii Integration: In what regional and/or global organizations, if any, was the country a full member?**

Tajikistan is a member of the UN and OSCE, the latter membership acquired by default since OSCE entry was offered to all Soviet successor states when the Union fell apart. Tajikistan had to sign up to the OSCE commitments which it probably did not fully comprehend in the heat of the civil war and which the OSCE states ‘west of Vienna’ try to make it to comply with. As withdrawal from the OSCE is not an option, the government is in an uneasy position of having to be a subject of OSCE elections’ monitoring and advice on human rights standards.

Tajikistan is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization set up to facilitate post-Soviet disengagement among the newly independent states which also allows high-level networking among presidents. It is also a member of various regional organizations with Russia in the heart of them, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Eurasec (Eurasian Economic Community). Recently SCO established in 2001 gained momentum, which unites Russia, China and four Central Asian states (excluding Turkmenistan). Tajikistan is a member of Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) which includes Iran, but little activities take place. Tajikistan is also a member of a number of Islamic
organizations, such as Organisation of Islamic Conference. It is a member of international financial institutions, needed to receive financial aid and loans.

**Which events on the international scene shaped the intentions and strategies of the external actors (e.g. regime changes in neighboring states, major international events)? In what ways? How decisive was this change of intentions and / or strategies?**

September 11th and the start of the US-led intervention into Afghanistan decisively shaped strategies of external actors. It brought more resources, human capacities and public profile to a previously neglected country. Anti-terrorist military action in Afghanistan resulted in shedding light on the IMU activities and undermining the movement. A number of Tajik nationals who fought alongside Taliban were detained in Afghanistan. These events confirmed the government’s claims – previously dismissed as pure humbug - that Islamists are real and present a threat. The unwritten bargain was that the Coalition troops would address external security concerns emanating from Afghanistan while the government allows some political freedoms and activities of western charities and NGOs.

The attacks on America also brought western security assistance, however, not on a scale which was commonly believed. In the crucial financial year 2002 US security assistance to Tajikistan amounted only to US $ 3,959,000.109

Other major event was a chain of coloured revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). The first two were received by the government with caution, but still thought to be too remote to present a concrete threat of regime change. However, Kyrgyzstan showed that external actors promote democracy with a purpose of undermining existing leaderships. If the leadership was in doubt, statements of western NGOs, experts and officials about their contribution to making the popular will happen created an exaggerated impression of power of foreign-funded civil society. In the words of President Rahmon, ‘what makes the danger worse is that our homegrown provocateurs now have skilled coaches who have learned how to use provocations.’110 The ousted presidents (Shevardnadze and Akayev) impressed upon their former peers through personal networking that they overlooked the dangers of ‘democracy promotion’ and have been too liberal, with a detrimental effect.

Another development was the US intervention in Iraq which resonated in the Muslim world. Moreover, since Arabic studies were developed in Tajikistan, many among humanitarian intelligentsia worked in Iraq as interpreters at the time of Soviet developmental assistance and had an attachment to it. A day of execution of Saddam Hussein was a very sad day in Tajikistan (I’ve been there at the time). The US debacle in Iraq also undermined a belief in American wisdom and its vastly superior recipes of reform. For the broader public in Tajikistan it presented the US as any other country which makes mistakes and suffers set-backs rather than a bastion of higher skills and values.

110 Quoted in Radio Free Europe Newsline, 10 January 2005.
democracy promotion and good governance promotion became en vogue only in the early 90s. Before that, the modernization paradigm dominated development policy. How did this shift of paradigms influence the fate of democracy? - the role of “the end of the end of history”: For a brief period (roughly between late 80s and late 90s) “democracy” and “liberalism” had clearly won the day, and many warring parties actually competed for being “more democratic”. Today, “democracy” has lost much of its appeal. Some observers speak of a democratic rollback, and undemocratic but economic successful states (such as China, Russia and Kazakhstan) are becoming role models for other states. What is the impact of this development?

The impact of this development is that the West which promotes and personifies democracy lost moral credibility in the eyes of the elites. Values of democracy it tries to plant came to be seen as geopolitical interests in disguise. ‘Democracy’ lost its original meaning of a ‘universal good’ and became a victim of resurrection of old rivalries and new ‘political technologies’ believed to be behind coloured revolutions.

The other impact was that the link between democracy, prosperity and stability is no longer made. It came out that if the state can achieve prosperity and national coherence, and give population freedom in their private lives, it is unlikely that the citizens would want to seriously challenge the regime in power and undermine stability. Thus, even if people generally continue to believe that democracy is a ‘good thing’, they can easily go without it, if stability and prosperity are ensured.

Lastly, the impact was on the democrats themselves. They came to be seen as pariahs if they were idealistic liberals, or as corrupt and greedy rivals for power who are unlikely to do better than the incumbent regime, were they to take office.

In the end, a decade ago it was not possible to credibly argue against democracy and maintain a semblance of international credibility. This has changed considerably now. In the meeting between the EU and Central Asian foreign ministers in September 2008 in Paris Central Asian ministers made it clear that they are not interested in sermons on democracy, the rule of law, or strengthening civil society. All cited their challenging geography, lack of a liberal political tradition, and occasionally the "mentality" of their peoples as more or less insurmountable obstacles to immediate reforms.111

Counterfactuals: if Russia did not engage in peacekeeping and the international community did not provide aid.

Peacekeeping did not radically affect the outcome of the civil war, but it did affect its duration. Without Russian intervention a low level warfare could have lasted for another five years, further weakening the institutions of governance and driving people away from the habits and expectations of civilian life, which would have made post-war rehabilitation more challenging.

The international community’s relief and rehabilitation aid during and in the aftermath of the civil war was vital for the population; in its absence human suffering would have been much worse. Picture at a later stage is more complicated: some Tajik observers believe that were relief aid stopped earlier, or at least was distributed only to those in dire need, e.g. food in hospitals, then reconstruction and rejuvenation of the economy would have happened better and earlier while people have not yet accustomed to living off aid.

