External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

Rwanda

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This report has been commissioned by Freie Universität Berlin for a comparative project on the international factors shaping transitions to democracy in post-conflict countries. See http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html.
External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

An Introduction To The Project

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U of Ottawa and Freie Universität Berlin

The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can - to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition? While much research effort has been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has so far been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence, but succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity. Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical with regard to the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. The empirical evidence seems indeed to suggest that countries rarely emerge from war as democracies. When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after WWII (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission or not), we find little reason for optimism. Only 10% of the countries that experienced civil wars reached a polity score of +7 or higher (approximately like Kenya, Moldova or Mali) two years after war ended. 53% all war-affected countries show a polity score of -5 or lower two years after the end of civil war, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. 37% have a polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan (all data is from Sambanis, Nicholas, with Michael Doyle, 2000: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, in: American Political Science Review 94: 4, 779 - 801). The picture looks similarly gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52% have a polity score of -5 or lower; 39,4% have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10,6% have a score of +7 or higher. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia or Macedonia in the post cold war period, to name only a few. What made these cases of post-war democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.
The study of post-war democratization is a relatively new field, and there is surprisingly little empirical scholarly work devoted to the factors that allow a post-war country to become both stable and democratic. This can partly be explained by the fact that the two bodies of literatures, which are relevant for such an endeavor, are concerned with only one half of the problem. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peace building is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy or not is typically not of interest to this body of literature. This division of labor may explain why there is only a very small literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes which are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or is it perhaps a consequence of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that post-war countries are in essence a sub-class of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases sui generis.

The researchers involved in this project think that post-conflict cases are fundamentally different from transition cases, and they assume that these differences may have an impact on the factors which affect peace and democracy. If this is true, then it is necessary to account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same, or do not necessarily have the same impact, in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy respectively do not necessarily simply add up, but that they may cancel each other out. One implication of this is then that we have to disaggregate the concept of “success” into sub-concepts. One way of doing this is to individually look at “absence of war”, “democratic quality of the regime” and “state capacities”. While these three concepts may merge in the case of fully established democracies, we argue that for countries emerging from war we need to disaggregate them in order to be able to empirically explore which sequences and combinations are most conducive to the normatively desirable outcome: stable democracies at peace.

The Research Design

Given these challenges, we opted for a case study oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms. Case studies allow researchers to treat cases a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causation and which may lead to the identification of typological sub-classes. Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons; and finally, small-n research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets, because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data which they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We collaborated with an international team of country experts, who prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2008 and December 2009. Our sample covers cases on Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Haiti. We deliberately chose cases from the post cold-war period only,
because our main interest is the contribution of external actors to post-war democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peace building missions became fashionable and feasible after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s.

The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases consists, theoretically, of all civil wars that came to an end after 1989. We count 52 cases (Data from Doyle/Sambanis 2000). Our main interests is the question of whether and how countries that were affected by large-scale violence can emerge as stable and democratic polities, and we are particularly interested in the impact of external support to this outcome. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war; post-conflict countries can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic polities; and post-conflict countries could emerge as democratic, yet unstable polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in our sample. Furthermore, we also want to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the amount of external support for democracy. Hence, we have four different outcomes, and two different values on our main independent variable. This can be depicted in a table with 2 x 4 cells. In order to group the cases into the cells, we have to define measures for stability, democracy and external support. Because this is not for analytical-descriptive purpose, but for sampling, we do this in a fairly rough and ready way. We classify countries that are still at peace five years after the war ended as stable. We classify countries as democratic when they reach a polity IV score of 10 or higher five years after the war ended. We proxy the amount of external support by the type of UN mission. Countries in which a complex peace building mission, or a peace enforcement mission, took place are coded as having received high external support. For all coding we rely on a data set compiled by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Sambanis 2000).

The next table groups all cases in the eight cells. Case in bold were included in our sample:

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The Research Template¹

In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. Only then did the authors shorten the studies turning them into condensed analytical narratives. The original versions of the reports are accessible at the project’s webpage.²

The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security”, “democracy” and “state capacities” into sub-concepts: With regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? By security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of organized violence (e.g. criminal violence). By state capacity, we refer to the capacity of the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement them. In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and re-deploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input

¹ The Template is available here: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html

² http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html
legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors (such as long-term economic development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy), about war-related factors (such as duration and type of war, numbers of fractions, level of war-related destruction, and quality of any peace agreement) which may have had an impact on the countries’ capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy such as linkages and integration; it then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention focusing on both military and non-military aspects. We are interested in state-reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures, and in the question of how intrusive these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure and/or persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences and constraints. These questions allow us to reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of external intervention; we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows in the conflict country and to assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. This section inquires about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid where available. Experts provided annual figures for: elections and political processes; rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights; institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administrative capacity); civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform. Please note that these are our generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the OECD-DAC, and that this data should be treated as illustrative rather than complete for most case studies due to a lack of availability of such information. Finally, we asked our experts to indentify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

**The Case Studies**

The case studies are available from our website. We think that they provide a valuable source of fine-grained data which help us to better understand the processes which lead to a much desired, yet rare outcome: A successful transition from war to peace and democracy.
Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development (Volume 2: Post-Conflict Countries)

RWANDA

Rachel Hayman

September 2008
Executive Summary

This study explores the influence of external factors on Rwanda’s democratic development: the role of diplomatic, military and financial assistance since 1990 to the present day in fostering the establishment of a democratic state. From 1990 to 1994 Rwanda was embroiled in a civil war which was rooted in economic and political crisis. A UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in 1993 to oversee the peace process and the transition to democratic elections. The study concerns itself with two periods: the first five years following the start of this mission (1993 to 1998); and the period from 1998 to 2008.

Section 1 outlines the nature and degree of democracy in Rwanda in relation to security and state capacity. It explores key aspects of democracy: rule of law, participation, competition, and vertical and horizontal accountability. From this it becomes clear that Rwanda by 1998 was not democratic but was putting in place the institutions of democracy. By 2008 the institutions of democracy were stronger, but there were weaknesses with regard to the separation of powers, representation and competitive politics. Rwanda demonstrates characteristics of a ‘hegemonic electoral authoritarian’ system. This can be explained in part by the history of democracy in Rwanda which has been characterised by violence and discrimination. While the post-conflict government has been committed to democracy, the opening of political space is subordinate to security concerns. Until 1998 parts of Rwanda were still insecure, and extremists remain encamped on the country’s borders. Unity and reconciliation is the other core theme of the government, hence the priority given to consensus-based rather than competitive politics. Ethnicity is a taboo subject in political life, but underpins ongoing fears about opening up political space. There is a strong relationship between state capacity, security and democracy. Rwanda receives a lot of external aid, much of which has fed into increasing state capacity to provide security and public services. Improved security has enabled an election process to begin. The strengthening of administrative systems, including decentralisation is seen as a means to foster democracy from below. However, maintaining security is the overriding factor, and both the general population and the government appear to see democracy as a threat to be controlled than as an opportunity for peace.

Section 2 explores domestic factors which fuelled the conflict. Democracy in Rwanda since independence in 1962 has been equated with ethnic majority rule (by the Hutu) over the minority (Tutsi and Twa). Under duress from external factors (shifts in international priorities with democracy being promoted by donors; global economic downturn for commodities and rising debt), President Habyarimana agreed to liberalise political space in 1990. This led to the growth of new political parties and media. However, the weakening of the Rwandan government, together with the opportunities offered by multi-party democracy and pressure from Uganda on the refugee population, led to the start of the civil war with the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The ensuing low-level civil war and peace process (sponsored by the Organisation of African Unity, other African governments and western countries) served to exacerbate cleavages along ethnic, regional, political and economic lines. The stalled peace process and ongoing violence led to the rise of extremist political factions, and the creation of militia wings. Inconsistent messages from the international community, with France actively supporting the Habyarimana regime, strengthened the extremists. Both the incumbent president and the extremists stood to lose greatly from the peace process, and the outcome was the organised genocide which began in earnest in April 1994 following the assassination of Habyarimana. The civil war and genocide
ended when the RPF took Kigali in July 1994 and ousted the interim government, although insecurity remained until 1998.

Section 3 examines external variables, notably the role of international diplomatic efforts to bring about peace and democracy and military intervention in the form of a UN peacekeeping mission. Several UN missions were authorized, the main being UNAMIR which was deployed in November 1993 with a mandate to assist with the implementation of the Arusha Accords, signed in August 1993, including the establishment of a transitional government and the preparation of democratic elections. In light of the obstacles in the way of peace, the operation was inadequate, under-funded and suffered from weak political backing by international actors. When hostilities resumed and peacekeepers were killed in April 1994 the UNAMIR mission was scaled back.

Throughout the civil war donors were using threats and incentives to try and keep the peace and democratisation process on track with some limited success. However, mixed messages were also being given. Some aid was reduced but many threats were not carried out as it was felt that incentives would work better; military and technical support continued. Too much faith was placed in the commitment of the warring parties to the Arusha Accords and the limited support for a robust peacekeeping operation sent a message to the extremists that the international community was unlikely to act. Following the genocide, Rwanda was subject to greater diplomatic pressure regarding democratisation and more human rights monitoring which created considerable bitterness within the new government. Throughout the war and post-conflict period a range of different preferences and constraints has impacted upon the interaction between external and internal actors. Both the pre- and post-war regimes have required financial and diplomatic support from external actors in order to run the country. However, during the conflict internal spoilers were able to derail the peace process with external actors doing little to prevent it; since the conflict the new government has had superior bargaining power because of international guilt, and external actors have been largely supportive.

Prior to and during the conflict Rwanda was tightly interwoven into the international community through economic, political and social ties. The drive for democracy happening elsewhere in Africa and supported by donors helped the push for internal change, despite the lack of a democratic culture in Rwanda and limited comprehension of it beyond the educated elite. The conflict, the peace process, and democratisation since 1994 have been influenced by regional security concerns on the one hand and by shifts in donor concerns and priorities on the other. This has seen both a push for democracy, but also general acceptance of where Rwanda is today in terms of democracy on the grounds of context, history and developmental priorities which place more emphasis on governance around socio-economic development than political governance.

Section 4 looks at flows of external financial assistance since the conflict. It highlights the changing profile of Rwanda’s main donors and patterns of aid which increased considerably in the two years after the war (mainly humanitarian aid) before dropping back to more or less the same amounts as the pre-war period before rising again since 2004. More aid now flows into Rwanda as programme aid (budget and sectoral budget support). The increases in aid, and more budget support, means that Rwanda is arguably becoming more dependent upon aid, especially for investment. In terms of democracy-promotion, donors have funded a wide range of activities which could be deemed as supporting democratisation. Aid has been crucial in the rehabilitation of the justice sector, for strengthening the rule of law, and for
building administrative capacity. It has been less important for the elections process, demobilisation and human rights. Over the last ten years almost every major bilateral donor has incorporated a “democracy” element into their programmes, with new projects being oriented towards increasing political accountability. Punitive conditionality has rarely been applied in Rwanda, although the few instances where aid has been frozen or withdrawn has had an impact in influencing government positions. Generally the government is uncooperative when faced with criticism and positive engagement and dialogue are considered more conducive to encouraging the regime to follow a democratisation path.

The role of external intervention: key issues
External factors have played a negative and positive role in Rwanda’s democratic development. The opening of Rwanda’s political system in 1990 reflected the post-Cold War order with international pressure for democracy; the international economic system also negatively impacted upon Rwanda’s economic stability. External actors had two priorities in Rwanda in the 1990s: peace and democracy, the two being inter-linked. The Arusha peace process was supported by and pushed by external actors. Rwanda’s reliance upon aid helped encourage the Habyarimana regime to negotiate with the RPF and sign the Arusha Accords. However, poor understanding of the real political dynamics in Rwanda and the weak international peacekeeping mission led to the collapse of the peace process and the genocide. Diplomatic pressure and aid conditionality (both positive and negative) has had an impact on the post-war democratisation process. The RPF-led regime seems genuinely committed to democratisation, albeit on its own terms, and donors have only limited leverage in matters of security and democracy. However, aid has been crucial to restructuring and supporting the institutions of democracy, and enabling some civil society voice to be established. External factors are inextricably intertwined in Rwanda’s democratisation process. The country today is not a full democracy in the liberal, western sense of the term, but donors are largely supportive and consider that it is going in the ‘right’ direction.
Introduction

In September 2008 Rwanda held its second legislative elections since the political system was liberalised to allow for multiparty politics in 1990. These elections represented another step on Rwanda’s road to democratisation; but they also confirmed the dominance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) over the political landscape of the country.

This study explores the influence of external factors on Rwanda’s democratic development. Rwanda formally gained its independence in 1962. This was followed by two periods of de facto authoritarian rule under Grégoire Kayibanda (1959-1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994) which saw political power shift from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. Under Habyarimana the country was considered to be doing well developmentally, despite ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi and a record of human rights abuses. Economic crisis fostered political crisis in the 1980s and civil war broke out in 1990 when the RPF, a Tutsi-based guerrilla movement, invaded from Uganda. The civil war coincided with the beginnings of political liberalisation and the crisis escalated, with extremists preaching ethnic hatred. In April 1994 the organised murder of moderate Hutu and Tutsi in general began, ending when the RPF ousted the incumbent government in July 1994. The international community failed to intervene effectively to halt the slaughter. Since 1994, the RPF has led a broad-based government, emphasising inclusion and unity; democratic elections were held in 2003 at the national level. While the country is peaceful and stable, tensions persist in Rwanda both politically and socially.

For comparative purposes, this study concentrates on two periods: 1993-1998; and 1998 to the present day. External influence with regard to democratisation in Rwanda has been evident since the late 1980s, with an increase in activity during the civil war which began in 1990 and ended in July 1994. However, 1993 saw the signing of a definitive peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, which was internationally-funded and mandated to oversee the peace process and creation of a power-sharing government. This can be considered as a clear marker in terms of external influence on the democratisation process. 1998 marks the end of the first five years following the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). However, Rwanda did not hold any elections until 1999, so the five year snapshot does not given a sufficient picture of the democratisation process. Consequently, this study also considers the following ten years in order to provide a better overview of the democratisation process and external factors affecting it. Throughout these two periods, external influences have been considerable.

July 1994 saw a definitive end to the conflict, although insecurity remained for several years. The genocide caused a rupture in Rwanda’s internal political structure and its international relations. Consequently, some parts of the report, primarily Section 4, refer more frequently to the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods.

The information in this report primarily draws on established academic literature and material from international organisations and NGOs. The data was complemented with some primary data collection in Rwanda in August 2008, including interviews with government officials.
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Sources: Freedom in the World (http://www.freedomhouse.org); Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008)
SECTION 1: Defining Interventional Success or Failure

A. Democracy

(i) Rule of Law

Five years after the start of the UN intervention aimed at ending the civil war in Rwanda, the challenges in establishing the rule of law remained considerable. A legal framework was in place, the *Loi Fondamentale* (Fundamental Law) which was passed by the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in June 1995. This was considered valid from 17 July 1994 when the RPF formed the Broad-Based Transition Government (BBTG), more commonly known at the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on taking the capital city, Kigali, and routing the former regime. The *Loi Fondamentale* was based upon the constitution of 1991, the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993 and the declaration of the RPF of 17 July 1994. It provided for a series of institutions to be in place for a five-year period pending democratic elections: Presidency, BBTG, TNA, Supreme Court and other judicial institutions. The Arusha Accords had foreseen a power-sharing arrangement; the GoNU formed in 1994 was a modified version of this with all political parties which were not considered to have participated in the genocide represented in the government. The balance of power was tipped in favour of the RPF, justified on the basis of it having stopped the genocide and taking responsibility for establishing order, security and stability. Six seats in the TNA created in November 1994 were allocated to the army and police.

The major challenge was the state of the judiciary. Capacity had been seriously damaged during the war and genocide, starting from an already weak position prior to the conflict when it had been under the authority of the executive (UNDP 1999: 21). The judiciary was faced with the enormous burden of bringing those responsible for genocide to justice. By the end of 1998 over 125,000 people were still officially detained awaiting trial and it was recognized that it would take centuries to deal with all the cases (Reyntjens 1999: 14). Rehabilitating the justice sector was a central concern of the government and donors during this period (see Section 4).

Between 1994 and 1998 various steps were taken to guarantee the rule of law. The judiciary was rendered officially independent by the passing of new laws, although it was very weak and remained under the influence of the ruling elite. The police had not been independent of the army or the regime prior to the conflict, and a reform began in 1997 to create an independent national police force, foreseen in the Arusha Accords. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and the National Human Rights Commission, again foreseen in the Arusha Accords, were created to protect human rights and foster peace. Both were official voted into law in 1999.

By the end of 1998, therefore, progress towards establishing the rule of law was being made, but major challenges remained in practice, notably regarding the judiciary. Moreover, full security was not established throughout the country until 1998 (see B below).

By 2008, 15 years after the start of UN intervention, the situation had evolved considerably. In 1999 the five-year transition period was extended for a further four years, officially to enable a new constitution to be prepared before national and presidential elections were held. To this end the Constitutional and Judicial Commission was established in 1999 and the National Electoral Commission in 2001. A new constitution was approved by popular
referendum in 2003, replacing the Loi Fondamentale. The Office of the Auditor General and the Ombudsman had been created. Soldiers from the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and former army (ex-FAR) had been integrated and a demobilization programme had begun. A new independent police force had been established, as well as a Local Defence Force. Reforms of the judicial system continued, including placing the management of the judiciary under the Supreme Court rather than the Ministry of Justice. The main innovation was the development of gacaca courts to try lesser crimes of genocide. This was based on a traditional system of reconciliation and justice. Trials started in 2002.

The institutions are therefore in place to guarantee the rule of law in Rwanda. In practice, however, huge challenges remain. The state remains very strong with power concentrated in the hands of the RPF. Although judicial independence is guaranteed in the 2003 constitution, the judiciary remains influenced by the executive and members of the political, military and economic elite (Burnet 2007: 14; HRW 2008). Petty corruption is considered a problem, particularly within the gacaca system where judges are poorly paid, lack training and adequate monitoring. Weaknesses in the judicial system are blamed for rising crime rates. The problem of the trying of genocide crimes continues to plague the country, and there are attacks on genocide survivors which local defence forces are unable to prevent. Problems are emerging over new land laws and property rights (see Ansoms and Holvoet 2007; APRM 2006). Consensual government remains the order of the day thus rendering the independence of the three branches of government questionable. Moreover, there are reports of human rights abuses by the regime, notably against the press and human rights organisations (see Human Rights Watch 2007).

(ii)(iii) Participation and Competition
By the end of 1998, although the legal framework guaranteed the right of free and fair electoral competition, as well as the right of citizens to vote, these rights had not been exercised in practice as no elections had been held at any level in Rwanda. The 1991 constitution guaranteed freedom of the press, expression and opinion which were upheld in the Loi Fondamentale; the RPF also committed itself to social and political pluralism (Twagirimungu 1994). However, there were tight controls on political life and civil liberties. The GoNU constructed a strong discourse of national unity, based on consensus rather than competition. As mentioned above, the GoNU included representatives of all political parties which had not participated in the genocide. RPF political control expanded during this period, with harassment of the press and the sidelining and silencing of dissident politicians, many of whom went into exile (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 7). The genocide had seriously weakened the credibility of most political parties as well as broader civil society, with many organizations (including the media and churches) complicit. Consequently, there was a great deal of distrust and self-censorship was practiced.

At the same time, this period saw the beginnings of a participatory and consultative process on policy which became fairly standard, notably the Village Urugwiro discussions which started in May 1998 and ran until March 1999. These discussions brought together representatives of political parties, churches, the military, the judiciary and local leaders, as well as academics, journalists and lawyers. The aim was to debate key policy issues such as democracy, justice, the economy and security, and to map a way forward with regard to reconciliation and national unity (Republic of Rwanda 1999a). These discussions led to the

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1 Village Urugwiro is the name of the complex in Kigali city which houses the administrative offices of the President.
formulation of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 policy which continues to underpin the government’s development strategy.

