External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

Haiti

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External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

An Introduction To The Project

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The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can - to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition? While much research effort has been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has so far been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence, but succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity. Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical with regard to the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. The empirical evidence seems indeed to suggest that countries rarely emerge from war as democracies. When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after WWII (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission or not), we find little reason for optimism. Only 10% of the countries that experienced civil wars reached a polity score of +7 or higher (approximately like Kenya, Moldova or Mali) two years after war ended. 53% all war-affected countries show a polity score of -5 or lower two years after the end of civil war, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. 37% have a polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan (all data is from Sambanis, Nicholas, with Michael Doyle, 2000: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and
Quantitative Analysis, in: American Political Science Review 94: 4, 779 - 801). The picture looks similarly gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52% have a polity score of -5 or lower; 39.4% have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10.6% have a score of +7 or higher. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia or Macedonia in the post cold war period, to name only a few. What made these cases of post-war democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.

The study of post-war democratization is a relatively new field, and there is surprisingly little empirical scholarly work devoted to the factors that allow a post-war country to become both stable and democratic. This can partly be explained by the fact that the two bodies of literatures, which are relevant for such an endeavor, are concerned with only one half of the problem. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peace building is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy or not is typically not of interest to this body of literature. This division of labor may explain why there is only a very small literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes which are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or is it perhaps a consequence of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that post-war countries are in essence a sub-class of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases sui generis.

The researchers involved in this project think that post-conflict cases are fundamentally different from transition cases, and they assume that these differences may have an impact on the factors which affect peace and democracy. If this is true, then it is necessary to account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same, or do not necessarily have the same impact, in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy respectively do not necessarily simply add up, but that they may cancel each other out. One
implication of this is then that we have to disaggregate the concept of “success” into sub-concepts. One way of doing this is to individually look at “absence of war”, “democratic quality of the regime” and “state capacities”. While these three concepts may merge in the case of fully established democracies, we argue that for countries emerging from war we need to disaggregate them in order to be able to empirically explore which sequences and combinations are most conducive to the normatively desirable outcome: stable democracies at peace.

The Research Design

Given these challenges, we opted for a case study oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms. Case studies allow researchers to treat cases a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causation and which may lead to the identification of typological sub-classes. Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons; and finally, small-n research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets, because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data which they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We collaborated with an international team of country experts, who prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2008 and December 2009. Our sample covers cases on Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Haiti. We deliberately chose cases from the post cold-war period only, because our main interest is the contribution of external actors to post-war democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peace building missions became fashionable and feasible after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s.

The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases consists, theoretically, of all civil wars that came to an end after 1989. We count 52 cases (Data from Doyle/Sambanis 2000). Our main interests is the
question of whether and how countries that were affected by large-scale violence can emerge as stable and democratic polities, and we are particularly interested in the impact of external support to this outcome. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war; post-conflict countries can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic polities; and post-conflict countries could emerge as democratic, yet unstable polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in our sample. Furthermore, we also want to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the amount of external support for democracy. Hence, we have four different outcomes, and two different values on our main independent variable. This can be depicted in a table with 2 x 4 cells. In order to group the cases into the cells, we have to define measures for stability, democracy and external support. Because this is not for analytical-descriptive purpose, but for sampling, we do this in a fairly rough and ready way. We classify countries that are still at peace five years after the war ended as stable. We classify countries as democratic when they reach a polity IV score of 10 or higher five years after the war ended. We proxy the amount of external support by the type of UN mission. Countries in which a complex peace building mission, or a peace enforcement mission, took place are coded as having received high external support. For all coding we rely on a data set compiled by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Sambanis 2000).

The next table groups all cases in the eight cells. Case in bold were included in our sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High external support</th>
<th>Stable democratic and</th>
<th>Stable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable democratic and</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Timor</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia</td>
<td>Haiti 1994</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low or no external support</th>
<th>Stable democratic and</th>
<th>Stable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable democratic and</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh--Hill Eritrean</td>
<td>Bangladesh--Hill</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-ideol</td>
<td>Ethiopia-ideol</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Georgia-Abkhazia</td>
<td>Georgia-Abkhazia</td>
<td>Congo-Shabba I&amp;II</td>
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<td>Georgia-Ossetia</td>
<td>Georgia-Ossetia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Ogaden</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

n/a: Not applicable
The Research Template

In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. Only then did the authors shorten the studies turning them into condensed analytical narratives. The original versions of the reports are accessible at the project’s webpage.

The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security”, “democracy” and “state capacities” into sub-concepts: With regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? By security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of

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1 The Template is available here: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html
2 http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html
organized violence (e.g. criminal violence). By state capacity, we refer to the capacity of
the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement them.
In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-
developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants
and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and re-
deploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks
whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input
legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its
preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the
regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors (such as long-term economic
development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy), about
war-related factors (such as duration and type of war, numbers of fractions, level of war-
related destruction, and quality of any peace agreement) which may have had an impact on
the countries’ capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy such as linkages and
integration; it then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention
focusing on both military and non-military aspects. We are interested in state-
reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures, and in the question of how intrusive
these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure and/or
persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores
the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences and
constraints. These questions allow us to reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining
which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of
external intervention; we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct
effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows in the conflict country and to
assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. This section inquires
about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid where available. Experts provided annual figures for: elections and political processes; rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights; institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administrative capacity); civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform. Please note that these are our generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the OECD-DAC, and that this data should be treated as illustrative rather than complete for most case studies due to a lack of availability of such information. Finally, we asked our experts to identify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

The Case Studies

The case studies are available from our website. We think that they provide a valuable source of fine-grained data which help us to better understand the processes which lead to a much desired, yet rare outcome: A successful transition from war to peace and democracy.
Haiti Case Study Report

Eirin Mobekk

Executive Summary

This report analyses external intervention and international influences on democratic development in Haiti. There have been several external interventions in Haiti. This report focuses on two time periods: the 1994 intervention the first of its kind explicitly mandated to ‘restore democracy’ and the 2004 intervention following the breakdown in democratic governance and a rebellion which forced the president out of office. The primary focus of the report is the 2004 intervention and how external factors and variables have promoted or in some cases undermined democracy-building in Haiti. The 1994 intervention is dealt with in less detail, but sets the comparative context for the more recent intervention.

The report is divided in two parts discussing the two separate interventions, and these parts are divided into four sections each analysing the success and failure of the interventions; pre-conflict and conflict variables explaining external democratisation; the type and level of intervention and how this affected democracy-building; and the extent of development aid and its effect upon democracy.

The report establishes that although the 1994 intervention was undertaken to restore democracy, the democratisation process soon began to deteriorate and from the late 1990s was in severe decline – this was a result of both external and internal factors. This ultimately led to the conflict in 2004 which precipitated the need for a new international intervention to support democracy. The report emphasises that the renewed democratisation process from 2004 is very fragile, however, at the time of writing stronger than the process after the 1994 intervention. Moreover, stability and security, donor support and coordination, building state capacities, security sector reform and justice, and targeted development aid are key issues for ensuring continued democratisation in Haiti.
Introduction

There have been two periods of interventions in recent history in Haiti. The first was the international intervention in 1994 to restore democracy. This was the first of its kind explicitly mandated to ‘restore democracy’. The second intervention in February 2004 came as a response to a breakdown in democratic governance and renewed crisis and is the current and on-going process. Part I of this paper will outline and give a brief overview of the first international intervention with its aims to restore democracy, only broadly following the template. Part II will analyse the 2004 intervention, the democratisation process and where Haiti is at as of autumn 2008. It will not be a five-year after the end of the crisis measure, since at the time of writing it has not yet been five years since the intervention.

Background

Haiti since its independence had until 1991 experienced nothing but authoritarianism and a string of dictatorships. The fight for democracy and for an end to military regimes began in earnest in Haiti in the 1980s. It was domestically driven and had vast grassroots support. Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged as the leader of the grassroots and a symbol of the fight and opposition to authoritarianism and the dictatorship of Jean Claude Duvalier who had followed in the footsteps of his father François Duvalier. It was a popular rebellion that drove Duvalier out of Haiti in 1986, although his ouster was greatly assisted by the fact that the US finally withdrew its support for the regime. Violence ensued and Duvalier was replaced by a military junta, three Presidents followed in rapid succession, before an interim president and holding of the first free and fair presidential elections.

The first democratically elected president in Haiti, Aristide, was elected in 1990, but was ousted after only seven months in power on 30 September 1991 by a military junta. The military regime was exceptionally brutal towards anyone that was perceived to support Aristide and conducted vast human rights abuses. Although the international community

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was swift in condemning the coup effective action against them was slow. It was only when the refugee flows began to reach high proportions that more stringent measures were taken. Negotiations were attempted, but failed and on 19 September 1994, a US-led multinational force (MFN) of 20,000 troops intervened in Haiti to oust the illegal military regime. The objective was to restore democracy. It was followed by the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was established in Resolution 940 (1994) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. After UNMIH a number of smaller support missions followed.