In case the international community worked together rather than in parallel with Russia, and both pressed Rahmon and the IRP more in the first three – four years after the Peace Accords, the shape of the regime may have been different. Chances are that it would have been more inclusive rather than an exclusive bargain between the IRP and Kuliabis. If the external actors insisted rigorously, northerners and the Uzbeks could have been included into the government and the parliament, providing a more real counterweight to the Kuliabi domination given their political and managerial experience, and check and balances on power. They may not have been so easy to eliminate from power as former field commanders and Islamic democrats.

PART 4
Aid / Democracy financial and technical assistance after the war

Which were the most important donors after the start of the intervention (UN, UNDP, UN-related agencies, World Bank, IMF, EU, major EU nations)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>89,654,860.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>61,405,127.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment Protection and Tourism</td>
<td>16,768,277.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>122,978,915.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>860,587,627.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Management</td>
<td>132,530,609.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatisation, labour and private sector development</td>
<td>42,101,087.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>169,455,567.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>230,455,682.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Type</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Grant</td>
<td>14,493,820.00</td>
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<td>AKDN</td>
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<td>9,231,870.00</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>118,875.00</td>
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<td>Bill Gates Fund</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>11,159,117.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>532,205.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>14,582,518.00</td>
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Aid figures prior to 2003 are almost impossible to obtain, those which became available, are presented in the appendix on aid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>119,419,399.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>880,838.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>3,253,075.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>9,358,069.00</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>10,940,461.00</td>
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<td>GFATM</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>Loan</td>
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<td>Grant</td>
<td>1,305,074.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>2,392,759.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>69,790,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>5,700,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>15,445,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>1,648,720.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>22,126,476.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>121,232.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>23,926,877.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>1,419,211.00</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>2,495,221.00</td>
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<td>Loan</td>
<td>6,998,980.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>190,400.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>5,821,484.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>39,663,494.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>6,610,374.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>25,631,043.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>7,301,550.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDGO</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>460,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>15,908,547.00</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Grant</td>
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<td>UNFAQ</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNTOP</td>
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<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
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<td>UNWHO</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>7,569,128.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The USA was the largest donor to Tajikistan, followed by the World Bank and the European Commission in terms of provision of grants. Russia also provided considerable assistance in kind, but since it is not OECD member, Russian contribution is hard to compare with that of the western donors. China is the lead nation in provision of loans, but most of Chinese loans are intent to finance infrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese companies or are advance credit guarantees to purchase Chinese goods. It is obscure to what extent the allocated Chinese credits were actually used. Asian Development Bank (ABD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) were also top loan providers.

**Top ten Donors in 2005 – 2006**

2005 – 06 average, million USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Institution</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AsDF (Asian Development Fund)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF &amp; ESAF (IMF)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Agencies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Official development assistance and official aid (thousand US$), 2001 - 2006*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>169,270</td>
<td>168,320</td>
<td>147,840</td>
<td>243,140</td>
<td>251,150</td>
<td>239,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the start of intervention mostly multilateral donors led, while as time progressed, more European and American donors joined in.

It is worth remembering that UNDP and other UN agencies are not donors in a strict sense, as they partly distribute funds allocated through the central budget from headquarters in New York (‘track funds’) and fundraise directly from donors, by the same token as NGOs do, and compete with organisations such as Aga-Khan Development Network, Mercy Corps etc. These figures do not give a breakdown between track and non-track funds. In my time at UNDP the aspiration was to have a 50 – 50 ratio. Much track money is normally spent on core operation and office management costs.

**A1ii What was the pattern of aid? Did the pattern of aid delivery coincide with specific events, e.g. elections? Was there a massive infusion of aid in the immediate post-conflict phase with a rapid decline afterwards or rather a continuous but modest flow of resources? Please compare the baseline development aid prior to the intervention with the aid flows after the start of the intervention.**

113 [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/20/1882885.gif](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/20/1882885.gif)
Developmental and humanitarian assistance by the international community started to be provided in 1993 after the civil war broke out. Prior to the war there was no development aid. During 1992 period of fighting which witnessed the utmost flows of refugees, there was aid from UNHCR and Islamic relief charities, but it is hard to get those figures. The aid consisted of food and non-food components. Tajikistan’s first UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal (CAP) was prepared for 1994, and some $225 million have been mobilised through this mechanism. The international financial institutions started to fund development even before the Peace Accords were signed. For instance, since 1996 the World Bank Group has approved 17 projects for a total of US$302.1. In addition, US$1.4 million has been made available to Tajikistan for institution-building and post-conflict assistance on a grant basis.

Loans from the international financial institutions backfired in the end. In 2008 IMF determined that the Tajik National Bank had supplied the international lender with “inaccurate information” about the country’s cotton sector, doctored data concerning the size of international reserves, its net domestic assets and its credit policy. The IMF demanded a repayment of $47.4 million over a six months period, while other lenders such as ADB started to conduct their own audits, with an expectation that more repayment demands are to follow.

September 11th was a momentous event for Tajikistan in terms of upsurge of donor funding. In the preceding period Tajikistan has received limited external assistance since independence. The multilateral agencies, particularly IMF and World Bank were the major sources of assistance. World Bank operations started in 1994. The FY 1999-2001 World Bank country assistance strategy envisaged total lending of $220 million focusing on privatization, agriculture, finance, social services and protection and capacity building. The perceived high risk to project implementation and personal safety were the principal factors for the slow entry of much bilateral assistance. External assistance has consisted mainly of balance of payments support reflecting the country’s severe financial difficulties.

The EU and the European aid (from European bilateral donors) also grown since September 11th. The EU was about to cut aid to the Central Asia two-fold, but did not yet managed to do so when attacks on America happened. The EU announced a two-fold increase, but in reality this was the same money, as the Commission planned to cut aid in half before September 11th. Elections did not bring an infusion of aid, but the fact that more donor money for post-Communist countries was being freed-up elsewhere (the new EU member states, Russia, Kazakhstan, Croatia etc.) benefited Tajikistan because of a fighting poverty agenda.

