External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

Mozambique

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External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

An Introduction To The Project

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U of Ottawa and Freie Universität Berlin

The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can - to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition? While much research effort has been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has so far been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence, but succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity. Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical with regard to the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. The empirical evidence seems indeed to suggest that countries rarely emerge from war as democracies. When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after WWII (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission or not), we find little reason for optimism. Only 10% of the countries that experienced civil wars reached a polity score of +7 or higher (approximately like Kenya, Moldova or Mali) two years after war ended. 53% all war-affected countries show a polity score of -5 or lower two years after the end of civil war, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. 37% have a polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan (all data is from Sambanis, Nicholas, with Michael Doyle, 2000: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and
Quantitative Analysis, in: American Political Science Review 94: 4, 779 - 801). The picture looks similarly gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52% have a polity score of -5 or lower; 39.4% have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10.6% have a score of +7 or higher. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia or Macedonia in the post cold war period, to name only a few. What made these cases of post-war democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.

The study of post-war democratization is a relatively new field, and there is surprisingly little empirical scholarly work devoted to the factors that allow a post-war country to become both stable and democratic. This can partly be explained by the fact that the two bodies of literatures, which are relevant for such an endeavor, are concerned with only one half of the problem. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peace building is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy or not is typically not of interest to this body of literature. This division of labor may explain why there is only a very small literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes which are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or is it perhaps a consequence of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that post-war countries are in essence a sub-class of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases sui generis.

The researchers involved in this project think that post-conflict cases are fundamentally different from transition cases, and they assume that these differences may have an impact on the factors which affect peace and democracy. If this is true, then it is necessary to account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same, or do not necessarily have the same impact, in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy respectively do not necessarily simply add up, but that they may cancel each other out. One
implication of this is then that we have to disaggregate the concept of “success” into sub-concepts. One way of doing this is to individually look at “absence of war”, “democratic quality of the regime” and “state capacities”. While these three concepts may merge in the case of fully established democracies, we argue that for countries emerging from war we need to disaggregate them in order to be able to empirically explore which sequences and combinations are most conducive to the normatively desirable outcome: stable democracies at peace.

The Research Design

Given these challenges, we opted for a case study oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms. Case studies allow researchers to treat cases a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causation and which may lead to the identification of typological sub-classes. Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons; and finally, small-n research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets, because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data which they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We collaborated with an international team of country experts, who prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2008 and December 2009. Our sample covers cases on Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Haiti. We deliberately chose cases from the post cold-war period only, because our main interest is the contribution of external actors to post-war democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peace building missions became fashionable and feasible after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s.

The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases consists, theoretically, of all civil wars that came to an end after 1989. We count 52 cases (Data from Doyle/Sambanis 2000). Our main interests is the
question of whether and how countries that were affected by large-scale violence can emerge as stable and democratic polities, and we are particularly interested in the impact of external support to this outcome. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war; post-conflict countries can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic polities; and post-conflict countries could emerge as democratic, yet unstable polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in our sample. Furthermore, we also want to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the amount of external support for democracy. Hence, we have four different outcomes, and two different values on our main independent variable. This can be depicted in a table with 2 x 4 cells. In order to group the cases into the cells, we have to define measures for stability, democracy and external support. Because this is not for analytical-descriptive purpose, but for sampling, we do this in a fairly rough and ready way. We classify countries that are still at peace five years after the war ended as stable. We classify countries as democratic when they reach a polity IV score of 10 or higher five years after the war ended. We proxy the amount of external support by the type of UN mission. Countries in which a complex peace building mission, or a peace enforcement mission, took place are coded as having received high external support. For all coding we rely on a data set compiled by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Sambanis 2000).

The next table groups all cases in the eight cells. Case in bold were included in our sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High external support</th>
<th>Stable and democratic</th>
<th>Stable and undemocratic</th>
<th>Unstable and democratic</th>
<th>Unstable and democratic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia</td>
<td>Haiti 1994</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low or no external support</th>
<th>Stable and democratic</th>
<th>Stable and undemocratic</th>
<th>Unstable and democratic</th>
<th>Unstable and democratic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh--Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Ethiopia-ideol</td>
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<td>Congo-Shabba I&amp;II</td>
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<td>Georgia-Abkhazia</td>
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<td>Georgia-Ossetia</td>
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<td>Ethiopia-Ogaden</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>Indonesia-East Tim.</td>
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IV
The Research Template

In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. Only then did the authors shorten the studies turning them into condensed analytical narratives. The original versions of the reports are accessible at the project’s webpage.

The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security”, “democracy” and “state capacities” into sub-concepts: With regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? By security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of

<table>
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<tr>
<th>India-Sikh</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palest.</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Iraq-Kurds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Iraq-Kurds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Iraq-Shiites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Laos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Morocco/WestSah</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Nigeria-Muslim</td>
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<td>Papua NG</td>
<td>Pakistan-Bich</td>
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<td>Philip-NPA</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Vietnam Rep of</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka (JVP II)</td>
<td>Yemen-S/Peoples R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Zimbabwe/Rhodesia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 The Template is available here: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html
2 http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html
organized violence (e.g. criminal violence). By state capacity, we refer to the capacity of
the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement them.
In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-
developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants
and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and re-
deploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks
whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input
legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its
preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the
regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors (such as long-term economic
development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy), about
war-related factors (such as duration and type of war, numbers of fractions, level of war-
related destruction, and quality of any peace agreement) which may have had an impact on
the countries’ capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy such as linkages and
integration; it then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention
focusing on both military and non-military aspects. We are interested in state-
reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures, and in the question of how intrusive
these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure and/or
persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores
the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences and
constraints. These questions allow us to reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining
which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of
external intervention; we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct
effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows in the conflict country and to
assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. This section inquires
about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid where available. Experts provided annual figures for: elections and political processes; rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights; institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administrative capacity); civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform. Please note that these are our generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the OECD-DAC, and that this data should be treated as illustrative rather than complete for most case studies due to a lack of availability of such information. Finally, we asked our experts to identify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

The Case Studies

The case studies are available from our website. We think that they provide a valuable source of fine-grained data which help us to better understand the processes which lead to a much desired, yet rare outcome: A successful transition from war to peace and democracy.
Case Study – Mozambique

Section 1: Defining International Success or Failure

A. Democracy: How democratic is the regime that has emerged after the intervention?

A1(i) The rule of law

At the end of the five-year period following the General Peace Agreement (Rome, 1992), one could say that rule of law was established to a moderate degree in Mozambique. During one-party rule (1975-1994), Frelimo was by all accounts an unusually disciplined party. This is not to say that there were no problems with corruption or abuse of power, but there was a degree of internal accountability among party officials with respect to both. Party officials were banned from having business interests, and inequality between party officials and ordinary people, though present, was not marked to the degree that it was in many other places.

During the war, however, rule of law went into decline, as the war offered a pretext for the settling of local scores. Neighbors with land disputes could for instance denounce one another for political crimes, in hopes of gaining economic advantage. Provincial and local law enforcement officials could use the war as a cover for abuses of power. The discipline, morale, and integrity of the armed forces and police declined precipitously over the course of the war. And as Mozambique turned from a state-controlled to a more market-oriented economy and loosened restrictions that had prohibited politicians from partaking in private business activities, corruption began to be more evident.

Against this backdrop, during the five years following the signing of the peace agreement Mozambique was faced with reforming a military that had been used to keep internal order and had been turned on civilians; a weak, ineffectual police force that had developed a record of abuse against civilians; a much diminished system of local judicial institutions, with many districts lacking functioning courts and many others lacking skilled human resources and necessary materials. On the other hand, the Frelimo regime had for the most part maintained adherence to a rule-based system of governance throughout the one-party period. Although closed to outside competition, internal debate
and dissent were tolerated, and Frelimo was a well-institutionalized party with functioning mechanisms for accommodating at least limited competition and conflict. Renamo, the main opposition party, was a much more personalized party. Still, the legacy of Frelimo’s organizational coherence and attempts to form a transformative state in the early years of its rule left Mozambique with a traditional and a degree of political will, if not sufficient resources, to establish the rule of law. In addition, a new national constitution was promulgated in 1990, which ended single-party rule and created the necessary legal framework for the new political dispensation. This constitution, together with the General Peace Agreement signed between the government and Renamo in October 1992, were critical foundations for the maintenance of rule of law in the post-war period. On top of this, during the peace process, Denmark began providing aid and assistance to the development of rule of law, and they have continued to fund legal programs since that time.

A 1(ii) Participation

Mozambique’s first general elections were marked by an extraordinarily high turnout rate, on the order of 90%. Civil society groups proliferated. Groups were formed to promote the status of women, to advance professional goals, to protect human rights, and to support vulnerable sectors of society. A handful of groups, many of them led by individuals who had left government posts in frustration with government policies, had significant policy input on key issues. During this period, there were also a number of ad hoc groupings, such as Women for Peace, formed by prominent women in civil society who sought to keep pressure on politicians during this period to follow through on their commitments during the peace implementation process. Such groups were permitted freedom to organize, meet, and demonstrate and received plentiful press coverage.

In addition to the growth of civic organizations and freedoms, since the first elections in 1994, donors have increasingly prioritized decentralization and the role of local elections in fostering equal participation at all levels of society. Embassy documents from the Like-minded Donors¹ point to the need for local channels of accountability and participation, as well as increased access to resources by local

¹ The so-called Like-Minded group includes Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland.

NORWAY TOO? WHO ELSE?
governments. Mozambique held its first municipal elections in 1998 and a second set in 2003, yet decentralization has remained a slow and difficult process.

A1(ii) Competition

The 1990 constitution—promulgated roughly four years before the first multiparty elections—guaranteed the active and passive political rights of citizens and spelled out the powers and limitations of various branches of government. But it was not until 1993 that a multiparty conference was held to build consensus on legislation that would govern the formation and behavior of political parties (and the oversight of elections). The agreement reached through this process was then approved by parliament and put into practice.

The 1994 elections were viewed as free and fair by international and domestic observer groups alike. The UN deployed more than 2000 observers, and a large number of other international and domestic observers were also present. Despite a handful of incidents of intimidation of Renamo supporters and interference with campaign rallies by supporters of rival parties, the entire electoral process was remarkably smooth.

Elections were overseen by a National Elections Commission (CNE), whose composition followed a formula for representation by the government, Frelimo, Renamo, and the ‘unarmed’ opposition parties. The CNE was to be convened only during electoral periods and was seen as the conflict management and policy-making body that would oversee electoral processes. Its executive arm, the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration, was part of the Ministry of State Administration and was envisioned as a permanent bureaucratic body for election administration. There were provincial and district elections commissions which reported to the CNE, and provincial and district STAEs that reported to the national STAE. While there were numerous struggles over the composition and activities of these bodies, all in all it is fair to say that there was a clear legal and constitutional order that guaranteed and regulated political competition. There were clear provisions for registering complaints about the electoral process and

2 The 1990 constitution was revised in 2004. The major changes included the elimination of the law requiring parties to earn 5% of votes nationwide in order to win seats in parliament. No other changes pertinent to the questions raised in this template were made. Thus we refer henceforth to ‘the constitution’ meaning the constitution as it was in force following the 1990 revision.
mechanisms for resolving any legal disputes. These mechanisms worked largely as intended.

**A1(iv) Vertical accountability**

A number of factors provided for a reasonable degree of vertical accountability in Mozambique. These included a proliferation of civil society organizations representing a wide range of societal interests, including strong nationwide organizations such as the Christian Council and powerful local business groups in the major cities; the tradition of top-down communication between the Frelimo party and the grassroots during single party rule; relative press freedom and the proliferation of independent media outlets in this period; and the existence of a legal and constitutional framework spelling out the particulars of the post-war political dispensation. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Mozambique held its first municipal elections in 1998, after donors began emphasizing decentralization as a way of vertical accountability and transparency between citizens and the state.

**A1(v) Horizontal accountability**

The constitution contains provisions for horizontal accountability. On paper, Mozambique is a semi-presidential system, with a president and prime minister who acts as first minister of the cabinet. In practice, this is a presidential system. Most scholars of semi-presidentialism argue that the designation applies only to those systems in which executive power is shared by a president and a prime minister who is accountable to the legislature. (Elgie, 2005; Siaroff, 2000 and 2003). In Mozambique, the prime minister is only nominally accountable to the legislature. He/she is responsible for preparing the government’s plan and budget and presenting it to the Assembly, and members of the cabinet are responsible to both the president and the prime minister for the execution of the plan and budget the prime minister is also charged with explaining the positions of government to the Assembly and presenting reports on implementation to the Assembly (Articles 204-6, constitution of 1990). The President of the Republic has the power to dissolve parliament if the government’s program is rejected by the Assembly. If the new parliament also rejects the government’s program, the president dismisses the government. This is the only sense in which the prime minister is ‘responsible’ to
parliament, but even in this the act of dissolving the government falls to the president, not to the legislature.

Furthermore, the prime minister is appointed by the president without consultation or confirmation by the Assembly. The prime minister responds first and foremost to the president.

The Assembly has constitutional authority for oversight of the executive and, of course, for making laws. In practice, the overwhelming majority of legislation is introduced by the executive. The president may veto laws passed by the Assembly, and the president’s veto may be overturned by a 2/3 majority in the Assembly. The latter has never happened in practice.

Members of the cabinet are required to appear before parliament for regular question and answer periods, to present the government program and budget, and to provide testimony as called for by parliament, in accordance with clearly set out rules.

The constitution also spells out provisions for vertical accountability between the executive and judicial branch. During the period under consideration, the president appointed all members of the Supreme Court and other superior courts. Still, the high courts in Mozambique were reasonably well regarded in this period and not viewed as simply subservient to the executive branch.

A1(vi) Is Mozambique a full democracy

During this period, it would be a stretch to say Mozambique was a full democracy by most standards. I am not comfortable with answering this question unless the parameters of our definition of democracy are clear. By standards of the Freedom House, Mozambique was ‘partly free’ in this period. By the five criteria above, Mozambique would probably merit the same designation. While it had achieved much in the way of laying the foundation for democracy, in practice there were many problems. Many of these related to the practice of democracy at local levels—equal access to justice, security, economic opportunity, etc. There was still discrimination against opposition supporters particularly in outlying areas with respect to access to economic opportunity; courts were minimally functional in many localities; resource constraints were so great that the system could not function as it was envisioned to do. Police forces remained under-resourced and their training neglected.
A1(vii) As of when
I would say that by the end of the period in question, the assessment above applied.

A1(viii) Alternatives to democracy
Elites generally treated the new democratic rules of the game as ‘the only game in
town’. There were no major opponents to democracy in the country, either among
politicians or among the population at large.