Throughout MNF and UN presence in Haiti, although international presence increased stability, eliminated institutional violence and helped organise elections, there was instability, insecurity, political crimes and armed groups forming. Supporters and opponents of Aristide continued to shape politics and violence in Haiti. The opposition parties to Aristide claimed that both the parliamentary elections in 1997 and presidential elections in 2000 were not free and fair – the latter returned Aristide to presidential power. Political instability and insecurity increased significantly after both these elections. In addition, the new Haitian national police force (PNH) became increasingly abusive, and involved in criminal activities. The period after 2000 was characterised by violence and instability. There were regular demonstrations against Aristide and his government, as well as clashes between the opponents and supporters of Aristide.

Instability and insecurity reached its peak in February 2004. Armed gangs, former soldiers and police gradually took over the country and were ready to enter Port-au-Prince. President Aristide resigned on 29 February 2004 and left the country. An interim president, Boniface Alexandre, was sworn in and he and prime minister Gerard Latortue in consultation with a Conseil des Sages formed a thirteen member transitional government, to be in power until free and fair elections could be held. A Consensus on the Political Transition Pact was signed by the transitional government, members of the Conseil des Sages, political groups and civil society organisations. Fanmi Lavalas however denounced the pact. The UN Security Council authorised a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to intervene, which was replaced by the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 1 June 2004.
One of the key objectives of the UN mission was to support and assist in holding elections. The elections were postponed several times, but were held on 7 February 2006. They were considered free and fair and Rene Préval was elected president. Jacques-Edouard Alexis became prime minister.

In April 2008 food and ‘la vie chère’ riots plagued Haiti. This resulted in the resignation of the prime minister. After a five-month impasse Michèle Pierre-Louis was accepted as prime minister by parliament and she took office on 5 September 2008.

**PART I**

**Section 1: Defining intervention success or failure**

**Democracy**

Five years after the 1994 intervention to restore democracy in Haiti, the country had been without a prime minister since 1997, the president was ruling by decrees, the police force was unravelling and accountability limited. The laws in Haiti were publicly known, but there had not been extensive reformulation of the laws and the judicial system was only semi-functioning and suffering from extensive corruption. Hence there was at the time no equality under the law since people who had the resources could pay to have their case dismissed. Perpetrators arrested by the police were regularly let back out onto the streets. There had been extensive efforts in training a new Haitian police force by the international community but the judicial system had not been focused upon to the same extent, which had dire consequences for the police as well as the equality of the law.

Participation in the democratic process dwindled through the five first years after the intervention. Participation in the first municipal and legislative elections was marred by difficulties including postponement, electoral fraud, missing electoral cards and calls for boycott of the elections by a number of parties. In the run-off elections, which Jean

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2 ‘Electoral Council Confirms Case of Electoral Fraud, but Denies pro-Lavalas Claim’, Radio Metropole, Port-au-Prince, 5 April 1995, as translated in SWB part 5, 7 April 1995. ‘MRN Leader Calls for Boycott of
Bertrand Aristide’s party *Organizasyon Politik Lavalas* (OPL) won, and the other parties boycotted, participation was very low although the numbers were disputed. There were three key reasons for low participation; people were not accustomed to participating in second round of elections; the accusations of irregularities led people to withdraw from the process; limited civic education on the importance of the different elections. In the presidential elections held in December 1995 there was only 15 per cent participation – this was low because the population wanted Aristide to continue as president for the years he had been in exile. Haitians did not want the elections, but the international community insisted. In the parliamentary elections, held in 1997, participation was at only 5 per cent. These elections were also plagued by irregularities. Joining and forming political parties and organizations was not a difficulty and the political discourse was vibrant and political parties in opposition as well as civil society organisations could critique government policies without fear of reprisals. However, frequently there was a lack of capacity among the mass population to fully participate and effectively communicating their displeasure at government policies. Speaking out against the government was not suppressed at the time, but the problem lay in having the capacity to do so, at least among civil society. This had not been a focus of the democracy-building process. Their discontent with the democratisation process was shown through the non-participation in elections. All citizens had the right to vote and the legal system and constitution guaranteed these rights. However, due to election irregularities the fairness of the competition between political parties could be questioned.

Both vertical and horizontal accountability was at the time limited. Haiti was de facto without a government from June 1997 to January 1999 when President Préval appointed a prime minister and began ruling by decrees. This was referred to as a coup by some sectors of Haitian society. Therefore, answering to their voters regarding decisions taken was minimal to non-existent. Answering to other officials and state institutions, or accountability mechanisms was similarly minimal.

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There was significant support for democracy in Haiti among the mass population. The population viewed democracy essentially different from that of the interveners – they were given a democracy defined as elections, but wanted a participatory democracy, when they received elections only they became disillusioned.\(^4\) Opposition to democracy came from members of the economic elite and the armed forces who viewed democracy as problematic to their continued way of life and control over state affairs. They were also fiercely opposed to Aristide who preached equality for the people of Haiti.

**Security**

The security situation improved immensely after the intervention in 1994 due to the international presence, which critically eliminated institutional violence conducted by the Armed Forces of Haiti. But there was a rapid increase in crime, as well as instability, political crime and armed groups forming, that the interim and later the new Haitian police force were not able to deal with. This situation was exacerbated after the new police also began to be involved in criminal activities. But there was not massive organised crime that threatened the security of the population. After the 1997 and 2000 elections instability and insecurity increased and the period after 2000 was particularly characterised by violence and instability.

**State capacity, legitimacy, service provision**

The Haitian state had in 1999 limited capacity in many areas and was still in dire need of further capacity building. Although the intervention had focused on capacity building in certain areas others had been marginalised or ignored. Critically, the state had very limited capacity to effectively implement their decisions. President Préval was seen by a large majority to be Aristide’s choice of successor and that it was in fact Aristide who was in control. The bureaucratic apparatus existed but suffered from lack of capacity and corruption.

\(^4\) Interviews with civil society groups and organisations by author, Haiti, 1997-1998.
The state capacity to provide services and public goods was very inadequate, infrastructure was exceptionally bad, improved security was a result of international presence, and welfare, such as it was, was provided by external agents. The lack of change in the state’s capacity to deliver public services and goods was a key reason for the population’s disillusionment with democracy. They had expected change and improvement in their circumstances, but, apart from increased security and freedoms, had found little improvement in terms of jobs, justice, education, health and welfare in the five years of democracy. A key problem was that their expectations were much higher than what realistically the government could have provided – the criticisms however tended particularly to be directed at the international community; that they had not delivered and that they had not given them a participatory democracy.

By the majority of the population the regime was perceived to be legitimate, but beleaguered with problems. Haiti was de jure independent from outside interference making its own decisions. But it continued to receive foreign aid and a UN mission was present which mandate was to support the government in the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police.

Section 2: Pre-war and war variables most important in explaining external democratisation

Long-term, structural factors

The World Bank estimates that over the 1980-1991 period real Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was falling by about 2% per year and Haiti was the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The economy went into even worse decline during the military regime, exacerbated by the US, Organisation of American States (OAS) and UN sanctions. Five years after the intervention not much had improved when in 1999 the

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5 Interviews with civil society in Haiti by author 1997-1998.
6 Ibid.
7 For more see also Introduction and Part II, Long-term, structural factors.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was approximately US$250 compared with the average of US$ 3,320 for Latin America and the Caribbean region.\(^8\)

There was and always have been very sharp cleavages between the economic and political elite and the vast majority of the population in Haiti. These have their background in French colonialism, but are predominately based on economic structures. It is not based on ethnicity. The elite’s core interest has been to keep their economic dominance which was best served within a non-democratic context. As Dupuy (1997) argues ‘for most of its history, the Haitian bourgeoisie has been a visionless, retrograde social class concerned primarily with safeguarding its immediate wealth and privileges.’\(^9\)

There were also divisions within the elite and these were predominately political – some of whom supported a democratic Haiti, others who worked vehemently against it. It was however the division between the elite and the armed forces on one side and the rest of the population on the other that was of importance prior to the 1991 coup.

Since prior to the conflict the democratic system was in place only for seven months it is difficult to assess its capacities in the different areas. It did have the capacity to make and implement decisions, in that it made some decisions there were exceptionally unpopular with the economic elite, the army and the US, which contributed to its downfall. For example, the government retired the entire military high command, set about dividing the army and the police and the chefs de section were abolished.\(^10\) Fighting corruption, drugs and human rights abuses within the military was also in focus. Commissions to investigate massacres were established and several people were arrested.\(^11\) Moreover they attempted to raise the minimum wage to 5 US$ per day. The state had very limited time in which to show whether it did have the capacity to provide services and public goods, but the new government focused on improving the economic situation of Haiti.

\(^10\) Farmer, Uses, pp.164-169. However, in fact many chefs de section operated as previously. Dupuy, Haiti, p.117.
\(^11\) Dupuy, Haiti, p.118.
War related factors / factors referring to the peace process

There was no war in Haiti, but a military regime who had taken power through a coup. The parties in this conflict was the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), the attachés, their armed supporters, the Front Révolutionnaire pour l’Avancement et Progrès en Haïti (FRAPH), a paramilitary organisation who supported the army, the economic elite a majority of whom supported the military regime, and the mass population the vast majority supporting the return of Aristide. There was significant opposition to the military regime, but very limited to no armed opposition.