Additional question: What did the internationals do?

114 These are concessional credits: 40 years repayment period, 10 year grace period and zero interest rate (with service fee of 0.75%).
A number of multilateral organisations concentrated on areas remote from democracy promotion and ones with accordance to their mandate, e.g. IMF focussed on financial stabilisation, balance of payments and budgetary support, ADB also provided budgetary support, and engaged in infrastructure projects. UNHCR provided care for the remaining refugees from Afghanistan, UNAIDS undertook activities in the field of combating HIV/AIDS. OSCE was the lead agency engaged in elections monitoring, in cooperation with IFES and UNTOP. Donors and agencies whose activities had bearing upon democracy-promotion, are represented below, with financial information entered in the enclosed spreadsheets. The important exception is the US, information on which proved so far impossible to compile. Perhaps OSI can be used as a proxy?

**UK government**

The UK government aid is mostly administered by the Department for International Development (DFID). However, other government departments and agencies are also involved, most importantly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and security-related ministries. In the case of Tajikistan, the Embassy had funds to distribute in the country at its own discretion. These would be fairly small amounts which would not enter official aid figures supplied by the government to OECD (to the best of my knowledge). This money would typically be used for ‘democracy-promotion’ activities, e.g. support for elections, political parties, media and civil society etc. I was unable to find the exact figures. The other important agency was Customs vested with responsibility of prevention drugs from penetrating the UK. In 2005/06 and 2006/07 it has put £2 million into EU BOMCA project on reinforcing protection of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan implemented by UNDP in cooperation with other agencies, such as UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

During 2000-03 DFID aid was administered according to a regional programme which covered the Central Asia and South Caucasus (CASC) countries. The Regional CASC Strategy separated the eight countries into three levels of engagement:

- **Focal countries**: Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic
- **Limited activity**: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
- **Monitoring**: Tajikistan (activity dependent on the security situation).

2004-2007 period saw inclusion of Moldova in the Regional Assistance Plan (RAP), and the levels of engagement with the different countries were revised. Focal countries for the current ‘CASCM region’\(^{117}\) where bilateral programmes are run are Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Tajikistan. The latter accounted for 12% for DFID’s commitment to the region.\(^{118}\) Country-level objectives included:

1. Strengthening of governance and institutions for poverty reduction where it provided technical assistance and concentrated on processes (rather than outputs)
2. pro-poor growth and healthcare
3. conflict resolution and peacebuilding

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\(^{117}\) CASCM stands for Central Asia South Caucasus Moldova.

Allocations to Tajikistan were steadily growing, reaching £2.76 million in 2005/06. Approximately 70% of spending was committed to activities under objective (1). Democracy, human rights, civil society and regional integration have been regarded as region-level priorities and support for such activities mostly comes from the regional budget line (region being nine CASCM countries). However, evaluation of the DFID programme found that budget allocations were seldom linked to objectives. DFID abstained from provision of budget support due to the fragile state context, in which it followed the Fragile State policy.

The sectors DFID works in Tajikistan are as follows: (i) government administration, (ii) agriculture and irrigation, (iii) water supply and sewage, (iv) private sector development, (v) health and (vi) multisector. The larger projects include:

**Integrated Rural Development**

*Zarafshan Valley Livelihood Project* operated via UNDP from March 2006 to March 2009 operated via UNDP with a budget £3.340 million. The project provides an integrated package of development assistance to local governments, the private sector and civil society (Jamoat Resource Centres, see the UNDP section) in the Zarafshan Valley to raise living standards and integrate the Valley into the national economy.

**Access to Justice**

*Third Party Arbitration Courts* (TPAC) with a budget of £1.4 million from December 2004 to December 2007. The project is in establishing an alternative dispute mechanism of land and property disputes in Tajikistan in support of the country’s land reform programme. Out of court arbitration is an alternative mechanism for solving disputes arising between individuals or businesses, mostly over land and property and in commercial matters and is a procedure in which a third person is chosen by the disputing parties themselves, to whom they entrust the resolution of their case and with whom they engage beforehand to execute it.

DFID provides additional funding towards further development and testing of recommendations on the farm debt strategy. The scope of work over the three year timeframe includes working with Tajik State bodies, international organisations, local administrations and NGOs, identify and agree on complimentary areas of expertise and search for suitable providers of expert assistance in areas such as innovative mediation and dispute resolution (TPAC) procedures, institutional strengthening, improved cost recovery and sustainability of service provision. This is a type of British *know how* which has a history in the country and has been successfully applied in development abroad.

**Strengthening governance and institutions**

**Support to IFIs (WB, EBRD and ADB)**

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119 Information provided to the author by DFID office in Tajikistan, April 2008.
120 The author evaluated a similar project in Sri Lanka within the Access to Justice Programme, financed by GCPP, June 2008.
ADB
Contribution to ADB Farm Debt assistance (£362,000). ADB and the government developed the farm debt resolution strategy (FDRS) to tackle the resolution of debt. The Independent Commission (IC) comprising senior ministers, donors and NGOs was set up to implement the FDRS. IC has prepared an Action Plan and has sought comments from the donors to improve the Plan using participatory methods. DFID paid for two consultancy posts on the IC.

Technical Assistance to the State Investment Committee to implement Private Sector Development Strategy – DFID contribution $0.5 mln (co-funding with ADB - total budget $2 million).

WB
National Social Investment Fund Tajikistan, February 2004 – March 2007, £1.5 million. The rationale is similar to the UNDP Zarafshan Valley project, but was implemented differently. The Fund was aimed to promote pro-poor development and community empowerment, and to increase the impact of the World Bank supported Second Poverty Alleviation Project (SPAP). The objective of the SPAP is to improve the living standards of poor and vulnerable people through micro-projects, micro-credit services and community empowerment.