A1(ix) Same old state?
Although the Frelimo party was in power both before and after the end of the
conflict, the state that emerged after the conflict was governed by a dramatically different
constitution. The bureaucracy remained intact (except for the dismantling of state security
police and the reform of defense and security forces), but it was now overseen by
officials elected through genuinely competitive elections. The last years of the war, and
the process of ending the war, had also wrought changes within Frelimo, bringing
technocrats to the fore and placing the party’s harder line ideologues on the margins.

B. Security: Security Assessment; Phases of Political Instability; Relapse into War:
B1 (i) Security Situation:
Since the beginning of intervention, and the subsequent end of the civil war, the
security situation in Mozambique has remained relatively stable. The country has not
relapsed into civil war since the government of Mozambique and Renamo signed the
1992 peace agreement, officially ending sixteen years of civil war. With the exception of
isolated acts of violence, protests and boycotts surrounding election periods, post-conflict
Mozambique has been largely devoid of political instability.

B1(ii): Phases of Political Instability:
Despite complaints of fraud, international election monitors have regarded
Mozambique elections as free and fair in the years after intervention. There were
scattered incidents of political violence in 1994, during the period surrounding
Mozambique’s first post-conflict elections. Yet, clashes between Frelimo and Renamo
during the campaign period, and their supporters, have been remarkably rare, and have
not seriously threatened the political stability of Mozambique (Manning, 2002).
In the period up to Mozambique’s first multiparty elections in 1994, Renamo, the
former rebel group turned opposition party, threatened to boycott the elections, accusing
Frelimo of engaging in electoral fraud. However, at the last minute, Renamo participated in the elections, primarily due to international pressure, and accepted the election results. This action by Renamo set a precedent for subsequent elections, as the opposition has continuously accused the ruling Frelimo government of participating in fraud and corruption (Manning, 2002). Therefore, while political stability has characterized post-intervention Mozambique, and there has not been a return to autocracy or war, democratization remains a tenuous process.

Finally, while organized crime is not a particular problem in Mozambique, abuses by security forces are widespread, as is corruption (Freedom House, 2002). Police abuse is an ongoing problem that threatens the security of Mozambique. In general, the public views security forces as ineffectual and incompetent. While the Rapid Intervention Police (RIP) is a well-trained and strong police force, Renamo is distrustful of the RIP. In comparison, the national police force is under-paid, and lacks the training and resources, making them unable to adequately address incidents of unrest or crime (AWEPA, 1994).

**B1(iii): Relapse into War:**

The country has not relapsed into civil war since the beginning of the intervention (either in the 5-year period or at any time since).

**C. State capacity, legitimacy, service provision**

**C1(i): Bureaucratic Apparatus:**

Given the thinness of human resources available at independence, Mozambique managed to create a relatively well-developed bureaucratic apparatus, and the Mozambican party-state formulated and executed policy decisions, often with the technical and financial support of donors who shared the government’s socialist aspirations. Sweden played a particularly large role, and ‘cooperantes’ (cooperators) came from other Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada, among others, to bolster state capacity. In the early years of independence, the government succeeded in boosting rates of primary school enrollment and vaccination, as well as provided improved primary health care. During the war years, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and others often worked directly with provincial governments, paying salaries of civil servants (such as nurses and teachers), and providing recurrent cost support to these governments. Foreign
technical assistants funded by donors commonly worked directly in the Ministries. The idea here was to work directly with state structures so as to boost state capacity.

As Mozambique turned toward economic liberalization in the early 1980s, these ‘like-minded donors’ also helped support that transition, and by the end of the war, these donors had a clear idea both of the resource constraints (human and financial) of the state and what it would take to allow the government to finance a peace process and a transition to democracy. This thorough understanding of the state’s limitations, and the ability of these donors to work closely with a state whose confidence it enjoyed, were key factors contributing to the success of Mozambique’s dual transition from war to peace and from party-state to multiparty system, as we discuss below.

In sum, the state bureaucracy was built with significant and ongoing support from donors, and continued to rely upon such support throughout the period under examination. This donor involvement pre-dated, and later helped to soften, the conditionality imposed by the IMF once Mozambique embarked on its IMF-backed Economic Reconstruction Project. Even today, Mozambican and foreign policy analysts alike speak of a “pathological” model of aid-dependent growth, which some critics argue suits both donors and the government but contributes little to development of the country as a whole. Thus while the close relationship between the government and donors may have contributed to strengthening state capacity, it reduced state autonomy. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was the handing over of the Mozambique Customs Authority in 1996 to the British firm Crown Agents, in a project funded by the British Department for International Development (DFID), the IMF, and the World Bank. Under the management of Crown Agents, customs revenue increased from $106 million in 1996 to $340 million in 2005, amounting to some 47% of the state’s total tax revenue. (Powers 2008)

C1(ii): State Capacity:

Donors were intensively involved in bolstering state capacity during this period, as they had been during the war. Perhaps most important, economists working for the like-minded donors, joined by the US and the World Bank, formed a Budget Working Group in 1992. This group took on the task of assessing, together with the government of
Mozambique, the government’s ability to finance and implement the necessary elements of a peace process. This included both specific tasks like transitional elections and DDR, and the fostering of economic growth through the modification of macroeconomic policies normally required as part of structural adjustment and stabilization.

One of the most important achievements of this Budget Working Group was to put pressure on the IMF to relax tight fiscal constraints that were imposed as part of Mozambique’s PRE (Program of Economic Recovery), which called for tight money and constrained growth in employment and real income. They also pushed hard for debt relief to allow the economy to grow sufficiently to help provide for newly demobilized soldiers and returnees. According to one source, five or so like-minded donors working on the debt relief issue succeeded in reducing 16-18% of government debt each year for several years during this period.

Finally, this Working Group succeeded in getting the EC and the US to shift away from providing food aid for the Mozambican government to sell and gain revenue. Commoditized food aid provided for the largest chunk of government revenue. The working group successfully urged both the EC and the US government to substitute commoditized food aid with cash support, arguing that the effects on the Mozambican economy would be much greater.

The experience of providing direct budget support for recurrent costs served as an important precedent for the intervention period, as these donors were able to make the case to their home office (and to the government of Mozambique) for continued and very intensive involvement in the process of designing, costing, and funding the implementation of the peace agreement.

During the period in question, Mozambique completed a restructuring process that involved the integration of Renamo and government forces into a new army. The new army succeeded in attracting roughly a third of the expected number of troops to the combined force. During these years, the military was in the process of forming its joint command structure for the integration of the Renamo and government forces and regrouping in terms of its peacetime mission. The military had a coherent command structure, a functioning hierarchy of authority, and limited material resources. It received training from European donor countries during this period.
Policing has benefited less from external support, and Mozambique was faced with the need to dismantle and restructure its multiple police forces at the end of the war. The most capable force was the PIR (Rapid Intervention Police), a paramilitary unit that was used for any serious disturbances. The Criminal Investigation Police were largely ineffectual and bereft of vehicles and other equipment necessary for their work.

Despite the general benefits of external support to state capacity, the state’s continued heavy dependence on external aid since the transition paradoxically brought weakened state autonomy, thus creating a situation of dependent development (Donini, 1996). The lack of coordination between organizations and donors and the “inability to promote national and local self-reliance as a policy objective” can undermine the development and independence of government structures and decisions (Donini 1996: 86). However, budget support is seen by many European donors as a way of empowering and funding the government at the same time.

C1(iii): State Capacity for Providing Services:

The government’s strong relationship with its donors probably had positive effects on the state’s economic and regulatory capacities, depending on how those are defined. As noted above, Mozambique’s post-war history was perhaps more conducive to the establishment of a rule of law state than that of other countries on the continent. It is really not useful, however, to speak of regulatory capacities in such general terms – rather, we would need to discuss this on a sectoral basis.

Regulatory capacity varied from one ministry to another, depending, among other things, on the involvement and interest of various donors, the kinds of activities to be regulated, and what was at stake in the issue of regulation. By and large, it would be safe to say that the state was able to secure its territorial integrity and defend itself from external attack (its military capabilities); that the state largely succeeded in preserving law and order internally during this period; that it proved capable of offering and implementing macroeconomic plans (in conjunction with international donors and other partners); and that the state showed reasonable capacity to exercise regulatory oversight in some areas. One area that highlights the complexities and contradictions in this respect would be land allocation and tenure.
During the period in question, Mozambique engaged in a major demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process meant to demilitarize Renamo, demobilize a significant number of government soldiers, and construct a new, unified Armed Forces of Mozambique incorporating elements from both armies. This task was heavily supported, with both human and financial resources, by donors. The unified military had a coherent command structure, a functioning hierarchy of authority, and very limited material resources. The new army succeeded in attracting only about one-third of the troop strength initially foreseen.

Reform of police structures received much less external support, and Mozambique was faced with the need to dismantle and restructure its multiple policy forces at the end of the war. The most capable force was the PIR (Rapid Intervention Police), a paramilitary unit that was used for any serious disturbances. The Criminal Investigation Police were largely ineffectual and bereft of vehicles and other equipment necessary for their work.

C1(iv): Informal Structures:

Shadow structures were not a significant factor in the provision of services and public goods at this time.

C1(v): Outputs Evaluated by the Population

Speaking impressionistically, the population at this time was more oriented toward provision of public goods and basic services by international actors than by the government. A system had been established over the course of the emergency (drought and war in the 1980s) in which external donors became the primary providers of relief to areas suffering extreme hardship. As such, the population often had greater expectations of donors than of the state with respect to the provision of basic goods and services and emergency relief.

By the next general elections (1999, 2 years after the period under consideration here ends), the population had begun to hold the state responsible for failures in the provision of public goods. While the state made a concerted effort in the years after the 1994 elections to improve the provision of infrastructure and basic goods and services, particularly in areas where Renamo enjoyed strong support, it was not until the end of our five-year period that these efforts began to bear fruit.
C1(vi): Popular Perceptions of the Regime:

A 1997 public opinion survey commissioned by the USAID mission in Mozambique and conducted by Eduardo Mondlane University’s Center of Population Studies found that the majority of those surveyed felt that Mozambique was on a positive trajectory. Only 13% said that nothing had changed for the better since the peace agreement. They most frequently identified the lack of public services and the cost of living as the major problems facing them in their daily lives (though it is perhaps notable that fully 73% of those surveyed did not have a specific response for this question). Sixty percent of the survey sample said they were interested in politics, and respondents were about equally divided between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the country’s political leadership. (38.6% said they agreed, 37.4% said they did not agree, and 24% said they didn’t know). While these findings are admittedly rather vague, they certainly don’t indicate strong opposition to the path the country was on, nor do they suggest a reserve of political or economic discontent among the population that a ‘conflict entrepreneur’ might draw upon. (Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Centro de Estudos da População, Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública, Relatório Final, Vol I, Maputo, March 1998).(Universidade Eduardo Mondlane 1998)

C1(vii): Independent from Outside Interference:

Mozambique has long depended for more than half of its budget on external aid, and this remains true today. Even in 2005-06, aid was nearly 25% of the country’s GDP, and two-thirds of public expenditure is financed by external aid. (Castel Branco 2008) As elaborated in Section 4, external actors have long played an influential role in the development, financing, implementation and oversight of policy in many sectors in Mozambique. During the period of 1992-97, Mozambique hosted a sizeable UN observation mission, more than 150 international nongovernmental organizations implementing US aid alone, and dozens of donor agencies and their nongovernmental implementing partners. The country’s major donors were intensively involved in the planning, financing, and execution of many elements of the peace process implementation plan. The Budget Working Group, mentioned above, met once a month with the Finance Minister to confer on macroeconomic policy as well as the design and financing of various elements of the implementation plan. There was also a working
group on elections, the Democracy Support Group/Election Process Support Group, which consisted of major donors and met several times a month. Members of the EU conferred amongst themselves to determine consistent policy approaches for bilateral support from member states. Among these, the members of the Like Minded Donor group comprised a sub-group with particularly strong links to the government, whose confidence these donors enjoyed. The US and Italy offered crucial financial, technical and moral support to Renamo throughout the process. In short, it would not be too much to say that virtually all important government functions in Mozambique were essentially carried out jointly by the government and donors.

More recently, donors have emphasized decentralization and governance. Furthermore, they have directed aid to the government via budget support, which implies a different, and somewhat controversial, form of external interference.

D1 The interdependence between democracy, security, and state capacities:

In Mozambique, democratization resulted in an unambiguous improvement in both security and state capacities. However, democratization, like improvements in state capacity and security, was the result of intensive and extensive involvement by donors in policy decisions of the Mozambican state. It is especially important to note the role of donors in providing assistance to Renamo’s transformation to a political party, along with the role of the like-minded group in providing guidance and assistance to the Frelimo government. If donors had not funded these aspects of the transition, these improvements would likely not have been possible. Despite this, as mentioned above, extensive donor involvement has the possibility of undermining or weakening the development of self-reliance government structures and institutions. For example, if Renamo becomes the ruling party in future elections, their relative lack of resources and organizational history could have a decisive impact on the relationship between democracy, security and state capacities in Mozambique, since it is not at all clear that the effects of investments by donors in state capacity would transfer to a Renamo administration.

Section 2: Pre-War and War Variables

A. Long-term, structural factors

1(i) Type of Regime:
After gaining independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, Frelimo, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, established a single-party regime in Mozambique. Frelimo initially enjoyed widespread support because of its struggle for independence against the Portuguese, as well as its call for national unity, mirroring the post-colonial political experience of numerous other newly independent African states (Manning, 2002). The Frelimo government adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform in 1977, the same year that the civil war against Renamo began, and proceeded to enact ambitious reforms and nationalization projects. These changes were largely disruptive to Mozambique’s society and economy, and were overseen by the Frelimo party-state. “Democratic centralism” was the official name given to the Frelimo state’s version of single-party rule. Though there was space for dissent inside Frelimo within limits, this was an authoritarian, single party regime and remained so until first the 1990 constitution, and then the first multiparty elections (1994), changed things. There was not regime change during the war.

1(ii) Previous Attempts at Democratization:

The multiparty elections in 1994 represented Mozambique’s first attempt at installing a democratically elected government.

1(iii) Pre-War Level of Economic Development:

In the years before the civil war, Mozambique’s economy was in disarray. In fact, at independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world’s poorest economies. At independence, Frelimo inherited an economy that had long been manipulated and developed unevenly according to Portuguese colonial interests. The post-independence economy suffered from a colonial trade deficit, mass exodus of skilled Portuguese workers, capital flight and unemployment (Manning, 2002). Significant revenue came from contracts with South Africa to provide mine labor, and South Africa’s decision to reduce the use of Mozambican and other emigrant miners in the late 1970s constituted a significant shock to Mozambique’s economy. (The decision led to a 70% drop in the number of Mozambicans working in South African mines between 1975 and 1978). (Manning, 2002) This affected both the trade deficit and the overwhelming majority of rural households in southern Mozambique, which had supplied much of the emigrant labor to South Africa. Mozambique’s reliance on primary commodity exports also hurt
the new regime, as the 1974 worldwide recession caused a drop in commodity prices. From 1974-76, due to the fall in commodity prices and the disruption to Mozambique’s independence caused by the abrupt departure of the Portuguese, the value of the country’s agricultural exports dropped by half. Frelimo’s anti-capitalist economic reforms before and during the civil war only exacerbated Mozambique’s economic problems, and as war dragged on the economic situation worsened. Food shortages became common in urban areas and from 1981-86, overall domestic production fell by 30%, per capita income was halved, and exports fell by 60% in the same five-year period.