The army and elite had similar goals in Haiti. The key issues for the military were to ensure their financial and political power which had been threatened by the new government. The elite also felt threatened by Aristide and his government who spoke about justice, equality and transparency. They wanted to retain their political and financial positions in Haitian society.

The coup took place on 30 September 1991, and it is estimated that 3,000 to 5,000 died as direct result of the military regime from 1991 to 1994. These were all civilians. The repression of the population was intense and was conducted throughout the country, but it was particularly bad in the major urban centres. In the first few months over 100,000 fled across the border to the Dominican Republic. The exodus across the seas began and by April 1992 the American coast guard had intercepted 20,000 refugees from Haïti. At the end of 1992 US intelligence estimated that 100,000 were about to take to the sea.

When the planes with the international forces were on their way to Haiti the head of the military junta Raoul Cédras signed the Port-au-Prince agreement with a US delegation led by former US president Jimmy Carter, which gave de facto amnesties to the military regime and meant that the intervention could be conducted without loss of lives. This was

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13 Farmer, 1994, Uses, p.190
a very contentious document since the elected government of Haiti was not party to it. The government did not in principle accept it but had no choice but to do so. It meant however that there would be no justice for the crimes committed during the years of repression. The military regime was ended by the fact that the international community finally stepped up the pressure on the regime, predominately as a result of the refugees steadily increasing.

The Port-au-Prince agreement affected the situation in the country thereafter. Aristide’s return and the return of the elected government was not referred to at all in the agreement. The agreement stipulated that the Haitian army would work in ‘close co-operation’ with the US military mission to implement the agreement, which was to promote ‘freedom and democracy’. It also emphasised that the US mission would be co-ordinated with the Haitian military high command. The intervention rhetoric before the agreement was emphasising the legality of the intervention based on the illegality of the de facto regime and the protection of democracy. Nevertheless, the agreement was reached with that illegal regime in order to minimise the casualties of the intervening forces. It disregarded the legitimate government and democracy. It had a direct impact upon security since there was no justice for past crimes, the leaders of the coup went into exile and the soldiers, the FRAPH and the attachés, were left with their weapons.

Section 3: External variables – military intervention and democracy promotion

External intervention
The US-led multinational intervention started 19 September 1994. It was followed by the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was established in Resolution 940 (1994) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It called for the restoration of democracy, the establishment of a secure and stable environment and the restructuring of the security forces. The mission began deployment in January 1995. The US was still a key actor in

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15 Port-au-Prince agreement para.2 and para.1, respectively.
16 Ibid., para.4.
the UN mission. The stated objective was to restore democracy to Haiti however, democracy was defined in narrow terms as return of the elected government and holding of elections.

The first stage of the intervention consisted of 20,000 troops predominantly from the US. These remained in the country until the handover to the UN in 1995. The maximum authorised strength of UN forces and staff was 6,000 troops, 900 civilian police officers, 230 civilian staff, 200 local staff and 30 UN volunteers. This was however in the first UN mission to Haiti, it was followed by a succession of smaller missions. The expenditures of the first UN mission were $320 million gross.

All the elections after the intervention were subject to election monitoring conducted by several organisations. The Organisation of American States, as well as independent groups conducted elections monitoring. The UN and international human rights organisations reported on the state of human rights in Haiti. The findings of the election monitoring and the human rights monitoring were made public.

The intervention never assumed legislative power, nor did it shape a new constitution or a legal codex. The international community never assumed executive powers. Executive policing was not part of the mandate, but they did conduct de facto executive policing for a period of time because of the very limited capabilities of the interim Haitian police force and also whilst the new Haitian police force was being established. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration were attempted but were not done very successfully. Official statistics for the disarmament established that there were about 25,000 to 30,000 weapons and munitions collected, but human rights groups estimated that the number of weapons in circulation was at the time between 90,000-200,000.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued, in cooperation with the government, with privatisation schemes and structural adjustment programmes. There was pressure

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17 See e.g. S/1995/183, 6 March 1995, para.7, p.3.
upon the government to introduce these schemes, but the IMF had been present in Haiti long before the intervention focusing on the same issues and it cannot be seen as only part of the intervention. There was no complete takeover of powers, either de facto or de jure. However, it is necessary to point out that some sections of Haitian society including representatives of civil society and political elite referred to the presence of the international community and that of the UN as an occupation, and viewed it as a very intrusive presence. This was however in 1999 a small minority.

**Modes of interaction between internal and external actors**

The aim of the interveners was to end the military regime, reinstate the legally elected government of Haiti and by doing so ensuring a stop of the refugee flows. The expectation of state and rural elites was that the intervention would provide security and stability, solidify the democratic process, and through that ensure job creation, justice, accountability and economic development. As any UN operation it faced a certain degree of time constraints since each mandate would have to be renewed, as well as facing economic constraints. There was no bargaining between the interveners and the state elites to what type of regime was going to be put in place, since it was the return of a regime that had already been elected.

The key change agents in the domestic system in Haiti at the time were the mass population who had fought for participatory democracy in Haiti since the mid-1980s and key actors in the economic and political elite who promoted the status quo. Haitian civil society had extremely limited contact with the external actors promoting change, which was a key reason why they got disillusioned with the democracy that they received. The external actors predominately dealt with the elite.

**International events**

There was one key event that shaped the US’ behaviour in the intervention in Haiti, namely Somalia and the death of the US troops there. This was a key reason for the Port-au-Prince agreement. The potential for loss of American lives and body-bags meant that they signed away justice for Haitians, cooperated with the remnants of the military
regime that had oppressed the population for years, and were unwilling to conduct a disarmament process.

**Section 4: Development aid and democracy promotion**

The most important donors after the 1994 intervention were the UN, UNDP, IMF, World Bank and the US. Much the aid was directed at the elections so as to be able to draw the conclusions that democracy had been successfully restored; however, a key focus was also establishing the new Haitian police force. The sectors that were prioritised were elections and political processes, police reform; to a less extent justice reform and DDR.

Aid was important to democracy building, but it was focused on a few key areas only and not on issues such as job creation, which was central for Haitians, 70 per cent of whom were unemployed. Official development assistance was in 1999 US$262,860,000 (per capita 31.19), a significant decrease from 1995 when it was at US$722,220,000 (per capita 92.17). The IMF focused heavily on the assembly sector to improve the economy, but this was misplaced. At the time 70 per cent of the population lived in rural areas and worked in agriculture. Despite this, the agricultural sector, between October 1994 and October 1995, only received 1% of the total aid distributed.19 The emphasis on export-oriented development created massive migration of people from rural areas to the cities, mainly Port-au-Prince, consequently leading to ‘overcrowding of the worst slums in the world’.20 The assembly sector was a focus, because the low wages in Haiti was its ‘comparative advantage’. However, the wages were so low that it was impossible to live off them. In March 1995, the Haitian government complied with donor requirements to continue with low wages, and set a new minimum wage of US$ 1.90 a day. This, in effect, constituted a real-wage decrease.21

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21 McGowan, p.9, footnote 7.
PART II

Section 1: Defining intervention success or failure

A Democracy

There has been considerable change in Haiti since the intervention in 2004 and its democratisation process, but as the riots in April 2008 underscored much remains the same. Domestic democratic change on the key dimensions of rule of law, participation, competition and accountability has improved – but crucial areas are in need of substantial change and improvement at both national and local levels.

Rule of law is critical not only to ensure security and stability in a post-conflict society, but essential for democracy. As Carothers (1998) points out ‘the relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy is profound’. Rule of law in Haiti has suffered from a multitude of problems and in many areas continue to do so. Although laws are publicly known and do not fluctuate, the judicial system is in considerable disarray and can only be described as semi-functional. It suffers from corruption, justice officials (prosecutors, judges, magistrates, etc.) are under-paid, there are not enough justice officials, and cases take a long time to go through the system if they do at all. One result of this was that in 2006 and most of 2007 between 80 to 85 per cent of the prison population were in pre-trial detention.\(^{22}\) This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the police became much more efficient in their duties and arrested and detained many more alleged perpetrators, whilst similar progress was not made in the judicial system. Although the judiciary is independent from the executive; corruption is extensive. Haiti was in 2007 ranked 177 on the Transparency International’s list of corrupt countries with only Somalia, Iraq and Myanmar below it (although, in 2006 it was last). Because of corruption there was at the time of writing limited predictability or efficiency of rulings. Moreover, there is a need to update and change certain aspects of the criminal codes, these were both written in 1835 but were last updated in 1988.\(^{23}\) Importantly, the president has made it a key issue to

\(^{22}\) Interviews with UNDP and MINUSTAH representatives, Port-au-Prince, November/December 2006. Statistics from DPKO, May 2007

change parts of the constitution, but has faced opposition to this by other political parties. There have been significant efforts in reforming the police and considerable progress has been made in this regard. For example, police have since 2007 been undergoing vetting to ensure human rights abusers and corrupt officers will be kept out of the force, they have received training, and accountability mechanisms have been reinforced. But there has thus far not been similarly strong efforts aimed at the judicial and correctional systems.