Support to the Ministry of Finance in MTEF roll-out constituted £100,000 since January 2006. The project is implemented by the WB and is aimed to help the Ministry of Finance to roll out the first MTEF, and provide training and capacity building for the ministry staff.

Support to Statistics Agency /MISP implemented by the WB, contribution of £600,000.

Support to Monitoring and Evaluation and Communication of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS-2), December 2006, £46,000.

EBRD
EBRD Small & Micro Finance Facility (TMSEF), August 2003 – September 2005, £1.244 million (further 800k Euro through ETC fund) were allocated with the goal of supporting small and medium enterprise sector development.

Social Welfare
MICS and Child Poverty Study in Tajikistan, implemented by UNICEF and co-sponsored by the WB, £85,000, September 05 – Summer 06. The funds were provided to UNICEF towards the cost of conducting a Multi Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in 2005 and producing a child poverty study. The main objective of the study is to analyse the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS) and MICS data from the perspective of child poverty.

Health
Central Asian Regional HIV and AIDS Project (CARHAP) – harm-reduction activities for high-risk population, with a total of £5.4 million regional budget.

World Bank

The projects have WB thematic codes, these will be followed in the WB section below. None of them fall under ‘humanitarianism’ or ‘democracy-promotion’ activities.

Conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery – IS THIS DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN ANY SHAPE OR FORM - AM?, Participation and civic engagement (P), Vulnerability assessment and monitoring, gender

‘Second Poverty Alleviation’ started in September 2002 until 31 December 2006, grant to National Social Investment Fund of Tajikistan. The objective of the project was to improve the living standards through micro-projects, micro-finance services and community empowerment in rural areas. Microproject portfolio totals over 130 microprojects in various phases of completion which was improving the standard of living for approximately 140,000 beneficiaries.

Communities have been empowered through development of community development centers, training, building of partnerships and associations with national and international NGOs and through a collaborative process. In 2005 the project was restructured as it was thought that microfinance component would be better used in the project's primary micro-project component, given that the National Social Investment Fund of Tajikistan (NSIFT)'s strengths lay in the latter area. A technical audit team was formed to respond to a request to assess possible activities in community civil works, particularly health facilities. DFID became a partner in this project at the time and contributed $2.4 million.

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 14.6
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): .9
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 2.9
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2005): 7.01
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2005): 9.21

Lending Information/Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<th>Undisbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic policy, standards and financial reporting

‘Structural Adjustment’ (July 2001 – June 2003) in partnership with the Office of Prime Minister. WB supported the Government in public sector management reforms, fiscal and budgetary management, privatization and private sector development, and improvements in the financial, agricultural, and infrastructure sectors. The project suffered severe delays.
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 27.6

Infrastructure services for private sector development

‘Farm and Privatisation Support’ (February 2000 – December 2004), privatisation of state farms and land allocation to families, and, following approval of a supplementary credit in 2001, mitigation of the effects of severe drought of the year 2000 through emergency help to 96,000 farm families covering 52,000 ha of affected land. The ten pilot state/collective farms have been systematically privatized. As of late September 2003 some 5,870 land-use-right certificates were issued to individual farm family land parcel holders. WB noted that scaling up of privatization in the cotton belt is going relatively slowly, however. In 2004 5,900 land use certificates have been issued, compared to 4,400 expected, and countrywide another 2,100 have been distributed using the project model. Other achievements include training 100 technical staff, rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, forming nine water users associations, and licensing the first credit organization. 142 collective farms were being privatised using the model.

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 4.8
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2005): 0.58
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2005): 2.91

Health system performance

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2002): 3.4;
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 3.1
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 2.2
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 1.8
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 3.6

‘Community and Basic Health’, December 2005 – March 2010
Sectors: Health (65%), Compulsory health finance (15%), Central government administration (15%), Other social services (5%)
Themes: Health system performance (P), Other communicable diseases (S), Administrative and civil service reform (S), Child Health (S), Population and reproductive health (S)

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<th>Undisbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Water and Sanitation
‘Dushanbe Water Supply’ in partnership with Vodokanal. The WB allocated $17.9 million to the project from October 2002 to June 2007. This was the infamous ‘$17 million project’ when money literally went down the drain, according to the government which claimed that mudslides of July 2004 destroyed all the progress made. Quality of water only deteriorated since, and eight dead bodies were found in the water reservoir as it was drained. The internationals claimed that the mudslides were an excuse and that the money was misappropriated by the government. The WB reported progress as only ‘very modest’.

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 18.4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 1.4

Lending Information/Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>15.90</td>
<td>3.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPN Effective</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWTZ Closed</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education (for all)
Ministries of Finance and Education were partners, October 1999 to March 2003. The project was a Learning and Innovation Loan and will test the result of specific inputs at school and national level.

Undisbursed amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2002): 7;
Cumulative disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2002): 4.1,
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 1
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 4.8
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 0.5

Rural Services and infrastructure
‘Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation,’ December 2000 – March 2006. The village drinking water services component is being implemented as a community-demand-driven (CDD) programme, where the community procures and executes subprojects and is responsible for the fee collection, operations and management. This was meant to produce empowerment. In the WB view, better water management was brought about by the registration of 19 additional water user associations. Village drinking water supplies are being improved in 23 villages under management of Village Water Organizations.
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2002): 18.9;
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 18.4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 2.4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 7.2

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
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<th>Status</th>
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<td>19.15</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN Closed</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Community Agriculture and Watershed Management’, June 2004 – April 2011
Sectors: General agriculture, fishing, and forestry (49%), Sub-national government administration (25%), Agricultural extension and research (10%), Roads and highways (8%), Water supply (8%)
Themes: Other rural development (P), Land administration and management (P), Biodiversity (P), Rural services and infrastructure (S), Participation and civic engagement (S).