By 2008, Rwanda had begun a second round of elections. Elections were held at local (cell and sector) level in 1999, 2002 and 2006; at district level in 2001 and 2006; 2 and at national level (presidential and parliamentary) in 2003. The second round of parliamentary elections were held in September 2008. The 2003 constitution guarantees the right of citizens to participate in political and civil life, freedom of expression and association, and free and fair voting. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was set up in 2001 to oversee the running of elections. Turn-out has been high, at over 90% for all elections to date. The constitution guarantees women at least 30% of seats and posts within the national assembly and government; seats are also reserved for representatives of the disabled (1) and youth (2).

Participation in policy-making has become a norm. The constitution went through a consultative process, likewise policies such as the national poverty reduction strategy. The government frequently presents policies publicly to wide audiences including representatives of civil society and international agencies. The true extent of participation in policy-making is debatable, however. Citizens appear freer to express their expectations openly and to be involved in decision-making, although there is minimal consultation over major issues (IRDP 2005: 85, 104); often, participation it is closer to consultation or information-sharing rather than deep participation (Mutebi, Stone and Thin 2001; Renard and Molenaers 2003). Control is also exercised over the formation of organizations and political parties, with local and international NGOs and religious groups required to register with the government on an annual basis.

The 2003 constitution states that Rwanda has a multi-party system; however, political competition continues to be framed by a discourse of national unity and consensus. As a result no party can hold more than 50% of posts within the Cabinet and all political parties participate in the Forum of Political Parties. The Forum was established to promote dialogue and consensus, with equal representation between small and large parties, to ensure that smaller parties could have some voice against the organised RPF machine; it can also initiate disciplinary action against politicians. While this enables participation of all political groups in policy-making it also restricts competitive politics and the development of a real opposition. It is not a public institution with debates held in secret and is seen as very centralized, and the RPF is seen to dominate it (IRDP 2005: 61, 87). The RPF dominates the political landscape and opposition groups have been harassed in the past. In the run-up to the 2003 elections one party (MDR) was suspended and the former president, Pasteur Bizimungu, was placed under house arrest for attempting to form a new political party, an act considered illegal. At the same time, there was very little difference between the main political parties in terms of ideology and political programmes in 2003 (IRDP 2003) and manifestos for the 2008 elections demonstrate a similar phenomenon.

Elections on the whole have been well run, although irregularities have been recorded and external observers are concerned about how elections are run, particularly at the local level. In the March 1999 local elections candidates were not allowed to stand under a party banner and parties were unable to campaign; voting was not by secret ballot but voters literally lined up behind the candidate of their choice. This continues to be the system for local elections. It is

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2 In 2005 a reform of the administrative system was enacted. Rwanda is now divided into: 4 provinces plus Kigali City Council; 30 districts; 416 sectors; 2148 cells (Ministry of Local Affairs 2006: 28).
presented by the government as a cheap and simple procedure which enables transparency and limits discrimination. No international assistance was requested and no observers were present. Human rights groups condemned these elections as not free and not fair (HRW 2001; ICG 2002). Of concern to human rights groups in the 2001 elections was the lack of choice of candidates, instances of intimidation, and the fact that the RPF appeared to be campaigning and recruiting while other parties could not (HRW 2001, ICG 2001). The 2003 elections were won resoundingly by the RPF. Paul Kagame (who had served first as Vice-President since 1994 then as President since 2000 when Pasteur Bizimungu resigned) was elected President with 95% of the vote. The RPF won 73.8% of votes in the legislative elections. Again the 2003 referendum on the constitution and elections were considered to have been well-run, although international observer missions, notably from the EU, highlighted irregularities in the process (EU 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).

At the start of 2008 restrictions were lifted on political parties, enabling them to establish local branches and campaign at all levels for the first time. Legislative elections were held from 15 to 18 September 2008, with the RPF winning 78.76% of seats in the parliament.

(iv)(v) Vertical and horizontal accountability

In 1998, both vertical and horizontal accountability were weak. The emphasis by the GoNU was on consensus rather than competition. The executive was very strong, while the legislative branch was weak, although attempts were made during this period to begin separating powers and for the national parliament to assert itself. For example in 1996 the TNA voted a law increasing its scrutinizing role over government and inquiries were launched into high level members of the government over corruption (Reyntjens 1999). Prior to this, there had been no ministerial responsibility before Parliament, only to the President. Under the Loi Fondamentale the cabinet was chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President, balancing competence and representation of all political parties. The TNA was composed of members nominated by the political parties. Real power remained with the President who could make appointments or dismissals without consulting Parliament or the political parties (Reyntjens 1999: 5).

By 2008, systems were in place to ensure greater accountability of politicians and political leaders towards both the electorate and government institutions. Under the 2003 constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and Cabinet members are appointed by the President on the proposal of the Prime Minister. Cabinet members are selected from political organizations on the basis of their seats in the National Assembly, but once in Cabinet they are considered to represent the whole and not their political parties, a concept dating back to the Arusha Accords. A maximum of 50% of the Cabinet can be from one political party, and other competent people not belonging to political organizations can be appointed. Since 2003 there has been no military representation in parliament.

There is space for interest groups to hold the government accountable and to challenge the government, e.g. through the office of the Ombudsman, although those who are overly critical risk intimidation. Constitutional bodies, notably the Auditor-General and the National Assembly have brought charges against some politicians over corruption.

Decentralization is a key priority of the government, and has been an ongoing process since about 2000. Beyond administrative efficiency, decentralization is seen as an important component of the democratization process, a way of empowering local people and rendering
local authorities more accountable. Recently, the government has established a system for formalising accountability at local level by reviving the tradition of *imihigo*, a system for publicly declaring promises towards others and then accounting for whether those promises have been kept.

**(vi) Democracy?**

By the end of 1998, Rwanda could not be described as a full democracy. Peace had been restored to the country and the government was in control of the entire territory, although only just (see B); institutions of democracy were being established and a broad-based transition government was in place. However, no elections had been held at any level and the rule of law was weak. Although there was some participation of broader society in policy-making, political freedom was restricted. Consensus and unity took precedence over civil liberties. Consequently, Rwanda at this time could be categorized as ‘politically closed authoritarian’ (Diamond 2002). The government described this as a period of ‘democratic consolidation’ (Republic of Rwanda 1999b: 119).

By 2008, the key institutions of a liberal democracy were in place. The 2003 constitution guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms of the people; there was official separation of powers; a judicial reform had been completed, guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary; and elections at all levels had been held. However, Rwanda cannot be considered a full democracy in a western, liberal sense. The Freedom House report of 2007 considers Rwanda to have moved from a ‘consensual dictatorship’ since 1994 to a ‘nominal democracy’ since 2003 (Burnet 2007: 1). Following Diamond’s criteria (Diamond 2002), Rwanda today could be considered as a hybrid regime which combines authoritarian and democratic elements, corresponding to his category of ‘hegemonic electoral authoritarian’ in that one party (the RPF) dominates the political scene, competition is minimal as the opposition is weak, elections are held but the outcomes are largely foregone conclusions, there is some space for political opposition, an independent media and social organizations, but restrictions are imposed upon them. Moreover, there is evidence of state interference in the affairs of the judiciary and the security forces and human rights abuses. Within popular perception, the executive, and by extension the RPF, is seen as being extremely powerful in contrast to the legislature and other political parties. For example, most laws are proposed by the executive rather than the parliament (IRDP 2005: 101). Paradoxically perhaps, as Rwanda’s political system has been liberalized, it would appear to be becoming more authoritarian.

Rwanda’s political system needs to be evaluated in light of the specific context, and the government has a strong sense of the type of democracy that it considers Rwanda to have and need at this stage. As several informants said, Rwanda’s democracy is a ‘bit different’; the government does not seek to emulate the west but to build a system which reflects Rwanda’s specific circumstances.3 Central concepts are that of inclusion and consensus-building, captured in the power-sharing arrangement of the Cabinet and the Forum of Political Parties. These recent views on democracy in Rwanda today reflect a long-standing internal debate on the subject. For example, at the Village Urugwiro discussions in 1998-99, democracy was considered to be about people taking responsibility for their problems (ownership and participation), for appointing structures to resolve these problems (representation), and for representatives not to abuse their authority (control and accountability) (Republic of Rwanda 1999a: 5).

3 Interviews with government representatives, researchers and donor agencies conducted in Rwanda in August 2008.
Research conducted by Rwandan researchers on democracy amongst different swaths of the population also provides an insight into demands for democracy and popular understanding of the concept. The research highlights that Rwanda is considered to have no tradition of democracy, and that democracy (and its attendant institutions, such as political parties) is a concept imported from the West. Democracy in the past was associated with ethnic-based violence (IRDP 2005: 58; 81-82). Past experiences have created a passive attitude, characterised by caution and unwillingness to be openly critical (idem: 107). More recently, there is a feeling that representative democracy is an empty shell, with elected leaders more interested in pleasing the party hierarchy and state than the people (idem: 83, 105).

Nevertheless there is an assumption of accountability of leaders to the people. A leader is considered to be all-powerful; yet, the people should benefit from his power. If the population does not benefit then the power wielded by the leader is considered to have been stolen. The people know what constitutes a good leader and what constitutes a bad leader. A good leader ensures that the people remain safe, that they can work, and that they have the possibility of becoming prosperous; for the educated and politicised, democracy means the possibility of having access to power.

Popular perspectives on the multi-party system are also based on Rwanda’s particular context. Between 1963 and 1990 Rwanda was a one-party state. Political parties are seen to have “progressively played a big role in destroying the unity of Rwandans” (Republic of Rwanda 1999a: 41). At a more popular level, political parties are seen as a “foreign invention” (IRDP 2005: 71), as tools of the elite aimed at gaining power, and there is a concern that ethnicity will remain the primary criteria for choosing representatives amongst the least educated (idem: 78). Parties are seen as a means for gaining power with no coherent political agendas, with some very small parties seen as opportunistic rather than representative (idem: 114). There are concerns that promises are not upheld and that there are no accountability mechanisms for political parties or from MPs to the people (idem: 105). Many people express a preference for power-sharing (idem: 80).

Views on whether Rwanda is a democracy vary greatly. For example, the Freedom House and Polity IV ratings for Rwanda over a period of time imply that little has changed between the pre-war and war-time periods and today, while the ‘Governance Matters’ reports indicate some minimal progress since 1996 (see Table 1.1, page 5). Reports from international human rights groups, such as International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International tend to be fairly negative. Government and donor frustration with these analyses - which they consider do not capture the reality on the ground and are not based on sufficiently robust evidence - has resulted in a recent exercise in arriving at an assessment of Rwanda’s governance which is acceptable to both government and donors, and which is aimed at forming the basis of future dialogue on governance issues: the Joint Governance Assessment.4

Underpinning the political situation in Rwanda, and behind much of the ensuing critiques, lies the issue of the politicisation of ethnicity. The politicisation of ethnic differences since before independence is considered to be one of the major causes of the genocide by the population (IRDP 2005: ii). Rwanda’s past experiments with democracy (see section 2) have seen the democratic majority equated with the ethnic majority. Ethnicity underpinned the political

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4 This exercise is ongoing and no public reports were available at the time of writing.
system until the genocide, and arguably it has also been central to political debates since 1994 but in the sense of how to remove ethnicity from politics. This has led to the claim that ethnicity is a taboo subject in Rwanda, although I would argue that this is a fallacy. Ethnicity is not denied, nor is it not discussed as the research conducted by the IRDP demonstrates. What is taboo is the political instrumentalisation of ethnicity.

The quirks of Rwanda’s democratic system therefore need to be seen in this light. For example, the voting-through-queuing system used for local elections is aimed at keeping costs low but also at making candidacy more transparent. The list system for legislative elections means that people cannot vote for a person on the basis of their ethnicity or place of origin. The search for consensus-based rather than oppositional politics also reflects this logic. Amongst the fundamental principles of Rwanda’s 2003 constitution is the need to eradicate ethnic, regional, and other divisions, to promote national unity, and to ensure the equitable sharing of power. Framing this is the need to fight the ‘ideology of genocide’, which renders any activity considered as promoting discrimination based on ethnicity or region prohibited by law.

At the same time, fears about mobilisation along ethnic grounds are real. A small number of genocide survivors are being killed to prevent them testifying in court and claims of ethnic discrimination within schools. While some external observers see such fears as a mechanism by the ruling elite to maintain control over the Hutu population and consolidate their power, it would also be naïve to think that only fourteen years after the genocide and after decades of ethnic tension these issues have gone away; there would appear to be genuine fear amongst many people about a resurgence of violence. In many ways the elections of 2003 exposed the raw nerves of Rwandan society. What the political elite can be criticized for is how it handles these matters, with allegations of ‘divisionism’ used in a political and sometimes indiscriminate manner. A contradictory situation has also arisen where there is no overt quota system by ethnic group, but it is widely known that an ethnic balance needs to be struck, particularly at higher levels of government.

(vii) Democratization Process
By 2003 many of the criteria of a liberal democracy were fulfilled, so 10 years after the start of the intervention it can be said that Rwanda was democratic. However, as indicated above, the nature of that democracy is contestable and Rwanda can best be described as a hybrid state.

(viii) Democracy as the ‘only game in town’
Since 1994, there has been a strong discourse of democracy amongst Rwanda’s political elite and there are no real signs of a challenge to that. Likewise, amongst the wider population, although a general suspicion of politicians and political parties remains on the grounds of the historical record of democracy in Rwanda, there is also faith that the new constitution, decentralization policies and the incumbent political powers are providing the space for impunity to be eradicated and a democratic culture to develop (IRDP 2003, 2005).

(ix) Same old state?
The post-war state in Rwanda is a different entity to the pre-war state, although it retains features of former structures. By 2008 a new constitution was in place, new administrative structures had been created and old ones reformed. These changes included public sector reforms, restructuring of ministerial portfolios, a reform of the local administration, decentralisation, reform of the security services, and new legal structures and institutions to
regulate the public sector and render it more accountable and transparent. Some office-holders of the pre-war regime remained in place, although there are many new faces at the higher levels. A key difference is that ethnic discrimination has officially been removed.

**B. Security**

(i)(iii) Security situation and relapse to war

When the UN peacekeeping force was established in 1993 a ceasefire was officially in place. Violence and sporadic fighting continued, however, until the complete breakdown of the peace agreement and a resumption of the civil war in April 1994. In the night of 6 April 1994, the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda (Juvénal Habyarimana) and Burundi (Cyprien Ntaryamira) from peace talks in Dar es-Salaam was shot down just short of Kigali Airport.\(^5\) This sparked the beginning of the organised killing of Hutu moderate politicians and the genocide of the Tutsi. The UN peacekeeping force was powerless (see Section 3.A). In July 1994 the RPF finally took Kigali and overthrew the interim government established after the death of Habyarimana and the murder of the Prime Minister in the early days of the genocide. This marked the end of the main conflict and was followed by the establishment of the Government of National Unity.

However, throughout the first five years following the UN intervention (1993-1998), Rwanda was not fully at peace and the security situation for many people was precarious. While there was no official campaign of organized violence against the population, civilians were caught up in ongoing clashes between the army and militias of the former regime and the new regime which lasted until the middle of 1998.

When the RPF took Kigali in 1994, the remnants of the interim government, the army (ex-FAR) and the militia (Interhamwe and Impuzamugambi) fled west, taking hundreds of thousands of civilians with them. Huge refugee camps were established over the Rwandan border in Zaire (as well as in Tanzania). In addition, a safe haven known as Zone Turquoise was created in the southwest of Rwanda by French troops. These areas quickly came under the influence and control of the former regime. Indeed, the Zone Turquoise provided not only a safe-haven for innocent civilians, but it also acted as a buffer zone and escape route for the perpetrators of the genocide. The ex-FAR and militias used these camps as bases from which to continue launching attacks on the RPA and on Tutsi civilians.

The response of the new government in Rwanda was the forcible closure of the camps. The final camp in the Zone Turquoise was closed in April 1995 and the refugee camps in eastern Zaire were closed in 1996, with the Rwandan government tacitly supporting Zairian rebel forces which later went on to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Nevertheless, rebel forces remained active in eastern Zaire. Indeed, the closure of the camps led to an increase in raids into Rwanda, escalating into a full-blown insurgency in the north-west of the country in May-June 1997. The insurgency saw the displacement of around 600,000 people (Stephens 1999: 7) and numerous reports of human rights abuses by both the ex-FAR/Interhamwe and the Rwandan army in retaliation against civilians colluding with the rebels (African Rights

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\(^5\) The perpetrators of this act remain unknown. Various theories lay the blame on Hutu extremists, the RPF, the French military and the Belgian military respectively. The most plausible explanation is that it was shot down by Hutu extremists seeking to wreck the peace deal, especially given the speed at which the genocide began. The claim that the RPF was responsible is most notoriously being pursued by a French anti-terrorism judge, which has led to frequent diplomatic spats between France and Rwanda.
1998). In mid-1998 the army and government became more reconciliatory towards the Rwandan population, recruiting ex-FAR soldiers into the army and making an effort to protect civilians. This enabled the insurgency to be defeated finally by April 1998.

So, by the end of 1998 security in Rwanda was still precarious but peace had been established throughout the country. The conflict was not fully resolved, however. Through much of our second period (1998-2008) rebel forces remained active in eastern Zaire. This led to the ‘externalisation’ of Rwanda’s conflict, with the Rwandan army becoming embroiled in the Congo war which lasted from 1998 to 1999, although Rwandan troops were finally withdrawn in 2002 only. The security threat from rebels remains a core concern of the Rwandan government, with reports of incursions into Rwandan territory as recently as 2005.

(ii) Political instability
Since 1994 there have been no instances of major political instability, although throughout the period the veneer of national unity has masked underlying political tensions. By 1995 splits had emerged within the political elite and over the years a number of high-level politicians (both Hutu and Tutsi) have resigned from government with many fleeing into exile. Some of these splits reflect new areas of cleavage within the Rwandan population since the genocide, between survivors and returnees, perpetrators and victims. As described above around the 2003 elections there was intimidation of the opposition and clamp-downs on freedom of expression and association but no widespread, organised violence.

C. State Capacity, legitimacy and service provision

(i)(ii)(iii) State capacity
During the period 1993-1998, the main issue with regard to state capacity was the sheer extent of the devastation caused by the civil war and genocide. Around a million people (out of a population of around 8 million) had died; there had been massive movements of the population internally, and into and out of the country. Around 2 million civilians fled the country in 1994, many returning en masse in 1996, while refugees from earlier pogroms began returning in the wake of the RPF advance. In 1994 the economy was in tatters, public buildings and services were at a standstill, and the coffers of the central bank had been emptied by the retreating interim government. Very few public servants from the pre-war era

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6 The issue of human rights abuses by the RPF remains controversial. Attempts to investigate these abuses have always been criticized by the new regime in Kigali. Accusations have been countered with reminders of genocide guilt, and the dismal record of the international community during the genocide meant that many were concerned not to be too critical of the new government, so there was a degree of 'looking the other way' (Prunier 2002). For example, a report commissioned by the UN in 1994, the Gersony Report, was covered up as the outcome would have greatly exacerbated tensions with the new government. Prunier considers that there were phases in the killings by RPF soldiers and questions whether these were revenge killings or a “deliberate policy aimed at terrorizing the Hutu into submission” (Prunier 2002: 361). Revenge killings were likely in mid to late 1994, then again from about March 1996. Likewise, the numbers of civilians killed during the closure of camps in the Zone Turquoise and in Zaire remain disputed.