1(iv) Structure of Economy:

Mozambique’s economy was primarily agrarian before the civil war, relying on the export of primary commodities, such as cashews, cotton and sugar. Despite Portuguese investment in industry and manufacturing, by 1975, these sectors employed a mere 2% of the population that was economically viable, and manufactured good were primarily sent to the local settlers (Hall and Young, p.10). In addition to this, at independence, Mozambique’s economy was largely dependent on the stronger economies of Rhodesia and South Africa, primarily through the provision of emigrant labor. As mentioned above, once in power, Frelimo embarked on a number of socialist economic reforms that centered on central planning and state-owned production (Hall and Young, 1997; Manning, 2002).

Seeking to rid the Mozambican economy foreign influence and alleviate the economic and social distortions of Portuguese rule, Frelimo enacted widespread reforms after independence. Their ambitious agenda included the nationalization of land, industry and rental properties. While they embarked on these reforms immediately after independence, in 1977, Frelimo officially declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party, and proceeded to expedite the process of economic transformation (Pitcher, 2002). At this point, Frelimo dedicated itself to the collective organization of production, which ultimately resulted in rural alienation and discontent (Manning, 2002). In 1984, the government began to reconsider these policies and turn toward Western aid and its accompanying market-oriented economic policies.

1(v) Pre-War Elite Cleavage Structures:
Even before the civil war, ethnic and regional cleavages existed within the ruling Frelimo party and state and within the country as a whole. These cleavages were reinforced by patterns of unequal development along regional lines under Portuguese rule, as was the case in most African colonies. These divisions helped fuel the development of Renamo, though they do not wholly explain it. Within Frelimo, struggles over ideology and personality conflict tended to coincide with regional differences. In seeking to attain their ideological-driven transformation of Mozambique’s society, the “radical” wing of Frelimo dominate other voices in the party. This dominant group was drawn predominantly from the south.

1(vi) Ethnic Structure:

Mozambique, like most African countries, suffers from regional economic disparities. Regional disparities in economic development under colonialism coincided in part with the geographic distribution of Mozambique’s different ethnic groups. Furthermore, although Frelimo’s ideology stressed national unity, their post-independence socioeconomic and leadership reforms exacerbated the existing ethno-regional cleavages. As Manning (2002) points out, Mozambique’s civil conflict was shaped by “the perceived dominance of state power by southerners” (p.44). The educated African elites that dominated Frelimo did not understand or anticipate the different landscape and social forces in central and northern Mozambique. While the south was more modern and industrialized, primarily due to Portuguese patterns of development, the center and north were largely rural, with complex dichotomies of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial social and economic elements (Pitcher, 2002). However, most observers agree that Mozambique’s ethnic cleavages alone were not sufficiently politicized either before or during the war to make ethnicity the basis for armed conflict. Nor has ethnicity formed the primary basis for party formation, though clearly there are regional patterns of support for the two major parties. These regional patterns, however, also tend to throw together large numbers of disparate ethnic groups and traditions.

1(vii) State Capacity to Autonomously Make Decisions:

Despite the fact that Frelimo ruled Mozambique for only a few years before the civil war began, they were largely able to enact sweeping socioeconomic reforms and create new bureaucratic structures in this short time. Frelimo assumed power after
leading the liberation struggle, and at independence, the ruling party initially enjoyed widespread popular support and considerable legitimacy (Hall and Young, 1997). This support allowed the leaders to consolidate power and mobilize people in favor of their national reforms. Hall and Young (1997) note the dominance and longevity of the core Frelimo leadership, as well as their remarkable capacity for consensus. However, Frelimo’s transformation goals were quite ambitious, and although they succeeding in abolishing many of the colonial and pre-colonial structures, there was a chasm between the old and new administrative capacities of the state (Manning, 2002). Furthermore, economic disruption and disarray exacerbated the weaknesses of new state structures, and Frelimo’s popular support waned over time.

Still, if we look at the Frelimo government’s relations with donors even during the emergency and wartime periods, we see a state capable of delivering services and of negotiating with donors over the terms of aid. This was not a failed state or even a weak one in the sense of its ability to make decisions and act on them. This is true notwithstanding the many mistakes of policy formation and implementation made by the state.

1(viii) Pre-War Military, Policing, Economic and Regulatory Capacities:

Frelimo’s pre-war military and policing capacity was undermined by Mozambique’s interdependent relationship with both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Mozambique was particularly vulnerable to South Africa’s powerful and influential military power (Howe, 1984). These external security dilemmas would eventually allow Renamo to strengthen its position against the government via external support, resulting in Frelimo’s claim that Renamo was merely a puppet of the South African government. Consequently, the FPLM, Mozambique’s military, had the dual task of fighting internal insurgencies, as well as South African military intrusions. This situation was particularly problematic, considering the FPLM’s limited military abilities and skills, and Frelimo’s difficulty in controlling rebellious soldiers (Howe, 1984). The impact of external regional factors undermined Frelimo’s military and policing

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3 The ‘emergency’ refers to the humanitarian crisis brought on by the drought in the mid-1980s, when Western aid became a significant source of support for Mozambique.
capabilities after independence, and this complicated security situation acted to exacerbate Mozambique’s economic decline.

1(ix) State’s Pre-War Capacity for Providing Services and Public Goods:

Despite Frelimo’s inability to adequately extend control over Mozambique’s economic and security dilemmas, they did embark on a number of sweeping social reforms in order to rid Mozambique of its repressive colonial institutions. Barely a month after independence, the government made education free for all Mozambicans, and six months after independence, it enacted widespread preventative health care reforms for all citizens (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983). Frelimo acted to provide health care to the rural population, which had previously been without access to modern health care resources and facilities. Hall and Young (1997) underscore the breadth of health care reforms by pointing out that Frelimo’s “vaccination campaign in 1976-8 reached 95% of the population (p.58). Despite initial social reforms, the state’s weak security capabilities, along the threat of economic collapse after independence and Frelimo’s misguided socialist reforms undermined the stability of Mozambique’s pre-war government.

B. War-related factors/Factors referring to the peace process
1: Type of war and warring Parties
1(i) Type:

The civil war in Mozambique began two years after independence and lasted until 1992, when the government of Mozambique signed a peace treaty with Renamo, the rebel group. While the conflict was internal, the nature of violence changed over the course of the war. While external forces initiated Mozambique’s civil war by striving to destabilize the government, over time, different incentive structures shaped the conflict (Manning, 2002). Ethno-regional cleavages in Mozambique, in addition to Frelimo’s state-centered policies, particularly villagisation, allowed Renamo to take advantage of popular discontents toward the state (Hall and Young, 1997). The conflict was fueled by the fact that Frelimo’s leadership stemmed primarily from the southern Gaza province, and many of Frelimo’s former members that were not from southern Mozambique had been isolated from the party’s core. Renamo was able to exploit Frelimo’s lack of popular support in central and northern Mozambique.
1(ii) Number of Warring Parties:

The primary warring parties in Mozambique’s civil war were the Frelimo government and the opposing guerilla group, Renamo. Ethno-regional factions within Frelimo allowed Renamo to gain support from a variety of marginalized groups, although their support primarily stemmed from central and northern Mozambique. Conversely, Frelimo's support was concentrated in the south and extreme north.

1(iii) Spill-Over Effects in War:

While the civil war in Mozambique cannot be reduced to spillover effects from neighboring countries, various external actors fueled and manipulated the conflict, particularly those from Rhodesia and South Africa. At independence, Frelimo established a relationship with ZANU of Rhodesia, providing them with arms, bases in Mozambique and other resources to aid their struggle for independence (Hall and Young, 1997). Rhodesian security forces, seeking to destabilize the Mozambican government and undermine its support for Rhodesia’s national liberation forces, backed the guerilla group that was to become Renamo. In doing this, Rhodesian forces enacted a number of covert and overt recruitment operations that centered on exploiting the discontents of those that opposed the Frelimo government (Hall and Young, 1997). Over time, Renamo was able to gain further strength by capitalizing on regional and ethnic grievances in Mozambique.

While external actors in Rhodesia fueled Renamo’s development, by the early 1980s, the South African government became an important external player in Mozambique’s conflict. As Hall and Young (1997) point out, with the independence of Mozambique, followed by that of Zimbabwe, the South African government acted to preserve its status as a regional economic power, despite the continuation of apartheid. By providing military intelligence to Renamo, the South African government helped Renamo to significantly expand its activities in Mozambique and to become a more public, and structured threat to Frelimo (Hall and Young 1997: 126). Thus, the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, along with the fight to end apartheid in South Africa resulted in efforts by both of these governments to destabilize the newly independent government in neighboring Mozambique. As a result, Renamo was the vehicle through which these external forces fueled conflict.
1(iv) **Main Cleavages and Issues of Conflict:**

Territorial concerns represent the primary cleavage in the conflict between Frelimo and Renamo. Essentially, the civil war was a manifestation of embedded regional tensions between southern Mozambique, on one hand, and central and northern Mozambique, on the other. Regional economic disparities left over from Portuguese rule and uneven patterns of colonial exploitation coincided with ethnic cleavages and the absence of communication between the northern and southern parts of the country (Manning, 2002; Hall and Young, 1997). In addition to this, Frelimo’s political and economic reforms after independence, especially that of villagisation, exacerbated the existing ethno-regional tensions by alienating and marginalizing rural and traditional segments of Mozambican society. Renamo was able to exploit these regional discontents from the peasantry in order to obtain support and recruit members (Hall and Young, 1997). This was a struggle principally over who would control the Mozambican state – not one about how to define the identity or the territorial boundaries of the nation-state.

1(v) **Entrepreneurs of Violence:**

The entrepreneurs of violence in Mozambique were primarily external actors from Rhodesia, South Africa and Malawi. These actors provided resources to the warring parties, with the ultimate goal of destabilizing the Mozambican government. However, while economic interests may have played a role in the actions of these external actors, especially the South African government, the goal of their destabilization of Mozambique was largely the result of efforts to quell unrest and threats to their own governments.

1(vi) **Recruiting Mechanism:**

Hall and Young (1997) describe Renamo’s recruitment strategies as “draconian,” citing the widespread use of forced recruitment, as well as recruit incarceration in order to “break them psychologically before formal military training began” (pp.169-170). This is not to say that all recruitment was forced; many joined the ranks of Renamo voluntarily, especially after Frelimo’s economic policies exacerbated rural discontent with the government. After 1984, Renamo made an effort to recruit people that would aid in the development of Renamo’s political and administrative structures. Like their military recruits, the vast majority of the organization’s political and administrative
recruits did not voluntarily join Renamo, but were forced or former prisoners (Manning, 2002).

Frelimo’s recruiting tactics were different from that of Renamo. After independence, the Frelimo government’s actions did little to recruit supporters and resulted in the isolation of many segments of society. Their formal establishment as a Marxist-Leninist party in 1977, along with the establishment of increasingly stringent membership requirements largely undermined their popular, as well as internal, support. However, as Hall and Young (1997) point out, Frelimo’s 4th Congress, in 1982, was geared towards revitalizing the party by opening up party membership and abandoning the exclusive rhetoric that had isolated important societal groups (p.157). With respect to the military, the government resorted to forced conscription. But unlike Renamo, Frelimo had a party apparatus that was fully developed at the outset of the war, complete with a well developed ideological basis and party bureaucracy.

2: War Variables

2(i) Start of War:

The brutal civil war in Mozambique began shortly after the country gained independence in 1975, as the Frelimo government faced an armed resistance that was backed by Rhodesian security forces. In 1977, the first attacks inside Mozambique were officially reported (Manning, 2002). While there is no single defining incident that acted as a catalyst for the conflict, Renamo was able to capitalize on a variety of regional, ethnic and economic grievances, particularly after Frelimo formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform, in 1977. In addition to this, after Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, Renamo was able to expand and strengthen with the help of South African military intelligence and resources.

2(ii) Battle-Related Deaths:

Between 1975 and 1992, the civil war in Mozambique resulted in an estimated death toll of one million people. A striking characteristic of the war was its use of routine violence against civilians, in addition to the use of terror and forced labor. These tactics were unusual at the time, and seen as a way to compensate for the lack of military capabilities. Since the civil war in Mozambique, these tactics were adopted in other conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Manning, 2002).
2(iii) Other Casualties:

Apart from battle-related deaths, the conflict adversely affected the civilian population in numerous ways. Aside from fighting tactics that involved routine violence against civilians, there was the destruction of the economic and social infrastructure by Renamo. As a result, refugees and internally displaced people numbered in the millions. Numerous refugee camps were set up in neighboring countries, including Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Gersony, 1988). According to Newitt (1995), by 1990, one-third of Mozambicans, about 4 million people, had been displaced or became refugees, and Newitt points out that this is a conservative figure (p.571).

2(iv) Period with Highest Number of Casualties:

Newitt (1995) describes Renamo’s military campaign that began in 1986, after being expelled from Malawi, as one that resulted in “some of the darkest moments in the history of any African country” (p.569). In 1984, Frelimo and the South African government signed the Nkomati Accord, after which South Africa withdrew its official support for Renamo, but in practice the group continued to receive support from elements of the South African state (especially military intelligence) roughly until the end of apartheid rule in South Africa. The late 1980s was probably the most disastrous period of the war in terms of the toll on civilians, as the looming decline in external support for Renamo led the movement to redouble its efforts to stockpile weapons and forcibly recruit fighters and others who could build the movement. It is also worth noting that Renamo tactics varied geographically, with some of the worst large scale atrocities occurring in the south. (Hall and Young)

2(v) Dynamics of War:

The duration and enigmatic nature of Mozambique’s civil war resulted in complicated and shifting dynamics over the course of the conflict. By 1980, Zimbabwe had gained independence, thereby eliminating one of Frelimo’s regional external threats. However, after South Africa backed Renamo in 1980, strengthening its organization and military strength, the war intensified. South African involvement revived Frelimo’s dedication to fighting the “internal enemy,” resulting in more severe acts of state repression and authoritarianism (Manning, 2002). Overall, developments within the region and on the international level, such as Zimbabwe’s independence and the Cold
War, greatly affected the dynamic of Mozambique’s civil war. Internally, economic inequality and Frelimo’s harmful economic policies exacerbated tensions between the state and society.