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006 )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>4.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPN Closed</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sectors: Irrigation and drainage (66%), General water, sanitation and flood protection General public administration (10%), Crops (2%), Agricultural extension and 2%)
Themes: Water resources management (P), Rural policies and institutions (S), Participation and civic engagement (S), Environmental policies and institutions (S), Land administration and management (S)

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006 )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>12.79</td>
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<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 11.1
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 0.0
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 11.1
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 0

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006 )

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<th>Undisbursed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWTZ Effective</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sectors: Power (48%), Oil and gas (48%), Central government administration (4%)
Themes: Infrastructure services for private sector development (P), Climate change
Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Administrative and Civil Service Reform
‘Second Institution Building/Technical Assistance’, August 1999 – June 2004. The project aimed at achieving reforms in public administration, the budget management system, and privatization of medium and large-scale enterprises and private sector development. Implementation of a strategic budget planning has been slow. On the private sector, the privatization strategy for medium and large enterprises have been adopted and the project provided technical assistance and finance to the government. Some administrative barriers have been streamlined. Finally, the implementation of technical assistance for public administration reform has been slow.

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 2.5
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): 4.2
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 1.4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 5.4

‘Land Registration and Cadastre System for Sustainable Agriculture’, April 2005 – September 2010
Sectors: Sub-national government administration (30%), Agricultural extension and research (20%), Central government administration (20%), General agriculture, fishing, and forestry (15%), Crops (15%)
Themes: Land administration and management, Rural markets, Personal and property rights, Rural policies and institutions, Rural services and infrastructure.
Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
<th>Undisbursed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDA Effective</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>9.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Natural disaster management
‘Lake Sarez Risk Mitigation’, December 2000 – December 2005. Operational capabilities of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence have been enhanced to manage the risk.

Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): .4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2003): .2
Undisbursed Amount (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 0.4
Cumulative Disbursements (in US$ millions-as of June 30, 2004): 0.2
Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

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<th>Status</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN-51206 Effective</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN-52115 Effective</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWTZ-23507 Effective</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Municipal Infrastructure Development’, January 2006 – August 2011
Sectors: Water supply (40%), Solid waste management (35%), Sub-national government administration (23%), Sewerage (2%)
Themes: Other urban development, Access to urban services and housing, Municipal finance, Municipal governance and institution building.

Disbursement Summary (USD millions, as of June 30 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
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<th>Cancellation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>15.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPN Closed</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Irish Aid**

Disbursements were mostly made to international organisations. Only in 2006 Ireland contributed to election monitoring (presidential elections, I gather).

- **2006**
  - UNDP Shelter Programme €50,000
  - Interserve Ireland Development Assistance €15,000
  - Election monitors €16,678.87

- **2002** World Food Programme €300,000
- **2001** World Food Programme €253,947.62
  - World Food Programme €190,460.71
  - World Food Programme €285,691.07
  - UNICEF Rehabilitation €158,717.26
  - Food and Agriculture Organisation €126,973.81

**Netherlands**

The information provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unsurprisingly in Dutch. With Sarah’s help, I’ve deciphered what I could and entered into the spreadsheet. There is a large sum for ammunition and SALW destruction, I doubt it can be termed ‘democratisation’, so I entered it separately on the spreadsheet.

**Germany**

It proved impossible to obtain budget breakdown either from BMZ or GTZ. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 12th Development Policy Report provides the following figures for Tajikistan. All money was disbursed on grants’ basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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121 Information provided by Partnership Committee for Europe and Central Asia, IrishAid.
122 Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
European Commission

Since 1992 the EC provided almost 600 million € commitments and nearly 500 million € disbursements. Out of this 114 million € were loans, most of which has been paid back; the rest are non-refundable grants.

| Total, m euro | 3.760 | 5.294 | 10.780 | 4.135 |

The EC assistance was distributed through the following instruments of cooperation

1. ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) provided 165 million € since 1993. As humanitarian aid is now finalising (depending on severity of the winter); the focus is on DIPECHO (disaster preparedness). The EC Delegation tries to link its poverty alleviation projects to past ECHO relief efforts.

2. TACIS has been officially closed at the end of 2006, but projects under this budget line continue to operate. Approximately 100 million € have been spent. TACIS is essentially a developmental instrument. Few projects were implemented in the mid 1990s, there was a complete suspension from 1997 – 2001 following the kidnapping of an EC TACIS expert and killing of his wife, but there was a surge of assistance again since 2002.

TACIS focuses on:

1. regional issues (e.g. Border Management – BOMCA, and anti-drug trafficking – CADAP, but also on environment and customs);
2. national issues (e.g. civil service reform, vocational education and training);
3. poverty alleviation and rural development.

Currently Tajikistan is covered by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

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124 Information provided by the European Commission Delegation in Tajikistan, April 2008.
3. FSP (Food Security programme) spent approximately 80 million € (30.5 food aid; 23.5 budget support; 2 technical assistance; 24 to NGOs). Its first budget support project was implemented in 1996.

4. EIDHR (European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights) spent 2.2 million € for 41 projects in different fields since 1994. The EC has been active in the human rights and democracy sector on the basis of the EC programming priorities for the region mainly through EIDHR grant program. The general objectives of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) are to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

5. Exceptional Financial Assistance was given to the government. The Commission provided 114 million € in loans and gave 45 million € budget support. This assistance had conditions attached, linking to improvement of the revenue collection system, privatisation, restructuring of the banking sector and public finance management. EC followed the line with WB, ADB and IMF with regards to budget support disbursements.

6. Thematic budget lines for the EC did not include democracy-promotion, but the following issues instead:
   - NGO Co-financing
   - Rehabilitation / Refugees
   - Mine Action Programme
   - Health
   - Migration
   - EC contributions to funds
     - * Global Fund against AIDS, TB and Malaria
     - * Avian Influenza
     - * Multilateral organisations (UNDP, EBRD)

**US government**

I did not manage to get any ‘insider’ information. What is presented below comes from the USAID website: 125

**Governing Justly and Democratically**

With the emergence of independent media, USAID has helped draft and improve media legislation, trained media managers and journalists, and assisted with the creation of the National Association of Independent Mass Media. USAID continues to support the production of local programs. To strengthen local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), USAID has provided training, information, networking opportunities, and other assistance to local NGOs and has taught civic education to over 50,000 students. Professionals from various sectors receive opportunities for training in the United States. Through the Eurasia Foundation, USAID provides small grants to NGOs to strengthen private enterprise, civil society, public administration, and education. With support from USAID, 67 municipalities have improved the provision of services, including better water supply and garbage disposal, and they have expanded the involvement of residents in local decision making.