7 The Uppsala Conflict Database considers Rwanda’s conflict to have had two stages: 1990 to 1994; and 1997 to 2002. However, as no final resolution has been achieved between the two warring sides, the conflict remains ‘inactive’ rather than terminated (see http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdbdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=133&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#)

8 There have been several bouts of negotiations between the Rwandan government and the DRC about disarming the rebels and thus ending the security threat to Rwanda, the most recent of which dates from November 2007 (African Rights 2007). In 2005 the FDLR (the main rebel group) declared a ceasefire but there have been no official negotiations reported between the FDLR and the Rwandan government.
remained in office – many had died, fled or were accused of colluding in the violence. The incoming elite had limited experience of government and many new civil servants came from very different administrative backgrounds in their previous countries of exile.

The capacity of the government to independently govern and manage the country, and to provide public services, was therefore weak. Rwanda at this time was heavily dependent upon external financial and technical assistance. Foreign grants accounted for a significant proportion of the country’s total revenue and grants (see table 4.2, page 49). Rwanda received considerable support from the UNDP and the World Bank to develop policies which could be presented to donors for funding at the UN-sponsored Round Table conferences held in 1995 and 1996. The immediate years after the conflict – when the country was still in a situation of insecurity – were primarily dedicated to rehabilitation of infrastructure, the resumption of the economy and the provision of social services. Major challenges were the return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees, caring for vulnerable groups (orphans, child-and female-headed households, victims of rape, the disabled, etc.), and justice. The education system got back onto its feet fairly quickly, with schools opening by late 1994 and new policies were enacted to remove the ethnic discrimination of the past.

The security apparatus, on the other hand, was strong. The RPF dominated the new Rwandan government and the military had a tangible presence within state institutions. Prunier notes the importance of informal and formal policing networks made up of RPF representatives present throughout the country, which he considers to have been impressive in terms of establishing social control over the population (Prunier 2002: 366). As to formal policing, by the end of 1998 moves were just underway to establish an independent police force and to integrate the army.

By 2008 the government’s capacity to govern had improved dramatically. Numerous reforms had been made to the public sector, with the restructuring of the central administration, administrative decentralisation, the creation of semi-autonomous taxation and auditing bodies, training programmes for civil servants and retrenchment. This was all aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy, and improving the provision of public services. Education and health services were available to the whole population.

Reforms of the security services began in 1999, separating the military from the civilian police. In 2000 the Rwandan National Police was established merging the Gendarmerie Nationale (a paramilitary police force modelled on the French system), the Communal Police and the Judicial Police. There was considerable external support for this process (the Netherlands and the UNDP in particular, and more recently from Sweden) which came about when the internal security situation allowed for real institutional change, namely after the end of the insurgency in the northwest A law was passed in 2002 establishing the Rwanda Defence Forces, the new national army incorporating soldiers from the RPA and the ex-Far.

(iv) Informal structures
Clientelism does not appear to play a major role in the provision of goods and services, although petty corruption is considered to be a problem. There is an ongoing debate about the existence or not of a strong RPF inner circle which effectively is in control of the country.

(v) Popular perceptions
Popular perspectives on the legitimacy of the regime and its capacity to provide security depend greatly upon the experience and perspectives of individuals. A survey of living
conditions in 2006 indicated that the population was largely satisfied with government services, notably the functioning of district administration and primary education and health services. Poverty nevertheless remains high, with 92% of the poor living in rural areas, and inequality is rising (Republic of Rwanda 2006b: 20-21). As one informant said, until the hunger of everyone is satisfied then the regime is not fulfilling the demands of the people. However, the president is considered to be legitimate and is generally popular because ‘he makes people feel safe.’

The Rwandan leadership is considered to have a “clear will to carry out self-criticism”, evidenced through its organization of public seminars and such events as annual retreats for the government. However, it is felt that decisions are not often well implemented due to a “lack of required skills and capacities” and that “sometimes there is unwillingness or deliberate negative attitudes” (IRDP 2005: 85-86). Efforts at better governance and overall development policies are appreciated but challenges are seen to remain, including the lack of capacity and means, conflicts of interest and mistrust between citizens and the authorities, imposed decisions about people’s welfare, poor management and coordination amongst institutions, and accountability to the political hierarchy not the people (IRDP 2005, IRDP 2006).

(vii) Independence from outside interference
Rwanda is a sovereign state with control over its security apparatus, its policy-making and its governing institutions. Since 1994, the RPF-led government in Rwanda has had a very clear set of policy priorities which have remained constant to the present day, namely concerns with national security, national unity, establishing a functioning administration and judicial system, economic development, social development, and governance (including democracy). However, external actors play an important role in providing financial resources to bolster the state budget (developmental and current) and in providing technical support for policy-making, training and service provision.

In the 1993 to 1998 period, external involvement was primarily due to weak state capacity. Paradoxically, as state capacity has improved, external actors have become more tightly entangled in Rwanda’s administrative and policy-making apparatus. This is partly due to changes in the provision and management of aid in very poor countries like Rwanda, where attempts to improve aid effectiveness through more direct budget support and better coordination in support of poverty reduction has led to greater donor engagement in social and economic policy formulation and implementation. Consequently, the decision-making process is officially independent of outside interference but the hand of external actors is tangible. Over certain questions the regime is fiercely independent, most notably national security matters but it has also stubbornly forged ahead with policies which have courted controversy amongst donors, such as resettlement schemes (imigudugu), gacaca and some aspects of the decentralisation policy. In other areas, notably the social sectors, there is evidence of greater collusion between government and external actors (see Hayman 2006, 2007, 2008).

D. Interdependence between democracy, security and state capacities
In July 1994, the Government of National Unity published a Declaration of Principles listing the priorities of the new regime. These included restoring peace and security, organising the administration, consolidating national unity, improving the well-being of the population,
resuming the economy, and consolidating democracy by combating the culture of impunity, guaranteeing freedom of expression and respect for fundamental human rights, and promoting political and social pluralism (Twagirimungu 1994). These fundamental principles have remained at the heart of subsequent government documents and policy statements (Republic of Rwanda 1999b, 2003). Within these the overriding importance emerges of security (both physical and political), economic and social development, and governance, demonstrating that within government discourse there is an important interplay between security, peace, governance and development.

Within this nexus, national security is arguably the overriding priority and this underpins the democratisation process in post-conflict Rwanda. It explains the RPF understanding of governance, which emphasises administrative and institutional aspects very much in line with international norms. Political governance (democracy) is subordinate to security, however. As the government stated in 1999, the election process would have advanced further in the years since 1994 were it not for the ongoing insecurity in the country and the problems of reintegrating a large returnee refugee population (Republic of Rwanda 1999b: 119). The security issue at a regional level remains a concern and Rwanda’s internal security is not assured so long as that threat remains (see APRM 2006: 34). The strong discourse of national unity and consensual politics reflects not only Rwanda’s recent history but also these internal and external security concerns. Consequently, demands for human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, popular participation, freedom of civil society activities, etc. are all tolerated but within strict boundaries. Likewise, political opposition is tolerated only to the extent that it does not challenge national security and stability.

The link between state capacity and security and state capacity and democracy is also evident. It is a strong state with control over the security apparatus, which has enabled internal security to be assured but also to allow socio-economic development to take place. State capacity, particularly to deliver development and socio-economic progress, has been a consistent central concern of the government with various strategies in place since 1994 to bolster administrative and policy-making capacity to deliver public services. The decentralisation programme can be seen in the light of this nexus. By bolstering administrative capacity at local levels the government is seeking to render delivery of public services more efficient and effective. Obviously security is necessary for this to happen, and there is an argument that decentralisation increases state control over the country. Decentralisation also has the objective of enabling popular participation while rendering local leaders accountable both to the people and the government.

As one informant observed, as the country becomes more democratic there will be a greater sense of national and community spirit which will impact upon security; as security improves it will lead to more democracy and more development. The more the basic needs of the people are satisfied, the more time people will have to develop ideas, to engage in competition and to participate in political life. So the effectiveness of the state through development encourages democracy and security. The question is whether the RPF-led regime will allow grassroots democracy the space to grow. The current approach to democracy demonstrates that multi-party politics is viewed as a threat and a potential source of conflict rather than an instrument for peace. Opening political space too much is seen to carry the risk of extremism re-emerging. There is a real threat, in that there are armed extremists camped on Rwanda’s borders and extremist political views are espoused by opposition groups outside the country; but that threat is not great enough to seriously destabilize the state. Of greater concern is perhaps the lack of a democratic culture, and the
risk that people would easily vote along ethnic or regional grounds rather than on the basis of ideology or policy positions; the unprofessional nature of the media in Rwanda does not help. Support for the RPF is huge, as the 2008 elections testify, but it is hard to judge whether that stems from true faith in the RPF’s political position, conformity or fear. The RPF is a strong political force and highly organized, and other political parties are hard-pressed to offer a real alternative in ideological or policy terms. The general feeling amongst informants was that more space for genuine political opposition would not threaten the regime, but that some control is also necessary.
Table 2.1: Rwanda Selected Development Indicators 1988-1998

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (current US$)</strong></td>
<td>2,395,578,368</td>
<td>2,410,194,176</td>
<td>2,584,367,360</td>
<td>1,911,970,688</td>
<td>2,037,982,592</td>
<td>1,971,348,352</td>
<td>753,636,352</td>
<td>1,293,447,680</td>
<td>1,382,334,848</td>
<td>1,851,557,120</td>
<td>1,989,343,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong></td>
<td>819.97</td>
<td>830.91</td>
<td>845.11</td>
<td>884.80</td>
<td>1025.36</td>
<td>1045.60</td>
<td>565.89</td>
<td>793.92</td>
<td>874.42</td>
<td>929.24</td>
<td>923.48</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HDI Ranking</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total ODA (current US$)</strong></td>
<td>244,910,000</td>
<td>225,630,000</td>
<td>287,920,000</td>
<td>359,160,000</td>
<td>348,930,000</td>
<td>353,910,000</td>
<td>711,540,000</td>
<td>694,700,000</td>
<td>465,310,000</td>
<td>229,600,000</td>
<td>350,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ODA as % of GDP (current US$)</strong></td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>11.14</td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>94.41</td>
<td>53.71</td>
<td>33.66</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ODA per capita</strong></td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>30.91</td>
<td>39.48</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>52.82</td>
<td>57.95</td>
<td>123.92</td>
<td>123.09</td>
<td>79.28</td>
<td>36.08</td>
<td>49.9</td>
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2007; Human Development Report, UNDP, various years
SECTION 2: Pre-War and War Variables

A. Long-term, structural factors

(i) Pre-war regime
Prior to the war Rwanda was an authoritarian state under the leadership of Juvénal Habyarimana. In a bloodless coup in July 1973, Habyarimana took power from the de-facto authoritarian government of Grégoire Kayibanda which had run Rwanda since 1959. He abolished all political parties and formed a single-party in 1975, the MRND (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*), creating a totalitarian state with extensive control over the population. Identity cards showed ethnic group and place of residence, and population movement was controlled. As Prunier (2002: 76-77) states: “the MRND was a truly totalitarian party… The party was everywhere; every hill had its cell, and party faithfuls, hoping for promotion and a professional boost, willingly spied on anybody they were told to spy on and on a few others as well... Administrative control was probably the tightest in the world among non-communist countries.”

Between April and July 1994 Rwanda was run by an interim government which was formed after the assassination of Habyarimana, the Prime Minister and many members of government in the early days of the genocide.

(ii) Earlier attempts at democratization
Local, legislative and presidential elections were held throughout the Kayibanda and Habyarimana years. However, the incumbents were the only candidates in presidential elections, and under Habyarimana elections were only competitive on an individual basis. Under Habyarimana the term ‘responsible democracy’ was coined, meaning that each citizen was accountable for his/her actions and responsibilities as a citizen. Effectively this meant unconditional commitment to serve the single party system (IRDP 2005: 83).

In July 1990 Habyarimana agreed to open the way for multi-party politics. By November 1990 the right to form political movements was in place, and multi-partyism was enshrined in a new constitution of June 1991 (Voyame et al. 1996: 134). This opening came in response to both internal and external demands. By the late 1980s, popular frustration with the regime was growing and the 1988 presidential elections saw real electoral fraud on a large scale for first time; there was also “a veritable political guerrilla war” being waged in southern and central Rwanda between political groups with popular mobilisation, intimidation and violence (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 13). By this time, Rwanda was facing an economic crisis which was born of structural and political factors (see below). Corruption and clientelism were rampant, and calls for political change grew internally as state control weakened. For example, an open letter was published in November 1990 from 33 Rwandan intellectuals demanding political pluralism. There were demands for an end to regional and ethnic discrimination, the right of return for Tutsi refugees, the rule of law and the liberalisation of the media. This internal pressure for reform coincided with a wave of political liberalisation that was sweeping Africa in the wake of the Cold War. Moreover, France’s President Mitterand made his famous statement in 1990 that France would henceforth only support countries instigating democratic reforms; France at this time was Rwanda’s largest bilateral donor.
A variety of political parties were established in the early 1990s, tending to be regionally or ethnically based (see below) rather than ideologically distinct. There was limited engagement with the wider population. The opening of the political system coincided with the outbreak of the civil war which culminated in the genocide, therefore it was a complete failure. The legacies left were distrust in political parties and particularly in ethnic-based politics (cf. Section 1).

(iii)(iv) Economic structure and development before the war
Rwanda was a poor country prior to the war with GDP per capita in 1989 of US$830 (see table 2.1), more or less comparable to its neighbours in eastern and central Africa (see table 2.2). In 1991 it ranked 133 out of 160 in the Human Development Index.

Table 2.2 GDP per capita levels of countries in eastern and central Africa

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>705.42</td>
<td>797.50</td>
<td>676.84</td>
<td>656.52</td>
<td>663.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1233.92</td>
<td>932.64</td>
<td>752.40</td>
<td>679.01</td>
<td>588.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>876.37</td>
<td>917.16</td>
<td>964.14</td>
<td>1013.31</td>
<td>1074.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>830.91</td>
<td>1025.36</td>
<td>793.92</td>
<td>923.48</td>
<td>973.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>392.46</td>
<td>430.06</td>
<td>444.49</td>
<td>484.54</td>
<td>552.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>634.1</td>
<td>730.83</td>
<td>910.75</td>
<td>1048.89</td>
<td>1213.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rwanda was (and remains) a largely agrarian society, with 90% of the population engaged in agriculture, much of it on a subsistence basis in rural areas. There are limited natural resources, and it is a landlocked country with a high population density. The private sector is small, with only about 400 enterprises in Rwanda (World Bank 2008).

Rwanda was widely viewed as a successful developmental state from the mid-1970s. Indeed, up to the mid-1980s it was seen as a beacon of tranquillity, orderliness and development in a troubled region – compared with Obote’s Uganda and Mobutu’s Zaire. It was registering reasonable economic performance, and was something of a donor ‘darling’ despite the totalitarian nature of the state. Indeed, “with hindsight the entire period from 1973 to roughly 1988 can be labelled as one of relative political stability, moderate economic growth and a favourable human rights record if compared to a number of contemporary regimes in sub-Saharan Africa” (Douma 2000: 19). Uvin (1998) analyses World Bank documents which stress Rwanda’s developmental challenges prior to the conflict but also highlight its valiant efforts to tackle them. Assets were seen as the country’s political stability, the government’s concern for the rural population, its effective administration, and its sound, prudent and realistic management.9

This situation gradually changed up to the end of the 1980s. The country was dependent upon exports of coffee (accounting for 82% of export earnings in 1986) and tin, the prices of which both collapsed in the mid-1980s leading to economic recession. Export earnings plummeted by 50% between 1987 and 1991; external debts doubled between 1985 and 1989 and by a further 34% between 1989 and 1992, amounting to $804.3m in 1992 (Andersen 2000). Debt rose from 16% of GNP in 1980 to 32% by 1990 (Uvin 1998: 54). Around this time droughts

9 The international community was seemingly oblivious to social inequalities, discrimination and political tension in Rwanda. As Uvin (1998) notes, World Bank reports even mention Rwanda’s cultural and social cohesion and ethnic and socioeconomic homogeneity as a strength, demonstrating complete ‘blindness’ to the political realities behind this developmental façade.
also affected subsistence agriculture, adding to the economic woes of the rural poor who were also subject to the introduction of ‘voluntary’ forced labour (umuganda). In 1989, the budget was cut by 40%, largely offset by cutting social services. As revenues from the export of commodities fuelled the patrimonial society, the only other resource for elite enrichment and patronage was international development aid upon which Rwanda’s dependency had been steadily growing.

Aid rose considerably in the 1970s, from around US$22 million in 1970 to US$155 million by 1980 and US$200 million by 1986. Aid constituted 5% of GDP in 1965, rising to around 10% through the 1980s. Around 200 bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental donors were present in Rwanda at this time, and as Uvin (1998: 42) states, the “aid system was omnipresent in Rwanda, both physically and geographically.” However, aid was also declining in real terms at the end of the 1980s. Indeed, Prunier considers that (2002: 364) “the crisis which turned the more or less benevolent authoritarian Habyarimana regime into a hardened and aggressive dictatorship was linked to the decline of the international price of raw materials and to the aid crisis around 1988.”

To combat the economic crisis, a structural adjustment programme was implemented with the support of the World Bank in 1990. Many bilateral donors increased their aid to complement this, such as Belgium whose aid rose from €38 million in 1990 to €48 million in 1991, and Switzerland whose aid rose from CHF 4 million in 1987 to CHF 10 million in 1991. Hence, overall aid increased again in the early 1990s (see table 2.1), rising to around US$350 million and accounting for 18% of GDP by 1991.

(vi) Elite cleavages and ethnic structure
The major cleavages in Rwanda were ethnic and regional. Rwanda’s experiments with democracy were forged in a climate of ethnic-based politics. The Tutsi were favoured under the Belgian colonial regime; in the run-up to independence, however, the Belgians shifted their allegiance to the Hutu majority who were calling for an end to Tutsi domination and for majority rule. Political parties were formed in the late 1950s and elections were held in 1960 and 1961 which were won by the pro-Hutu Parmehutu party. The ‘social revolution’ of 1959-1961 saw the Hutu counter-elite overthrowing the Tutsi monarchy and Rwanda was declared a republic under Kayibanda. The independence struggle, therefore, was highly ethnicized and “democracy became synonymous with domination by the ethnic majority over the minority” (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 11). Under both Kayibanda and Habyarimana, Tutsi were excluded from political and civil life with a quota system in place for access to public sector positions and services such as education. Sporadic pogroms against Tutsi led to waves of refugees leaving the country. Many Tutsi who remained in the country became prominent in the private sector which also caused some antagonism. For much of Habyarimana’s rule Tutsi were widely discriminated against, but not violently so. Prunier (2002: 76) stresses that provided the Tutsi did not ‘mess around with politics’ then life was tolerable.

There is an ongoing debate about whether Rwanda’s ‘ethnic’ groups are primordial or socially constructed. The Twa (an indigenous, pygmy race) are considered to be a separate ethnic group; they constitute a tiny minority and are politically, socially and economically marginalised. Inter-marriage and a common culture (language, history and traditions) blurred what were probably original lines between Hutu farmers and Tutsi herdsman. The debate leans towards the position that Hutu and Tutsi are largely socially constructed identities which existed before colonial times but were consolidated during colonial rule when the Belgians began a process of ethnic segregation, dividing the population on the basis of physique and
economic status. The two became separate ethnic groups through the politicisation of the question, which intensified after independence. Before the conflict the ethnic breakdown of the country was approximately 80% Hutu, 20% Tutsi and 1% Twa.

In addition to the ethnic cleavage, divisions also existed along regional and clan lines. Under Kayibanda, the central region of Gitarama had been favoured; under Habyarimana power lay with a group from the northwest of the country (Gisenyi) and Hutu from the central and southern regions were discriminated against in political and civil life. Prior to the outbreak of the war, these political divisions were probably more important than ethnic ones.

(vii)(viii) (ix) State capacity before the war
As mentioned above, prior to the war Rwanda had a very strong state, with effective control exercised by the regime over the country. It was considered relatively successful in terms of delivering public services and security to the population within the limits of a poor country. Even during the civil war when Rwanda was experiencing an economic and political crisis, the state retained very tight control over the populace. Indeed, the genocide was only possible because the state was so strong.