Renamo’s capacity and organizational makeup shifted dramatically over time, reflecting the motivations of different external influences. As mentioned above, when Renamo lost the support of the Rhodesian government with Zimbabwe’s independence, the South African filled that void, strengthening Renamo and, thus, intensifying the civil war. The loss of Malawi’s official support in 1986 further intensified the conflict as Renamo began working largely inside Mozambique for the first time. Furthermore, as Manning (2002) argues, in the mid-1980s, Renamo began building its political core, and sought to establish relations with the West by proving to the international community that it had viable political ambitions and goals. This tactical move was important, as it changed and expanded Renamo’s internal organization and platform, thereby setting up the possibility for a future peace settlement and formal political role for Renamo.

2(vi) Location of War Activities:

Renamo’s guerrilla characteristics at the beginning of the war, along with Mozambique’s regional and economic disparity, contributed to Renamo’s mobility and widespread presence during the conflict. According to Manning (2002) Renamo’s strength in the early period of the conflict resulted from “its ability to create no-go zones for government forces, to attack infrastructure, and to disrupt commerce and other traffic” (p.39). Before the mid-1980s, Renamo’s operations were primarily concentrated in the central regions of Manica and Sofala. After losing external support, Renamo aggressively worked to expand their operations to territories outside of these regions. However, while Renamo did launch their most horrific offensives in the south, they were unable to develop organizational structures in this region, unlike in the central and northern regions. Some have attributed this to the flat, dry terrain in southern Mozambique, geography that is not conducive to guerrilla bases, as opposed to the dense forests found in other parts of the country. Others argue that Renamo was more aggressive toward civilians in the south because it was a stronghold of Frelimo. Unable to recruit the willing support of civilians, Renamo chose to terrorize them to achieve its goals.
3: War End/Peace Process

3(i) Duration/End of War:

The civil war lasted for 16 years. It began two years after independence, in 1977, and ended in 1992, when the Frelimo government and Renamo signed a ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement. The General Peace Accords were signed in October of 1992, with the central tenet of the accords being a transition to multiparty democracy.

3(ii) Did War Drag on or End Quickly?:

Mozambique’s transition from war to peace was largely successful. In fact, Manning (2002) states that, on both sides of the conflict, “it proved remarkably easy to get the average soldier to quit the military once the peace accord was signed” (p.111). According to a report by ONUMOZ, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, overall, there were relatively few formal violations of the ceasefire agreement in 1992. Furthermore, the violations that were confirmed did not seriously threaten the peace process.

3(iii) How was the War Terminated?:

By the early 1990s, the war had reached a point in which Frelimo and Renamo had entered into a mutual stalemate. External actors had ceased their destabilization efforts of fueling and funding the war, and the Cold War had ended (Manning, 2002). As a result, neither side had the ability to fight to victory, and each side recognized that its best chance lay with a negotiated agreement. An embassy source pointed out that, aside from the mutual stalemate and the end of the Cold War, the way in which aid and intervention was directed towards smaller, integral actions truly allowed for the success of war termination. Donors created an inclusive supportive environment for both warring parties. Bringing Renamo into Maputo, providing them with sufficient resources and lowering uncertainty were key factors in war termination and the transition to peace.

3(iv) Ceasefire Arrangement:

When Frelimo and Renamo signed the General Peace Accords on October 4, 1992, the agreement called for a ceasefire between the parties to occur no later than October 15, or E-day (ONUMOZ). During and before this point, both Renamo and Frelimo received substantial financial and (humanitarian) material support from the United Nations and the international community. This support was geared towards
aiding Renamo’s transition from a guerilla movement into a viable, legitimate political party, as well as the liberalization of the Frelimo government.

3(v) Comprehensive Peace Talks:

The warring parties engaged in comprehensive peace talks, which culminated in the signing of the General Peace Accords in 1992. External actors played a vital role in the negotiation process, as well as during Mozambique’s transition to peace. The Italian government hosted these peace negotiations, and they were “observed by Mozambique’s major donors, including the U.S., Great Britain, Portugal and Germany” (Manning, p.28). According to Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005), Italy “played a key role in organizing the peace negotiations and was prepared to take the lead in financing its implementation” (p.16). Before and during the peace negotiations, donors, especially the like-minded group, worked closely with both parties to provide political guidance and assistance in preparation for the transition period. Furthermore, the United Nations had a central role in the implementation of the peace agreement.

3(vi) Inclusion of Relevant Parties:

The two warring parties, Frelimo and Renamo, were included in the peace process, and both parties signed the peace treaty. Over the course of the negotiations, Renamo delayed the process because of security fears, trust issues and communication difficulties. In some instances, Renamo threatened to boycott the entire negotiation process; however, Renamo’s complaints and threats were stifled by “intense international pressure not to jeopardize the negotiations” (Hall and Young, p.214). It is important to note that the active inclusion and funding of Renamo as a relevant party by the donor community was an important factor in creating a conducive environment for the successful implementation of the GPA.

3(vii) Impact of Peace Process of State Reconstruction:

The peace process had an enormous impact on Mozambique’s successful transition to a stable, multiparty democracy. External actors had a vital role in shaping and sustaining the process. They provided substantial financial and material support to stabilize the country through demilitarization, liberalization and elections. The General Peace Accords, and its seven protocols “called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for
the general elections and in monitoring these elections’” (UNOMOZ). The peace accords
enjoyed legitimacy on the side of both government and Renamo and the agreement
served as an essential blueprint for the transition to peace. While it did not cover every
detail, the document served almost as a sort of constitution to which each side, and
external actors, would refer in disputes. There were sometimes differences in
interpretation of the peace agreement, but the legitimacy of the agreement itself was
never called into question, and so the parties worked to deliver on the spirit and letter of
the accord.

**3(viii) Dominant Party:**

Frelimo remained the dominant party during the peace process. Because the
Frelimo party led the Mozambican government from the time of independence until the
beginning of the peace process, this was only natural. Similarly, the President of
Mozambique and leader of the Frelimo party, Joaquin Chissano, assumed Frelimo’s
leadership role in the peace process, backed by an elite consensus. Frelimo’s
advantageous position, during and after the peace process, stems from its material
resources, organizational coherence, longevity and government experience. Renamo, as
the principle opposition, was also a coherent party in the peace process, although it
lacked Frelimo’s governing experience and resources. However, it is important to note
that the transitional institutions that were created to implement the peace process
“privileged political balance, decision-making on the basis of consensus, and equal
representation of the two parties based on their status as ex-combatants” (Manning, p.20).

**3(ix) Charismatic Leader:**

The peace process was contingent upon Mozambique’s transition to a multiparty
democracy, therefore requiring Renamo to transform from a guerrilla movement into a
legitimate political party. While neither Frelimo nor Renamo enjoyed mass popular
support during the peace process, Renamo’s leaders were relatively successful at
developing a consistent message and drawing large crowds at their rallies before the first
elections. This message emphasized Renamo’s dedication to democracy and
inclusiveness, along with the promise not to return to war. Furthermore, their use of
tradition and local leaders helped to legitimize the new party (Manning, 2002). The
leaders of both Frelimo and Renamo publicly espoused their dedication to sustaining
peace during the transition. Their leadership abilities were important in bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion. However, their internal legitimacy as heads of their organizations did not rely upon their personal charisma.

3(x) Internal Veto Players:

Renamo used its veto power on several occasions during the peace process. Over the course of negotiations, Renamo threatened to abandon talks with Frelimo, and during implementation, they came close to boycotting the first multiparty elections. However, Renamo’s use of threats, delays and complaints during the peace process were not the result of their opposition to the peace settlement. Rather, they resulted from Renamo’s need for financial, material and human resources in order to aid in their transition to a legitimate political organization. Manning (2002) points out that the “need for resources to make the shift from battlefield to political arena served Renamo well as a bargaining chip to renegotiate or guarantee certain details of the peace process” (p. 103). Overall, Renamo was extremely successful in gaining the material and financial support of the international community using these veto powers, but it never tried to use them to halt or reverse the peace process altogether. Renamo’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama, was wholly committed to, and indeed once the agreement was signed his political survival was dependent upon, the success of the process. The same could be said of President Chissano.

3(xi) External Veto Players:

External veto players did not try to impede the peace process. Those who in the past had an interest in destabilizing the country had themselves been the victims of history – the apartheid regime had ended in South Africa, and Zimbabwe had gained independence. The peace process in Mozambique was supported and funded by powerful international actors, which deterred other external veto players from attempting to impede the peace process.

3(xii) Root Causes of Conflict and Peace Treaty Negotiations:

Many of the driving factors of Mozambique’s civil war had disappeared prior to the beginning of the peace process, leaving Frelimo and Renamo in a stalemate. The Cold War had ended and regional actors were no longer trying to destabilize the country. A major component of the peace treaty called for the removal of all foreign troops from
Mozambique, which Frelimo and Renamo supported. (Zimbabwean troops had helped Frelimo secure the Beira corridor toward the end of the war). However, the underlying ethno-regional cleavages still existed, and the peace process mediators sought to address this division through dialogue, inclusiveness and reconciliation. While discussions of ethno-regional cleavages were taboo until the early 1990s, the negotiations centered on the establishment of democratic institutions and processes. Democratization was regarded as a way of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the political arena, while also opening up formal institutions of decision-making to previously marginalized groups. Since the first elections, in 1994, donors increasingly have called for further democratization through decentralization. Official documents from several major donors point to decentralization and local participation in public affairs as important factors in national reconciliation and integration.

3(xiii) Demilitarization, Demobilization, Repatriation and Reintegration:

The peace talks and subsequent peace treaty explicitly addressed the demilitarization and demobilization of warring groups, along with the repatriation of displaced persons. A series of peace commissions were put in place to implement the General Peace Accords, with a substantial role for the United Nations and key donor countries. The agreement established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) with the goal of overseeing demobilization and aiding in the establishment and integration of soldiers into a new national army. The talks and agreement realized the necessity of prompt demobilization and the establishment of a new national armed force as a prerequisite for successful elections (ONUMOZ).

In addition to this, the talks and agreement emphasized ONUMOZ’s role in the collaboration of military transformation with humanitarian assistance in order to reintegrate soldiers into civil society. Finally, the peace agreement “set out two objectives for international humanitarian assistance to Mozambique: to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger, whether they had taken refuge in neighboring countries or in provincial and district centres within Mozambique” (ONUMOZ).

3(xiv) Losers:

N/A
3(xv) Recurrence of Violence:

While the warring parties never returned to war, there were reports of violations of the ceasefire in the period immediately after the General Peace Accords took effect. However, by the second year of the peace process, the ceasefire had largely remained intact, and the violations that were formally recognized did not threaten the process. (ONUMOZ; Manning, 2002). There were no major incidents of political violence in the period under consideration.

3(xvi) Change in Economic Structure:

There was a significant change in Mozambique’s economic structure after the end of the civil war. In conjunction with its dependence on international aid, the government adopted a package of neoliberal economic policies and subsequently became “a kind of poster child first for structural adjustment and then for the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief initiative” (Manning, p.8). The extent of economic change after the conflict was a significant deviation from Frelimo’s socialist economic policies during the previous decades, although the government had begun to take steps towards economic liberalization before the peace process. Pitcher (2002) points out that, since the peace accord in 1992, the “government no longer controls the commanding heights of the economy. It does not set exchange rates, nor subsidize consumer items, nor engage in detailed planning” (p.126). Furthermore, the process of privatization, “the single most important and controversial component of economic transition,” was substantially bolstered after the conflict ended (p.126). The government has privatized companies from all sectors of Mozambique’s economy. However, despite Mozambique’s relative economic success after the conflict, its inherited economic disparities, which coincide with ethno-regional cleavages, continued to exist. This has resulted in the continuation of uneven regional development.

There also tension between the types of donor funding for economic activities, which can undermine the coordination of economic policy-making, especially considering the high level of aid dependency. This tension is evident in the disagreement among donors on the long-term merits of providing budget support versus the economic benefits of curbing inflation or lowering deficits. Therefore, the structure of
Mozambique’s economy has changed drastically since before the war and inconsistent policies reflect, to a degree, the larger disagreements in donor perspectives and goals.

Section 3: External Variables – Military Intervention and Democracy Promotion

A. External Intervention

1. Parameters of the Intervention

1(i) Start of Intervention:

The intervention in Mozambique officially started on October 15, 1992, with the arrival of Aldo Ajello, the United Nation’s interim Special Representative for Mozambique and 21 military observers. This was also the day that the General Peace Agreement was set to become active (ONUMOZ). However, it is important to note that there was growing external involvement before the peace process formally began, especially by the IMF, US and like-minded group, primarily the Swedes.

1(ii) State of War at Time of Intervention:

The intervention began after the government and Renamo had signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992. The mandate of ONUMOZ formally stipulated that it would remain in Mozambique from December of 1992 to December of 1994. The state of war at the time had become a virtual stalemate among both parties.

1(iii) Mandate:

The intervention in Mozambique had a clear mandate for ONUMOZ. This mandate consisted of numerous measures to address the military, political, electoral and humanitarian components of Mozambique’s transition to peace. Furthermore, the mandate emphasized the interrelatedness of these four components. ONUMOZ was to enforce and monitor the ceasefire agreement, including demobilization and disarmament of warring parties, including private armed groups. In addition to this military component, the mandate required that ONUMOZ oversee the withdrawal of foreign military and monitor security for crucial infrastructures and international activities. The political and electoral components of the mandate called for ONUMOZ to supervise and support the electoral process. Finally, ONUMOZ, through its humanitarian component,
UNOHAC, was to manage humanitarian missions aimed at addressing the problems associated with displaced persons, demobilization and the affected Mozambican population (ONUMOZ).

1(iv) Leadership of Intervention:

There was extensive involvement from the United Nations, bilateral donors, and numerous NGOs in Mozambique’s intervention. As the single organization with the largest footprint in the country and a formal mandate to oversee the transition to peace and formal democracy, the leader of the intervention was the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This leadership did not change during the course of the intervention. Still, neither the ONUMOZ mandate nor the way that mandate was implemented extended to the full range of challenges of the transition process. The SRSG faced problems within ONUMOZ created by rivalries and differing agendas within the different elements of ONUMOZ. As a result, bilateral donors and the UNDP took on necessary tasks not covered by ONUMOZ, although the UNDP provided a coordinating role between the CNE/STAE and the donors in the electoral process. However, all recognized ONUMOZ as playing the leading role in the transition overall.

1(v) States and Intervention:

There was general agreement by all actors involved in the peace process, including the government and Renamo as well as the external actors, that there should be international involvement in its implementation. The government of Mozambique initially balked at the size of the intervention, but in the wake of the Angola debacle the UN Security Council insisted on a robust mandate and presence, and the UN prevailed. Relations between the government the ONUMOZ were never particularly warm during the intervention and were increasingly strained as time went on. But this did not prevent ONUMOZ from fulfilling its mandate effectively.