Participation at all levels is a cornerstone of democracy and, as Diamond and Morlino (2005) point out without it ‘no regime can be a democracy’. The first round of presidential and legislative elections in Haiti was held 7 February 2006 and participation was at 60 per cent. There are over twenty-seven political parties, seven of which are currently represented in the Senate, and eight in the Chamber of Deputies – however, not all run-off elections have been held and several seats in the senate were still disputed as of April 2008. Political discussion in Haiti is lively and critiquing the government and its policies frequent, underlining the freedom of expression and freedom of the press that exist, in addition to rights such as freedom to form and join organisations. This is a considerable change from prior to February 2004 when it was reported that journalists in particular were targeted for disagreeing or critiquing the government. For example, Reporters without Borders’ 2004 annual report on Haiti states that during Aristide’s government from 2000 there were attacks and threats against journalists who reported on demonstrations, but that there were also targeted attacks resulting in journalists going into exile.24 Moreover, it is also a considerable change from the transitional government, which targeted former-President Aristide’s supporters and saw their time in power as a potential for attacking political opponents. Although there is freedom to speak out against the government, communicating with elected representatives may be difficult due to, for example, some organisations’ lack of capacity and lack of knowledge on how to gain access and influence state representatives at both local and national levels. The Civil Affairs section of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) are currently present in all the departments of the country and, according to a senior official, work with civil society and local authorities to ensure transparency, access and communication.

There are a vast number of civil society groups and organisations in Haiti, but several lack capacity within their chosen fields.

There is a right to vote for all citizens, and a legal and constitutional order which protects these rights. And in principle, there is free competition between the different parties. However, after the presidential elections, where Préval obtained 48.8 per cent of the votes, but over 50 per cent was needed to avoid a second round of voting, the Electoral Council ignored the electoral law, and counted the blank votes and divided them up between different candidates. This increased Préval’s support from 48.8 to 51.2 per cent. This is an example of limiting fairness of competition. People took to the streets to support Préval and to refuse a second round of elections, stating that he had won. Also, according to a senior official at MINUSTAH, the government saw little use in supporting local and municipal elections. This can undermine in particular local democratic change.

There has been limited level of vertical accountability, civil society has not been sufficiently strong to exert the kind of pressure needed and to effectively work as accountability and oversight mechanisms. It is not necessarily due to the government that there has been a lack of vertical accountability. Civil society needs strengthening to be able to effectively function as an accountability mechanism. This has not been a key focus for most of the international actors after the intervention, but UNDP has had links with civil society for a long time and for example supported *Citizens Forum for the Reform of the Judicial System*, a forum aiming to influence and oversee the justice system. The riots in April 2008 could perhaps be interpreted as a form of vertical accountability. However, too many questions regarding the riots remain unanswered at this time, and although demonstrations and freedom to hold them characterises a democracy, violence, destruction and riots to depose elected officials do not. There is a level of horizontal accountability, for example, a vote of no confidence against the prime minister.

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25 Interview by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
26 UNDP (January 2004), ‘Latin American Experiences in Strengthening the Role of Civil Society Organisations in Political Processes’.
minister was raised in 2008, but was defeated. However, capacity-building of parliamentarians and state officials is needed.

Haiti, at the time of writing, did not completely satisfy the above criteria (rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability) of a ‘full’ democracy. It is undergoing a democratisation process. Both at national and local levels the rule of law, particularly justice, needs to be improved, undergo reform and corruption addressed. Participation in the different democratic processes is at all levels possible and there is no longer persecution because of political beliefs, but communicating with elected representatives not always easy or accessible. The rights to participate, compete, disagree and critique is protected, and elections following the intervention have been viewed as free and fair. But limited support by the government to local elections curbs the local democratisation process. Vertical accountability is easier at the local level because of more transparency, but civil society at local and national levels often lack capacity to function as effective accountability and oversight mechanisms. Horizontal accountability has been difficult since limited oversight mechanisms are in place.

There is public support from the political and economic elites and civil society for democracy. There are some among the elites that may be against democracy, who want to revert to previous style regimes and work to undermine democratic efforts. But these were at the time of writing not publicly vocalising their beliefs.

Constitutionally it is the same state as prior to 2004. It is not the same office holders as prior to the crisis of 2004, but president Préval was president in 1996-2001 and many members of his government during his first presidency became office holders during his second presidency, including his first prime minister.

B Security
Security improved after the intervention, but throughout 2004 and parts of 2005 armed groups continued to play a role as law enforcers. MINUSTAH was at the time not operating at the mandated strength, and this undermined its capacity to tackle the
violence and the armed gangs. In 2005 security in Port-au-Prince deteriorated, due to a rise in killings and kidnappings. Initially the reason for kidnappings had its origins in politics. After Aristide left the country, the head of Haiti’s Supreme Court was sworn in as President, in accordance with the constitution. Many in Haiti and abroad argued that this was coup and that Aristide had been kidnapped by foreign forces and taken out of the country. This significantly affected the violence after the intervention. Because many Aristide supporters believed that he had been kidnapped from Haiti, it led them to kidnap civilians in retaliation, however, it transformed into urban gang violence, kidnapping for financial gain irrespective of political affiliation or no affiliation. A primary cause of insecurity in Haiti since the intervention has been the armed gangs. But in addition human rights conditions in general were dire during the transitional government and included summary executions, arbitrary arrests and torture.

MINUSTAH was strongly criticised for what was viewed as inaction against the armed gangs by many Haitians. There was a self-imposed truce during and after the presidential elections, but violence escalated again in June 2006. MINUSTAH was able to significantly reduce the level of violence and kidnappings in early 2007 by conducting a crackdown on armed gangs in the capital. Security increased markedly, which resulted in by April 2007 schools, shops and markets reopening, and residents returning to high violence areas. The situation of kidnappings significantly affected security, but mainly in the capital. November 2007 saw a rise in the level of kidnappings which continued to be a problem at the time of writing. It has however, not risen to earlier levels. Verifiable data on kidnappings are difficult to come by, and made more difficult by underreporting. One report states however that there were 722 victims of kidnapping in 2006, 293 in 2007 and 162 in the first six months of 2008. In the rural areas kidnapping has not been an issue, and threats to security have been substantially less. It cannot be viewed as organised violence or political violence; it has taken on a financial perspective in a

27 Lederer, Edith (7 August 2004). ‘UN peacekeeping force in Haiti at 40%’, Associated Press.
29 Interview with civil society by author, Haiti, June and December 2006.
context of socio-economic under-development. The violence in Haiti should also be put in perspective with the rest of the region – one report found that the homicide rate in Haiti was half that of the average in Latin America and the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{32}

The key phase of political instability after the democratic elections in 2006, were the riots in April 2008 in Les Cayes and Port-au-Prince due to the high cost of living, which resulted in the prime minister resigning. Parliament rejected the President Préval’s first nomination for a new prime minister, Ericq Pierre a man he also put forward during his last presidency, and only after several months of political wrangling was a new prime minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis, accepted by parliament and she took office on 5 September 2008. This ended a five-month impasse during which time Haiti was effectively without a government. Even though reaching an agreement on a new prime minister took some time that agreement was reached was a positive move for the democratisation process.\textsuperscript{33}

C State capacity, legitimacy, service provision

Lack of state capacity is one of the major problems in Haiti. On paper there is a bureaucratic apparatus which may appear solid enough for governance however, in practice it is different. The civil service suffers from corruption and is ineffective.\textsuperscript{34} There is a fundamental lack of transparency,\textsuperscript{35} civil society, donors and even parliament do not have an overview of what is going on or how central issues are handled. A key problem has been in building capacity; donors have not only disagreed with each other, but also with the government in how to best build capacity.\textsuperscript{36} The problem does not lie in making decisions, but in implementation. Programmes that have been scheduled to take three to four years to execute take ten years, because of lack of capacity.\textsuperscript{37} The capacity of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Dade, Carlo (January/February 2007). Haiti: Economic Growth and Violence, FOCAL Point 6 (1). Though it did acknowledge the problem of data in Haiti.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Particularly when comparing it to the situation in the nineties when Haiti was without a government after the resignation of the prime minister from June 1997 to January 1999 at which time the president began ruling by decrees.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Interview with IOM official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008
\item \textsuperscript{35} Interview with senior MINUSTAH official, BID official, by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Interview with BID official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
\end{itemize}
police however, has increased significantly and major changes have occurred in the last two years. Although policing has significantly improved as the riots in April demonstrated security still needs to be provided by the UN; it was the UN troops that stopped rioters entering the National Palace and dispersed rioters at road blocks.\textsuperscript{38}

The state had at the time of writing very low capacity in terms of providing services and public goods. This was not only due to a lack of qualified personnel, but because of limited funds and the fact that so many issues needed to be addressed concurrently. For example, according to the WHO there were only 3 doctors per 10,000 people and only 1 nurse/midwife per 10,000.\textsuperscript{39} There is a vast difference between the health coverage in the rural and urban areas, where the urban areas are better covered. However, access remains limited to the poorer segments of the population. Only 49 per cent of school age children attend schools, which according to the PSRP is a reflection of limited capacities; by the inability to rebuild all the necessary schools, and provide them with adequate teachers. But it is also a reflection of the poverty where children are held back by parents to help with subsistence farming. Moreover, the schools that do exist most have inadequate facilities, for example, 58 per cent have no toilets, 23 per cent no running water, only 36 per cent have libraries.\textsuperscript{40} The weakness of governmental intuitions also means that, according to an Inter-American Development Bank (BID) official, only 33,000 families are paying for public water, but there are two million with access to public water in Port-au-Prince, and more than 50 per cent of the electricity is lost.\textsuperscript{41} To provide even the minimum of infrastructure and welfare the state continues to be heavily dependent upon foreign aid and assistance.