125 http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/tajikistan/
Priorities include:

- Civic participation, implementing partners: ABA/ROLI, PACT (Internews and ICNL), Urban Institute, World Learning.
- Media freedom and freedom of information, implementing partners: Internews, Adil Soz, Eurasia Foundation, IREX.
- Local government and decentralisation, implementing partner: Urban Institute.
- Political Competition and consensus-building, Implementing Partners: National Democratic Institute. To support the development of a multi-party system in Tajikistan, USAID helps democratic political parties improve communication between their branches, develop membership, create recruitment strategies, and build constituent relations. This programme has been suspended since May 2006.126

**UNDP**

In 1996 UNDP Tajikistan developed the ‘Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (RRDP) to support stabilisation of the areas damaged by the war. The programme was operated by UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) and in the end of 2003 transferred to UNDP ownership under the name of ‘Communities’ Programme’. When the ex-combatants were formally integrated into the national army and law-enforcement agencies, in reality little had changed in their lives since they returned to their villages with no money and no jobs. UNTOP and UNDP, funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Norwegian government (and later also by a grant from the European Commission) designed and implemented the re-integration programme.

Special Reintegration Committees (SRCs) were set up in Gharm (Karategin Valley), incorporating representatives of local authorities, field commanders, the communities themselves and UNDP. The SRCs identified community needs and designed projects on the condition that they would employ ex-combatants as much as possible. By early 2000 over 1,100 were actively involved in labour-intensive rehabilitation projects. On average each project employed 18 ex-combatants. Between 2000 and 2002 127 projects were implemented, employing a total of 4,141 persons in irrigation, health and sanitation, energy, agriculture, rehabilitation of schools and the building of roads and bridges.127

The project resulted in the whole Gharm region being covered by the Committees (34 altogether). They later moved away from re-integration agenda and accumulated broader functions, such as infrastructure rehabilitation, microfinancing, civic awareness and social protection. The Committees were renamed Jamoat Development Committees (JDCs) and later Jamoat Resource Centres. This model of work was recognised by UNDP as successful, as it combined representation from a given community with that from the local authority, and even businessmen when they

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126 Basically, after Terry was expelled after seducing a young son of the Minister of Defence, NDI never recovered from the blow.
started to appear. The fact that each JDC had a revolving microfinancing fund ensured that they acquired sustainability and were less in a need of a constant influx of new donor funds after they reached a certain level of development. The model was subsequently applied in other areas where UNDP operated – in Kulyab and Shaartuz (Khatlon province), Soughd province and Zarafshan Valley (DFID-funded project mentioned above).

The only downside of the JDC development which UNDP noted was that as Committees were set up to cover the entire Gharma area, they could not be easily dropped and UNDP had to provide care for all of them. The whole area is very poor and neglected by the government, and JDCs provided vital development. However, the sheer amount of JDCs created a great deal of pressure upon UNDP both financially and operationally to look after 34 Committees. In other Area Offices JDCs were established only in those jamoats where there was a particular developmental need and taking UNDP’s own capacity into account.

Otherwise, UNDP addressed issues of democratisation through governance and civic awareness components of its Communities’ Programme (spread sheets attached).

**UNTOP**

Many activities which would fall into democracy-promotion portfolio have not been packaged as such. This stems from two reasons: (1) after coloured revolutions democracy-promotion acquired a bad name, governments grew suspicious and the internationals considered it more acceptable to present it as something different; (2) others genuinely believed they were doing something different. A good example is UNTOP which did ‘conflict resolution and peacebuilding’. The activities included:

*Political Discussion Club* (under varying titles, but the same activity year to year) in 2001 (covering issues of post conflict reconciliation and reconstruction), 2002 (discussing local governance), 2003 (concerning political pluralism), and 2004 (concerning political dialogue in the run up to parliamentary elections). There were about five to eight sessions per year, funded from the UN Trust Fund for Preventive Action at UN HQ, with budgets approximately $50-70,000 per year. The costs involved were arranging local transport, logistics for participants, a lunch in Tojikibod, and honorarium for guest experts (nationals). The basic idea was to bring central and local officials together, along with former opposition and other civil society figures, to discuss reasonably provocative topics in the district context. Academics and the NGO involved used to produce a summary account of the discussions and informal recommendations reached.

*Rule of Law*: UNTOP also facilitated technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior for the establishment of a forensics laboratory and training programme, in 2002 (supported by the Government of Germany) and then 2003-04 (supported by US State Department, via US Embassy in Dushanbe). The sums involved were approximately $100,000 for the first and 150,000 for the next phase. The technical equipment was procured; specialists sent on training courses; and, in the second phase (US supported), a "human rights and policing" training programme instituted across Tajikistan MOI units, carried out by a local NGO. UNTOP also had a small project (about 20,000) for assistance and training to the MOI training institute for community...
policing. It had a dedicated police adviser to carry out such work since 2004 (earlier experiments were unsuccessful).

The UNTOP human rights section carried out multiple projects for human rights education and support to treaty bodies, for their reporting and implementation of national recommendations. There were various donors.