The major donor countries included the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, who helped to finance the implementation of the peace agreement, with Italy playing a key role in organizing and financing the peace process. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also played a role in the implementation of the Agreement, as a member of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was the committee responsible for guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA (ONUMOZ)
Involvement by the “like-minded group” of Scandinavians was aimed at stabilizing the peace agreement by providing aid for social and economic reforms designated to soften the effects of structural adjustment requirements (Suhrke and Buckmaster, 2005). Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005) point out that, unlike other cases of intervention, in Mozambique, “there was a core of donor-government consensus on the need for budgetary outlays to institute social reforms and use economic policy...to soften the effects of the structural adjustment demands” (pp.16-17). Overall, strong and dedicated donor support for Mozambique’s transition to peace reflected the country’s symbolic position as a “test-case” for international aid and stabilization (p.18).

1(vi) Capacities of Intervention:

Mozambique’s international visibility, along with its significance as a “test-case” for intervention resulted in a large, stable infusion of aid from the donor countries. The active commitment of the donor countries and the United Nations (together with the connections and leadership style of SRSG Aldo Ajello) gave ONUMOZ a high capacity to monitor and implement the comprehensive security, military, political, humanitarian and economic components of the peace agreement.

1(vii) Coordination:

Most observers attribute at least part of the extraordinary success of this intervention to an unusual level of donor coordination and donor interest. This is in spite of the UN’s own problems and the UNDP’s inability to provide leadership for aid coordination during the war.

During the war, Barnes (1998) identifies the coordination of aid as one of “government-led” coordination, in which the government establishes mechanisms of interface and oversight for humanitarian interventions and missions. However, during the peace process, this situation transformed into a “donor-driven” coordination process. The coordination of external actors was characterized by “inter-agency rivalry, divergent donor views on the roles and responsibilities of the State, subjective personality clashes, bureaucratic delays and careerism of individuals” (Barnes 1998, p.7). Additionally, there were tensions and lack of coordination between UN agencies operating in Mozambique, including intra-agency rivalry between the UNDP, ONUMOZ, UNOHAC, UNICEF and WFP. As Barnes points out, this rivalry created a space for NGOs and bilateral countries
to work outside of governmental and UN operations. This situation undermined coordination efforts, thereby creating a kind of dual system of external intervention between the UN and donor countries, also reducing the role of government oversight in Mozambique’s humanitarian programs. In particular, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs created a “parallel bureaucracy” which, according to Jett, “did not just duplicate the efforts of other UN agencies and dozens of NGOs already active on the ground. It actually served to slow and even block donor efforts to deal with problems on a real-time basis.” (Jett, 1995) For example, UNOHAC, which was ONUMOZ’s humanitarian component, was often more of an obstacle in demining and reintegration missions. Jett (1999) attributes UNOHAC’s lack of success to bureaucratic struggles and policies (p.91). Donor dissatisfaction with UNOHAC was one of the factors that led donors to come together to play the major role in the reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

Another aspect of coordination that faced logistical difficulties was that of the ONUMOZ mission’s military continents. Originating from 22 different countries, “the capabilities among these units varied greatly. Engineering and logistical units were often deployed without the equipment or training to accomplish their tasks” (Jett 1999, 85). Furthermore, the ability of infantry units varied widely. The same can be said for CIVPOL, the UN policing operation during the peace process. While CIVPOL was brought in to ensure police neutrality and stability, they accomplished little, as a result of the lack of “language skills, the qualifications, or the inclination to curb police abuse” (Jett 1999, p.86). Overall, the diversity in military and policing ability and performance and the UN’s difficulty in adjusting for these differences resulted in impediments to coordination in these aspects of ONUMOZ’s mission. These weaknesses did not impair the consolidation of peace, in part because neither the government nor Renamo had a better alternative to adhering to the peace process. It is not clear what might have happened had ONUMOZ faced any serious military challenge from either side. While Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama made threats about returning to war, these constituted more of a diplomatic than a military challenge for SRSG Ajello and the intervention force.

1(viii) Objectives of Intervention:
The mandate of ONUMOZ specified four interrelated objectives of the intervention. A central component for the implementation of the peace agreement was the establishment of multiparty elections. Militarily, the intervention was to monitor and implement the ceasefire, secure infrastructures, demobilize and disarm the warring forces, while simultaneously creating a unified national army. In addition to establishing transparent multiparty elections, other non-military objectives of the intervention included providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons (ONUMOZ).

The ultimate political objective of the intervention was to oversee a transition to multiparty politics, and the mandate of ONUMOZ included several actions to prepare and provide political guidance for Mozambique’s first democratic elections. The Office of the Special Representative (SRSG) was to oversee and direct the political objectives. A National Elections Commission would organize the electoral process, while ONUMOZ’s Electoral Division would monitor it. The GPA called for presidential and legislative elections within one year of the signing of the agreement, although this timetable was eventually extended an additional year, to be held in 1994. The political mandate provided for electoral technical assistance, such as voter registration and finance, the creation and development of political parties. It would also oversee the negotiation and development of Electoral Law, and work to ensure the necessary conditions for free and fair elections (ONUMOZ).

Military objectives of the intervention were closely related to the political, electoral and humanitarian objectives. First and foremost, ONUMOZ would monitor the ceasefire arrangement, thereby ensuring “the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons.” Additionally, the military objectives called for the monitoring of foreign troop withdrawal, disbanding armed groups and providing security for necessary infrastructures and activities within the country (ONUMOZ).

The two primary objectives of the intervention’s humanitarian mission, led by UNOHAC, were “to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger,” whether within or outside of Mozambique. In many ways, the humanitarian objectives built on military aspects of the intervention in that they would aid in the reintegration of approximately 100,000 soldiers into civil
society. These humanitarian missions would provide food and assistance to former soldiers, along with training, counseling and employment opportunities (ONUMOZ).

Aside from the primary objectives of ONUMOZ, bilateral donors funded outside projects which emphasized other factors, such as the development of institutional infrastructure, public services and administration, rule of law and civil society. More recent objectives of intervention have been geared toward decentralization efforts.

1(x) Exit Strategy of Intervention:

There was a well-defined time frame for the intervention. When the United Nations established ONUMOZ on December 16, 1992, its mandate was initially set to end on October 31, 1993. However, this timetable was revised in order to secure the demobilization of troops before the holding of elections. Therefore, the revised timetable called for the mandate of ONUMOZ to end after the elections, on December 9, 1994. Although Mozambique’s Parliament and President assumed power at the end of 1994, “ONUMOZ continued to carry out residual functions until the Mission was fully liquidated at the end of January 1995” (ONUMOZ). When the mission ended, most observers agreed it had accomplished its goals.

2: Election Monitoring

2(i) International Election Monitoring:

During the intervention, Mozambique’s first elections were subject to international election monitoring, primarily by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. In October of 1994, according to a report by ONUMOZ, the international community sent approximately 2,300 electoral observers to monitor the presidential and parliamentary elections. While a majority of election observers were from the United Nations, there were also observers from other organizations, including OAU, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA) and the European Union. While there was no human rights component to the mission, measures were taken by ONUMOZ and the other election observers to ensure that elections were free, fair and conducted peacefully, without fraud or intimidation. Therefore, before and after the elections, Mozambique’s political and human rights conditions were being monitored by United Nations operations, but only with respect to the election climate. The findings were made public in numerous sources.
3: Military Aspects of the Intervention

3(i) Origin of Troops for Intervention:

The military aspects of intervention were primarily carried out by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. ONUMOZ deployed military observers, UN military forces and civilian police during the intervention. The UN drew over 6,000 military contingents from approximately 22 countries, (Jett, pp. 83-4). Overall, according to a UN Security Council Report, countries with the highest troop contributions to ONUMOZ were Bangladesh, with 1,443 troops, 1,022 Italian troops, and 919 Indian troops. Other contributors included Uruguay and Zambia, with 845 troops and 874 troops, respectively. Botswana and Portugal, among others, also provided troops for the intervention (UN, 1994).

3(ii): Personnel:

ONUMOZ’s personnel strength was comprised of 6,625 military personnel, including troops and support personnel, 1,144 civilian police and 354 military observers. Furthermore, there were 506 local and 355 international staff personnel. Finally, during the 1994 elections, there were 2,300 international election observers, with 900 observers from ONUMOZ (UN).

3(iii) Resources for Intervention:

Financial support for military intervention in Mozambique was extensive and set precedents in the pattern of international aid for war termination. At the 1992 donors meeting, Mozambique requested US $402 million for reconstruction in the first postwar phase. ONUMOZ reports a total gross expenditure of US $492.6 million and net expenditure of USD $486.7 million for the duration of the intervention. The UN funds to implement its military operations in Mozambique came from the country’s key donor countries, which included the U.S., France, Italy, the U.K., Germany and Portugal. However, Italy not only played an integral role in the peace negotiations, but it contributed the largest amount of financial resources to the intervention (Suhrke and Buckmaster, 2005).

Advanced authorizations, which allowed donors to provide funds up front, without first going through a bureaucratic budget amendment process, were a primary characteristic of aid administration (UNDP, April 1995). As a result, through the
combined efforts of ONUMOZ and the major bilateral donors, resources were readily available when needed. There were several stumbling points along the way where quick injection of resources by donors made the difference between continued progress and stalemate. One was in the demobilization of Renamo troops, another was in training party poll monitors, another was bilateral donor intervention to convince Dhlakama to renounce his electoral boycott. Many more examples could be cited.

As Jett points out, the availability of resources for its transition had much to do with the fact that Mozambique had during the war a committed group of donor countries willing to do what was necessary to make this work. These countries (mainly the Nordics) had supported Mozambique as a bulwark against the South African apartheid regime and out of ideological commitment to a social democratic model. Their support was critical after the war as well.

3(iv) Coordination for International Troops:

Because the troops were largely consolidated under ONUMOZ, rather than being dispersed among a variety of bilateral donors, there was a high degree of coordination in the military intervention. Furthermore, the UN chaired the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), which was primarily responsible for enacting military and security tasks. The UN had learned through the collapse of the Angola peace process that it was necessary to complete military changes before holding elections (AWEPA, 1993). Although there were logistical delays in sending UN troops to Mozambique, the effort was relatively cohesive once they were fully deployed in May of 1993 (ONUMOZ). The primary coordination problem for international troops resulted from variation in the capacities and resources of troops among the military contingencies. However, the UN’s dedication to implementing military tasks in order to hold elections, along with that of the donor countries, coupled with the desire to make Mozambique an example of a successful transition from war to peace in light of failures in Somalia and Angola, resulted in a highly coordinated military intervention.

3(v) Robust Mandate:

The military mandate of ONUMOZ was robust and comprehensive. Refer to Section 4:1v(iii) for the scope and objectives of the mandate.

3(vi) Peace and Military Intervention:
As the warring parties had reached a stalemate before the military intervention, and because they were both generally dedicated to implementing the ceasefire agreement, the military intervention was less an operation of coercion, and more an operation of monitoring and implementation. ONUMOZ did have coercive power and did have a role in providing security to the country, but, as the UN report on ONUMOZ points out, the violations of the ceasefire were relatively rare and did not compromise the peace process. An article in the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin points out that the role of ONUMOZ lies somewhere between observers and peacekeepers (AWEPA, 1993). Armed military observers from ONUMOZ were primarily responsible for securing trading routes and were not to use force or violence in their operations (AWEPA). According to Jett (1999), the primary objective of the armed contingents “was to provide security along the main transportation corridors…Providing security for the transportation corridors was essential at the start of ONUMOZ, to ensure that they remained open and to allow the Zimbabwean and Malawian troops that had been guarding them to leave” (p.83). However, beyond this role, as Jett points out, the objectives of foreign troops was ambiguous and unclear (Jett 1999, p.84).

3(vii) Concrete Measures of External Actors:

ONUMOZ did implement many of the military operations of the mandate, although the operation was delayed due to logistical difficulties. According to the UN report on ONUMOZ, United Nations forces provided security for roads and transportation facilities, arm depots, state infrastructures and the ONUMOZ headquarters. The military observers also investigated accusations of ceasefire violations from both parties and oversaw the troop cantonment process. There were several delays in the demobilization of Renamo and government forces, but this process began in January of 1994. In cooperation with the humanitarian assistance component of ONUMOZ, military observers worked with UNOHAC to secure the resettlement and reintegration of 200,000 former combatants by 1994. Furthermore, by February of 1994, all 49 assembly areas for demobilization operations were operational. In the same year, ONUMOZ also established three training facilities to aid in the creation of a new Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM), which had trained approximately 2,000 soldiers by April. Despite many delays in the demobilization of soldiers, in August of 1994, the Secretary-General
reported that this process was almost complete, and that elections were to remain on schedule for October. As noted above, ONUMOZ also oversaw the electoral process.

Therefore, ONUMOZ succeeded in implementing the concrete measures of the mandate, to different degrees, despite many delays and obstacles during the operation. The establishment of CIVPOL, at the beginning of 1994, was not in the initial mandate of ONUMOZ, but circumstances in Mozambique shifted the need from monitoring the ceasefire arrangement to monitoring police activity and ensuring civil rights. The timeline was adjusted on several occasions, and the elections were pushed back a year, yet, military observers largely fulfilled their duties to monitor and implement the military components of the peace agreement.

4. A: Intrusiveness

4(i) Legislative Power and Intervention:

The interveners did not assume legislative power at any time in Mozambique’s transition.

4(ii) Constitution and Intervention:

The General Peace Agreement, signed by Frelimo and Renamo and mediated by powerful international actors, set rules for the establishment of a multiparty system with presidential and parliamentary elections. The agreement also stipulated that international observers would monitor and provide assistance for the elections. The interveners also had an indirect role in negotiations over the implementation of some provisions in the constitution and peace accords. Although Frelimo had revised the Constitution in 1990 to provide for the establishment of a multiparty democracy, both parties’ dependence on the international community, coupled with strong international pressure for multiparty elections, drove the Multiparty Conference, which established Mozambique’s electoral law. Donors funded but did not participate in this conference, which suffered from a series of deadlocks and collapses before finally reaching consensus on the electoral law. The final impasse “was only broken with the visit of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when Chissano and Dhlakama met to resolve a number of issues” (Manning, p.178). However, in contrast to some other cases, the interveners did not have a hand in drafting the constitution or the laws that governed implementation issues.
During and after the intervention, various donors, primarily Denmark, have provided assistance for areas such as rule of law and legal code.

4(iii) Executive Power and Intervention:

The interveners did not assume executive power in Mozambique’s transition, either formally or informally.

4(iv) Economic Policies and Intervention:

The Frelimo government began enacting economic liberalization reforms in the years before the war ended. However, the government’s dependence on international aid during and after intervention was tied to government enactment of economic reforms, including privatization and a revised role of the state in economic policy. Hall and Young (1997) point out that, by 1994, “although the Great Powers continued to be generous with aid, the details of their shaping of economic policy included the insistence on the introduction of value added tax, the lifting of all price controls, direct constraints on subsidies to public enterprise, the complete restructuring of the banking system…and the compulsory sale of state companies” (Hall and Young 1997: 227). Therefore, the interveners did not shape economic policy themselves, but made aid contingent upon the government’s adoption of these policies and reforms. (See Section 4)

4(v) Executive Policing:

A CIVPOL (civilian police) component was added to the ONUMOZ mission. The CIVPOL contingent, consisting of 1,086 civilian police from 29 countries, was responsible for monitoring the behavior of the Mozambican police. Neither CIVPOL nor other interveners ever took on an executive policing role themselves.