As ‘la vie chère’ riots, and the discourse the four months prior to the riots which had focused heavily on the ‘la vie chère’, demonstrated people have grown tired of the lack of outputs. But this has also been complicated by limited understanding of problems faced

\textsuperscript{38} Observation by author and interviews with MINUSTAH security personnel by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} WHO, Core Health Indicators, http://www.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select_process.cfm?country=ht&indicators=healthpersonnel
\textsuperscript{40} PSRP, p.22, para.40.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with BID official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
by the state and government, in part due to lack of transparency. It is not that the state lacked the will to deliver on a number of issues but, as of autumn 2008, it clearly lacked the capacities to do so.

The president and government were, as of autumn 2008, perceived as legitimate. Nevertheless the government was perceived to be inefficient in addressing key issues that concern most Haitians; economic development, job creation and education. Haiti is de jure independent from outside interference and assistance, however, de facto it is reliant on the UN for security, and international agencies for provision of many of its services and public goods.

D The interdependence between democracy, security and state capacities
The relationship and interdependence between democracy, security and state capacities is a complex one. There has been violence throughout international presence in Haiti, but there has been a level of security that, for example, permitted the holding of free and fair elections. A complete secure and stable society has not been necessary for a continued democratisation process or state building in Haiti, but a level of security was necessary for the democratisation process to move forward. The continued violence and insecurity has not stopped the democratisation process or state-building, but it has served to slow it down.42

However, democracy has also strengthened security in the sense that when the non-elected transitional government was in power they used violence, pursued Aristide supporters and illegally arrested and detained political prisoners. This stopped after the democratic elections and with the new government in place. Furthermore, although the transitional government strengthened the democratisation process by agreeing not to be able to run for office in the elections, but as a result there was little incentive for them to begin to build institutions and ensure state capacity-building. For example, one (of many) reasons that police reform was delayed was the unwillingness of the transitional government to commit to reform. The transitional government’s aversion to state

42 But the slow pace of democratisation cannot be blamed singularly on the issues of insecurity.
capacity-building had an adverse effect upon the democratisation process and complicated the situation for the elected government.

Although considerable progress has been made in terms of capacity-building of the Haitian National Police (PNH), they were as of autumn 2008 not capable of ensuring security and stability. Therefore, at the time of writing the continued presence of the UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti was vital to ensure that the democratisation process did not unravel.

State capacities and democracy needs to be addressed simultaneously. Democracy, in a narrow sense, has thus far been paid more attention than building state capacities. Or more specifically certain parts of state capacities, such as policing, have been given a lot of attention whereas other state capacities have been more marginalised. This has been exacerbated by donor disagreements on how to best build capacity in Haiti. Building state capacities without at the same time focusing on the development of democracy would probably not lead to democratisation. It could lead to consolidation of power in the hands of the power-holders, but this was never a question in Haiti, since elections were deemed a pre-requisite for further development both by Haitians and the international community.

Section 2: Pre-war and war variables most important in explaining external democratisation

A Long-term, structural factors
There was no war in Haiti prior to the 2004 intervention. There was a democratically elected president, although the elections had been deemed irregular and boycotted, whose regime had faced increasing opposition. The regime did not fulfil the key variables for democracy outlined in section one and was seen to be increasingly authoritarian. A democratisation process had begun in 1990, but had been broken down by the military coup in 1991, and restarted again with the international intervention in 1994. What could be observed in Haiti from the late nineties onwards was a gradual unravelling of the democratic process. The period after the re-election of Aristide in 2000 was characterised
by violence and armed gangs. *Famni Lavalas*, Aristide’s political party, as well as other political and non-political groups, began to rely on young armed men to control the community – this was to provide security but also to ensure that no other groups operated in those areas for both political and financial reasons. The situation in the country was particularly chaotic in 2003, when armed groups, former members of the armed forces and armed Aristide supporters regularly clashed and were uncontrolled in much of the country.\(^\text{43}\) There were numerous demonstrations against Aristide and his government in the period leading up the armed revolt and rebellion, which led to his resignation on 29 February 2004.

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere where 70-80 per cent of the population currently live below the poverty line surviving on less than $2 per day and a small minority controls the vast majority of the country’s assets. In 2004, according to the World Food Programme, 76 per cent of Haitians lived on less than US$2 per day, and 55 per cent lived on less than US$1 per day.\(^\text{44}\) This was broadly the situation in 1994, 2004 and 2008. The GDP per capita according to the World Bank in 2003 was an estimated $400 and the human development index ranking was 150. There were and are extreme differences between the capital, other urban areas and rural areas, in the capital 20 per cent live in extreme poverty, whilst in other urban areas this increases to 50 per cent and in the rural areas to 59 per cent.\(^\text{45}\) Compared to the average Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries Haiti had a life expectancy in 2004 of 49.4 years, whilst in neighbouring countries in 2005 it was an average of 71.9. Infant mortality at birth (per 1000) in 2003 was at 91, which improved to 79 in 2004 however, LAC had an average of 27 in 2005. Life expectancy is 52 year compared to 71 in the region. The percentage of population that was undernourished was 50 and 49 per cent in 2003 and 2004 respectively, whilst in LAC it was 10 per cent in 2005.\(^\text{46}\) The minimum wage which the government was forced into under the first intervention is still in place. Haiti was in 2003/4, and is presently, largely agrarian where two-thirds of the population are


\(^\text{44}\) WFP, [http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=332#Facts%20&%20Figures](http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=332#Facts%20&%20Figures)

\(^\text{45}\) Faubert, p.15.

\(^\text{46}\) Ibid. p.15.
subsistence farmers. Under Préval’s first presidency he had began a policy of privatisation of state-owned enterprises as a result of pressure from the international financial institutions.

There were some elite cleavage structures\(^{47}\) prior to the over-turn of president Aristide. A majority of the elite were not in support of Aristide, parts of the elite that had supported him turned against him later due to his actions.\(^{48}\) There were nevertheless some among the elite that supported him. It was however not cleavages between the elite in Haiti that affected the crisis of 2004, but cleavages between supporters of Aristide and non-supporters, where political and criminal violence frequently interacted. Haiti did not have any ethnic or religious structures that put it at risk for conflict.

Prior to February 2004 the state had the capacity to take autonomous decisions however, they were difficult to implement due to the economic situation. Corruption was prevalent (Haiti was last on Transparency International corruption index in 2004). The state’s capacity regarding policing, rule of law, security, was limited there were high levels of insecurity in part perpetrated by the state and the police were part of the insecurity situation. Its capacity regarding welfare, public goods and services was similarly limited in part due to the international aid embargo.

**B War related factors / factors referring to the peace process**

1 **Type of war and warring parties**

The conflict in Haiti was internal, and in early 2004 the armed gangs included Aristide loyalists, former officials of the Lavalas government, unofficial pro-Aristide armed gangs, gangs who participated in the 1991 coup (including *Le Front pour l’Avancement et Progres d’Haiti* (FRAPH) members), former military officers, former police officers, and former rural police (*chefs de section*), and non-political armed groups.\(^{49}\) These were not ethnic or religious divisions, but political and economic. Violence in Haiti has

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\(^{47}\) For elite versus population cleavages see part I, section 2, ‘Long term structural factors’.


changed over the years. Describing the violence as political violence reflecting the pro- and anti-Aristide factions is too simplistic. Haiti was never only a conflict of political factions fighting for power. Polarisation and the violence it has engendered in Haiti is multi-layered.

There were no spill-over effects from other countries but an entirely internal conflict based on political and economic factors. The entrepreneurs of violence and their private economic interests seem to have been key in the conflict. The demonstrations against Aristide’s regime established that there was opposition to what he was doing, but several of these participants had their own agendas and aims. These actors were both societal actors armed gangs, but also state actors, including corrupt security services, a president that used armed gangs for particular purposes, as well as corrupt government officials. The recruitment process to the different parties to the conflict varied, but can broadly be said to have been a combination of political support as well as financial in terms of payment for support and participation.

2 War variables

The violence in Haiti was both criminal and political in nature. It is therefore difficult to estimate the number of causalities during this period of Aristide’s regime that were a direct result of the political violence or what was a result of criminal armed violence. As Oxfam has pointed out that data on deaths and injury in Haiti are scarce, the Ministry of Health lacks a functioning system for tracking and collection by civil society organisations is limited.\textsuperscript{50} For the crisis of February 2004, which led to the intervention, it has similarly been difficult to reliably estimate any numbers.

Prior to 2004 when the armed rebels which began to take over the country from the north and work their way southwards, the majority of the violence and instability had taken place in urban centres. The civilian population was affected since the majority of violence took place in urban areas and over-crowed slums. There were, however no refugee camps because of the violence. There were refugees to the Dominican Republic, the US and the

\textsuperscript{50} Oxfam (2006). Haiti: Violence Impact Study,
Bahamas, however, how many of these refugees was a direct result of the violence or because of the extreme poverty in Haiti is also difficult to estimate. The UNHCR states that the total refugee population from Haiti to the US, France and Canada was 9,208 in 2004, and there were 6,953 asylum applicants to the same countries in that period. In 2003 it was 7,547 and 5,061 respectively and 2005 in 13,542 and 9,622. However, that does not include the illegal non-registered refugees nor the ones that were turned back and is therefore not an accurate overview of the refugee population.