B. Factors related to the war and peace process

1. Type of war and warring parties

(i) Type of war
The conflict in Rwanda started as a low-intensity civil war, escalating to a country-wide conflict which culminated in genocide. The crisis then spilled over into the wider region. The conflict was fought along ethnic lines, although the issues at the heart of it were more complex and inherently tied up in the political liberalisation process as well as economic crisis. As the civil war went on ethnic aspects became stronger.

(ii) Warring parties
The main warring parties were the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government under Habyarimana. The RPF was a guerrilla movement formed of exiles from sporadic violence against civilians in Rwanda since independence. The bulk of the RPF were Tutsi, although it also included Hutu opponents of the Habyarimana regime. The original aim of the RPF was to put pressure on Habyarimana to let the Tutsi minority participate in decision-making and to promote the reintegration of Tutsi refugees into Rwanda (Douma 2000: 30). The RPF was formed in Uganda, but members came from refugee communities all over the region. It had considerable military experience and strength - many of its members had served in the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda. On the Rwandan government side, there was the official Rwandan army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), which received military support from France, Belgium and, in the early stages of the conflict, Zaire. Over the course of the conflict the RPF evolved from a rebel group into a “legitimate participant in the political process” (Melvern 2000: 39).

10 As with the ethnic categories, clans were also largely socially constructed by the Tutsi ruling political order before independence.
While these were the main warring parties, the conflict can better be described as ‘three-sided’, with the political opposition to Habyarimana within Rwanda constituting the third party. Overlaying the low intensity civil war was a far more complex political conflict. After 1990 new political parties were formed in Rwanda, some along ethnic or regional lines. The main parties were: MRND (Habyarimana’s party); the Mouvement démocratique rwandais (MDR); the Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR) which was radical and fiercely pro-Hutu; the Parti social démocratique (PSD) which was southern-based and (mildly) pro-Hutu; and the Parti Libéral (PL) which was urban-based and included Tutsi businessmen. In 1992 a new power-sharing cabinet was formed which included the main opposition groups. However, from the outset, supporters of Habyarimana sought to undermine the new government, with harassment of the opposition, assassinations and a more general increase in crime levels adding to internal insecurity (Longman 1998). As the conflict escalated, cracks emerged within many parties, with extremist factions breaking away and forming new political configurations. In 1993, the MDR split with the extremist anti-Tutsi wing (MDR-Power) joining the MRND and the CDR to form the Hutu Power coalition. The main split consequently was between groups that were interested in negotiating for peace with the RPF and those that were violently opposed to this.

Within the MRND, real power lay with a small clique formed mainly of members of the clan of the President’s wife, known as the akazu (‘little house’). When Habyarimana was assassinated, hard-line Hutu elements within the government and army took control of the government. They installed a puppet regime consisting of Hutu Power politicians, which served as the formal interim government, but real power lay with ‘Zero Network’, an underground paramilitary network, the akazu and Colonel Bagasora, head of the Defence Ministry.

(iii) Spill-over effects

Behind the invasion of the RPF lay important regional dimensions. Since the late 1950s, several waves of refugees had fled Rwanda, settling in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, notably Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. In Uganda in particular the refugee question was never resolved and it became a political issue in that country in its own right. In 1982, many Rwandan refugees were expelled from Uganda. Many Banyarwanda (the collective term for those of Rwandan origin – both Hutu and Tutsi - in Uganda) became actively involved in Museveni’s guerrilla army fighting against Obote. When Museveni took power in Uganda in 1986, many Rwandans were given high-level positions in the army and government. However, there was no promise of full integration of refugees into Uganda, fuelling the creation of the RPF to fight for a return to Rwanda. Events in Burundi also impacted upon the civil war. Political instability there led to retaliatory acts of violence in Rwanda. For example, the abduction and murder of the democratically elected (Hutu) president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi army officers on 23 October 1993, fuelled anti-Tutsi propaganda and led to violence against Tutsi in Rwanda. The fact that the international community did nothing sent signals to extremists in Rwanda.

(iv) Cleavages and issues of conflict

At the heart of the conflict between the RPF and the Rwandan government was the issue of representation of Tutsi within political life and the right of refugees to return to Rwanda. Within the wider political conflict multiple issues were at stake: discrimination along ethnic

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11 The RPF’s eight-point programme included seeking an end to Rwanda’s ethnic divide and compulsory identity cards, promoting democracy, a self-sustaining economy, an end to corruption, the establishment of social services, the democratization of the security forces, and a progressive foreign policy (Melvern 2000: 29).
and regional lines; the struggle for political power amongst different elite groups; economic factors. For example, land pressure is considered to have been one of the most important structural causes of tensions in Rwanda (Douma 2000: 17), and was an excuse used by Habyarimana for refusing the right of return of refugees in 1986. By the mid-1980s internal opposition to the corruption and clientelism of Habyarimana’s regime was growing, and it was this that primarily brought about internal demands for democratisation. As the war progressed, and notably as peace negotiations progressed, the ethnic dimension became increasingly prominent. Uppsala considers the main ‘incompatability’ to be over ‘governmental power’.

(v) Entrepreneurs of violence
Private economic interests were of limited importance in the broader conflict, although personal economic gain is considered to be one explanation, among many, for widespread popular participation in the genocide.

(vi) Recruitment mechanisms
While the main conflict was fought between the Rwandan army (FAR) and the RPF, as the conflict escalated paramilitary groups and militias began to be formed by the extremist parties. Militias (the interhamwe linked to the ruling MRND and the impuzamugambi linked to the CDR) were largely drawn from disaffected youth (the unemployed and uneducated) in Rwanda, bolstered by the economic crisis. Some were secretly trained by the French. While the militias were the main perpetrators of the genocide, there was widespread popular participation. There were various reasons for this, including individual economic interests, but there was considerable manipulation by the regime, notably through propaganda spread via the media (‘hate’ radio) which exhorted the masses to kill Tutsi with impunity. Rwanda’s strong state and the tradition of obedience to authority enabled a highly organised and systematic slaughter to take place.

Moreover, in the early phases of the civil war there was little popular support for the RPF; the Hutu masses demonstrated no desire to be ‘liberated’ and the RPF made little attempt to win over the peasantry (Melvern 2000). The incumbent regime was able to use a strong ethnic discourse to build up fear of the Tutsi taking power.

2. War variables

(i) The start of the war
The civil war began on 1 October 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda (northeast); the first battle-related deaths occurred on this day.

(ii) Battle-related deaths
By the end of the main conflict in 1994, it is estimated that there were over 3000 battle-related casualties. Taking into account all clashes before 1994 and after 1994 between the post-1994 Rwandan army and the remnants of the former regime, battle-related deaths in 2005 were estimated at 6000 (Uppsala University).

(iii) (iv) Other casualties
Civilians were always caught up in the conflict. Douma (2000: 21) estimates that there were up to 800,000 internally displaced persons by March 1993 (out of a population of around 7

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The most intense period of the conflict was from April to June 1994. The assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 signalled the start of the organised genocide of Tutsi and the murder of moderate Hutu politicians. The next day the RPF resumed hostilities claiming the need to protect the Tutsi population. External public awareness of the generalized nature of the genocide was masked by the resurgence in the war between the RPF and the army, and a cover-up facilitated by France which provided political support to the interim government in the UN and other international forums, “discretely supporting the Kigali view that the genocidal violence was the inevitable response to the RPF’s military advance” (Douma 2000: 22; des Forges 1999: 657). The first killings concentrated on Hutu moderates and prominent Tutsi leaders; then Tutsi refugees in public places and buildings, such as schools and churches. Within 10 to 14 weeks around 500-800,000 Tutsi and around 30,000 Hutu were killed (Douma 2000: 22). There are conflicting figures over casualties. Des Forges (1999) estimates 500,000 Tutsi; Prunier (1997, 2002) estimates 800,000 Tutsi plus 10-30,000 Hutu opposition. Government figures are 1,074,017 declared victims and 934,218 victims counted (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 4). Unmarked graves are still being discovered.

The genocide sparked a massive population move, creating further tensions in the wider region. Around 2 million people (civilians, plus remnants of the Habyarimana government and army) fled the RPF advance to Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania, often under coercion and fear by community leaders (Prunier 2002: 312): 1.2 million to Zaire; 600,000 to Tanzania; and 270,000 to Burundi. Thousands died in the refugee camps; a cholera outbreak in camps in Zaire led to a massive humanitarian operation. As outlined in section 1, the end of the war did not mean the end of insecurity in Rwanda and many civilians were caught up in ensuing clashes between the RPF and the former regime. Very few people living in Rwanda today are untouched personally by the civil war, the genocide and its aftermath.

(v) (vi) Dynamics of the war
The initial RPF invasion in October 1990 was short-lived. By the end of the month the rebels had been driven back by the FAR with support from France and Zaire.13 It seemed that the war was over. However, in January 1991 the RPF attacked again sparking a small-scale guerrilla war in the north-east which led to thousands of people being displaced internally. Peace negotiations began in 1991 but sporadic violence continued over the next three years. There was a new offensive in early 1993 in retaliation for the killing of Tutsi in Rwanda (in response to the murder of the Burundian President by Burundian Tutsi army officers). August 1993 saw the signing of the Arusha Accords aimed at ending the war, but tensions remained and hostilities resumed in earnest on 7 April 1994.

Up to 1993 the conflict mainly affected the north, and particularly the north-east of the country. Once the genocide started the conflict spread to the whole country from the north, through the capital Kigali, to the south. The south-west saw the last pockets of violence, where the Zone Turquoise was established. The north-west was affected particularly by rebel incursions in 1996 and the uprising in 1997. Border areas with the DRC, and Burundi to a lesser extent, have been affected by ongoing tensions.

13 Rwanda also purchased large shipments of arms from Egypt (Melvern 2000: 31).
3. War end / Peace process

(i)(ii)(iii) End of the war
A definitive end to the civil war came when the RPF ousted the interim government in mid June, took the main cities by early July, and installed the transitional Government of National Unity which was sworn in on 19 July 1994. This marked a turning point in the political development of Rwanda; there was no final ceasefire, peace agreement or external military involvement, but an outright victory by the RPF following three months of intense violence during which the genocide was underway (April to June). Nevertheless, conflict and violence continued for several years (cf. Section 1.B).

(iv)(v) Peace talks
Throughout the civil war attempts were made to reach a peace agreement. The first cease-fire was signed on 29 March 1991, with talks held in Dar-es Salaam under the aegis of the Organisation for African Unity and regional governments, notably Tanzania, with UN backing (Andersen 2000: 444). The peace process was inextricably linked with democratisation in Rwanda; the path to peace was seen as the creation of a broad-based transitional government, including all political parties and most importantly the RPF, to be followed by democratic elections. However, sporadic fighting meant that the peace process was frequently stalled and resumed over the following two years. In July 1992 the Arusha (Tanzania) peace talks began following a renewed ceasefire. Over the following year a series of protocols were negotiated: provisions on national unity, democracy, political pluralism, human rights (August 1992); power-sharing agreements (October 1992 and January 1993); repatriation of refugees (June 1993); integration of the two warring armies (August 1993). On 4 August 1993 the Arusha Accords incorporating these protocols were signed and a UN assistance mission was approved in October 1993. Several months of political wrangled ensued over the establishment of a transitional government with a view to multiparty elections. Although a transitional government and national assembly were officially formed in January 1994, the composition of their bodies was continually delayed and it never materialised.

External actors played an important role throughout the peace process. The main pressure came from regional leaders, notably Tanzania; early talks were also held in London, Paris, Brussels and Zaire. In April 2004 regional presidents summoned Habyarimana to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania to push for the implementation of the Arusha Accords (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 4). It was on the return from this trip that Habyarimana was assassinated. Donor countries also applied pressure for peace. For example, at the UN-sponsored Round Table conference in July 1992 international organisations and donors stated that aid for economic development would be dependent upon peace being restored (Voyame et al. 1996: 36). Uvin (1998: 95) referring to Adelman and Suhrke (1996) claims that without international involvement the peace process would not have advanced as fast as it did, and there may not have been a negotiated settlement at all. Prunier (2002: 186-190) considers that the signing of the Arusha Accords came about through exhaustion of all parties, despite the clear evidence of the fragility of the agreements. The outcome was a democratization process that threatened the powers-that-be:

The international community’s heavy pressure for a rapid peace-plus-democracy settlement in Arusha is considered by many to have been crucial in pushing part of the elite toward extremist solutions. As the negotiation process was the result of external pressure rather than internal realignments of power and interest, significant and powerful groups that would have lost from the negotiations set out to undermine the outcome. (Uvin 1998: 234-5)
However, external pressure was neither consistent nor particularly forceful. The peace process broke down completely when hostilities resumed in April 1994, although UN peacekeepers continued to attempt to bring the warring parties back to the table.

No peace talks were held after the genocide, although there was pressure from several countries for the new RPF-led government to negotiate with the former government based in eastern Zaire (see section 3).

(vi) Inclusion of relevant parties in the peace process
The Arusha Accords were negotiated between the Government of Rwanda on the one hand and the RPF on the other. It was signed by President Habyarimana and the Chairman of the RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe. However, the peace agreement was about more than just peace, it was also about establishing a power-sharing arrangement including all political parties in Rwanda. A fundamental issue, therefore, was whether all Rwanda’s new political groups felt that their interests were sufficiently represented at the talks.

From the outset there were serious obstacles to the success of the peace process. Firstly, the commitment of the Habyarimana regime was minimal. The president was set to lose considerable powers in the new arrangements, which would further impact upon the clique surrounding him. So even as the MRND was negotiating in Arusha, it was attempting to derail the process through massacres of Tutsi and political violence against the opposition, all aimed at exacerbating the ‘ethnic’ rather than political reading of the conflict. As discussions over demobilisation and disarmament were going on, militias were being trained and arms were continuing to flow into Rwanda. Hutu hardliners never accepted the peace negotiations and the CDR refused to participate, notably over the composition of the transitional government to include the RPF. Violence against Tutsi provoked retaliation by the RPF which in turn undermined support for the integration of the RPF and Tutsi refugees amongst more moderate Hutu political groups and provided fuel for ethnic propaganda. By 1993 Habyarimana was going along with the negotiations to satisfy his ‘old’ opponents, while trying to stall the process to satisfy his ‘new’ opponents amongst the extremists.

(vii) Impact of peace process on state reconstruction
As Prunier (2002: 192-193) observes, the transition government negotiated at Arusha was an “unworkable” structure relying on “goodwill, an element in short supply” and likely to result in “paralysis of the whole state... The result was that the whole carefully-balanced construction ended up being based on almost strict consensus between mutually hostile elements. Nobody seemed to have any idea of how it would work in practice.” The subsequent collapse of the ceasefire attests to the weaknesses of the peace process. Nevertheless, as outlined in Section 1, the Arusha Accords did provide the basis for the structure of the Government of National Unity, as well as for measures such as the integration of the armed forces, the creation of a new police force, the reintegration of refugees, the creation of national commissions for human rights and reconciliation, and the preparation of elections.

(viii)(ix)(x)Dominant party, charismatic leader and internal veto players
There was no real dominant party in the negotiations, nor was there a charismatic leader. The views of the general Rwandan population towards the peace process were ambiguous; there was a desire for peace but the RPF did not enjoy strong popular support. As noted above, there was considerable opposition to the peace process from Hutu hardliners, including within the president’s own close circle. As negotiations went on a stronger coalition emerged to
oppose the peace process, namely in the form of Hutu Power. The opposition was mainly against the inclusion of the RPF in a power-sharing government rather than to peace per se.

(xii) External veto players
France is the most notorious external power which played a significant role in the civil war. France put pressure on Habyarimana to open political space in the early 1990s; however, it also provided significant military support to Habyarimana during the civil war. A military cooperation pact had been signed between Rwanda and France in 1975, and France provided military advisors and troops in reaction to RPF offensives in 1990 and 1993. France is also considered to have issued false statements about RPF-initiated civilian massacres (Prunier 2002). The French rationale for this was to support a long-standing ally and sovereign government against an invading army, however, there were also deeper issues at play with regard to France’s position on the African continent in respect of its Anglophone rivals (see Hulianis 1998; Chossudovsky 2003).

(xii) Root causes addressed?
The peace process did seek to address most of the obvious root causes of the conflict: the integration of the RPF and opposition forces into Rwandan political life; and the return of refugees. What actors involved in the peace process failed to comprehend was the depth of hostility towards the negotiations amongst Hutu extremists, and less obviously, the deeply rooted socio-economic and socio-political dynamics within the wider Rwandan population which would enable the genocide to be planned and orchestrated (see Uvin 1998).

(xiii) Demilitarization, demobilisation, repatriation and reintegration
Specific protocols on demilitarization and demobilisation, as well as integration of the warring armies and creation of a single national police force were negotiated in the peace process. Likewise there were specific protocols on the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced peoples. These protocols were drawn upon in subsequent measures taken to tackle these issues by the post-1994 government.

(xiv) Losers
The agreement on the broad-based government negotiated in 1992 and 1993 laid down the split of government portfolios amongst the main political parties. Within this the main losers were the MRND which would have to give up significant power to the RPF and other parties. The extremist wing of the MRND and the CDR stood to lose the most in political terms if the peace agreement was implemented as they were not significant enough politically to be strongly represented (Prunier 2002: 173). The akazu also stood to lose from the democratisation process which would destroy patronage links and systems.

The genocide, followed by the RPF victory, completely changed the power dynamics in the country. Extremist parties were not only excluded from power but rendered illegal; other parties remained within the power-sharing government but were politically damaged by the violence. Those individuals who had participated in the genocide were subject to legal proceedings, with different legal arrangements made for trying different degrees of crime. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in Arusha to try those who had planned and orchestrated the genocide; lesser crimes are dealt with by the conventional court system in Rwanda and the gacaca tribunals.

(xv) Recurrence of violence
Following sporadic violence the peace process collapsed completely in April 1994. After the official end of the war in July 1994, there were ongoing clashes between the forces of the new and old governments (cf. Section 1.B).

(xvi) **Change in economic structure**

The already weak Rwandan economy was brought to its knees by the genocide. It took until 1998 for the IMF to consider Rwanda to have achieved macro-economic stabilisation and until 1999 for the real GDP of the country to return to its 1993 level. Although there have been significant macro-economic reforms since the end of the conflict, for example privatisation of state and parastatal bodies, there has not been a major change in the country’s economic basis. The long-term vision of the current government is for Rwanda to move away from its basis in subsistence agriculture to become a service-oriented economy. The new political elite, notably the returnee Tutsi, is probably the main winner of changes in the economy, for example fuelling the construction boom in Kigali. They are also considered to be the main winners from changes in land legislation since 2005 at the expense of the rural poor (see Ansoms and Holvoet 2007). The conflict led to an increase in Rwanda’s aid dependency, notably in the initial two years following the genocide (see table 2.1, page 18), although the increase in Rwanda’s aid dependency is also linked to changes in the international aid system and government strategies (see Section 4).
SECTION 3: External Variables – Military Intervention and Democracy Promotion

A. External Intervention

Throughout Rwanda’s civil war and post-conflict phase, numerous external actors sought to promote democracy and peace. 1993 marked the beginning of a concerted UN effort to become involved in Rwanda’s peace process. However, external pressure was tangible in Rwanda’s democratisation and peace process before 1993, and since 1998 it has taken new forms. These other types of intervention will be analysed in Sections 3.B and 4.

1. Parameters of the intervention

(i)(ii) Start of the intervention and state of the war

Our primary interest in this section is the role of the United Nations missions, which began in 1993 when the war had already been going for three years but when the signs of reaching a lasting peace were greatest. Four operations were undertaken:

- United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
- UNAMIR II
- Opération Turquoise

In March 1993, the UN Secretary General sent a ‘goodwill mission’ to Rwanda to examine the peace process and consider the possibility of deploying military observers along the Rwanda-Uganda border as requested by Rwanda and Uganda in February 1993. This marked the beginning of a concerted UN effort to become involved in Rwanda’s peace process which would result in the deployment of two missions, UNOMUR and UNAMIR. Prior to this the peace process had largely been sponsored by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Tanzanian government, with the OAU deploying the Neutral Military Observers Group in 1992 which originally involved just 50 troops, expanded to 120 in August 1993.