The Electoral Assistance Department of DPA also designed with UNTOP a technical assistance project, channelled via UNDP, in the run up to parliamentary elections in autumn 2004. It involved publications of pamphlets about voting procedures and rights, voter education, and some outreach to electoral officials to raise awareness. There were contributions from various western embassies in Dushanbe, with the US being the main donor.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{A1ii What were the prevailing modalities of delivery?}

\textit{How important was budget support in relation to other aid modalities (such as project aid)? Were there other instruments of giving aid, such as trust funds?}

Most aid has been project aid. Budget aid was provided by the WB, ADB, IMF and EC (see section on the EC above) and perhaps by the US.\textsuperscript{129} Budget support was mostly sector aid to health, education and social protection, and there was support for food security, i.e. to enable the government to buy food (this must be general aid?). There were UN trust funds to promote a particular issue, such as DPA has the UN Trust Fund for Preventive Action, and some of it was used by UNTOP. Tajikistan received some funds through Millennium Development Goals Fund at the UN and the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria.

The prevailing mood among donors was that the government is too corrupt to be trusted with large sums of donor money and resultant reluctance to allocate money in a way which would make it difficult to ensure control by the international agencies.

\textit{A1iv How dependent is the country on development aid?}

According to DAC List of Aid Recipients, effective from 2006 for reporting flows on aid in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Tajikistan is included in the category of ‘other low income countries’ (per capita GNI $825 in 2004).\textsuperscript{130} OECD DAC figures do not match those provided by the UN Coordination Unit (Principals Group).

On the whole, the country is not heavily aid dependent. However, certain social sectors, such as education and healthcare, would be hard hit were international aid completely withdrawn. Aid to the social sector does not seriously influence political behaviour of the leadership since the popular capacity to protest over health and education agenda is negligible and the elites who matter can buy these services on the market. Foreign assistance to armed and security services, such as the US and EU aid

\textsuperscript{128} Correspondence with Brian Vitunic, UNTOP/ DPA & author’s personal observation while deployed in Tajikistan.

\textsuperscript{129} This was the understanding during author’s time living in Dushanbe and working for UNDP. However, the author was unable to obtain official data confirming such support and cannot present it as a fact.

\textsuperscript{130} http://www.bmz.de/en/figures/InDetail/2005_2007_DAC_Laenderliste_original.pdf
to the Tajik border troops and to the anti-narcotics efforts, produced some impacts, but only before serious political stakes for the leaderships have been raised.

Figures illustrating reliance on aid, 2000 - 2006

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<th>2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>ODA as % of GDP</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>13.59</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>10.86</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA per capita, US$</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>23.13</td>
<td>37.59</td>
<td>38.34</td>
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These figures illustrate that although overall amounts of aid grew from 2000 to 2006, the proportion of aid to GDP has in fact reduced (from 15% in 2001 to 8% in 2006), showing that aid dependency was not overwhelming. Moreover, the real amount of money in the economy is perhaps greater than the official GDP figures.

AIv Give your assessment of the importance of development aid in general and aid for democracy promotion in particular: To what extent did it contribute to the observed outcome? What impact would have had more / less / different aid?

The development aid was not of any considerable importance because of two reasons. Firstly, it was not allocated at the time when the country most needed it and when potential influence of the international community could have been higher. Secondly, the decision not to work with Russia deprived the internationals of credible sticks, but produced alternative carrots and a comfort zone to where the government could turn to when the international pressure started to bite. The development aid was allocated when the population already found a coping strategy (labour migration to Russia), while democracy promotion aid came about when domestic political arrangements have more or less taken shape.

A2i Please specify, if possible, the overall annual amounts of development aid aiming at democracy promotion received by the country. Break down the figures in main donors and sectors. What sectors and activities were prioritized and which ones were either deemphasized or not funded at all?

Please provide annual figures for the following sectors:
(1) Elections and the political processes;
(2) Rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights;
(3) Institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administration capacity);
(4) Civil society, media, civic education, empowerment;
(5) Civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform.

Large development agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP, seldom engaged in democracy-promotion beyond assistance in institutional infrastructure and improvement of administration capacity. At the same time, the implicit approach was that their rural development projects will increase participation and accountability in the areas in which they operated, create empowerment and bring more awareness of rights. Cumulatively, this would foster democracy from below in terms of practice of decision-making and citizens’ participation. It is impossible to disaggregate figures.
how much was spent within the individual projects on such software as opposed to infrastructure, microfinancing etc, and it is hard to assess whether this approach was successful or not. The only conclusion possible at this point is that such approach did not do any harm and did not alienate the government to the extent as did the activities, explicitly targeting democracy-promotion.

Most World Bank and UNDP projects targeted strengthening institutional infrastructure on central or local levels. Activities in rural areas implemented through village organisations, rural development committees, jamoat resource centres and the like were intended to improve accountability, but the primary objective was to achieve project targets in terms of deliverables. It was also hoped that enhanced participation at the local level would help to reduce corruption.

The largest proportion of donor money went into ‘institutional infrastructure’ heading, but it is extremely difficult to ascribe this to democracy-promotion, as most of it took the form of technical assistance. Relatively little money went into civil – military relations, apart from the DDR process, but this was vastly outnumbered by military assistance to the security sector given by the US, EC and a number of European donors, such as the UK and France, given Tajikistan’s significance for defence. ‘Civil society, media, civic education, empowerment’ is too broad a category to arrive to any definitive conclusions, as it can comprise gender, child’s and old peoples’ rights, peacebuilding, dissemination of information etc., among others. This category accounts for a large part of donor aid, but this may be to do with the ambiguity of the definition rather than donor policies.

**B1i Has the country been the “target” of democratic conditionality from any external actor in the aid sector? If so, by which actor? What incentives (punishments/rewards/threats) were offered? For what changes? Is conditionality used in sectoral approaches (see above)? If the country has not been the target of democratic conditionality, explain why.**

The UN did not attach conditionality in any precise manner to its programmes. However, the UN Resident Coordinator William Paton (2003 – 2007) was outspoken with the Government and the President of the need for more transparency (and less corruption), combating violence against women and improvements in rights’ agenda. His argument was that these improvements would enhance the image of Tajikistan, which, in turn, would bring more development aid. As a result, his popularity with the government declined, and he has left under a cloud, with the government reportedly complaining to the UNDP HQ in New York. UNTOP, by contrast, sought to maintain friendly relations with the government and keep its good offices available both to the government and former opposition, to maintain the confidence of both sides, while living on a mandate extended by invitation of the Government. UNTOP was criticised by international and local civil society actors for being too meek with the government and letting it to get away with tightening of restrictions upon political space.