3 War end/ peace process

The armed rebellion that precipitated Aristide’s removal from office effectively began in 5 February and ended when Aristide left the country on the 29 February and with the arrival of the intervention. However, throughout 2003 there was increasing opposition to Aristide’s regime and by late 2003 an opposition movement comprising political, private and civil society actors demanded his resignation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) offered to mediate and submitted a Prior Action Plan on 31 January 2004, which was followed by an implementation plan established by the Group of Six (Canada, France, US, EU, OAS, Bahamas (for CARICOM)).

Several diplomatic initiatives taken by the OAS and CARICOM followed. The peace plan which outlined a power-sharing agreement with Aristide, a new prime minister and legislative elections, was rejected outright by the rebels and opposition leaders who insisted on Aristide’s departure. Aristide agreed to the peace plan, but insisted he would not step down until 2006. The US stated they would continue to press for the peace plan and were talking with the parties to gain acceptance for it. However, they were unsuccessful.

Armed groups continued create instability after the intervention. Moreover, the transitional government pursued Aristide supporters and illegally arrested and detained political prisoners. The transitional government’s use of violence was part of their pursuit of their own political agenda. The majority of the transitional government had been firmly against Aristide’s government and many had supported the armed groups and

52 See e.g. Golhurst, David (25 February 2004). ‘US still aiming for peace plan in Haiti despite opposition rejection’. State Department VOA.
violence that led to his resignation. They wanted to limit Famni Lavalas’ support and in many ways used their time in office to obtain that goal. In this sense they were an internal veto player or spoiler which slowed down the democratisation process and establishment of rule of law. Armed pro-Aristide supporters also impeded the democratisation process and rule of law. There were no external actors who tried actively to hinder a democratisation process in Haiti at that time. There was no change in the economic structure of the country after the conflict, but significantly aid began to flow again.

Section 3: External variables – military intervention and democracy promotion

A External intervention

1 Parameters of the intervention
The Multinational Interim Force (MIF) was led by the US and began deployment immediately after Aristide’s departure 29 February. It was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1529 adopted on 29 February 2004. OAS and CARICOM had taken the lead in addressing the issues of increasing insecurity and discontent and opposition by Haitians to Aristide and attempting to find a peaceful resolution. The intervention came at the invitation of the acting President, the head of Haiti’s Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre. It was a swift response from the international community to the request from Haiti. The first phase of the intervention was, as stated in Security Council resolution 1529, to stay no longer than three months, when the UN Mission in Haiti took over. The MIF mandate was to ‘contribute to a secure and stable environment’…’facilitate provision of humanitarian assistance’ and ‘facilitate international assistance to Haitian police and coast guard in order to establish public safety and maintain law and order.’ It authorised the MIF to ‘take all necessary means to fulfil its mandate.’ The resolution, which was taken under Chapter VII, states that ‘Haiti constitutes a threat to international
peace and stability and to the stability in the Caribbean especially through the potential outflow of people to other states in the sub-region.  

Subsequently UN Security Council resolution 1542 adopted on 30 April 2004 established MINUSTAH which replaced MIF on 1 June 2004. MINUSTAH’s first mandate stipulated that the mission should ‘ensure a secure and stable environment’ ‘assist the transitional government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police….’ ‘assist the transitional government particularly the Haitian National Police with a comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme for all armed groups’ and to ‘assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law…including the re-establishment of the prison system.’ Moreover, it was to ‘support the constitutional and political process underway in Haiti, including through good offices, foster principles and democratic governance, and institutional development’ and to assist the transitional government in organising, monitoring and carrying out free and fair elections. The Security Council also asked the UN, the OAS and CARICOM to work with Haitians in promoting the rebuilding of democratic institutions, as well as assisting in developing a strategy to combat poverty and socio-economic development. MINUSTAH’s mandate was renewed on 15 August 2006 and contained a reinforcement and expansion of the existing mandate. It was extended for eight months on 15 February 2007 and then again until 15 October 2008. The US led the MIF force in the first phase of the intervention and the UN was in charge of the ensuing intervention, neither was a hotly debated intervention externally. The MIF intervention was not debated extensively internally, but the UN intervention was debated in Haiti particularly at a later stage after they had been deployed when there was opposition to it among certain sectors of society.

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54 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, 7, I, (b), (c), (d).
55 Ibid. 7 II (a), (c)
56 UN Secretary General’s Report, S/2004/300, 16 April, 2004, para.1.
The UN intervention has a broad mandate, but it was not equipped to deal with all parts of the mandate from the beginning. The mission deployed slowly hence in the beginning being unable to ensure stability and security. The capacity to fully conduct and implement police, justice and prison reform has been lacking. This has been a result of numerous factors among them the inability to get the required number of people mandated in the resolutions as well as people with the required skill-set. In addition, the mission has also suffered a lack of French-speaking capacity. In December 2006 there was not sufficient capacity to do what MINUSTAH planned to do in the police, justice and prisons sectors, although the mandated capacity would have been sufficient. For example, in December 2006 UNPOL only had 44 per cent of its required staff, and the justice section were in key posts operating at 50 per cent. This changed during 2007 and human capacity improved. Capacity to address the election assistance and support was greater than in the rule of law and security sector.

The coordination among the different actors participating in the intervention varied (and varies) according to time, themes and specific actors (within the mission, within the UN, with donors, with local stakeholders both government and civil society). It cannot be generalised about the coordination between actors more broadly. For example, under the Interim Cooperation Framework donors and partners cooperated and coordinated their efforts reasonably well in many of the themes, but did not do so in security sector reform. Coordination between certain actors has increased during 2007, particularly within the UN family and on certain issues, such as security sector reform. However, it does not seem to have improved with other donors in this field.

The stated objectives of the intervention, as reflected by the mandates, were to ensure a secure and stable environment and assist in holding free and fair elections, and institution building. Apart from the MIF there has not yet been a clear exit strategy for MINUSTAH

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60 Interview with senior MINUSTAH official, Port-au-Prince, November/December 2006.
61 Interview with senior UNPOL officer, Port-au-Prince, November/December 2006.
63 Interviews with MINUSTAH officials and two donors, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
the first mandate was only for six months, the last mandate was for one year ending 15 October 2008, but with ‘the intention of further renewal’. 64

2 Election monitoring
The EU had an Electoral Observation Mission during presidential and legislative elections. There were also independent organisations monitoring the elections, for example, the International Mission for Monitoring the Haitian Elections, which was followed by the Canadian Mission for Accompanying Haitian Elections. Political and human rights conditions since the intervention has been reported on and monitored by the UN, but also international organisations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. All findings from election monitoring, political and human rights monitoring have been made public. The elections after the international intervention in 2004 were deemed free and fair.

3 Military aspects of the intervention
US, France, Chile and Canada contributed troops to the MIF. By 14 March 2004 they were about 2,700 troops. 65 By 23 March it had risen to 3,300 of whom 1,800 were American, 760 French, 330 Chilean and 340 Canadian. The military contributing troops to the UN peace operation are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, US, and Uruguay. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jordan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uruguay were as of 2008 providing the majority of the troops.

The initial authorised strength of the UN intervention as established by resolution 1532 was up to 6,700 military personnel, 1,622 police, 548 civilian personnel, 154 UN volunteers and 995 local civilian staff. This was temporarily reinforced in June 2005 by resolution 1608 up to 7,500 troops and 1,897 police. The authorised strength in resolution 1702 on 15 August 2006 increased the first resolution’s mandated strength up to 7,200 troops and 1,951 police officers; as of 31 March 2008 there were 7,064 troops and 1,923

police officers, 511 international civilian personnel, 1,152 local civilian staff and 199 UN volunteers in MINUSTAH. The UN troops were and continue to be led by Brazil. The approved budget for 1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008 for the UN peace operation in Haiti was $535.37 million, 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 $601.58 million. During the MIF deployment both US and French troops underscored that the coordination worked very well.66

MINUSTAH received criticism from several sectors including civil society and political and economic elites for not addressing the violence perpetrated by armed gangs sufficiently strongly, particularly in the capital.67 In response to the deteriorating security situation in late 2006 early 2007 the UN on request of the Haitian government went into armed gang held areas to arrest perpetrators; this led to exchanges of fire, and the UN SRSG admitted that there had been ‘collateral damage’.68 This action was described as a ‘new experience in UN peacekeeping,’69 since it dealt with armed gangs rather than rebel groups or state actors. The UN forces arrested several hundred gang members, kidnap victims were released, and weapons and ammunition seized. This could perhaps be interpreted as enforcing peace, but it was more UN forces dealing with criminal/political violence destabilising primarily Port-au-Prince.

Concrete measures executed by the MIF were more or less in accordance with mandate. However, according to officials they also confiscated illegal weapons when they came upon them, which was not part of their mandate.70 Although stability increased significantly violence did continue throughout their presence in the country.