On 22 June 1993, UNOMUR was authorized for an initial period of six months. Its mandate was to report on the transit or transport of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border from Uganda into Rwanda; it was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border. The mission entered into force on 16 August 1993, reaching its authorized strength of 18 military observers by the end of September 1993. It was headed initially by Roméo Dallaire from Canada until he became head of the UNAMIR mission; his role was taken over by colonels from Zimbabwe then Bangladesh. UNOMUR did patrol and monitor the border areas, and was seen to bring some stability, although its full mandate was not carried out in light of the continuing conflict. It officially closed on 21 September 1994.

During the Arusha peace negotiations, the RPF insisted on the creation of a neutral international force to help implement the agreement. UNAMIR was sanctioned on 5 October 1993. With the collapse of the peace process in April 1994, the UNAMIR force was reduced to 270 men. On 17 May 1994 a renewed operation was authorized, UNAMIR II.

Opération Turquoise began as a unilateral initiative by France in mid-June 1994, a humanitarian mission aimed at protecting civilians. With other nations dithering about supporting UNAMIR II, it was the only concrete offer of international action in the face of the
genocide. France offered to turn this into a French-commanded multilateral initiative, and it received retrospective UN Security Council authorization and a Chapter VII mandate on 22 June 1994. It acted as an interim force until UNAMIR II was fully operational, creating a demilitarized zone and safe haven for civilians in the south-west of Rwanda. *Operation Turquoise* was launched on 23 June 1994. UNAMIR assumed responsibility for the *Zone Turquoise* in August 1994.

(iii) Mandate
The negotiating parties at Arusha called for the UN mission to assist in the maintenance of public security, the delivery of humanitarian aid, searches for weapons caches, the neutralization of armed bands, demining, the disarmament of civilians and the cessation of hostilities. It was also called upon to oversee the demobilization of the existing armed forces and the formation of a new national army and police force.

The mandate given to UNAMIR was to: assist with ensuring the security of Kigali; monitor cease-fire arrangements, including establishing a demilitarized zone and demobilisation; monitor the security situation in the run-up to elections; and assist with mine-clearing. It would also investigate allegations of non-compliance with provisions of the peace agreements, provide security for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and assist in the coordination of humanitarian relief operations. At the height of its operation, UNAMIR consisted of 2548 military personnel. A Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General was also assigned to Rwanda. The mandate given to UNAMIR consequently fell well short of the requests made by the warring parties, and was completely insufficient in light of the obstacles to the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The opposition of the USA, with Russian and British support, to creating a robust peacekeeping force in Rwanda led to the Arusha Accords being “gutted” (Melvern 2000: 80).

UNAMIR II foresaw 5500 troops. Its mandate covered the security and protection of internally displaced people, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including the creation of safe havens, and the monitoring of borders. It did not envisage enforcement actions but did allow for action to be taken in self-defence against people threatening protected sites or delivery of humanitarian relief. An arms embargo against the government of Rwanda was also agreed, and a report was requested into the killings of civilians.

Unlike UNAMIR, *Operation Turquoise* was given a Chapter VII mandate, i.e. it was authorized to use force to achieve its humanitarian objectives.

(iv) Leadership
UNAMIR was headed by a general from Canada, Roméo Dallaire. He was replaced by another Canadian in August 1994.

(v) The push for intervention?
International support for UNAMIR was limited from the outset. France first suggested the idea in March 1993; the UK and USA argued that the UN was already overstretched. The vote on the provision of peacekeepers to Rwanda occurred two days after American troops were killed in Somalia. There was more support from other Security Council members, such as Nigeria. UNAMIR was therefore a compromise mission, small and cheap (Melvern 2000: 77-79). Belgium went from being supportive of action to advocating a withdrawal after ten of the country’s troops were killed, on the grounds that there was no longer a peace for the peacekeeping force to keep. According to Melvern (2000, 2004), the permanent members of the
UN Security Council and Secretariat kept information about the true extent of the crisis in Rwanda quiet; many reports from Dallaire about the impending genocide were hushed up. The presence of Rwanda as a non-permanent member at the time added to the flows of misinformation.

Rwanda was fundamentally a low priority for the international community until the real extent of the genocide became unavoidable. Subsequently, international interest in Rwanda grew exponentially. The period following the end of the conflict saw a completely different type of international intervention, namely massive inflows of aid to deal with the emergency and to fund reconstruction (see Section 4).

There was unease in the Security Council about Opération Turquoise, namely the real objectives of the French given their implication in the conflict on the side of the Habyarimana regime. Several countries abstained from the vote: Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan. The US supported the French plan, along with several Francophone African states. There was also opposition from the RPF, which did however avoid confrontation with French troops, as well as with the UNAMIR commander.

(vi)(vii) Capacities and coordination
From the outset UNAMIR was doomed to failure. The negotiators at Arusha were aware that the successful transition to democracy in Rwanda depended upon the speedy deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force, especially in light of weak commitment by most of the concerned parties to the peace process. Yet, UNAMIR had neither the military capacity nor the political backing to carry out its mandate, which of itself was inadequate to the task. There was neither a human rights cell nor an intelligence unit, and UNAMIR was given no authorization to disarm militias. It was only given 2548 troops, and four months after forces began arriving in Kigali – the first only arriving in November 1993 - only 1260 had been deployed and much of the promised equipment, including helicopters and most armoured personnel carriers, never arrived. Many of the troops had neither the relevant training nor equipment.

When hostilities were renewed in April 1994 the UNAMIR mission hit a crisis. Belgian troops were withdrawn after the death at the hands of extremists of ten soldiers who had been protecting the moderate Hutu Prime Minister.

The implementation of UNAMIR II was hampered by bureaucratic negotiations for troops, equipment and funding. By the time it was executed, the genocide was nearly completed and the RPF had secured its victory over the interim government. UNAMIR II troops arrived at the end of July 1994, with its mandate extended to 8 March 1996 but by then the presence was a mere 1400 troops and its mandate was reduced to monitoring and facilitating the return of refugees from neighbouring countries.

(viii) Objectives
UNAMIR’s objectives were to monitor the ceasefire as well as the establishment of the transitional government and subsequent elections; hence, it had a clear goal of helping to establish a democratic regime. In addition, UNAMIR had humanitarian objectives, namely assisting with the supply of humanitarian aid and providing security for refugees and displaced persons.

(ix) Exit strategy
UNAMIR was initially established for six months; its mandate was set to end following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, which were scheduled to take place by October 1995 and no later than December 1995. Between January and April 1994 pressure was mounted to keep the peace process on track, with threats of withdrawing the UN operation if progress in implementing the transitional government was not achieved. On 5 April 1994 the mandate was extended for a further four months with a review scheduled after six weeks.

UNAMIR’s mandate was renewed on 17 May 1994 (UNAMIR II). The mission was foreseen to last six months with at least another six months anticipated. It lasted until 8 March 1996 when the Rwandan government turned down a request for an extension.

2. Election monitoring

With the first elections since political liberalisation held only in 1999, international election monitoring did not occur during the first five years after the start of the intervention. However, during the civil war, international human rights groups became increasingly concerned about violence against civilians and several reports were published; there was also observation of political trials (Piron and McKay 2004). A major report was submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission in April 1993, which impacted upon donor relations with Rwanda (see section 3.B).

Following the genocide, local and national human rights groups kept a close watch on abuses in Rwanda, including those committed by the new regime. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (UNHRFOR) was created at the end of 1994 to monitor the human rights situation, provide technical support for the justice sector, legal reform and institution building, and contribute to the promotion of and education about human rights. The mission was suspended in May 1998 by the new government which considered it to be intrusive and its mandate was not renewed. Kimonyo et al. (2004: 48) consider that the presence of UNHRFOR did limit human rights violations, such as killings, arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, especially during 1996 and 1997. UNHRFOR was replaced with a Special Representative of the High Commission for Human Rights from 1998 to March 2000 which reported to the UN Secretary General on the human rights situation and supported the establishment of Rwanda’s National Human Rights Commission.

During the elections of 2001 and 2003, international election monitors from across Africa and the European Union observed the elections. Monitors held conflicting opinions on the conduct and outcome of the elections, with the overall results considered to be more or less accurate but highlighting some irregularities (see EU 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Kombo 2003). More recently, Rwanda became the first country to submit itself to peer review under the African Peer Review Mechanism, with a report published in 2006 (APRM 2006).

Apart from the April 1993 UN report, many of the reports on human rights abuses prior to the genocide went unheeded, a taster of international indifference to the genocide. After 1994, the new regime was subject to considerable, and arguably unfair, scrutiny from the outside world in comparison to the pre-genocide regime. The RPF-led government is highly defensive when criticized by external observers, and human rights groups (local and international), academics

and on occasion donor agencies have been subjected to stinging attacks for criticizing the regime.

3. Military aspects of the intervention

(i) Troops
Troops were provided by Belgium, Ghana, Bangladesh and Tunisia. France had initially offered troops but the RPF was opposed to this. The Belgian contingent constituted the trained core. By April 1994 military personnel stood at 2165 with 321 military observers; following the withdrawal of the Belgians in April there were 1515 troops and 190 observers.

(ii) Personnel
Authorized personnel for various stages of the UNAMIR mission were as follows (note that these are authorized figures; the actual numbers on the ground differ considerably):15
- 5 October 1993 to 20 April 1994: 2548 military (2217 formed troops and 331 military observers); 60 civilian police; international and locally recruited civilian staff.
- 21 April 1994 to 16 May 1994: 270 military; international and locally recruited civilian staff.
- 17 Mary 1994 to 8 June 1995: 5500 military (5200 troops and military support personnel and 320 military observers); 90 civilian police (increased to 120 in February 1995); international and locally recruited civilian staff.
- 9 June 1995 to 8 September 1995: 2330 military; 320 military observers; 120 civilian police; international and locally recruited civilian staff.
- 9 September 1995 to 11 December 1995: 1800 military, 320 military observers; 120 civilian police; international and locally recruited civilian staff.
- 12 December 1995 to 8 March 1996: 1200 military; 20 0 military observers; international and locally recruited civilian staff.
Personnel came from around 40 countries.

(iii) Resources
The total expenditure of UNAMIR (I and II) was US$453.9 million. In 1994 the approximate cost of UNAMIR (including costs related to UNOMUR) was US$197.5 million.

(iv) Coordination
There were difficulties in getting nations to commit troops, particularly from developed countries. Coordination in terms of arrival of troops, equipment and funding was also problematic. Once the mission was in place, it appears that coordination on the ground was reasonable. However, once the conflict erupted again in April 1994, the force commander faced difficulties, for example from the Bangladeshi contingent which did not carry out allotted tasks. There were also problems at management level between Dallaire and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (see Dallaire 2003).

(v) Mandate
As indicated above, UNAMIR’s mandate under Chapter VI was woefully inadequate, particularly as the situation deteriorated. The mission was only authorized as a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement, operation; it was based on the assumption that both sides were committed to the Arusha Accords. There was no support in the UN Security Council to

change the mandate. Rather than being given a stronger mandate to protect civilians and halt the genocide, the operation was scaled back. It was only when the true extent of the genocide became an international scandal that the mandate was renewed by which time much of the killing was already over.

(vi) Coercive capacity
UNAMIR never posed a credible threat to the warring parties, the militia or the Hutu extremists. Under its chapter VI mandate, UNAMIR troops had no authorisation to use force. Pleas for more troops and an extension of the mandate in light of reports of violence, distribution of arms, warnings of genocide and a plan to kill Belgian troops to force the withdrawal of UNAMIR were ignored and decisions stalled. Troops (French) were sent in during the genocide, but their mission was to evacuate foreign nationals. Various countries, including the USA, UK and China, carefully avoided using the term ‘genocide’ in order to avoid international responsibilities under the Geneva Convention. The description of events as ‘tribal’ and ‘chaotic’ by journalists helped to present the situation as uncontrolled and uncontrollable (see Pottier 2002).

(vii) Concrete measures
In the early phases, UNAMIR did succeed in implementing its mandate. A weapons-secure area was established in Kigali by December 1993 and strong efforts were made to keep the peace and democratisation process on track despite clear indications that things were going wrong by early 1994. The resumption of the war and the genocide demonstrate, however, the extent to which UNAMIR I was totally incapable of carrying out its mandate with regard to assisting the establishment of a transitional government with a view to elections. The withdrawal of the Belgian troops seriously depleted UNAMIR’s capacities. When the troops were reduced to 270 following a UN resolution on 21 April 1994, the mandate was also revised. UNAMIR was reduced to concentrating on negotiating a truce between the warring parties, securing a cease-fire, protecting civilians to the extent that it could, and providing humanitarian assistance. It did continue to try to bring about a ceasefire, however, acting as an intermediary between the two sides. After the start of the genocide, the RPF refused to deal directly or indirectly with the Rwandan interim government. The Arusha peace agreement remained the basic framework for negotiations but both sides insisted that the recurrence of violence would require renegotiation of certain aspects.

UNAMIR, even in its severely weakened state after April 1994, has been credited with saving around 35,000 lives by protecting several safe havens. The presence of the UN force was a mixed blessing, however. Before the real extent of the threat to Tutsi became clear a great deal of faith was placed in the UN to protect civilians. Dallaire considered that with 5000 well-equipped troops the genocide could have been halted altogether.

Under UNAMIR II, the main activity carried out was assisting with humanitarian relief operations, although the civilian police component worked closely with the new government after July 1994 to help establish the new civilian police force.

4. Intrusiveness

The UNAMIR mission was a peacekeeping operation; it did not assume any legal or political powers and there was no suspension of Rwanda’s sovereignty. A small civilian police unit
was deployed in various locations around the country under UNAMIR, working alongside the National Gendarmerie, to assist with maintaining public security.

In the post-conflict period, there was never any formal assumption of power by external actors. However, as mentioned in Section 1.C, since 1994 external actors have played a very considerable role in the functioning of the government and economy. Rwanda’s dependency on external aid and technical assistance means that donor agencies are actively engaged in many aspects of policy-formulation in the country, with foreign advisors placed at very high levels within the state apparatus. At an even more inconspicuous level, through their control over funding, donors have played a strong role in determining which government priorities are implemented (see Section 4).

B. Diplomacy, normative pressure and persuasion

In addition to the various UN operations aimed at bringing about peace and supporting democratisation in Rwanda, other types of external involvement can be observed of a direct (diplomacy) and indirect (aid conditionality) nature. The deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation came at a relatively late stage in Rwanda’s civil war. International involvement with a specific democracy-promotion angle can be observed from at least 1990, when donors began applying pressure for democratisation right across Africa, complementing internal demands for political change.

When the civil war broke out in 1990, Rwanda had just agreed a structural adjustment programme (SAP) with the World Bank to deal with the economic crisis, which several bilateral donors supported (cf. Section 2.A). Given the context of political liberalisation at the time and the start of the civil war, this aid began to be subject to conditionality, notably progress with and implementation of the peace negotiations and the Arusha Accords. The period 1990-1993 saw a ‘carrot’-style approach, with several donors providing neutral places for negotiations and meetings, mediators and observers; and providing more aid to encourage the regime to stay committed to the peace process.

Uvin claims that of all donors the USA “acted most forcefully” (1998: 90). It cut aid in 1992 citing human rights violations, although the amount was still over historic trends; in 1993 it increased humanitarian aid through US NGOs and the World Food Programme. After the March 1993 ceasefire it announced it would bring aid back up to 1991 levels conditioned upon the ‘satisfactory handling of public affairs and continuance of democratization’. More of a ‘stick’ approach emerged in 1993, following the publication of a UN report on human rights abuses, when Uvin describes a “brief episode of serious pressure on the Rwandan government to change its ways” (Uvin 1998: 82). Belgium and Germany threatened to cut aid unless the human rights situation improved, but this was never executed. Belgium and Switzerland briefly recalled their ambassadors. Switzerland “expressed displeasure” (Uvin 1998: 91) but did not change aid allocations, although it only approved annual plans from 1990; Canada announced that it would drastically reduce aid which did happen but it was justified by general cuts; the Netherlands drew back; and Austria reduced its activities. The World Bank refused to give more funds until an established government was set up to negotiate commitments, and the European Parliament condemned the violence. The storm then died down and no more pressure was placed on the Rwandan government. Arguments against conditionality were that “alienating the government undoubtedly could have hampered the peace negotiations in Arusha, which were sponsored by the same Western countries that were Rwanda’s most important donors” (Uvin 1998: 91). It was also felt that cutting aid would
have harmed the majority of the population, thereby damaging the chances of democracy taking root. Around this time there was some new support for human rights organisations and a few conflict-resolution seminars. The USA and Switzerland added new ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society-strengthening’ projects in 1992/93.

However, there were also inconsistencies in donor behaviour. Several donors provided military assistance during the civil war, notably the USA ($200,000), Belgium (which gave military assistance up to 1994, although it stopped providing lethal weapons in 1991 and the budget dropped from an annual €4 million between 1990 and 1993 to €2 million in 1994), and notably France. Rwanda’s military expenditure was also increasing, at a time when public expenditure should have been under tight external scrutiny due to the SAP. There is evidence to suggest that programme aid was being used for military ends (Melvern 2000: 33). Switzerland was relatively vocal, yet continued to provide a high-level presidential advisor.

The other major inconsistency was pressure to end the civil war set against a general unwillingness to authorize an effective peacekeeping operation.

Overall, as Uvin (1998) observes, the reaction of the international community to civil war, ethnic polarization, human rights abuses and militarization was ‘business as usual’. There seems to be agreement that international pressure to implement the Arusha Accords did have some effect (Uvin 1998; des Forges 1999; Andersen 2000). For Uvin (1998: 99) this was “not surprising, given that the Rwandan regime depended entirely on international aid for its survival.” However, the fluctuations in aid are also considered to have caused deep discord, further weakened Habyarimana and increased the power of the extremists (Andersen 2000). While the international community was aware of the deteriorating situation in 1994, few imagined that the genocide could or would actually happen. It was easy to see the increasing violence as ‘normal’ political violence which would be halted once “peace-cum-democracy” negotiations at Arusha were concluded (Uvin 1998: 85). Voyame et al. (1996: 140) consider that the international community placed too much faith in the Arusha process when the attitude of the participants was at best ambiguous. By the time it was clear the genocide might happen it was late 1993/early 1994 and policy measures would not have worked. Once the genocide started only prompt military action was going to stop the killings, and there was no international commitment to do this.

The genocide marked a real rupture in diplomatic relations and pressures on the new regime regarding democratisation after 1994 are quite distinct from earlier efforts. Initially such pressures were overshadowed on the one hand by the emergency needs of Rwanda, and on the other by the legacy of the conflict which put the international community in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the new government. As far as the RPF was concerned, by its failure to prevent or stop the genocide and its provision of aid to camps where the guilty were fed alongside the innocent – in quantities which dwarfed aid to Rwanda itself – the international community had lost its ‘right to criticize’ the new regime. Nevertheless, democracy was an issue of concern. The main forums at which such concerns were publicly expressed were the UN-sponsored Round Table conferences (RTC) held in 1995 and 1996, and subsequent annual partnership talks between government and donors. While some donors concerned themselves merely with expressing support and solidarity with the new Rwandan regime, other donors, such as France, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany outlined areas in which they wanted to see progress, notably refugee return and justice. Some were more

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16 The most notorious was the exponential rise in imports of machetes as ‘agricultural’ equipment. Machetes were the prime weapons used in the genocide.
explicit. For example at the RTC of January 1995, Germany made a direct link between aid and progress on democracy and human rights; France and Belgium expressed a desire for a national dialogue amongst political groups, including the former regime. There is no evidence to suggest that the government adopted particular strategies regarding democracy because of such pressure, but in its own statements at such gatherings, the government was always keen to stress its democratic credentials and address donor concerns (see Hayman 2006).