4(vi) Level of Intrusiveness:

While one would be hard pressed to say ONUMOZ had a light footprint in Mozambique – due to its sheer size and multifaceted character, neither was ONUMOZ acting as a surrogate state. Mozambique’s domestic sovereignty was never formally suspended, and the UN did not serve as a transitional authority, as the Frelimo government retained power during the transition process. It is important to note that international intrusiveness in Mozambique was unique in many ways, setting precedents in international financial support. Financial incentives and the establishment of a trust fund to aid in Renamo’s transition to a formal political party are two examples of new
forms of financial support in war termination (Manning 2002, p.30). The use of incentives in exchange for participation was coupled with the UN comprehensive mandate that required active participation in implementing the peace agreement.

B: Diplomacy, normative pressure and persuasion

1(i) Diplomatic Pressure and Democratization:

One could identify many forms of diplomatic or peer pressure on various actors in this period. Much of the external pressure was directed at sustaining Renamo’s cooperation and participation in the transition to democracy. Moreover, this pressure was rarely purely normative or diplomatic, as it often coincided with financial incentives and resources. However, Mozambique’s international visibility during its transition, and the extensive involvement of powerful international actors in the peace process undoubtedly put pressure on internal actors to democratize.

1(ii) Verbal Pressure and Interaction:

In the period leading up to the first democratic elections, there was close interaction between both Frelimo and Renamo and external actors, along with extensive forms of persuasion. Renamo, in particular, had developed close ties with the international community. Renamo leaders have consistently achieved political goals by making demands to the Frelimo government with the expectation that the international donors would act as the guarantors of those demands. Both parties counted on the involvement of international persuasion during the peace process.

In addition to the role of international persuasion, external actors played a crucial role in developing and sustaining patterns of domestic elite interaction. As Manning (2002) points out, this externally driven interaction between Frelimo and Renamo “helped to build trust and allowed them to play out some of their fears, while the international community was there to serve as a referee of the peace process” (p.213). The like-minded group was particularly important in this sense, by providing guidance and assistance to both parties, and working closely with the government. In essence, the international community used both carrots and sticks in order to build confidence and ease uncertainties in the new system.

C: Modes of Interaction between Internal and External Actors

1(i) Preferences of Interveners:
The interveners were essentially united in their interests and goals for Mozambique’s transition from war to peace. International actors viewed political stability via the establishment of a democratic political system as integral to ending conflict in Mozambique. They pushed for the creation of a competitive multiparty democracy, and the peace agreement outlined the institutional framework for the new political system, including majoritarian presidential elections and parliamentary elections based on proportional representation. Furthermore, previous interventions in other countries had led to the realization that security components of the transition to peace are necessary preconditions for securing a stable political and electoral environment.

Although not explicitly included in the settlement, the continuation of aid after Mozambique’s transition would be based on the enactment of economic liberalization reforms as well as continued progress on democratization. While political liberalization reforms have become the standard norm for transitions to peace in the post-Cold War environment, Mozambique represents one of the initial cases to which the approach of peace building via democratization was applied. As a result, these goals were relatively ambitious and the peace process in Mozambique thus became a model for future peace-building efforts.

1(ii): Preferences of State Elites

The state elites in Mozambique, or the ruling Frelimo government, set their preferences around the imperatives of war termination and the establishment of a multiparty democracy. Therefore, during the peacebuilding process, state elites sought stability and sustained power. However, they also realized that concessions to Renamo, and international support, were necessary for a successful transition to peace. Frelimo expected to retain power in a winner-take-all multiparty democracy, and expected the international community to monitor and secure the transition. Frelimo of course had internal party divisions, notably between the “technocrats” and “ideologues” (the latter are often referred to as the party’s ‘historic generation’ and include leaders of the armed struggle and the early years of party formation). However, Frelimo was at this time a party with considerable discipline and elite unity on the big issues, despite (or perhaps because of) the tradition of permitting internal dissent. Once President Chissano had
taken the party through the process of discussing peace negotiations with Renamo (though these were underway before any open debate) and through the process of rewriting the constitution to establish multiparty democracy, there was no question of anyone within the party attempting to steer a different course.

1(iii): Preferences of Peripheral Elites –

Here we refer to the main opposition party, Renamo. Renamo cannot be considered as peripheral elites. They are the main and official opposition party and as such are viewed by many donors as essential to sustaining momentum in the democratization process.

Renamo’s preferences during the peace process revolved around their transition into a legitimate, formal political party. As a result, Renamo expected to gain economic resources, from the international community, in order to fund this transformation before the first democratic elections. Renamo’s goal of maximizing power within the Mozambican government set their preferences during the peace process. Dhlakama himself seemed to be strongly motivated by the desire to legitimate Renamo’s armed struggle and to cast himself and his party as democrats. He wanted and needed the approval of international donors in order to succeed in these goals.

1(iv) Constraints of Interveners:

The work of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was subject to cost and time constraints as well as those dictated by its mandate. When ONUMOZ was established on 3 December 1992, its mandate was to last until 31 October of 1993, after the full implementation of the GPA’s military components and the holding of elections (ONUMOZ). Because setting up conditions for successful elections was the central focus of the mandate, implementing the four components of the mandate were required before holding multiparty elections. However, after a series of delays and difficulties, the mandate’s timetable was extended until January of 1995, after the general elections, which were to be held in October of 1994.

Disagreements and the general lack of trust between Frelimo and Renamo were a primary cause of the delay in military intervention, and, consequently, a delay in elections. Interveners were constrained by Renamo’s numerous threats to boycott the peace process, stemming from resource and security insecurities, which could have
unraveled the tenuous peace settlement (AWEPA, 1993). Furthermore, economic constraints on UN operations resulted from difficulties in extracting funds from donor countries; however, the establishment of a UN trust fund largely helped to alleviate these economic constraints. The UN created two trust funds, one to aid in Renamo’s transition to a political party and another to provide funds to all political parties that would be participating in the first multiparty elections. While donor coordination was problematic in many areas, Ball and Barnes note that donors were generally pleased with the UNDP’s coordination, transparency and organization of electoral assistance. These factors, along with the flexible nature of the trust funds, provided donors with the ability to reassure Renamo and “reduce tensions between Renamo and the Government.” (Ball and Barnes 2000)

1(v) Constraints of State Elites in interacting with interveners:

The interactions of both state and opposition elites with interveners were shaped by the country’s situation of economic dependence. As expected, Frelimo’s ruling position since independence provided the party with more security and resources, while Renamo was confronted with the simultaneous insecurities of the lack of organization and resources, demobilization and transformation into a political party. The government needed to continue its good relationship with donors for continued progress on economic and political reforms and forward progress on peace implementation. The government of Mozambique had developed strong and positive working relationships with its major donors by this time, and this facilitated the job of the interveners in this period. Renamo relied upon external donors for its very survival, and support for the party’s transformation was negotiated in Rome during the peace talks. Interveners in general had excellent access to both the government and Renamo, and this access is often credited for Mozambique’s success.

1(vi) Bargaining between Interveners and State Elites:

Frelimo and Renamo both accepted the terms of the political settlement and the goal of establishing a multiparty democracy in Mozambique. As both parties had reached a military stalemate in the years before intervention began, they each sought out support from the international community and neither opposed the strong intervention program that the General Peace Accords mandated. Moreover, both parties not only agreed on
democratization as an essential part of the peace process but competed with one another to see who could portray themselves as the greater champion of democracy.

1(vii) Veto Players in Domestic System:

Renamo had the capacity to act – and did act -- as a veto player in the peace process by threatening to abandon negotiations and seeking resources and protection in exchange for their cooperation in the process (Stedman, 2000). Renamo’s use of threats and boycotts prolonged, but did not compromise, the peace process. Shortly after the UN peacekeepers arrived in Mozambique, Renamo began a three-month boycott of the implementation. However, by offering inducements for participation in the peace process via financial assistance and the socialization of Renamo, the international community, particularly the UN, prevented Renamo from blocking the process (Stedman, 2000). Remano’s spoiler position stemmed from its insecurities in transitioning from a rebel faction into a formal political party, rather opposition to democracy or peace.

1(viii) Change Agents in Domestic System:

Both Frelimo and Renamo had strategic reasons to support democracy, even before the peace process. According to Manning (2002), “democracy had long served as a rallying cry, however hollow, for Renamo. The Frelimo government began a process of political liberalization in the late 1980s that allowed it, too, to don the mantle of democracy by the time peace talks began” (p.209). Therefore, both parties served as “change agents,” similar in their goals of gaining international support, but different in their relative motivations behind their calls for democracy.

Civil society organizations, though relatively new, were also active supporters of the transition to democracy and the implementation of the peace agreement.

1(ix) Costs of Adaptation for Democratization:

The distributional costs of democratization differed between Frelimo and Renamo. Understanding the link between international aid and multiparty democracy, both parties embraced democracy, yet the particular institutional arrangement for the new system was a prolonged point of contention during the transition to peace. Fearing a loss of power, Frelimo sustained a minimalist interpretation of the General Peace Accords, while Remano, seeking to maximize their formal political role, offered broad interpretations of the agreement (Manning, 2002). This disconnect in elite interests
dictated the pattern of negotiations leading up to the first elections. However, the resulting political settlement offered no real provision for power sharing in the new political system. This ultimately benefited Frelimo, who, as the ruling party since independence, had the resources, history and experience to gain from a centralized, presidential system. Meanwhile, Renamo depended on international funding to finance its transformation into a political party and build its political organization.

That said, the cost to each of the parties of the democratic transition failing was far higher than any costs incurred by successful adaptation.

D: Linkage, Integration, Convergence:

1(i) Geographical Linkage:

With the exception of Botswana, other countries in Southern African were not democratic during the period of Mozambique’s intervention and transition to peace. South Africa’s first democratic elections, marking the end of apartheid, were held in 1994, the same year as Mozambique’s first elections. Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had become increasingly authoritarian under Robert Mugabe. Nevertheless, Mozambique had strong links to Zimbabwe and had suffered tremendous economic consequences for its support of the liberation struggle led by Mugabe against the Rhodesian government.

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democratic rule was a significant factor contributing to the end of Mozambique’s war. South Africa also probably served as an important reference for Mozambique during its own transition period. On a personal level, the widow of Mozambique’s slain post-independence leader Samora Machel, Graça Machel, became romantically linked in this period (and eventually married) to South African president Nelson Mandela. This linkage only helped to cement the bond between the two countries, and there were numerous instances in which South Africa lent diplomatic support to the peace efforts in Mozambique both before and after the signing of the agreement.

1(ii) Spill-Over Effects and Democratization:

Spill-over effects do help to explain Mozambique’s civil conflict, including the mutual stalemate that Frelimo and Renamo reached as a result of fading support by regional neighbors for either party. See above discussion of South Africa. Rather, with
the end of the Cold War both parties understood that a transition to democracy would ensure international aid and support, and the international community sought to make Mozambique’s transition to peace an example, in light of the recent failure in Angola.

1(iii) Political/Diplomatic Linkage:

Mozambique had long been an active member of SADC and the Frontline States. It had very strong relations with Zimbabwe. As noted above, the country’s links with South Africa were significant and these were important during the peace process.

In addition, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe episodically played a key mediating role during Mozambique’s peace negotiations and Zimbabwe’s SADC countries as a group were firm and vocal in their commitment to the success of Mozambique’s peace process from 1992 onward, and this visible and credible commitment must be considered an important factor in shaping the considerations of the Mozambican government and opposition alike.

1(iv) Economic Linkage:

Mozambique has been a member of SADC and the Frontline States since the inception of those organizations. It plays an important economic role in the region due to its transportation connections with landlocked countries in the interior and has traditionally been an important outlet to the sea for those countries’ exports. During Zimbabwe’s war for independence, Mozambique’s refusal to ship Rhodesian exports was a notable contribution to that country’s liberation.

During Mozambique’s civil war, Zimbabwean, Malawian and Botswanan troops helped the Mozambican government to secure the Beira corridor, which connects the deep water port at the central Mozambican city of Beira to Zimbabwe.

1(v) Social/Cultural Linkage:

There was no preexisting tradition of representative democracy on a national scale. Both sides embraced the rhetoric and practice of democracy after the fall of the Berlin wall, when it became evident that continued aid and good relations with the developed world depended on it.

1(vi) Technological/Communication Linkage:

This was pre-internet. Renamo had no shortwave radio station or other mass communication. It made its case through paid lobbyists and external representatives
situated in Washington, Lisbon, Bonn, and London. The government of Mozambique had a formidable public relations capacity which enabled it to maintain ‘information dominance’ about the war for many years, even after the war ended. The Mozambique Information Agency provided monthly reports, and cooperantes (cooperators) from Nordic countries, Canada, and elsewhere maintained newsletters and journals that provided sympathetic reports of the Frelimo government’s travails during the war.

1(vii) Civil Society Linkage:

Many of the major civil society organizations were begun by people who had connections to the ruling party or had served in government, but they formed these organizations because of frustration or dissatisfaction with government policies.

1(viii) Integration:

Mozambique was a member of the Front-Line States, the United Nations, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Along with this, Mozambique had joined the World Bank and IMF in 1984, and, in 1987, launched the IMF-driven structural adjustment program. Other economic and social institutions, such as ECOSOC, FAO, WFP, IDA, ILO and WHO also operated in Mozambique.

E. International Events:

1(i): Events on the International Scene:

International events had a primary role in shaping the goals and strategies of external actors. The post-Cold War trends of negotiation, liberalization and democratization in conflict resolution had become the dogma of international peacebuilding efforts (Manning, 2002). Furthermore, after the recent peacebuilding debacles in Somalia and Angola, the UN was dedicated to making Mozambique an international example of a successful peace process (Hall and Young, 1997). Finally, the democratic transition in South Africa was decisive, as was the general trend in the sub-region of states moving toward democratization. These factors resulted in a comprehensive UN operation in monitoring and implementing the General Peace Agreement, along with unprecedented amounts of aid to fund the transition.

Section 4: Development and Democracy Promotion

A. Aid/Democracy financial and technical assistance after the war
1(i) Most important donors:

The country’s major donors in this period were the UN, US, EU, Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, Germany. The UN, EU, US and UK, the Scandinavian countries, Netherlands, among others were particularly engaged in the electoral process. The UN, Italy, US, and a number of other donors provided support for political party capacity building. France, Portugal and the UK were the major donors supporting the creation of a new, unified armed forces of Mozambique. SEE TABLE FOR BREAKDOWN OF DONOR AMOUNTS BY COUNTRY FOR 1993-94.