The measures conducted by the MINUSTAH reflected the mandate and included ensuring a secure and stable environment, protecting civilians, support to elections, DDR,

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67 Interviews with civil society, political parties with author, June and December 2006.
69 UN spokesperson David Wimhurst quoted by Jacobs, Stevenson (10 February 2007). Associated Press.
police, justice and prisons. There were no measures that were specified in the mandate that has not been attempted addressed by the mission. But the problem lies in how well and to what extent they have implemented the different aspects of the mission. A key problem was until the election of the new government they had no real interlocutor in Haiti. The transitional government was not interested in conducting for example security sector reform, hence there was no willingness to cooperate with MINUSTAH on this aspect of the mandate, making it very difficult to implement. Another problem was that with for example DDR they did follow the mandate but the mandate was flawed – there should not have been a traditional approach to DDR in Haiti, but this was what the mandate outlined and hence was attempted implemented without success.\(^\text{72}\)

4 Intrusiveness

The UN had not, at the time of writing, during their presence in Haiti assumed any legislative power, nor had the UN informally or formally assumed executive power for any amount of time. There has as yet not been a new constitution written or a legal codex. It is not an executive policing mission; they mentor, monitor, assist as well as train the Haitian National Police. It has not taken on a de facto executive policing role, although they have assisted the PNH in conducting arrests. However, as mentioned above, the military component of the mission has been active in rooting out the armed gangs and making arrests, but at the request of the government. The IMF, World Bank and BID, as well as the US, continue to influence the economic policies of Haiti, but their presence and influence in Haiti pre-dates the intervention and cannot be viewed in the context of the intervention only.

Sovereignty has not at any time been suspended in Haiti; the UN attempted to work with the transitional government and has since the elections worked with the government of Haiti. Due to the limited capacity of the PNH the UN has played and continues to play a critical role in providing security and stability and the government is reliant on this. Moreover, there is a difference between the level of intrusiveness in the capital versus

\(^{71}\) Interviews with MINUSTAH officials by author, Port-au-Prince, June, December 2006, April 2008.

\(^{72}\) Interviews with MINUSTAH officials by author, Port-au-Prince, June, December 2006.
that in the regions, as well as on national versus local levels – in the capital and at national level international presence has been and is more prominent. Critically however, certain sectors including a few representatives of civil society and political elite have felt that the intervention has been very intrusive, stating that it has encroached on Haiti’s sovereignty and have been referring to it as an occupation.\textsuperscript{73} This was at the time of writing a minority, and they have acknowledged that particularly due to the security situation the UN presence has been and is essential in Haiti for the moment.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{B Diplomacy, normative pressure and persuasion}

Publicly there has been limited pressure or persuasion exerted to keep the democratisation process going. During the transitional government the cooperation with the UN was complicated but there was pressure to hold elections. The elected government also has had pressure put upon it to hold elections and conduct the electoral law.\textsuperscript{75} Nevertheless, several elections have yet to be held and the electoral law has been postponed. Some MINUSTAH officials argued that exerting pressure upon the government was not a useful way to make things happen, and that things will not work by pressurising the government.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{C Modes of interaction between internal and external actors}

The broad aims of the interveners was to end the crisis, ensure stability and security, creating a stable state so that the refugee issue would be minimised and strengthening democracy within the already existing context in Haiti. The goals were and are considerable considering the level of institution and capacity building necessary. But this was and is dependent upon Haitian political will, civil society support for international influence, and the economic elite and armed gangs/actors willingness to support it. The interests among the international actors to achieve these goals seems to be unitary, it is the means how to achieve them that have at times been at odds. Security and stability is a

\textsuperscript{73} Interviews with civil society groups, political actors by author, June, December, Haiti, 2006.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Interview with senior MINUSTAH officials by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
key for all actors in Haiti and it is an expectation from both state and rural elites that the UN should provide this.

MINUSTAH face the constraints of resources, both financial and human, as well as time, although the mission has continued to be renewed it is a peacekeeping mission which inherently means it does not have a twenty year perspective. Moreover, even if it stays in Haiti for a very long time, each renewal is only for one year at a time, which limits planning long-term. The lack of coordination and strategic planning between the international actors is also a constraint. In terms of cooperating and coordinating with local stakeholders there are issues that serve as key constraints for the interveners, particularly the limited capacity of the state and prevalent corruption.77 One donor felt that in the context of absence of capacity there was frequently a lack of will to make decisions, which complicated the implementation of projects and programmes.78 The weakness in governance solidifies the constraints. The weak state and lack of Haitian resources and Haitian capacity are constraints under which the interveners and the state elites interact.

There was no bargaining with regard to what type of regime there should be in Haiti between the interveners and the state elites, the majority of Haitians wanted a democracy as did the interveners. Haitians wanted security and development but in the context of democracy. Moreover, it was expected that democracy would bring security and development – authoritarianism and faltering democracy had thus far brought nothing but violence and under-development. Although there were no bargaining regarding type of regime, state elites as well as civil society throughout international presence in Haiti has not always agreed upon all the different aspects of the intervention programme, as exemplified throughout this report.

D Linkage, integration, convergence

77 Interviews with donors and MINUSTAH officials by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
78 Interview with donor by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
Most of Haiti’s closest neighbouring countries are considered democratic, Cuba being the most notable exception. The democratic process in Haiti has always been influenced by its democratic neighbours, particularly the US. However, it is important to note that historically this close link with the democratic US has had a negative rather than positive influence on democracy and democratisation in Haiti. The US has supported numerous dictatorships in Haiti, including the Duvaliers and General Namphy, and the US was against the election of Aristide in 1990. It was in a vacuum of a democratic ‘spill-over’ from its largest, most powerful democratic neighbour that the democratisation process began in Haiti in the mid-eighties. The initial democratisation process was locally owned and based, the continued democratisation process built on this, but after 1994 with considerable international support.

Due to the previous numerous UN interventions in Haiti prior to 2004, Haiti had close links with the UN, OAS, CARICOM, the US, Canada and France. Aristide also re-established diplomatic links with Cuba in 1996, 36 years after they were severed. In 1998 Cuba began sending medical assistance and doctors to Haiti, resulting in over the years several hundreds of Cuban doctors assisting in Haiti.\(^79\) This was an invaluable aid during the time which little medical aid was given from other sources.

Haiti’s major trading partner is the US both in import and export, other countries include Canada and Dominican Republic. The difference between exports and imports in Haiti are huge, in 2006, according to US State Department data, exports were at $494.4 million and imports $1,548.3 billion (in total not to/from US only). There are considerable remittances from the Haitian diaspora, particularly US, France and Canada. According to the World Bank remittances in 2002 was $650 million, which had more than doubled from 1997 and represented 19 per cent of Haiti’s GDP.\(^80\) Although there is considerable labour migration to the Dominican Republic the remittances sent from that country are considerably smaller, compared to that of the US, France and Canada. In 2006 according to BID estimates the Haitian diaspora sent more than $1.65 billion to Haiti representing

\(^79\) See e.g. The New York Times (12 November 1998). ‘Cuba to send doctors to Haiti’.
one-third of the country’s GNP.\textsuperscript{81} The World Bank however, stated that there were $1.07 billion recorded remittances to Haiti in 2006 – the equivalent of 21.6 per cent of GDP. But the World Bank acknowledged that the true size of remittances was larger.\textsuperscript{82}

Haiti has qualified for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, but is between decision, reached in November 2006, and completion point. It completed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, as a condition for HIPC status, in March 2008.\textsuperscript{83} Interim debt relief is according to International Development Association (IDA) and the IMF being provided to Haiti.\textsuperscript{84}

The international community was invited in 2004 to Haiti to restore stability and assist in holding democratic elections, the intervention’s emphasis on democracy did not run counter to that of the demands of most Haitians. There was a pre-existing affinity towards democracy, which existed strongly at grassroots level, and among certain sectors of the elite. Although, the elite has always been divided in its support for democracy and many worked actively against it. The elite had a cultural affinity towards France, however, this did not necessarily translate into an affinity for democracy. Former members of the armed forces have also worked against democracy in Haiti.

The modes of communication with the external world were and are limited for a majority of Haitians who do not have access to television or internet. According to the World Bank 6.9 out of 100 Haitians were estimated to be internet users in 2006, and according to UN estimates television receivers were 63 per 1,000 in 2006. Due to high illiteracy


\textsuperscript{82} Haiti, World Bank, siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Haiti.pdf


\textsuperscript{84} IDA and IMF (27 September 2007). HIPC and MDRI – Status of Implementation, p.16.
rates radio is the primary technological and communication linkage for the majority of Haitians with the neighbouring countries and the world. Although some civil society organisations and groups had working relationships with some international non-governmental organisations, advocacy and religious groups, these ties were often issue-specific, focusing on a variety of different topics, for example, HIV/AIDS, women, union support, education.

Haiti is a member of the following international organisations: ACCT, ACP, Caricom, CDB, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OIF, OPANAL, OPCW (signatory), PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO.

**E International events**

There were at the time of intervention no discernable international events that shaped the intervention. It was taken in the environment of international presence and war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has generally shaped and had an impact upon world politics however, there was no evident link between the Haiti intervention and these events or events in neighbouring countries.