After 1998, there has been greater diplomatic pressure regarding democratisation. Observer missions have been critical of election processes and some election funding was withheld or delayed during the 2003 elections (see Section 4). Donors have also been more critical of the government’s regional agenda. The strongest overt diplomatic pressure on the government perhaps came when Rwanda became embroiled in the war in the DRC between 1998 and 2002; there the pressure was more about Rwanda’s role in regional peace and security than specifically about democratisation in Rwanda.

C. Interaction between internal and external actors

(i) Preferences of interveners
The overarching aims of the interveners, taking the long view from 1990 to the present day, have been dual: ensuring peace and stability in Rwanda, and establishing a liberal democracy. Over the years, different aspects have taken greater precedence. Between 1990 and 1993 the civil war was low-key. The goals of peace and democracy were closely interwoven and it was (wrongly) anticipated that Rwanda was on track with both elements. A poor grasp of the internal political dynamics, notably political extremism, rendered the dual goals over-ambitious. In 1994, ending the conflict became more important, although international efforts to do so were inadequate. The objectives of establishing the rule of law, state capacity, human rights and security took precedence after 1994, and it was not until about 2000, and notably the run-up to the 2003 elections, that external actors became more vocal about democratic liberalisation.

While this represents the overall picture of external preferences, differences can be observed which often led to contradictions and inconsistencies. For example, France’s preferences in its support of the Habyarimana regime were ambiguous; it was calling for democratisation across Africa more generally, yet was willing to protect and aid a regime that was practising exclusionary politics. Key members of the UN Security Council expressed the desire for peace and democracy yet undermined the capacity of the UN mission. After 1994, there were discernible differences amongst donor countries, primarily over the nature of the RPF and its intentions. This led to donors adopting different attitudes towards aid, conditionality and diplomatic pressure. The positions of donors were wrapped up in their individual histories in the country, their priorities and their domestic environments. For example, the UK, with no history in the country, was supportive of the RPF to enable state stability, taking the stance that if someone did not support Rwanda then further conflict was inevitable. Belgium, tied up in a controversial and long history in Rwanda, was very cautious about the new regime and was more demanding on governance and democracy (Hayman 2006).

(ii)(iii) Preferences of Rwandan elites
Before 1994, the stated objective of both state and non-state elite groups in Rwanda was establishing peace and democracy. The real objectives of different elites are much more ambiguous. Habyarimana embarked on the democratisation and peace processes under duress;
it can be surmised that his preference was to retain as much political power as possible in a process which ultimately was going to erode his full control over the country. Other political groupings within the Rwandan government at the time were seeking to gain as much political power for themselves as possible. The same can be said of the RPF. It cannot be assumed that there was a unity of purpose within these different groupings. The new political parties, and the RPF, had the most to gain from the peace/democratisation process in terms of access to political power. Over time the preferences of all these groups fluctuated. The true aspirations of the RPF are also ambiguous. While involvement in the Arusha peace process gave them a seat at the political table in Rwanda, the outright victory that they went on to secure when the peace process broke down ultimately gave them dominance over Rwandan political life.

After 1994, the parameters and objectives changed. Consolidating the peace, bringing internal stability and security, and embarking on reconstruction and development programmes became the primary objectives of the new state elite (the RPF and other political groups in government). Within this there were objectives for both the nation, and for individuals, including personal safety and economic security. However, as outlined in Section 1, cleavages emerged amongst the new state elite after 1994 over issues such as power distribution, democracy and justice. After 1994 the old state elite became an externally-based opposition movement, whose primary objective was to try and unsettle the new regime and to regain power in Rwanda.

(iv) Constraints for interveners
As noted in Section 3.A, the UN missions were constrained from the outset by a weak mandate, weak political support and insufficient resources. Since 1994, external actors have been constrained by collective guilt over the genocide which limits their leverage over the regime, and by differences amongst them in terms of strategic and developmental objectives as well as their individual relations with the new regime. Some, notably those who are supportive of the government’s agenda, who provide budget support and who have strong diplomatic influence (e.g. the UK and USA) have more leverage than others. The moral imperative to act in Rwanda is stronger than strategic imperatives, so there are limited constraints in political terms at domestic levels.

(v) Constraints for elites vis-à-vis interveners
Leading up to the intervention and prior to the genocide the state elite needed to secure external financial and diplomatic support to try to end the economic and political crisis. The peripheral elites (in this case the RPF and political opposition groups) needed to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process in order to sustain their credibility in the eyes of external actors. Once the UN mission arrived, both sides did at least appear to cooperate, demonstrating that maintaining external credibility remained important. After 1994, the new regime was constrained by the need for external financial and technical assistance, which partly explains the nature of its social, political and economic policies. The engagement with international norms for development and governance are partly determined by the need for international credibility and resources. Peripheral elites within Rwanda are more or less co-opted into the government; other opposition groups outside the country have limited interaction with external actors.

(vi) Bargaining between interveners and state elites
The Arusha peace agreement and the UN peacekeeping mission represented a compromise, brokered by external actors. It therefore represented a case of internal and external actors agreeing mutually acceptable terms. However, the compromise made by state elites was
undermined by factions with the state elite, notably the extremists. The extremists used the façade of adhering to the peace process while planning the genocide. So referring to Zuercher and Barnett (2006), this can be considered a case of ‘captured peace-building’. However, there were also elements of ‘conflictive peace-building’ with both state and peripheral elites (RPF) threatening to renew hostilities to achieve their own ends. The extremists did use force to weaken the UN mission, notably murdering ten Belgian paratroopers, which was calculated to bring about the withdrawal of the mission. The threat of force from international actors was always very weak, so the interveners had very limited bargaining power.

After the RPF-victory in 1994, bargaining power lay more with the RPF, although it was constrained by the need for external support. The nature of the intervention changed at this point, becoming more of an ongoing presence to help with the clean-up operation than a mission to bring warring parties together. More pertinent at this stage was international diplomatic and financial pressure, framed by international guilt, which meant that a compromise was reached. External actors (on the whole, although with exceptions) accepted RPF security priorities, the adaptation of the peace agreement and the timetable regarding democracy; the RPF for its part more or less adhered to its commitments within the Arusha Accords. This can be considered an example of ‘co-opted peace-building’ where the state elite (the new RPF-led regime) and the peace-builders (the UN plus other donors) negotiated a programme which reflected external and internal interests.

Since 1998 external actors have exerted more diplomatic and financial pressure with regard to democratisation but they have still more or less accepted the status quo. Rwanda is seen as going in the ‘right direction’ developmentally so supporting the regime enables donors to work towards their own social and economic development goals, an agenda which became more important from the end of the 1990s. Although Rwanda is not considered to be ideal with regards to democracy, it is still considered to be going in the ‘right direction’. Hence, external actors have accepted the type of ‘developmental’ state that Rwanda represents in the hope that this will bring about a more liberal state.

(vii) Veto players
Throughout the peace process there were spoilers at work within Rwanda, notably the extremist political parties who stood to lose the most. The signing of the Arusha Accords and the advent of the UN mission rendered them more determined. The fact that the extremists were at the heart of Habyarimana’s regime gave them great power, demonstrated by their ability to plan and carry out the genocide even as an international peacekeeping force was being deployed. Their strength also came from the weakness of the mission and international indifference.

Since the RPF victory, veto players (both armed extremists and political opponents) have largely been based outside Rwanda, from where they continue to put military and political pressure on the new regime. Their power is limited, however. The new regime is strong politically and militarily, and has the support of the international community, which limits the possibilities of veto players derailing the current status quo. Within the country, there is arguably a small group at the heart of the regime which has limited interest in establishing an egalitarian, democratic society (see Reyntjens 2004; DFID 2004: 6).

(viii) Change agents
During the peace process the new political parties formed in the early 1990s had the most to win from the peace and democratisation process, representing ‘change agents’ in the domestic
system. They were drawn from academic and business communities, but also moderate members of the regime seeking change. Their official power was greater than the veto players, as these groups had a place within the government and at the negotiating table. However, as the conflict went on the extremists became more powerful with their use of violence and popular manipulation via the media.

Since 1994, change agents could be considered to be more moderate members of government and administration genuinely working for a more inclusive, developmental society. Such people exist throughout the administrative apparatus. Informants implied that not all the political elite are pushing for change, that a lot of the demand is coming from the general populace, as well as from civil society and the emerging business community. Donors claim that it is these groups that they are seeking to support, for example the UK Country Assistance Plan for Rwanda of 2004 stresses its support for Rwanda’s ‘drivers of change’ and ‘champions of change’ (DFID 2004: 2, 6). Such ‘change agents’ have a strong voice, although vocal political opposition to the ruling elite tends to be repressed (cf. Section 1).

(ix) Costs of adaptation
The ‘costs of adaptation’ to democratisation were high for the pre-1994 regime in terms of loss of political power; the extremists would have lost their avenue to power almost completely.

Since 1994, RPF has controlled political space and only allowed a gradual, and controlled, democratic process to develop on their terms and in such as way as to not threaten their power or national stability and security. In light of this, full compliance with external demands about democratisation earlier could have had high costs for the RPF which has had to win support amongst a potentially hostile local population. Likewise resistance to external demands for RPF soldiers to be prosecuted for crimes committed during the genocide reflects what could be a high cost.

D. Linkage, integration, convergence

(i)(ii) Neighbourhood / Democratic linkage and spill-over effects
Rwanda’s attempts at democratisation in the early 1990s, its civil war, and more recent democratic processes have been inherently linked with political circumstances throughout the Great Lakes region, and notably regional political instability. Rwanda’s immediate neighbours are Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo; of these Tanzania has long been the most stable. Events in Uganda, Burundi and the DRC have had a strong influence upon democratic processes in Rwanda (cf. Section B.1(iii)). Uganda’s civil war ended in 1986 when Museveni took power; a ‘no-party’ democracy was installed in a bid to keep ethnic-based politics at bay. Many of Rwanda’s current ruling elite were highly involved in Museveni’s National Resistance Movement and arguably have been influenced by Museveni’s brand of democracy. In 2005 Uganda held its first multiparty democratic elections, with controversial results. There have been tensions between Uganda and Rwanda, particularly when both countries had troops in the DRC between 1998 and 2002, with open hostilities between the two sides at times. When political space in Rwanda began to be opened in the early 1990s, Burundi was going through a similar process. Its first democratic elections were held in 1993, leading to its own ethnic-based civil war (see Lemarchand 1994, 1996) with knock-on effects in Rwanda. A transition process began in 2001 with elections held in
2005. Until 1997 Zaire was ruled by the despotic Mobutu; in 1997 Rwandan troops helped a rebel movement to overthrow Mobutu. The DRC’s first democratic elections were held in 2006. So Rwanda sits within a volatile region with regard to democracy.

Beyond the immediate neighbourhood, the restructuring of the state since 1994, including security reforms, judicial reforms and constitutional reforms, has involved civil servants and politicians drawing on examples and experiences of a wide range of African and western countries. While there is no explicit attempt to model itself on Asia’s developmental states, the current system does reflect aspects of the benevolent authoritarian regimes of those states.

(iii) Political and diplomatic linkage
Before 1994, Rwanda’s main foreign allies in political and security terms were France and Belgium, which provided development aid, political support and military assistance. During the civil war, Rwanda also received military support from Mobutu’s Zaire. After 1994, Rwanda’s strongest security and political ties have been with the USA and the UK. The shift from Francophone to Anglophone alliances has been influenced by the fact that many of the new ruling elite grew up in Anglophone countries and in east Africa; but also by the discrediting of France due to its ties with the Habyarimana regime. Relations with France in particular have been very strained, and diplomatic relations were broken off in 2006. In recent years Rwanda has joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), which includes an agreement on political pluralism; it is also a very active member within the African Union (including sending peacekeeping troops to Darfur in 2004), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism. The latter is important in terms of democratisation, as member states subject themselves to a voluntary review of governance structures. Rwanda was one of the first countries to volunteer. The report, published in 2006, was not without criticism of the Rwandan government (see APRM 2006; Jordaan 2006).

(iv) Economic linkage
In 1993, prior to the UN intervention, Rwanda’s main trading partners were Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Uganda, the USA, UK, Kenya, Uganda and Japan (CIA 1993). It received aid from a wide range of bilateral partners, including France, Belgium, Germany, USA, Switzerland, Canada and Japan; and it was a recipient of structural assistance from the World Bank and the European Commission. In 2000, its main trading partners were Brazil, Germany, Belgium, Pakistan, Spain, Kenya, Tanzania, USA, and France (CIA 2000). Officially recorded remittances and investment from the Diaspora are increasing in importance, from US$7 million in 2000 to around US$21 million in 2006 which represented just around 0.9% of GDP (Ratha and Xu 2006); the figure is considered to be considerably higher, around US$80 million in 2008 according to one source.

(v) Socio-cultural linkage
Democratic norms were not embedded within Rwandan society when political liberalisation began and arguably are not embedded today in the western liberal sense (cf. Section 1.A). New parties formed in the early 1990s did not so much represent different political ideologies or aspirations of the people, but the geographic, ethnic and economic interests of different elite groups. It can be assumed that those demanding political change were influenced by the

17 In contrast to Rwanda, Burundi has sought to overcome its ethnic divisions by creating an overt ethnic quota system for political institutions and positions. A couple of informants stressed that this sort of system would negate the type of inclusive, undiscriminating system Rwanda was trying to create.

18 http://allafrica.com/stories/200808260183.html
‘wave of democracy’ (Huntington 1991) affecting many African countries at the time and that external demands for democracy could help attain their goals.

**(vi) Technological/communication linkage**
Before 1994 the main form of communication within the country was the radio. Newspapers had a very limited circulation, and literacy was low. Rwanda’s first national television station was established in 1992. With political liberalisation came liberalisation of the media in the early 1990s. This had negative as well as positive consequences, most notably the manipulation of the general population through ‘hate’ media (see Kayumba and Kimonyo 2006). Rwanda today is much more connected to the outside world. Internet coverage is increasing; likewise mobile phone networks. A reasonable number of newspapers are in circulation in Kinyarwanda, French and English although readership outside urban areas is low. New television and radio stations have been authorised.

**(vii) Civil society linkage**
Since independence, there have been strong ties between Rwandan civil society and international aid agencies in relation to development activities, especially through church groups. The 1990s saw the establishment of more political civil society organisations, including on human rights issues. There were a huge number of international NGOs active in Rwanda prior to and during the civil war; this number increased exponentially after the genocide. Many civil society groups, including church leaders, were accused of collaborating in the genocide, which led to a loss of confidence in civil society. The relationship of the post-1994 government with civil society is ambiguous, with both cooptation and confrontation evident, such as the expulsion of a number of international NGOs in 1995 (Baaré et al. 1999: 14). Since 1994 more political civil society groups have formed, tackling advocacy, justice, gender and human rights issues, although these often clash with the government which does attempt to control NGO activity (see section 1).

**(viii) Integration**
At the time of the peace process, Rwanda was a member of a wide range of international and regional organisations, including UN bodies, international financial institutions, the Organisation of African Unity and regional trade groups, such as the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). At the time of the genocide, Rwanda occupied a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

**E. International Context**

Rwanda represented a typical African crisis state of the late 1980s/early 1990s. The government was faced with internal economic crisis, the consequence of external economic factors and poor economic management, corruption and nepotism. The weakening grasp of the government on the country enabled demands for political change to emerge internally, influenced by the ‘wave of democracy’ spreading across Africa in the wake of the Cold War. External actors were part and parcel of this dynamic, with Rwanda’s key allies, and notably France, promoting political liberalisation. The civil war broke out in this atmosphere, in part enabled by this situation. Likewise, the peace process was tied up in this international agenda for democracy, respect for human rights, and good political governance. Hence, the new interest in democracy in the early 1990s was an inherent element of both Rwanda’s conflict and attempts to resolve that conflict. At the same time, there was limited real depth to international development programmes in the early 1990s with regard to conflict resolution, human rights and democracy. Prior to 1994 there were scarcely any serious projects or
activities being run by donors that would have had any real impact. It was only later in the 1990s that the ‘governance’ concept was transformed into tangible activities. Consequently, there was a call for democracy but little aid to support it.

The external intervention to support Rwanda’s peace process was also a victim of a particular era. The new enthusiasm for the UN as a nation-builder and peace-enforcer in the very early 1990s quickly waned. Calls for intervention in Rwanda were severely hampered by the reluctance of the Security Council to engage. This reflected arguments that the UN was overstretched already, but also the legacy of the failed US and UN mission in Somalia in 1993 (Melvern 2000: 74-79). International attention was focused elsewhere: the post-apartheid elections in South Africa in 1994 dominated media coverage on Africa; European attention was focused on the Balkans. Rwanda’s conflict, particularly the genocide, was seen as just another tribal war in a failed (small and insignificant) African state (see Pottier 2002). This was also a period when new dynamics in terms of extreme violence towards civilians during the increasing number of internal wars in Africa were evident; there was little understanding of the varied nature of these wars and little enthusiasm to be drawn in (Allen 1999). The period up to the mid-1990s was also one where overall aid volumes to Africa were falling, a consequence of aid fatigue and alternative recipients, notably in Central and Eastern Europe (see Riddell 1999).

The post-1994 period in Rwanda reflects international guilt at the failure of the world to prevent the genocide, as well as wider shifts in international objectives for aid. By the mid-1990s, the governance agenda was becoming embedded and by the late 1990s the poverty reduction agenda had emerged which would lead to the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. Political governance, including democracy, was considered central to bringing about development leading to a greater interest on the part of external actors to engage in democracy-promotion activities in a broad sense (see Section 4). At the same time, the desire to ‘get things done’ with regard to poverty-related goals often means that political governance is given less attention than other social development activities.

Rwanda’s democratic profile today also reflects similar situations in other African states in the 1990s and 2000s. The regime in Rwanda displays characteristics evident in other ‘post-liberation’ states in Africa, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Africa, with strong, centralised presidential systems with limited corruption. Once hailed as potential bright new stars, the governments which emerged from guerrilla movements have often struggled to make the transition to democratic states, impeded by ideologies, hierarchies and systems of government, as well as external and internal links which were developed in the bush (Dorman 2006). As Dorman goes on to observe, “when confronted with conditions of political crisis or vulnerability, leaders’ concerns with control take precedence over either liberation or democracy, leading to increasing authoritarian and exclusivist politics” (idem: 1086).

19 In the mid to late 1990s, several leaders, including Kagame of Rwanda, but also the presidents of Eritrea, Ethiopia, DRC and Uganda, were considered to constitute a new breed of leader in Africa with potential to bring about democracy (Allen 1995; Ottoway 1999).
SECTION 4: Development Aid and Democracy Promotion

A. Aid and Democracy Assistance after the war

1. Aid in General

(i) Most important donors
Table 4.1 gives an overview of Rwanda’s main donors between 1989 and 2003. Prior to 1994, the main donors were the World Bank, UN agencies dealing with humanitarian issues, the European Commission, Germany, France, Belgium, USA, Japan and Canada. During the emergency and immediate post-conflict period (1994), bilateral programmes were suspended and most aid was channelled through United Nations agencies or international NGOs. After the main emergency period was over, by 1997, the role of the UN agencies diminished.

An interesting aspect of aid to Rwanda is how the donor profile has changed significantly from the pre-war to post-war situation. By the late 1990s, Rwanda’s ‘traditional’ partners were being eclipsed by the rise of ‘new’ donors who were particularly supportive of the new regime, notably the UK, Netherlands and Sweden as well as the World Bank and EC. While traditional donors were more cautious about the RPF-led government, new donors argued that the Rwandan government deserved to be treated as a ‘special case’. However the tangible split in positions which was evident in the late 1990s (see Baaré et al. 1999) became less clear in the 2000s with new donors becoming more wary and many old donors re-engaging.