The securing of donor support for Mozambique’s peace process was first broached at the country’s Donor Conference in December 1992, in Rome. The principal concern was funding for the electoral process, which the government of Mozambique had estimated would cost $78 million US dollars. This was eventually revised downward to $60 million. Still, country representatives of donor agencies had to scramble to convince their home governments to arrange support for such a costly process. All told, donors paid $55 million of the $60 million cost of the 1994 elections. The government of Mozambique put up the other $5 million. (Jett, 1999: 110) The total aid pledged at that conference, and a followup meeting held in Paris in June 1993, amounted to $450 million. The government had initially requested $412 million. (Ball and Barnes, 2000, 177). Support for electoral processes and reintegration of demobilized soldiers amounted to US $137.9 million. The remainder was for emergency aid and reintegration of displaced persons and returning refugees.4

The US was a member of the Democracy Assistance Group (GAD) (later renamed the Electoral Process Support Group), a group of bilateral and multilateral major donors which was formed in 1992 to “provide the desired financial support for important discrete activities and programs considered necessary for the social and economic development of the country.”5 (Turner in Mazula, 1995: 651) GAD was broader in scope than the Electoral Process Monitoring Group (GAD’s successor), and was aimed at facilitating

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4 This included seed and tool kits, transport and other logistic support, primary health care and nutrition, education, water supply, support to vulnerable groups, repair of roads and bridges, social and productive activities, and “institutional support” (Ball and Barnes 2002: 178)

5 GAD’s principals were the US, UNDP, EU, World Bank, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. These countries already had some experience with donor coordination, as members of the ‘Emergency Program’ donor group, which had been providing emergency relief to Mozambique for several years. (Turner, 1995: 651)
and coordinating funding necessary to implement the peace process. Members of the
group were primarily interested in technical and logistical support for elections, electoral
and civic education, and democratization programs broadly defined. Nevertheless, there
was an understanding on the part of Mozambique’s major donors (an understanding that
was reinforced by Angola’s failed peace process just a few months before Mozambique’s
donor conference) that they needed to concern themselves with securing the peace, if
democracy was to have a chance. Thus support for demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration were viewed, and pitched to home governments, as part and parcel of
supporting the electoral process in Mozambique.

The Democracy Assistance Group later became the Electoral Process Monitoring
Group. This group was comprised of a group of 15 or so donors who met bi-monthly and
then weekly as elections approached to coordinate technical and financial assistance for
the elections. Among these donors the EC delegation in Mozambique played a leading
role. Note that at the Rome conference and afterward, this group was vocal in pointing
out shortcomings in the plans for financing the implementation of the peace process.
According to the SRSG’s report on the Donor’s Conference, “The Working Group on the
Electoral Process stressed the importance of a long-term approach in the electoral field,
facilitating capacity-building…” Specifically, the group pointed out at the Rome
Donor’s Conference (1992-93) that there was no funding provided for political parties.
Italy took the lead on discussing this issue with parties to work out a plan to provide such
aid. From this, the two trust funds (one for Renamo’s transformation, one to support all
parties’ campaigns) were born.

Though ONUMOZ had primary responsibility for overseeing the implementation
of the peace process, financial and technical support bilateral donors and specialized UN
agencies were essential to the successful implementation process. The level of
cooperation achieved among such a wide range of bilateral donors and the UN – though
hard won -- was unprecedented and was a key factor in success. ONUMOZ was limited
both by its mandate and by resource constraints, and strictly limited its involvement or

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6 SRSG, “Document 28: Letter dated 30 December 1992 from Italy transmitting the conclusions of the
Donors Conference for Mozambique, held in Rome on 15 and 16 December 1992,” S/25044, 4 January
1995), 159.
the sharing of its equipment and other resources for other parts of the electoral process with which it was specifically tasked (ONUMOZ priorities were electoral observation and administration). Bilateral donors stepped in at many points during the implementation and electoral processes to offer support where ONUMOZ could not. For example, USAID funded CARE and IRI to provide training for political party poll monitors. USAID and others supported the training and fielding of domestic observer groups as well as additional civic education. Some also provided support for Renamo beyond the UN-administered trust fund for that party. For instance, the Swiss purchased 25-30 flats in Maputo to house Renamo officials and supporters. The US embassy and the Swiss provided vocational training to former Renamo officers and soldiers. These bilateral actors not only achieved an unaccustomed degree of coordination among themselves with respect to goals and activities in support of the political transition, they also succeeded in limiting the government’s ability to ‘divide and conquer’ the donor community by speaking with one voice on the most important issues of implementation.

Baseline: In the early 1980s, Mozambique’s economy was in free fall, owing to drought, war, and disastrous policy decisions. The GNP fell by roughly 9% per year from 1980 to 1986, in real terms. In 1987, GNP per capita was about $150, and debt repayments were roughly 60% of exports in 1988. In 1984, the US government began for the first time to provide bilateral aid to Mozambique and Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank, marking the country’s initial turn away from the Soviet bloc and toward the market-driven economies of the West. Three years later the government embarked on an IMF-stabilization program (Economic Recovery Program, or ERP), for 1987-1990. (Reynolds, Africa South of the Sahara, 1990: 713). ERP called for dramatic cuts in the civil service payroll, and privatization of industry, liberalization of agricultural policy, among other things. (EIU Country Report No. 2)

Aid to Mozambique in the five years prior to the end of the war was primarily related to emergency relief of the drought and of the dire humanitarian conditions brought on by the war. In 1987-89, the government of Mozambique, through the UN, launched three consecutive international appeals for emergency aid totalling some 1 billion dollars, though the amount actually received was perhaps one-third to one-half of this total. (Reynolds in African South of the Sahara, 1990: 713; EIU Country Report No.
Western aid poured in, and as a result donors and more than one hundred NGOs there to implement emergency aid programs had established themselves in the country before the end of the war. In 1990, Mozambique’s finance minister said that Western aid comprised 65% of the budget. (EIU Country Report No. 2, 1990: 23)

From 1975-1985 Mozambique’s major donors were the USSR, Cuba, Eastern European countries, Nordic countries, members of the EC, and Canada. In many cases, these countries provided ‘cooperantes’ – individuals from the donor country who went to work inside Mozambican ministries. Sectoral support was given to a number of areas, especially agriculture and health. (Ball and Barnes 2000) The European Commission provided aid worth roughly 157 million ECU between 1984 and 1990, under the auspices of Lome III. (EIU Country Report No. 1, 1990: 31)

1 (ii) Pattern of aid

Patterns of aid and coordination before Mozambique’s transition to peace had an important impact on post-war patterns and modalities of aid delivery. During the war, there were two paths of donor involvement, emergency relief and development assistance, and until the US became involved in the mid 1980s, both paths generally funneled support through government ministries and allowed a significant role for government in the coordination and distribution of aid. This supporting role for the government, along with their preliminary planning for postwar reconstruction, helped prevent Mozambique from becoming a “failed state” and allowed Maputo to maintain legitimacy with donors and mobilize international support before and during the peace process (Ball and Barnes, 2000).

US involvement strayed a bit from this pattern. For instance, where Nordic countries sought to work with and strengthen government agencies for the management and distribution of relief aid, for example, the US government’s policy was to deliver aid directly to needy populations through its PVO Project, in which US-based and other international nongovernmental organizations were contracted to deliver emergency aid. By contrast, Norway and Sweden provided funds for a UNDP trust fund to support a government interministerial body designed to manage the drought emergency (CENE, the National Executive Commission for the Emergency. (Barnes, 1998).
From 1987 until 1992, Mozambique received US $1.6 billion in donor pledges for humanitarian assistance via the UN emergency appeals process. Ball and Barnes describe this process as a “multisector approach, assisting broad categories of needs in sectors such as food aid, logistics, relief and survival items, agriculture, health, social welfare, water, education, returnees, and institutional support.” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 166.). In this way, the government and the United Nations were able to use emergency appeals to put in place many of the programs that are necessary for postwar reconstruction before Mozambique’s transition to peace. Beginning in 1989, the state began planning for postwar reconstruction and demobilization, lending it widespread support from the donor community. The Swiss financed this planning process, giving the government technical assistance to aid in the initial preparations for the transition from war to peace. Furthermore, as Ball and Barnes point out, these actions by the state “gave the government a two-year lead before the GPA was signed” (Ball and Barnes, p.168).

The pattern that emerged in the post-war period for support to the transition to peace and the promotion of democracy must be understood in this context. During the emergency (1980s and early 1990s), the UNDP failed to provide the kind of leadership in terms of aid coordination and policy formation that many donors expected. As a result, a system emerged in which individual donors developed individual plans of action. NGOs and their donors found that they could operate separately from both government-defined and UNDP-defined priorities. When necessary, donors with similar approaches or policy aims formed working groups to loosely coordinate their efforts. This pattern of donor disappointment in the UNDP’s leadership capacity and consequent bilateral donor autonomy with loose cooperation continued into the post-war period. Bilateral donors, and particularly the US, repeatedly voiced their disappointment with both ONUMOZ and UNDP and stepped in to fill gaps as necessary. The birth of the various coordinating groups (for DDR, for the electoral process) were born of this background. As it turned out, this pattern worked quite well for Mozambique.7

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7 Ball and Barnes note that in contrast to other cases, the World Bank had not yet begun taking the lead on DDR in the early 1990s, so it was not significantly involved in Mozambique’s DDR process. Rather, the UNDP nominally took the lead, and donors took off with their own programs. This is worth pointing out for the contrast with later cases in which the World Bank played a major role in DDR.
As discussed above, democracy-related aid grew out of two sources in Mozambique. One of these was the UN peacekeeping operation, UNOMOZ, which was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the peace process and elections. The other was a group of donors who became concerned that the resources and mandate of UNOMOZ would not provide sufficient coverage of all aspects of the peace and electoral processes. These donors, observing the events at the Rome peace talks and the multifaceted intervention to which these would give rise, formed a coordinating forum in an effort to foresee and provide for needs not fully covered by UNOMOZ. Some aspects, such as civic education, voter registration, and the like were foreseen ahead of time. Others, such as the need to provide funding, food and transport for party poll watchers, prodding Renamo and the government with carrots and sticks to assume the commitments made in Rome on demobilization, providing transportation for demobilized soldiers to return home, and providing resources for the demilitarization of Renamo, were dealt with by one or more donors, with varying degrees of coordination, on an ad hoc basis as they arose. (Jett, 1999; Manning, 1997)

This donor group included representatives of countries that had some considerable experience on the ground in Mozambique because of the emergency relief effort that had begun in the late 1980s. To this group it was obvious that the UN effort and the usual Donor Conference procedures would fall short of both the resources and the oversight needed to bring Mozambique’s peace process to a successful close with elections. In particular the US, the EU, Great Britain, Spain and Denmark were instrumental in bringing this to the attention of the wider donor community. If not for their efforts, the pattern of aid would have been quite different, with UNOMOZ pursuing its mandate of oversight rather narrowly, and the great bulk of donor funds going to humanitarian relief to the exclusion of many of the less obvious, but crucial, aspects of the peace process. Following intervention by the five countries named above, the 1993 Donor Conference for Mozambique was broadened in scope to include discussion of funding options for election-related and DDR projects. Thus the overall pattern of aid contrasted large scale infusions (by UNOMOZ or the annual Donor Conference mechanisms), with a patchwork quilt of ad hoc interventions by various donors. US assistance to Mozambique peaked in 1992, reaching close to $200 million, and then falling off to around $75 million by 1994.
In 1984, US government assistance had been somewhere closer to $20 million.\(^8\) (Mahling-Clark, 1992)

1(iii) Modalities of delivery

Aid for elections and political processes was delivered in a variety of ways. There were three external funding modalities that were put in place to finance the election process: UNDP trust funds, cost sharing and parallel financing (Ball and Barnes 2000). The total amount of international financing for the electoral process was $59.1 million. The trust fund provided support for areas such as training, civic education and the establishment of electoral structures. Alternatively, cost sharing funds provided technical assistance leading up to the elections, and parallel financing ensured that the donors unable to provide aid via the UN were included in the program.

Parallel financing, as well as some of the donor coordination groups, arose in some instances because donors felt the UN had left important gaps in support to the peace implementation, and in some instances because of imperatives from the donor country capitals. In the DDR sector, for instance, the Reintegration Support Scheme, which turned out to be one of the most significant DDR components, was conceived and funded by bilateral donors who saw a need to supplement the UN’s in-kind support to demobilized soldiers with cash payments over an extended period.\(^9\) The UNDP worked closely with STAE and ONUMOZ’s electoral unit to coordinate election assistance. UNDP also chaired meetings of the Aid for Democracy group, which took on the task of identifying election needs and collecting support.

The UN administered two separate trust funds for political party capacity-building. One was for the transformation of Renamo into a political party. The second was a fund to support the participation of all opposition parties in the 1994 general elections. UNDP also created a fund to channel contributions of bilateral donors in support of the electoral process. In addition, a group of fifteen bilateral donors made individual arrangements with the government of Mozambique to support the electoral process. General budget support was not a significant factor in Mozambique’s peace

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\(^8\) Note: figures are approximate based on a rough chart on p. 22 – sourced as AFR Bureau Redbook and AFR/DRC.

\(^9\) The original plan called for the government of Mozambique to cover 6months’ salary for demobilized soldiers. The donors provided an additional 12 months of salary support.
process. Sectoral budget support was somewhat more common, but largely limited to the Scandinavian and other European countries that had had long-term relationships with the government of Mozambique from the days of one-party rule.

In addition to financial support, the UN and the EU hired technical support to train, equip, and assist STAE in electoral administration. Thus donor support for Mozambique’s first electoral process comprised trust funds, as well as direct bilateral transfers of funds or in kind support and technical support for electoral administration. Financial support for the electoral process foresaw support for organization and logistics; training; civic education; transport and communications; and information and technology.

As previously mentioned, ONUMOZ was primarily responsible for international election observation and for supporting the administration of the voting process. Two thousand three hundred international observers came for the elections, and there were 52,000 polling officers in place at more than 7,000 polling sites. USAID provided transport, food and pay for political party delegates to observe voting. (Jett, 1999)

In the post-war period, the Consultative Group process was an important modality of aid delivery. As a result of the government’s adoption of economic liberalization policies in the late 1980s, it also began receiving assistance from the World Bank, the IMF and the United States. In 1987, the government launched a $70 million dollar Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE), sponsored by the IMF (Ball and Barnes 2000, 163.). During this same year, the World Bank led the first Consultative Group (CG) meeting, which would later become one of Mozambique’s two pledging mechanisms for the peace process, the other being the UN. While the CG process was not completely isolated from postwar reconstruction issues, group discussions primarily “focused on traditional economic development.” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 164.).

In the post-war period under consideration here, CG meetings were held in 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997. (SEE TABLE FOR CG AMOUNTS) As the table shows, total amounts pledged and disbursed at these conferences fell steadily from the first CG meeting in 1993 and 1996. In addition, support for democracy and governance as a percentage of aid from CG members also decreased substantially. In 1993, for example, 23% of the support pledged at the CG meeting was designated for support of ‘special programs’, including DDR, refugee and IDP resettlement, elections, and demining.
In 1996 this category was at 6%. The lion’s share of aid was allocated for investment and balance of payment support, followed by import support and food aid.