The US democracy-promotion rhetoric increased since President’s Bush second term in office, but American disappointment with Tajikistan’s ‘democratic development’ did not affect the amount of assistance. A more important conditionality was that President Rahmon remains an American friend: his shifts towards Russia and China led to speculations whether assistance should be scaled down, or, on the contrary,
should rewards of bigger size lure the Tajik leadership towards the US. Period of 2003 – 2008 witnessed Rahmon zigzagging between Moscow and Washington, with both offering large-scale financial and technical support, while only a share of it materialised and not quite on the terms the government expected it to be.

It does not appear that there was much relationship between how democratic the country is and how much aid it receives. For example, political rights and freedoms in Tajikistan have been gradually becoming more limited throughout the period, while assistance mostly increased. There were occasions when donors as a group took positions against government’s practice, e.g. use of child labour in cotton field (the government announced that this is banned, but de facto continued to send school children into the fields). The donors threatened to halt aid to the cotton sector. On another occasion donors as a group said that they would not finance sniffer dogs any longer (expensive dogs purchased for anti-narcotics purposes were put to breed to sell pets, so they lost their sniffing skills and strengthened their breeding ones).

**B1ii Has the country been the “target” of democratic conditionality from any external actor in another context, e.g. diplomatic or military activities by the interveners? If so, by which actor? What incentives (punishments/rewards/threats) were offered? For what changes?**

OSCE had been the main actor to insist on democratic conditionality by diplomatic means. The main changes demanded were free and fair elections, equal access to media and public space for all contenders, freedom of media, freedom for political parties to operate and stopping of harassment and persecution of political opponents. The government retaliated with a threat to downgrade the OSCE Office to the Project Coordinator’s office headed by a local staff appointed by the government (as it happened in Uzbekistan in response to the international pressure).

The EU also tried to adhere to certain democratic conditionality by diplomatic means, implying that a very bad democratic record may lead the EC to re-consider the assistance package (as this was done with regards to Uzbekistan in 2005 after the Andijan events, but the damage was largely symbolic). The changes required by external actors was to prevent the situation from getting worse, such as not to ban political parties based on religious affiliation and thus allow the IRP to operate legally, not to adopt a draconic Law on Religion severely restricting freedom of religious expression, not to harass media and civil society, not to ban NGOs from receiving grants from abroad etc.

**B2iii How did the speed and size of rewards (threat of punishment) compare to the size of domestic adoption costs? Were the rewards promised sufficiently big to cause a real change in the domestic equilibrium, either top-down or bottom-up?**

There were few real rewards on offer, as humanitarian assistance was unconditional while other types of rewards came too little too late. One potential reward - to bring the country out of regional and international isolation - could have been attractive for the government and a low-cost option for the international community, but it did not see this opportunity at the time.

**B2iv Was democratic conditionality credible? In particular:**
(1) **Did the actor making the conditions have superior bargaining power compared to the target government?**

The OSCE had some bargaining power only insofar as it was supported by the European Commission which was in charge of the money. UNTOP had virtually no power as it was present in the country at the invitation of the government. UNDP had some bargaining power because of its development projects and attention to priorities the government was unable or unwilling to attend to. The US had some bargaining power, but it has vastly overestimated its own ability to influence internal politics of the countries it had little understanding of.

(2) **Was the external actor imposing the conditions able to withhold granting rewards at no or little cost to itself?**

Largely yes, with the exception of the OSCE and UNTOP which could have been forced to close down their operations and leave the country in case they become too much nuisance for the government. This happened to OSCE in Uzbekistan, and the Tajik government attempted to do the same in 2006 – 2007. Donors could have withdrawn, although since France has a small airbase in Tajikistan for its operations in Afghanistan, withdrawal would have been inconvenient, but possible.

(3) **Did the target government have any real alternatives to the rewards offered by the external actor (either from its own resources or from an alternative external actor)?**

Yes, alternatives came from Russia, Iran, Gulf countries, India and China.

(4) **How certain could the target government be that the reward would in fact be delivered (or that the threat would be acted upon)?**

The government had little sense of what to expect, as it was subjected to many empty promises in the past. Moreover, the government has been fairly unsophisticated in the international game and had been puzzled as of how the world of the ‘international community’ operates.

**How do you assess the effectiveness of the democratic conditionality?**

Donors and international organisations did not capitalise on a window of opportunity when there was a nascent demand for democracy on behalf of segments of the elite. After that, the processes were disjointed, with the Tajik government and the international community living in parallel universe. ‘Democracy promotion’ was increasing seen by the government as creating opposition and alternatives to the regime, while the international community failed to take this fear into account.

In general, the donors tend to shine away from being implicated in promotion of democratisation. For example, the view from a former World Bank executive is that ‘on the second set of questions (re democracy), this unfortunately is outside my realm of expertise/knowledge, and as you know the WB did not deal with democracy promotion (even indirectly) or conditionality.’ JICA prefers to term its activities as ‘capacity-building’, while UNTOP used to describe them as ‘peacebuilding’. It appears that the USAID is the main standard-bearer of democracy promotion. The

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131 Author’s correspondence with Johannes Linn, former WB director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, April 2008.
same applies to conditionality – donors tended to deny that aid was conditioned on
democratic development.

Conditionality, democratic or otherwise, did not work, in my view for the reason of
donors having only a vague idea of what was meant to be achieved and what were the
reasons for their involvement in the first place. Different agencies were motivated by
different interests, with geopolitics adding another layer of complexity. It would be
fair to say that donors were more motivated by what they did not want to see
happening in Tajikistan (opposition completely wiped out, independent press shut
down, Tajikistan looks up to Russia than the west, heavily borrows from China) rather
than by a positive and realistic agenda of what can be done in a given context.