Table 4.1: Top ten donors to Rwanda 1989-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>1989 Total (US$m)</th>
<th>1993 Donor Total (US$m)</th>
<th>1998 Donor Total (US$m)</th>
<th>2003 Donor Total (US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>32.53</td>
<td>WFP 53.94</td>
<td>World Bank 66.69</td>
<td>EC 54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.15</td>
<td>World Bank 39.22</td>
<td>France* 33.17</td>
<td>USA 52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Germany 38.56</td>
<td>Netherlands 29.01</td>
<td>UK 42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>Belgium 36.66</td>
<td>EC 27.21</td>
<td>World Bank 38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>19.57</td>
<td>EC 36.01</td>
<td>Belgium 23.17</td>
<td>Netherlands 23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td>France 35.53</td>
<td>USA 22.98</td>
<td>Belgium 20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>USA 26</td>
<td>UK 20.59</td>
<td>Germany 13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>Switzerland 20.21</td>
<td>Germany 20.55</td>
<td>Sweden 13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>Japan 14.94</td>
<td>ADF 17.68</td>
<td>France 10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Much of France’s contribution here was for debt relief.

(ii) Pattern of aid
Figure 4.1 provides the basic pattern of aid flows. There was a minor increase in overall aid flows after 1990; this can be associated with increased aid from the World Bank (structural adjustment programme) and from bilateral donors in support of the SAP and the peace process. In 1993 (to mid-1994) there was a small dip as the crisis escalated and many

20 This section draws heavily on Hayman (2006).
21 Caution is required when associating aid flows with events. The reasons for aid rising and falling in any given year can be multiple, as much technical as political. For instance, a dip in Dutch aid flows around 2004 can be accounted for by attempts to align closer with Rwandan government systems and restructuring of financial systems with the delegation of responsibility to the embassy in Rwanda, but also by cuts in the Dutch
development programmes were suspended. From mid-1994 to 1995 there was a massive increase, most of which was humanitarian aid. Aid flows then declined around 1997, dropping to below pre-conflict totals. This may be accounted for by the closure of the refugee camps leading to a decrease in humanitarian assistance, coupled with qualms over the new regime. The increase in flows around 2002 can be linked to the approval of Rwanda’s poverty reduction strategy and the withdrawal of troops from the DRC. Aid to Rwanda has increased considerably since 2003.

FIGURE 4.1: Aid to Rwanda 1988-2006 (Total ODA net disbursement)

Source: World Development Indicators 2007

(iii) Modalities of delivery
Prior to 1994, aid was delivered in both programme form (notably the structural adjustment programme, but some balance of payments support was also provided by bilateral donors, such as Belgium) and in project form, which accounted for the bulk of bilateral and multilateral aid. During the emergency and immediate post-conflict period most aid was channelled through UN agencies or international NGOs. Indeed, humanitarian aid constituted the majority of aid from 1993 to 1996, of which a vast amount came from the USA. Much of this went to refugee camps outside Rwanda following the wave of refugees fleeing the RPF advance. A massive cholera outbreak in the camps and subsequent suffering “almost eclipsed the magnitude of the Tutsi genocide. Western countries mounted the largest, most rapid and most expensive deployment of international humanitarian aid industry in the twentieth century” (Douma 2000: 25). This caused frustration within the new government which felt that the needs of Rwanda itself were being overlooked and that perpetrators of the genocide were being supported while the victims were not, and increased the already tense relations between the international community and the RPF-led government. Moreover, humanitarian aid flows contributed to the continuing conflict and added to insecurity in the region. Aid flows to the camps enabled the establishment of a rump state outside Rwanda’s borders. The former regime quickly organised the camps, controlling aid distribution. At first aid agencies were oblivious to this, then they were unable to do anything as they were caught in a moral
dilemma of whether to halt aid to prevent it falling into the wrong hands which would have led to enormous suffering amongst innocent refugees (see Terry 2002).

The UN played a very significant role after the conflict. Several appeals were launched by the UN (UNHCR and consolidated appeals) in 1994-1995 to mobilise humanitarian aid, and UN-administered Trust Funds were also established. The Secretary-General’s Trust Fund was created in July 1994, at the urging of the Dutch government, to meet the immediate needs of the Rwandan government (recurrent costs and administrative support). Pledges of US$6.5 million were made to this but only US$1 million was received. Funds were then transferred to the UNDP Trust Fund which was created in March 1995. The main supporters of this were the Netherlands, Japan and the UK. The UN also coordinated a series of Round Table conferences to mobilise support for Rwanda’s reconstruction and development (January 1995, July 1995, January 1996); and the UNDP helped the government prepare policy documents for these events.

By 1997 emergency programmes were being wound down and more funds were flowing through bilateral channels. The logic for using multilateral and NGO channels in the immediate post-conflict period was the lack of capacity of the new government to handle large volumes of aid, coupled with the nature of the humanitarian emergency needs. By 1997, government capacity was increasing, emergency needs were diminishing and the security situation was improving, so many bilateral donors restarted bilateral programmes. Some donors (e.g. Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Japan), however, continued to use alternative channels, mainly due to uncertainty about the RPF-led government. The ongoing conflict, prevailing insecurity within Rwanda, the lack of democratic reform and inclusiveness, and the lack of government capacity are some of reasons given by different donors for taking a cautious approach. Lower aid flows from countries such as Belgium, Germany and Switzerland are partially explained by such considerations.

Since 1999, direct budget support and sectoral budget support have become increasingly important aid modalities. Champions of this approach were the World Bank, European Commission, UK and Sweden who argued in the late 1990s that Rwanda’s special circumstances warranted more direct support to the central government. Other donors were more cautious for technical (accountability) and political reasons (concerns about human rights, democratisation and regional conflict). The government considers budget support to be the optimal aid modality (Republic of Rwanda 2006a) and is constantly pushing donors in this direction. This also reflects changes in aid at the international level, when aid effectiveness debates have led more donors to consider adopting new approaches. In 2008 the following donors were providing direct budget support: African Development Bank, European Commission, Sweden, UK, World Bank, Netherlands and Germany. Sectoral budget support is provided by the EC, UK, World Bank, African Development Bank, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, with Norway set to start.

(iv) Aid dependency
Since the late 1980s Rwanda has become increasingly dependent on development aid to balance its budget and undertake development activities. Up until then, aid flows to Rwanda had reflected the perception of Rwanda as a ‘good performer’. By 1992, however, ODA was accounting for nearly a quarter of GDP (Kumar et al. 1996: 6) and aid was increasingly delivered to keep Rwanda afloat. Since 1994, total revenue from external sources relative to internally-generated sources has declined, but as table 4.2 shows, Rwanda relies for around 45% of its revenue on foreign grants and loans. Although the government is careful to avoid
using budget support for recurrent costs, arguably the increase in direct funding renders the country more aid dependent as these funds finance core social programmes. In addition, most Rwandan ministries host foreign technical assistants and policy advisors. Consequently, development assistance in all its forms remains vitally important for Rwanda.

Table 4.2: Foreign Aid in the Rwandan Budget 1993-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Revenue and Grants (RWF billion)</th>
<th>Foreign Grants (RWF billion), of which:</th>
<th>Foreign grants as a % of total revenue and grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>103.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>136.8</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>148.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>195.5</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td>125.5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>344.8</td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>378.0</td>
<td>169.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bank of Rwanda 2004, 2007 (http://www.bnr.rw, accessed 28 May 2007); *includes MDRI grant (debt relief) of RWF 42.2 billion

However, the government is fiercely independent in its policy-making. As mentioned in section 1, the government does not compromise over priority areas, notably national security and reconciliation. It has driven forward activities of which donors have been critical and where they have withheld funding, including the holding of elections in 2003. So dependency on aid does not mean a lack of political independence (see Hayman 2008).

(v) Importance of aid in general and for democracy promotion
As indicated above, aid has been crucial for the Rwandan government in the post-conflict period, particularly for development and investment. With regards to democracy promotion it has been very important in some areas.

Prior to 1994, there were very few specific ‘democracy-promoting’ projects. Although governance began to appear in development rhetoric as important around this time, specific aid activities categorised as such were limited in general in the early 1990s. Belgium had a ‘democracy’ budget line before 1994 which funded activities such as seminars for journalists and military observers. Broader governance-related expenditures included institutional support for the prime minister, legislature and judiciary. Switzerland began supporting human rights organisations and promoting the rule of law through legal assistance activities. Uvin notes one specific democracy-project designed by the USA in 1992, but it remained “dead letter” (Uvin 1998: 93). Uvin goes on to contrasts this with the situation in 1995 when there was a proliferation of projects with a democratisation element, including peace-building, strengthening civil society, human rights monitoring and education, legal and judicial processes. It appears that it took the ‘rupture’ of the genocide for real action to promote democratisation to come about.

The Central Bureau for Public Investments and External Funding (CEPEX) is the main government agency which collates and produces figures on aid; however it only began to produce data from 2000. Hence, overall data from the Rwandan government on democracy promotion activities between 1993 and 1998 does not exist. However, the data available

22 Figures from CEPEX are problematic, however. The first matrix, produced in 2000, gave accumulated figures for aid to particular sectors up to 2000, with no indication of start or end dates. The 2002 and 2004 matrices are more detailed, but the figures often do not add up. CEPEX admits that the data is incomplete as the agency.
from CEPEX indicates how democracy-related activities are categorised within government thinking. The relevant activities are grouped under ‘governance and sovereignty’, which covers public services (political institutions, administration, statistics and planning), defence, and public order and safety (police, legal institutions, prisons). This area receives the main proportion of aid, around 40% in 2002 and 45% in 2003. Of funds disbursed in the governance sector in 2003 87% went to ‘public services’ (CEPEX 2004). The main donors were the EU and the UK, although this includes general budget support.

The main comparative source of data on democracy-related activities comes from the OECD (see table 4.3). This indicates that up to 1998 the main area which received attention was the rule of law, with some funds going to civil society and the media. Major concerns of donors in the post-conflict years were justice, human rights, the return and reintegration of refugees, support for vulnerable groups and reconciliation. Much of the UN Trust Fund money went to the justice sector. Throughout the 1993 to 1998 period, many donors were running ‘emergency’ rather than ‘development’ programmes, e.g. Sweden, Canada and Switzerland only moved to ‘development’ programmes after 1999.

Table 4.3: Rwanda - support for democracy promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year after conflict</th>
<th>Total (US$m commitments)</th>
<th>Elections/ political process</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
<th>Institutional infrastructure</th>
<th>Civil society, media</th>
<th>Civil-military relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1993)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (1995)</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1996)</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (1997)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (1998)</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1999)</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 (2000)</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 (2001)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (2002)</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 (2003)</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 (2004)</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 (2005)</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 (2006)</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System, September 2008. Note that data prior to 1995 is not available

In our second period, 1998 onwards, there has been more emphasis placed by donors on other areas of democracy promotion. Elections and the politic process have received minimal funds except in 2003. Some large inflows of aid have occurred in specific years: 2000 for institutional infrastructure (including US$21 million from the Netherlands); 2002 for rule of law (with $5.6m from Belgium, $5.4m from the Netherlands and $8.4m from the USA) and civil-military relations ($25m from the World Bank), 2004 for institutional infrastructure ($40m from the World Bank and $9.9m from the EC), and 2006 for the rule of law ($9.5m from the Netherlands and $8.2m from the EC). Since 2003 support for civil society and the media has increased considerably.

depends upon donor cooperation to gather this data. Figures given continue to be accumulated on the grounds that many projects are multi-annual; and figures often refer to monies disbursed not overall expenditure in real terms. There are also risks of double accounting, as CEPEX gathers data from bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental agencies; many bilaterals also channel resources through other agencies.
Most bilateral donors have incorporated specific ‘democracy’ elements into their programmes. For example, Germany, the USA and UNDP have specific ‘democracy’ pillars in their programmes. One of German cooperation’s five criteria and a condition for political dialogue is the involvement of the population in the political process, and the ‘democratisation’ axis has been central since 2003. Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK all have budget lines for promoting democratic systems. Canada and Belgium have broader ‘governance’ pillars as does the European Commission. The programme of the EC demonstrates the shift in support for democracy over the years. Under its rehabilitation programmes which ran until 1999, the ‘Human Rights and Democracy’ budget line was devoted almost entirely to rehabilitation of the justice sector. Since 2000 it has had a ‘good governance’ line which is much more diverse, funding public administration, the establishment of sector policies, transition to democracy, human rights, institutional capacity, reconciliation and civil society. The EC’s new Country Strategy for 2008-2012 stresses that there will be a ‘high priority [given] to human rights and good governance issues.’ This reflects a trend evident within other donors who are providing increased funds for issues such as ‘voice and accountability’. For example, the UNDP and UK have recently approved a $10 million joint programme for 2007-2011 aimed at strengthening accountability through support for parliament, government oversight bodies, the media, civil society and human rights.

Over the whole period, the most consistent donor with regard to democracy-promotion has been the Netherlands.

Aid for democracy-promotion in its broadest sense has certainly had a large influence on the present situation in Rwanda today. The funding provided for the justice sector, while still not sufficient to overcome the huge needs born of the specificities of the post-conflict environment, has certainly aided towards establishing a judiciary which is gaining strength and independence even if it continues to be influenced by the executive. Likewise, aid has helped towards improving the capacity of the NEC to run elections. On the other hand, aid for human rights and civil society has been patchy and limited. Probably the most ambiguous is aid for the electoral process. Some donors see themselves as having played a crucial role, for example the USA claims that “[w]ithout USAID’s election-related interventions, the March 2001 elections might never have taken place, and certainly would not have run as smoothly.” (USAID Annual Report 2002: 5). However, the position of Kimonyo et al. (2004:28) seems more plausible, namely that aid for elections has helped but it has not been decisive.

If the political impact of electoral assistance were to be measured in terms of donors’ ability to shape the Rwandan political process according to their own views, then its impact was rather small. Indeed, the electoral program and the design of the electoral process were essentially determined by Rwandan actors. On several points, the political program did not receive the approval of the donor community. It is therefore fair to conclude that aid has an impact on the development of democratic practices in Rwanda only in as much as it meshes with the government’s vision of democratization, which includes carefully controlled elections. (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 29)

2. Aid for democracy promotion

As mentioned above, details of aid flows for democracy-promotion activities are patchy at best. Staff turnover in aid agencies in Rwanda is high so institutional memory tends to be weak, and accounting practices differ. The following sections attempt to get behind the overall figures given above to explore the types of activities that donors have funded over the

years; the information is drawn from a variety of documentary sources and most of it covers the second period of interest (1998-2008).

(i) Elections and the political process
The election process began in 1999. The 1999 local elections received no external assistance. For the 2001 district elections 55% of the costs were covered by the international community (see table 4.3). The 2002 local elections again received no specific international assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount Disbursed (US$)</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Equipment and material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>Training of electoral workers, fuel, printing of ballots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Renting of NEC premises and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>Awareness raising and briefing, fuel, vehicle renting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Electoral material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Electoral material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>122,450</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Cooperation</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Training of NEC workers; awareness raising for voter registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>77,500</td>
<td>Purchase of 3 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>8,655</td>
<td>Training of election agents in Gitarama province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,778,605</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Reproduced from Kimonyo (2004: 17)

For the 2003 constitutional referendum and national elections the government was initially to provide 20% of the costs. Donors withheld or delayed some aid due to negative reports about space for the opposition and the nature of the constitutional debate, notably from the ICG (2002), HRW (2003) and Uvin (2003). Support for the constitutional process and more generally for the electoral commission came from the UNDP, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Canada, China, Belgium, EC, UNIFEM, UNICEF and Germany. Table 4.4 details support for the referendum. Much of this was small-scale, technical or logistical aid. The government covered 88% of the costs and donors 8% with the rest donated by the Rwandan private sector. The President of the Constitutional Commission claimed that donors had not provided more substantial support because Rwanda had chosen popular participation rather than expert drafting for making the constitution; donors were worried about the nature of the participatory approach and political manipulation (Kimonyo et al. 2004: 16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount (RWF)</th>
<th>Utilisation / mode of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>15.846.400</td>
<td>Materials/equipment/training of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31.184.013</td>
<td>Electoral materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>52.263.040</td>
<td>Electoral roll / civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Cooperation</td>
<td>21.870.755</td>
<td>Travel of members of the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total donor contribution</strong></td>
<td>121.1640.208 <strong>(231.835 US$)</strong></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget of the election</strong></td>
<td>1.427.374.879</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** National Electoral Commission. *The exchange rate used here is 500 Rwandan Francs (FRW) per 1 US Dollar.

---

24 Rate : US$ = 522.630 RWF
A basket fund for the 2003 national elections was established to which the UNDP, Belgium, Sweden and the UK contributed. The European Commission had committed itself to providing €1.8 million, but this was not disbursed until some time after the elections were over. Donor support covered 33% of the budget for the presidential election and 66.4% of costs for the legislative elections (see tables 4.5 and 4.6).

### Table 4.5: International Assistance for the August 2003 presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount (RWF)*</th>
<th>Activity/ mode of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>105,367,200</td>
<td>Materials/equipment/training of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>268,500,000</td>
<td>Through UNDP / direct funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>268,500,000</td>
<td>Direct funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total donor contribution</td>
<td>642,367,200</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget of the election</td>
<td>1,927,350,922</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Electoral Commission. * Rate : US$ = approx 537 RWF

### Table 4.6: International Assistance for the September and October 2003 legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount (RWF)*</th>
<th>Mode of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>213,330,000</td>
<td>Through UNDP basket fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>158,852,100</td>
<td>Through UNDP basket fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>492,300,000</td>
<td>Through UNDP basket fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total donor contribution</td>
<td>864,482,100</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget of the election</td>
<td>1,301,544,137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Electoral Commission. * Rate : US$ = approx 537 RWF

The second round of parliamentary elections was held in September 2008, with presidential elections set for 2010 and senate elections for 2011. A basket fund has been established for these elections as a package, administered by the NEC, with support from the UK, the European Commission, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UNDP. Donors are reported to have agreed to provide $10.2 million in total, with around $4 million made available for the 2008 polls. Around 60% of funding will come from the government, and the government has stated that even if donors do not support the elections, there is sufficient money available. The basket fund for a longer election period is seen as innovative and a sign of confidence in the abilities of the NEC.

(ii) Rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights

In this category, the main areas which have received donor attention have been the justice sector and law enforcement, with lots of funding provided in the early post-conflict years. The massive number of people accused of participation in the genocide called for a complete restructuring of the justice sector. Rwanda’s innovative *gacaca* court system for trying lesser crimes of genocide aimed at justice and reconciliation have been supported by donors, although they have been hot and cold on the system. Donors have also supported the classic justice system, Supreme Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the prosecution services, the Ministry of Justice, legal aid, and penitentiary services, including prisoner feeding programmes. A large proportion of funds from the UN Trust Fund set up in 1995 was allocated to the justice sector. The main donors to these areas include: Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, UK, USA, Germany, Switzerland, UNDP, France and the EC, as well as international NGOs like Penal Reform International and *Avocats sans Frontières*.

Support for law enforcement has included aid for the creation of the new national police force. The Netherlands, the USA and the UNDP were instrumental in this area in the early years after the genocide, with the Netherlands providing support for security officials in refugee camps, the rural police and the national police force; the USA was involved in capacity building of the national police force. Other donors to this area include: UNHRFOR, UNAMIR, UNHCR, ICRC, South Africa, Sweden, Norway, and international and local NGOs.

The Rwandan Commission for Human Rights was established in May 1999, with support from the UN High Commission on Human Rights. There has been some low-level funding for training and equipment from agencies like UNDP, USA and Switzerland. HRFOR and human rights monitors in the early post-genocide period were supported by Netherlands. Local human rights organizations depend almost entirely for their funding on external support, and for diplomatic support to enable them to function. Switzerland, the Netherlands, USA, Sweden, Belgium and Canada have been active in this area.