In 1995, two significant developments occurred. The government of Mozambique began to take the lead in preparing the discussion documents, and CGs “became an institutionalized form of donor-government consultation.…” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 194) Also in 1995, political conditionality was introduced. Donors called not only for the usual fiscal and monetary reforms, but also the strengthening of parliament, police, and the judiciary, institutionalizing press freedoms, engaging in decentralization, and addressing corruption. (Ball and Barnes 2000)

It is worth noting also that Mozambique’s donors viewed the country as an exemplary partner in this process and displayed flexibility on questions of macroeconomic stability conditionality in consideration of the country’s peace process. Indeed, the country’s major bilateral donors and the UNDP sent a letter to the IMF in 1995 urging the Fund not to restrict further the government’s ESAF funds despite the fact that the government had not met minimum wage cuts and other budgetary targets. The IMF relented. (Ball and Barnes 2000) According to Ball and Barnes, this helped Mozambique to establish “a more equal working relationship” with the donors and multilateral financial institutions.

Donor demands for decentralization and anti-corruption measures were reiterated in 1996 and 1997 at the CG meetings, and the government demonstrated progress on both respects. Legal preparations for the decentralization and local election processes were completed, and anti-corruption legislation was proposed. As Ball and Barnes point out, conditionality was effective in Mozambique. “The concern on the part of Mozambique’s development partners that particular peace consolidation issues be addressed has been important in encouraging the government to take action in those areas.” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 196) The 1996 CG meeting focused on four areas, according to a UNDP report: greater government accountability, improved governance (particular focus on corruption) “rapid growth to escape poverty,” and deepening of democratic governance through municipal elections. (UNDP 1997)
The one significant area that donors neglected was support for the reform of the security sector, which occurred haltingly and was never completed as envisioned in the peace agreement. As Ball and Barnes note, “there has...been no systematic effort by the government, donors, or international NGOs to upgrade the civil institutions that oversee the country’s security forces.” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 196)

1(iv) Aid dependence of Mozambique:

According to Hall and Young, Mozambique in the 1990s was, relative to its size, “the most heavily indebted country in the world, with foreign debt in 1992 totaling some $5 billion (about five times the country’s GDP).” (Hall and Young, 1997:231 – from IMF data). A commonly cited figure on aid dependency in Mozambique is that foreign aid funded “well over half” of the country’s budget in this post-war period. (Jett, 1999: 161) The UNDP estimated that in 1994, foreign aid amounted to 72% of GDP, or $62 of aid per capita. Aid was equivalent to nearly 3 times the value of Mozambique’s exports. The failure of Angola’s peace process led to the realization among the major donors that the peace process in Mozambique required large amounts of aid over an extended period of time.

As noted above, during and after the war, Mozambique was dependent on several streams of external aid, from a variety of actors. From 1987 to 1992, Mozambique received USD 1.6 billion in pledges from the UN emergency appeals process. During the war, donor aid was primarily aimed at emergency relief and development assistance. Mozambique’s heavy dependence on aid continued and grew in the post-war period. Barnes notes that, from 1990-1995, aid flow for emergency and development averaged USD $1 billion a year (Barnes 1998, p.27). Furthermore, the shift of aid coordination from primarily government-driven during the war to primarily donor-driven after the war implies that Mozambique’s aid dependence grew alongside this shift.

1(v) Importance of development aid in general and for democracy promotion:

Aid was essential for keeping the peace and electoral processes on track in Mozambique during the five-year period after the war ended, as well as for development purposes. Lesser amounts of aid, as well as less coordination, would certainly have been decisive to the outcome in Mozambique. Donors were crucial as confidence-builders, as a kind of court of public opinion, and as financial godfathers of the process – by being
ready and willing to provide financial and logistical support for aspects of the process that had been overlooked by those planning the intervention.

2(i) Development aid for democracy promotion

SEE APPENDIX FOR AMOUNTS BY DONOR, SECTOR AND TIME PERIOD. WHAT FOLLOWS IS BACKGROUND ON SUPPORT FOR EACH SECTOR MENTIONED IN THE TEMPLATE.

Because of the nature of the peace agreement, development aid generally prioritized the elections and the political process. Furthermore, as ONUMOZ reports, creating a conducive and stable political environment required securing the country through DDR and security sector reforms. While aid primarily emphasized political and security initiatives, donors and organizations did provide aid for projects in other sectors, although to a lesser degree. Furthermore, the type and goal of development aid to peripheral sectors largely depends on certain characteristics of their donors. For example, Scandinavian countries directed their non-security and non-democracy aid to the development of institutional and social infrastructure, administration and capacity (UNDP).

The IDA, along with various UN agencies, provided aid for structural rehabilitation and the development of infrastructure, in such areas as water and sanitation and stemming urban deterioration. Alternatively, as mentioned above Scandinavian countries, and primarily Sweden, provided aid for the institutional development and strengthening of the structures and capacities of Mozambique’s Ministry of Public Administration. Other aid in the institutional sector, primarily that of the UNDP, was aimed at facilitating decentralization and the strengthening of local governments (UNDP). YEARS FOR THE AID MENTIONED IN THESE PARAGRAPHS?

Other forms of peripheral aid centered on the development of civil society in Mozambique, primarily in areas such as media availability, the creation of local NGOs and education. For example, France and Norway provided aid for the development of community-level initiatives and programs, while UNICEF funded a project to promote school-community linkages, interaction and mutual support (UNDP). Other projects, largely funded by UN agencies, emphasized the development and availability of different
forms of media and the provision of education opportunities in order to strengthen and develop civil society (UNDP).

Overall, outside of the primary sectors of development aid, other streams of aid went to institutional infrastructure, media and communications development, and, to a lesser extent, to civil society initiatives, education and rule of law. There was little or no aid directed primarily at anti-corruption and human rights projects, aside from various programs by UNICEF and the UNDP to address the marginalization of women and children in Mozambique (UNDP) (See Table in Appendix on Peripheral Sector Support).

As noted above, apart from ONUMOZ, support for the electoral process, for political party-building, and for demobilization and reintegration constituted the bulk of external assistance to the democratization effort. Mozambique was one of the first cases in which donors provided aid expressly for the development of viable political parties. Their hesitation about this prospect was palpable. But donors understood that the existence of viable opposition parties was key to the success of the peace process. The UN created two trust funds for the purpose: one to support all registered political parties (17 parties received US $150,000 each); and one to support the transformation of Renamo into a political party. The UN Trust Fund mechanism was created to alleviate the misgivings and restrictions of many donor countries with respect to funding political parties directly. As a cable from the Heads of Mission in Maputo to the EPS Africa Working Group put it, “the most pressing issue concerning the elections is the proper involvement of Renamo – and the other emerging political parties – in the process.” (EPS Africa Working Group, 1993 mimeo)

The Renamo trust fund was a particularly dicey proposition, particularly for members of the Like-Minded Group that had forged strong bonds with Frelimo over the years. Thirteen countries, plus the European Commission, contributed to that fund. Italy made by far the largest contribution, over US $11 million. But Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of $1,963,596 to Renamo’s trust fund (twice the US contribution), with Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and USA. The contribution of these donors, who had strong and longstanding ties with the Mozambican government that were based on shared ideology from independence on, makes clear how important these donors believed it was to secure
Renamo’s full participation in the political process, and the lengths to which they were willing to go to underwrite success. (UNDP 1996 mimeo)

The demobilization and reintegration effort was a joint endeavour by ONUMOZ and a committed group of bilateral donors. ONUMOZ was responsible for setting up and supervising the Assembly Areas for government and Renamo troops, and for disarming soldiers on both sides. The efforts of the UNDP and bilateral donors were divided among support for demobilization itself (support for vulnerable groups and preliminary information about social reintegration); reinsertion (including civilian clothing, seeds and tools, cash payments for financial support of demobilized soldiers for 18 months); and reintegration, including skills training and enterprise development. Together donors (excluding ONUMOZ) contributed around US $84 million, with the government contributing around $10 million.

Support for the DDR process was in a sense representative of the flexible approach that donors and ONUMOZ took to financing and helping to implement the peace process as a whole. After the financial and logistical limits of ONUMOZ capacity had been reached, donors got together and filled in the gaps. Though the process of getting to a coordinated approach was sometimes bumpy, once there donors successfully spoke with one voice and between them managed the technical and financial support necessary to make the process work. For example, after extensive discussions with Mozambican government officials, donors decided to augment the resources available for demobilization by an additional US $35.5 million, in order to extend cash payments to demobilized soldiers for an additional 12 months beyond the six months that the government was prepared to pay.

B: Democratic conditionality in the aid sector

1(i) Democratic conditionality for any aid:

Mozambique began receiving significant quantities of western aid for any purpose only in the mid-1980s, after the government signed an agreement with the IMF for an Economic Recovery Program. The terms of the PRE were the standard fare of stabilization packages at the time. This aid was geared towards both economic
liberalization reforms and emergency relief from a drought that severely affected southern Africa, which brought in massive amounts of aid. However, these forms of aid were not conditional on democratic reforms.

In 1992, the signing of the GPA brought a surge of external aid to support the Mozambican peace process and its implementation. Overall, this aid was subject to democratic conditionality only in the broadest possible sense --- the onset of Mozambique’s peace-by-democratization process. Essentially, the parties signed the peace agreement with the primary goal of holding free and fair multiparty elections. This goal required political and social stabilization via the security, political and humanitarian components of the peace process, along with Renamo’s transformation into a political party. However, a large influx of aid was given upfront to fund the peace process and intervention that preceded the first elections, rather than based on specific conditionalities over time. Furthermore, not only was this aid unconditional in the usual sense, some portions of it were dispersed via new and unconventional mechanisms, such as the Renamo and all-party trust funds.

Still, donors made it clear that though policy conditionality was not imposed, they did expect a concerted effort both from the Mozambican parties to the peace process to make the effort a success. Similarly, donors sometimes conditioned their own donations on the participation of a critical mass of other donors, to ensure that their own contributions would not go toward a fatally underfunded project.

For example, in September 1993, the Aid for Democracy donor working group began to lose patience with the halting pace of crafting the ground rules for the 1994 election. The government had convened a Multiparty Conference to draft electoral legislation, convening all opposition parties and inviting donors to observe the process. In a September memorandum addressed to ‘all Mozambican political parties’, the group expressed its concern at the collapse of the multiparty conference and urged opposition parties to trust in the good faith of the government and to be mindful of the time frame for elections. “We stand ready to do our part, but we call upon the Government, Renamo, the emerging parties and the Mozambican people to assume the historic challenge and responsibility they face.” They reminded the parties that “our commitment to fund elections cannot be open-ended, particularly in view of other demands for scarce
resources," and also advanced a proposal for the party composition of the National Electoral Commission, which had become a major stumbling block. Conditionality in this case was based however not on acceptance of the donors’ specific proposals for particular points of electoral legislation, but on progress and cooperation among parties. It also came as part of a coordinated effort by all donors who were interested in funding the electoral process – here again, donors wanted to ensure that their resources were invested effectively.

Another example can be drawn from donor support for DDR, where conditionality centered around donor concerns that their aid would contribute to a successful process and not be squandered for lack of political will by the Mozambican government or parties, or wasted for lack of sufficient support for the process as a whole. Thus the Swiss government pledged a contribution of US $1.5 million for the first part of demobilization and reintegration provided that at least one more donor also committed to financing the first phase; that other donors commit to supporting other aspects of DDR; and that all donors involved take collective responsibility for negotiating the conditions of their participation in the DDR program jointly with the Mozambican government. It also stipulated that the Mozambican Ministry of Defense had to be more transparent about the number of personnel to be demobilized, and finally, demanded “a guarantee that this demobilization exercise will lead to a real and significant reduction of the armed forces, and that this reduction will not be made insignificant by the recruitment of new soldiers…..” (Swiss Development Corporation)

It is important to note that the absence of more rigorous democratic conditionalities for aid in Mozambique was the result of two key factors: the long-term relationship that key donors had with government, and the international context and recent events, including the UN’s recent failures to secure peace and transitions to democracy in Angola and Somalia. As a result, external actors and donors were more determined to make Mozambique a positive example for post-conflict peace building and democratization. This situation led to larger flows of aid and assistance into Mozambique, a more comprehensive form of intervention, and little to no immediate democratic conditionality, aside from the overall goals of successful demilitarization and the holding of credible multiparty elections.
After the first national multiparty elections were held in 1994, the Consultative Group of donors for Mozambique began to include democratic conditionality for aid, which was primarily centered on decentralization and governance issues, such as tackling corruption and ensuring institutional transparency. Several European embassy documents from 1995 emphasize the role of donor support in further democratization efforts, primarily the timely holding of transparent and efficient local elections. However, it was not until 1998 that Mozambique held its first municipal elections.

1(ii) Democratic conditionality for other reasons:

Mozambique was not the target of democratic conditionality in other contexts during this period. Later, there were civil-military projects, such as IMET, that conditioned some military aid on training in democratic civil-military relations, but these did not occur in the five-year period being considered here.

1(iii) Speed and size of rewards for democratic measures:

As noted above, Mozambique was rewarded immediately for progress on decentralization and anti-corruption, as well as out of consideration for general progress on peace implementation, with a successful plea for leniency by bilateral donors to the IMF in 1995. Mozambique was able to keep higher minimum wage and budget spending than the IMF had demanded.

More generally speaking, Mozambique received what by any measure must be considered a massive infusion of aid over this period. Mozambique was one of the first UN peacekeeping operations to include a large humanitarian effort. This included components such as DDR, the resettlement of displaced persons, food aid, the provision of basic social services, etc. while other democracy-related funds were provided either within the electoral division of ONUMOZ or by bilateral and other multilateral actors. All of this aid was, of course, a response to Mozambique’s dual transition from war to peace and from single-party rule to formal democracy.

Aid for democratization dropped off significantly both in scope and in terms of financial resources and profile after the elections in 1994, though democratization has continued to be of interest for the country’s major donors. Although there was not a kind of tit-for-tat policy conditionality, there was an unspoken understanding between the government of Mozambique, major donors and Renamo that the country’s privileged
position as a darling of the donors depended upon a successful peace process. This included credible elections in which all major forces participated, as well as the establishment of functioning representative institutions and the completion of outstanding provisions of the peace agreement. This shared understanding is demonstrated again and again in Renamo’s treatment of the donor community as a ‘court of public opinion’ in its disputes with the government over everything from elections to parliamentary procedure to the provision of social services in areas of the country sympathetic to Renamo. It is also reflected in government responses to Renamo and donor demands over the immediate post-war years.

1(iv) Was democratic conditionality credible?

Democratic conditionality was credible. Donors were intimately involved in overseeing and helping government to implement both the economic and political measures demanded, and progress was rewarded by donors and the multilateral financial institutions.
Bibliography


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