**Section 4: Development aid and democracy promotion**

There are serious problems with national accounts in Haiti, including incomplete coverage and the questionable accuracy of raw data.

**A Aid / democracy financial and technical assistance after the war**

The most important donors in Haiti after 2004 were the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank, the IMF, the BID, the EU, the US and Canada. The US is the biggest donor followed by Canada.
Obtaining statistics on how much has been given by the different donors at what times is extremely difficult in Haiti. The transparency of donor support to Haiti has been limited – this is acknowledged by MINUSTAH officials, Haitian civil society and the different donors. There is as yet not an overview of who supports what in Haiti and how much aid has been distributed by the different agencies and donors. The UN began in 2006 a mapping of aid and assistance from 2004, but conceded that this would not be possible; there was not sufficient information, and lack of cooperation by the actors. For example, the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) reports gave quarterly information on what had been disbursed, but the problem was duplication of data, moreover, they stated disbursements but not what happened to the monies after they were disbursed. As was stated ‘data collection until end 2007 was inaccurate, duplicated or irrelevant and arbitrary.’ Moreover, the data collection by the government has been weak.

There was substantial aid given in connection with the elections and preparation for elections, including voter registration. Assistance to police and institutional reform has also been a primary issue. The baseline development aid prior to the intervention was minimal since there was an aid embargo of Haiti prior to the intervention, and nearly all aid was suspended. On the first donor’s conference after the intervention in July 2004 $1.085 billion was pledged by the different donors in addition to the $440 million already pledged. According to the OECD and World Bank net ODA to Haiti in 2006 was 581 million up from 502 million in 2005, and bilateral ODA in 2005-2006 by sector was over 40 per cent on programme assistance – total external debt was $1.2 billion.

Canada is the second biggest donor to Haiti, and Haiti the second largest recipient of Canadian aid after Afghanistan. Canada does not give budget support, it is all programme and project support. But the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) gave

85 Interviews by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
86 Interview with MINUSTAH official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
87 The Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) was prepared jointly by the Haitian Interim Government and the international community, and drafted in a short space of time; it set out needs, priorities and targets in 19 sectors (sectoral tables), including security sector reform, elections and justice, and was aimed to bring Haiti through the transitional period. See http://haiticci.undg.org for full overview
88 Interview with MINUSTAH official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
89 Ibid.
targeted budget support in the period April 2004 to March 2006 when it contributed to payment of Haiti’s arrears to the World Bank – Total budget: $15.8 million, disbursements for the period: $15.8 million; payment of the cost of Haiti’s membership in the Caribbean Development Bank – Total budget: $3.3 million, disbursements for the period: $3.3 million; contribution to debt service – Total budget: $18 million, disbursements for the period: $18 million. Moreover, in the same period CIDA gave under the Support for United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Project – Total budget $27 million, disbursements for the period: $19.2 million.

The Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada supports Haiti through the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force with a budget of $15 million per year (budgeted no data for disbursements) focusing on the core issues of increasing security; supporting justice and security sector reform; and improving regional stability.

The BID gives general budgetary support. They focus mostly on support to infrastructure, because President Préval asked the bank to concentrate on this; transport, energy, water, agriculture, education, health and environment are the key foci of the BID. 90 Capacity building, administered by the prime minister’s office, has also been supported where five ministries have been the beneficiaries of $10 million. 91 A programme of vocational training of young people (18-24 years) all over the country was given $25 million (all budgeted no data on disbursements).

Development aid and aid for democracy promotion is essential for a nascent democracy, as is economic development. After the intervention the importance of development aid was underscored by ‘la vie chère’ riots in April 2008. Although there were other factors playing a part in these riots, there was a clear dissatisfaction with the lack of development and aid coming from the government and international community. If there had been more assistance focused on the basics maybe this could have been avoided. Even if other factors were behind the riots they could not have used this particular dissatisfaction and

90 Interview with BID official by author, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
91 Ibid.
the genuine hunger to incite riots for their own purpose if more aid had been coming in sooner. This has had an impact on the still fragile democracy, and if more aid had been focused on certain sectors this might have been avoided. There should in particular have been more aid focused on agro-food production, job creation, civil society, accountability, drugs-trafficking, public administration, and building up parliamentary, state and government capacity. As a result of the riots food aid was pledged.

**Elections and political processes**

**CIDA April 2004-March 2006 under the ICF framework:**

Support for electoral process project – Total budget $19.75 million, disbursements $19.75
Election security project – Total budget $2.25 million, disbursements $2.25 million
International mission for monitoring Haitian election project – Total budget $9.9 million, disbursements $5.5 million
Organisation building and electoral observation project – Total budget $492,984, disbursements $315,937.
Electoral training and information project – Total budget $237,687, disbursements $224,113.

**Rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights**

**CIDA April 2004-March 2006 under the ICF framework:**

Strengthening the rule of law project – Total budget $1.6 million, disbursements $800,000
Support for the OAS special mission project – Total budget $10 million, disbursements $5 million.
Diagnosis of the organisations active in human rights and justice sector in Haiti project – Total budget $307,693, disbursements $271,430
Judicial reform advocacy project – Total budget $150,417, disbursements $150,417
Communication for human rights project – Total budget $300,000, disbursements $206,243.
Haitian Human Rights Education Organization Capacity-Building Project – Total budget $62,369, disbursements $62,369

**USAID 2005** Protect Human Rights and Equal Access to Justice $2,189,000 DA, $7,000,000 ESF (no data on disbursements)

**USAID 2006** Protect Human Rights and Equal Access to Justice $10,000,000 ESF (no data on disbursements)

**Institutional infrastructure**

**CIDA April 2004-March 2006 under the ICF framework:**


Development of Specifications for the Rehabilitation of Four Courthouses” Project – Total budget $100,000, disbursements $50,408

Northeast Local Governance Support Project – Total budget $3.65 million, disbursements $1.05 million

**Civil society, media, civic education, empowerment**

**CIDA April 2004-March 2006 under the ICF framework:**

Media and democratic development in Haiti – Total budget $2 million, disbursements $850,000

Project to strengthen Haitian civil society involvement in the transition to democracy – Total budget $325,725, disbursements $64,310

Civic education and support to democracy – Total budget $495,000, disbursements $289,416.

Democratic Citizenship Education in the Northeast Project - Total budget: $199,992, disbursements $139,031.

Civil Society Participation in the Governance of Haiti” Project – Total budget $213,556, disbursements $152,398

Alternative Justice Support Project – Total budget $44,000, disbursements $42,544.

Kore Fanm Fund (FKF) status of women and women’s rights – Total budget $5 million, disbursements $1,437,796
USAID 2005 Strengthen Civil Society $1,000,000 DA, $16,225,000 ESF (no data on disbursements)
USAID 2006 Strengthen Civil Society $12,000,000 ESF (no data on disbursements)

Civil-military relations, DDR, SSR
CIDA April 2004-March 2006 under the ICF framework:
Haitian National Police Institutional Support Project – Total budget $494,000, disbursements $484,000
Inventory and Development of Technical Specifications for the Rehabilitation of 20 Haitian National Police (HNP) Stations Project – Total budget $75,276, disbursements $71,014
Project to Rehabilitate the Building Housing the Departmental Directorate, the Police Station, and Jacmel Civil Prison – Total budget $99,121, disbursements $99,121

USAID 2006 Promote Effective and Democratic governance of the Security Sector $14,000,000 (no data on disbursements)
USAID 2005 through OTI support DDR $3,000,000 (no data on disbursements)
USAID 2006 through OTI support DDR $2,000,000 (no data on disbursements)

B Democratic conditionality in the aid sector
MINUSTAH and UNDP officials state that they do not use democratic conditionality, in form of the carrot or the stick, and neither does Canada, nor the IOM. Several MINUSTAH officials and donors felt that this would not be of much use in Haiti, and that it has been tried but did not work.\(^92\) What international community have used diplomatically in the margins is not known.

The international community used democratic conditionality prior to the intervention. An aid embargo was put in place between 2001 and 2004 as a result of the disputed presidential elections in 2000. There was only a ten per cent voter turnout and the opposition argued that elections had not been free and fair. International observers

\(^92\) Interview with MINUSTAH and donor officials, Port-au-Prince, April 2008.
believed the allegations of election rigging to be well-founded. The embargo had disastrous effects upon the economy, and ‘the major factor behind economic stagnation, and did little to aid the progress of democratisation. On the contrary the aid embargo aided the gradual unravelling of the democratisation process and was a factor in the heightened internal conflict culminating in the violence in February 2004 and international intervention. As Jeffery Sachs stated ‘US officials surely knew that the aid embargo would mean a balance-of-payment crisis, a rise in inflation and a collapse of living standards, all of which fed the rebellion against President Aristide.’ However, it is impossible to say whether continued and/or heightened aid during that time period would have increased democracy, particularly since democracy had been in decline since the late nineties. It is however doubtful whether it would have had a strong positive impact upon democracy-building rather than ensuring a strengthening of the power holders.

93 Khouri-Padova, L.(March 2004). Discussion Paper, Haiti Lessons Learnt, UN Best Practices Unit, p.4. Empty ballot boxes were found with strewn ballots in the streets.
95 Quoted in Weisbrod, Mark and Sandoval, Luis (December 2007). Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Further Delays’ CEPR, p.3.
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