Institutions responsible for accountability and financial governance which have received support have been the Rwanda Revenue Authority (essentially created by the UK) and the Office of the Auditor General (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands).

(iii) Institutional Infrastructure
A high proportion of aid classified as aimed at ‘governance’ by CEPEX is allocated to public services, which includes support for public institutions, decentralisation and administrative capacity. Given the devastation of Rwanda’s institutional infrastructure during the war, considerable support has been provided for its rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as support for rendering institutions more effective through training and policy support. Few ministries in Rwanda do not house foreign technical assistants, and particular donors have their key ministries, e.g. the UK in education; Belgium, Germany and the USA in health; the EC in agriculture; the EC, Netherlands, USA and Belgium in Justice; Netherlands in Gender.

Decentralisation has received donor attention since about 1998. The main donors supporting this process are the Netherlands, UNDP, Germany (since 2000 for example for fiscal planning), the USA (for example training of officials following local elections, fiscal decentralisation and policy advice), the World Bank, Switzerland, EC and Belgium.

Support for the national parliament has come from the USA, the EC (rehabilitation of the parliament building), the UNDP (including support also from the Netherlands), Belgium and Switzerland. The USA, which ran a multi-year support project to improve capacity and voice, sees itself as “one of the few donors to support Rwanda’s legislature” (USAID, Annual Report 2002).

(iv) Civil society, media, civic education, empowerment
Most donors support local civil society groups, which could not function without external aid from bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental agencies. Local human rights and advocacy groups are reasonably well supported and provided with political support against government harassment. Some donors have funded civic education programmes around the elections, for example USAID (through CARE International), Germany (through GTZ), Sweden, Switzerland and the UNDP. International NGOs have also supported civic education initiatives, e.g. Trocaire, Norwegian People’s Aid and CARE International.
A number of donors have also supported the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), e.g. Sweden, Germany (since 1997) and USAID. Much of the money going to reconciliation processes is about supporting civil society organizations involved in peace building and reconciliation activities, including within the justice sector around the gacaca trials. Many projects funded through local or international NGOs carry elements aimed at promoting rights, the empowerment of women, and vulnerable or marginalized groups.

The media were heavily implicated in ethnic propaganda around the genocide, so there was a great deal of suspicion of the media following the conflict. UNHCR, UNICEF, Germany and Switzerland provided funding for radio stations for refugees and the rehabilitation of media infrastructure, and UNESCO has supported various media organisations. The early 2000s saw more support for the media with the sector beginning to open up, notably from the Netherlands as well as Canada and the UK. Donors are fairly wary of the sector, but have used behind-the-scenes political support to bolster the development of an independent press (Kimonyo et al. 2004).

(v) Civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform

An initial demobilisation programme began in 1997, which received some support from the Netherlands and the UNDP. UNICEF had been involved in demobilisation since 1995, including with support from the Netherlands. However, ongoing insecurity and conflict meant that few soldiers were demobilised, and these tended to be children and the elderly. Because of ongoing conflict, the Netherlands stopped supporting demobilisation at the end of 1997.

The Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP), within a large-scale regional demobilisation programme following the Lusaka and Pretoria accords aimed at ending external involvement in the war in the Congo, was put in place in 2003. This received contributions from a range of donors, including the Netherlands, the UK and Canada. Some support has been provided for the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities, for training and job creation, including from the UK and Germany.

B. Democratic Conditionality

(i)(ii)(iii) Democratic conditionality

Section 3.B outlined the pressure applied to the Rwandan government firstly to democratize and then to keep the peace and democratisation process on-track. Conditions were minimal and did not bring about the end of the conflict nor prevent the genocide; the actions of the international community may even have weakened the Habyarimana regime and facilitated extremism.

Since 1994, greater pressure has been brought to bear upon the new government with regard to democratisation in diplomatic terms. Some informants stated that there was considerable pressure after 1994 for democracy which weakened the government. However, the real extent of diplomatic pressure is hard to judge as much is behind-the-scenes.

There has been very limited application of political conditionality in practice with regard to aid. The few instances where aid has been frozen or halted have been less linked to democracy per se than other issues. For example, aid was frozen by the EC, Belgium, the
Netherlands and the USA\(^2\) over the Kibeho incident in 1995 when government forces massacred a disputed number of civilians while rooting out extremists; the Dutch made strong statements (Pottier 2002). However, aid was quickly reinstated when the government produced a requested report on the incident. During the second DRC war (1998-1999, although Rwandan troops were only finally withdrawn in 2002), considerable pressure was placed upon the Rwandan government over human rights abuses, the presence of troops in the DRC, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Piron and McKay (2004: 27) claim that international pressure, including the approval of the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, facilitated the final withdrawal of troops and Rwanda’s adherence to the international peace agreements signed in Lusaka in 1999 and Pretoria in 2002. Another example is the Netherlands threatening to suspend support to *gacaca* in 2003 over the issue of independent monitoring (McKay and Piron 2004: 27).

The main example of political conditionality specifically linked to democracy came with the 2003 referendum on the constitution and the legislative and presidential elections. There was strong criticism of the conduct of the government, notably around the squeezing of the opposition and disappearances of politicians. Some aid was withheld, for example the Netherlands refused to disburse some assistance (see Kimonyo et al. 2004: 20) and the UK suspended support of the media sector on the grounds of the government not liberalising the airwaves. These actions did not change the course of events, with the elections going ahead on the government’s terms. However, the financing of the elections led to budget unpredictability, contributed to Rwanda going off-track with the IMF, and led to considerable bitterness within the government. The statements about not being able to rely on donors but having alternative financing in place for the round of elections from 2008 to 2011 are directly attributable to this situation.

Rather than punitive conditionality, there is more evidence of positive conditionality, such as aid to specific sectors to promote democratisation and the rule of law, as outlined above. For example, European Commission sectoral budget support for the justice sector was linked to progress on *gacaca* (Piron and McKay 2004: 27). The recent increase in general budget and sectoral budget support reflects confidence in government accountability systems. The Joint Governance Assessment conducted in 2008 represents a strategy for improving dialogue between government and donors on governance matters and for jointly setting achievable targets, which will feed into discussions about aid allocations. Donors such as the Netherlands and the UK have consistently stressed an approach which is supportive yet critical where necessary. The Netherlands sought to engage with the Rwandan government during the conflict as a ‘neutral’ force; it then called for donors not to apply conditionality in the immediate aftermath but rather to support the establishment of law and order under the logic of being supportive to prevent chaos (Douma 2000). It did apply conditions over the Kibeho incident and the DRC war, and the Dutch parliament refused to provide general budget support until very recently. However, it has followed a strategy of “critical dialogue”, drawing on its good bilateral relations. The UK has been even more supportive, preferring to use

\(^2\) There are conflicting accounts about the position of the USA before and after the conflict. There are some claims that the USA provided military assistance to Habyarimana’s regime; others that it was supporting the RPF. Pottier (2002) claims that the USA immediately recognised the new RPF-led government in 1994 while Terry (2002) claims that it was hesitant and was instrumental in stalling World Bank funds to the new regime. Pottier (2002) also claims that the USA supported the government position over the Kibeho massacres, while other accounts note that at this time the USA put non-humanitarian aid on hold, i.e. applied political conditionality.
behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy to encourage the government ‘in the right direction’ rather than using aid conditionality.

(iv) Credibility and effectiveness of conditionality
All instances of positive or negative conditionality need to be analysed in the context of the legacy of the international community during the genocide. Guilt constituted a major reason for coming to Rwanda’s aid in the aftermath of the genocide; and the RPF-led government was apt at using this ‘genocide credit’ when faced with external criticism. Indeed, as one informant said, if the international community tried to make too many demands they would not have worked as donors had no credibility. The moral dilemma for many donors was the imperative to provide aid to Rwanda to compensate for the lack of support around the genocide, to render it more stable and to prevent a relapse to war, yet how to deal with incidents of human rights abuses and stalling on democratisation by the new regime. The outcome has been statements about the need to address democracy at international meetings, such as the Round Table Conferences mentioned in Section 3.B, but little real application of conditions.

Moreover, Rwanda has a large and diverse donor presence. Different donors have adopted different strategies with regard to conditionality which impact upon its effectiveness. For example, Switzerland has been initially very hesitant about engaging more positively with the Rwandan government, preferring to ‘monitor events’; Rwanda continues to have ‘special status’ as it does not meet certain criteria for a full bilateral programme, due to human rights, democratization and Rwanda’s regional relations. Norway provided a lot of assistance after the genocide but did not begin a full bilateral programme because of concerns over human rights. The Netherlands is an important donor but limits were set on the programme over democracy-related issues. Ireland chose not to make Rwanda a priority country over human rights concerns. Germany only made Rwanda a ‘priority’ country in 2002. These decisions are often couched in language of administrative constraints, such as overall budget cuts, but real reasons are often more political. Belgium spouts the rhetoric of conditionality but until recently the way aid has been delivered, in project form, has militated against the application of conditions in practice. At the other end of the spectrum is the UK which has been very supportive of the Rwandan government since 1995, coming from a background of no bilateral relationship at all to the largest bilateral donor by the end of the 1990s. A note of caution crept into the British programme in the early 2000s, with budget support instalments delayed in 2004 and 2005 over Rwandan intentions in the DRC, but overall it remains positive about the RPF-led government. Moreover, donors are often inconsistent, such as the Netherlands withholding aid for the elections while continuing to invest in justice infrastructure and decentralisation. The end result is that the government sees individual instances of donors applying conditions as a nuisance rather than a serious problem.

On the whole the international community has accepted the direction the Rwandan government has taken. No punitive action was taken when the transition period was extended in 1999, security concerns have been considered legitimate by many donors, and the conduct and outcome of elections have been accepted as ‘understandable’ given the context (Uvin 2001; Reyntjens 2004). Donors have often been sceptical about some of the government’s initiatives, such as gacaca, imidugudu (villagisation) and imihigo, but then come on board when they have seen positive results. The RPF-led regime is also resistant to pressure which does not suit its own interests and is effective in keeping the donors on-board while essentially pursuing its own agenda; this even results in harsh counter-criticism of donors, for example the Dutch were accused of being ‘divisionist’ when they withheld funding for the
2003 elections. In the face of Rwanda’s history and the pride of the government, donors have much more leverage when they act as ‘friends’ of the regime and engage positively with it; there is pressure to democratise but Rwanda does not take kindly to being pushed. Moreover, donors have varied prerogatives and the desire to use aid budgets, especially in support of a government which is seen as performing relatively well with regard to poverty reduction and development, tends to override concerns about governance. So although in theory donors have superior bargaining power in that they effectively hold the purse-strings of the Rwanda government, the ‘genocide credit’, Rwanda’s strong stance on its particular priorities, uncoordinated donor positions and different donor agendas militate against a coherent approach which gives the government considerable room for manoeuvre (see Hayman 2006, 2007).

It is worth noting that donors are insistent that they do not apply conditionality; the new language refers much more frequently to ‘mutual commitments’ within a partnership approach. This has seen new instruments developed to monitor governance progress and encourage political dialogue, such as the Memoranda of Understanding signed between the government, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, and the Joint Governance Assessment. This reflects international trends but also the nature of the RPF-led government which is more open to constructive discussions than overt criticism.
CONCLUSION

Five years after an external military force was deployed to oversee the peace agreement between Rwanda’s warring parties, Rwanda was not a full democracy. However, the government had committed itself to working towards the establishment of a free and open democratic system. Since 1994 the genocide has been analysed from multiple angles. This study places the genocide within the wider framework of a democratisation process which began in the late 1980s with the beginnings of political liberalisation, passed through civil war, a peace process, a resumption of the war and the genocide, to the end of the conflict, the restructuring of the state and national, democratic elections in 2003. From this angle, the genocide can be seen as an inherent part of the struggle for power, which entailed both civil war and internal political restructuring. The conflict therefore provided the catalyst for the establishment of the current political system in Rwanda today. The conflict began because the opening was there to change the state in the form of external pressure and external economic factors, as well as internal economic and political crisis. The outcome of that extremely violent conflict has been the establishment of a stable, nominally democratic state; it has its weaknesses and some analysts would argue that it is more authoritarian than democratic, but it is stable. However, this stability came about through the externalisation of the conflict and potential insecurity still exists.

This study is primarily concerned with the influence of external factors on the democratic development of post-conflict Rwanda. It is unlikely that the outcome would have been the same without external intervention. The international peacekeeping force which was deployed in Rwanda in 1994 ultimately failed in its mission. At the time there was considerable optimism that the Arusha Accords would work, that both sides were genuinely committed to peace, and that UNAMIR would be an easy success for the UN. Hindsight demonstrates that all the signs were there that doomed the operation to failure. The peace process failed to take sufficient account of the extremist opinions forming within Rwanda around ethnicity and representation. It can therefore be argued that the causes of conflict being dealt with in the peace negotiations and the main domestic actors were not the ‘right’ ones in terms of creating a lasting peace.

Nevertheless, although the peace agreement was weak and flawed and the peace process collapsed, the Arusha Accords signed in 1993 constituted the basis upon which the post-conflict state was built. International mediation and pressure went some way to ensuring that this agreement was reached in the first place, although war fatigue and internal pressure also played a major role. Had that agreement not existed then the basis for the post-conflict state could have been much different. Diplomatic pressure and aid conditionality (positive and negative) applied to the Rwandan government both during and after the conflict appears to have had a marginal, though positive, effect upon the actual establishment of democratic institutions. The RPF could have taken complete control of the country in 1994 and installed a dictatorship, given that it won an all-out military victory. However, democracy, representation and inclusion were core themes of the RPF war-time political agenda, and it has constructed its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, the African continent and the world on the back of its adherence to the Arusha Accords in contrast to the ‘enemies of peace’ who thwarted them (Twagirimungu 1994). Had the Arusha peace process not existed, the war may have dragged on indefinitely and the genocide may not have occurred. Had the international community acted more forcefully in 1993-1994 and got the Arusha process back on-track, Rwanda’s political landscape today would also have been completely different.
Aid and aid agencies are integral to the functioning of the Rwandan state, and aid has played a major part in building the institutions of democracy. While details of aid figures are not comprehensive, it is clear that donor support has been crucial for reconstructing and reorganising the justice sector, the national civilian police force, decentralisation, and building national and local administrative capacity. Local civil society groups, especially those engaged in advocacy and human rights work, could not function without financial and political support from external actors. While not flowing in the quantities or way that the RPF-led government may have preferred in the early post-conflict years, Rwanda did receive a considerable amount of humanitarian and developmental aid. These often ran in parallel, with donors providing both humanitarian relief and more developmental activities through the post-conflict period. It can be surmised from this that external intervention has been instrumental in laying the foundations for a state based on the rule of law, public accountability and democratic principles. The contribution of external aid to the narrower democratic process is more ambiguous, however. Aid for the electoral process has been fairly low overall, and when some of it was withheld in 2003, the course of events did not significantly change. However, if the RPF-led regime had not received aid following the conflict, and if ‘champions’ had not come forward to bolster it, then Rwanda may have become less democratic than it is today, and the conflict may have continued.

On the other hand, external intervention in the democratisation process may also have had negative effects. Andersen (2000) argues that the three strategies being promoted by development agencies in the early 1990s – economic adjustment, multiparty democracy and peace negotiations – while all integrated, also had mutually conflicting effects. Economic crisis and a conducive international environment gave strength to internal calls for change; but they also precipitated the start of the civil war and created space for ethnic-based politics to arise. Pressure to end the civil war through a negotiated peace deal which included commitments to democracy rendered the peace process incredibly complex and contributed to the weakening of the Habyarimana regime, which enabled extremism to gather strength. Donors were inconsistent in their messages to Habyarimana’s regime, no real support was provided to promote democracy, no real punitive action was taken in response to human rights abuses, and the weakness of the peacekeeping force sent a clear signal to the extremists that action was unlikely. Consequently, “the democratisation process effectively undermined the peace efforts and finally shattered all prospects of peace” (Andersen 2000). In the aftermath of the genocide, support for the refugee camps outside Rwanda enabled extremists to regroup and launch attacks into Rwanda, thus contributing to ongoing regional insecurity.

An informant in Rwanda said that there were two reasons behind Rwanda’s democratic system: to maintain links with donors; and to use it in the struggle to retain power. Behind this lies fear by the political elite that the people may take that power away. Consequently, democracy has an internal and an external logic. Today, Rwanda is continuing down a path towards democracy: elections have been held; there is some separation of powers; and Rwanda is a more open and inclusive society. However, Rwanda is not necessarily moving towards the western notion of a liberal democracy. The regime has a paternalistic attitude to the population, seeing its role as nurturing notions of responsibility and accountability within a populace who once associated, and many continue to associate, democracy with ethnic discrimination, majority rule and violence. Rwanda’s elite would not consider Rwanda to be a...
hybrid democracy but rather a ‘different model’, with priority given to unity and consensus over competition. Issues of security on an individual and national basis remain overriding, and the fear of competitive politics is possibly weakening the whole endeavour. The system is tightly controlled but for many it is a ‘necessary control’: the problem is that too much control can kill the hope for progress towards a better democracy. Under the surface tensions around ethnicity, equality and participation remain, which reflect societal cleavages which existed before the war. The economic situation remains precarious and issues such as land pressure remain as potent today as before the conflict. At the same time, many amongst the political elite seem genuinely committed to constructing a strong, benevolent, developmental state. The elite are not homogenous, yet there is a convincing unity of purpose with regard to where the country is heading. Democracy in terms of popular participation is part of that vision.

Rwanda’s democratic situation has been critiqued heavily by various human rights groups and political analysts. However, the donor community has largely bought into the government’s perspective about the right type of democracy for Rwanda and its security concerns. This is captured in the following statement on the Netherlands website in 2005: “the quality of governance is inadequate. Nevertheless Rwanda is on the right track.” There is a complicity in external dimensions of the democratisation process. Donors need to see democratic progress, they need to see elections; but they also know that they cannot have full faith in those elections. Donors also need to see progress in social and economic development, and Rwanda is performing relatively well in that regard. The Rwandan government is resistant to negative pressure, and donors who are supportive and encouraging rather than hostile and critical are much more likely to have their message heard; aid matters but only insofar as it suits the regime. There have been instances where conditionality or diplomatic pressure has made a difference, such as the withdrawal from the DRC in 2002, but on the whole donors are supportive rather than confrontational, seeing positive, if sometimes critical, engagement as the way to influence democratic development. Recent increases in aid, with more donors providing budget support, indicate faith in government programmes and systems.

There are two ways of reading Rwanda: as a developmental state creating a context-specific democratic system; or an increasingly authoritarian, hybrid state which is masking deep-rooted political problems. Many of the institutions of liberal democracy have been put into place in Rwanda with external assistance, but there is limited real pressure to push for greater change due to Rwanda’s past, the strength of the leadership and different donor prerogatives. The RPF continues to expand its control over political space in Rwanda and donors have been active agents in this. There are signs that support to strengthen ‘voice and accountability’ is on the increase which may reflect a recognition that more active encouragement by donors is necessary. International intervention in post-conflict Rwanda has made a difference to stability, both in terms of national security and national capacity; whether it results in a stable democracy remains debatable. Rwanda’s peace remains precarious and the people are living together in ‘peaceful coexistence’ (Burnet 2007: 2) rather than being fully reconciled. Yet, there is some optimism. As one informant repeatedly said ‘Rwanda is not there yet but...’
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**Electronic Resources**

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Acronyms

APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
BBTG Broad-Based Transitional Government
CDR Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CEPEX Centre Bureau for Public Investments and External Funding
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire)
EC European Commission
EU European Union
(Ex-)FAR (former) Forces Armées Rwandaises
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
ONU Government of National Unity
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRDP Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
MDR Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais
MRND Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
NEC National Electoral Commission
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-government organisation
NRA National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OT Opération Turquoise
PL Parti libéral
PSD Parti social démocratique
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTC Round Table Conference (UN)
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
TNA Transitional National Assembly
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRFOR United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID United States Agency for International Development