External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

Bosnia

Kristie Evenson

Freie Universität Berlin

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External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies

An Introduction To The Project

Christoph Zuercher

U of Ottawa and Freie Universität Berlin

The Research Question

Can countries emerge from civil wars as democracies? And if they can – to what extent and by what means can external actors support such a transition? While much research effort has been devoted to the question of how warring societies break the conflict trap and return to peace, much less effort has so far been spent on investigating under what circumstances warring societies not only end violence, but succeed in creating a stable and democratic polity. Political theorists, from Machiavelli to Huntington, are in general very skeptical with regard to the possibility of democratic regimes arising out of civil war. Instead, many see an intermediate stage of autocratic rule as unavoidable in order to overcome societal divisions and rebuild the fundamental political institutions of the polity. The empirical evidence seems indeed to suggest that countries rarely emerge from war as democracies.

When we look at the overall population of countries that experienced a civil war after WWII (regardless of whether there was a peacebuilding mission or not), we find little reason for optimism. Only 10% of the countries that experienced civil wars reached a polity score of +7 or higher (approximately like Kenya, Moldova or Mali) two years after war ended. 53% all war-affected countries show a polity score of -5 or lower two years after the end of civil war, that is, a regime type similar to Gambia or Iran. 37% have a polity score of -7 or lower, similar to Belarus or Uzbekistan (all data is from Sambanis, Nicholas, with Michael Doyle, 2000: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and
Quantitative Analysis, in: American Political Science Review 94: 4, 779 - 801). The picture looks similarly gloomy five years after the end of civil war: 52% have a polity score of -5 or lower; 39,4% have a score of -7 or lower; and only 10,6% have a score of +7 or higher. Yet, there are historical examples of countries that did emerge from war as democracies: Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, and Mozambique, Namibia or Macedonia in the post cold war period, to name only a few. What made these cases of post-war democratization successful, and what, if any, role was played by external actors? This is, in a nutshell, the puzzle that this research project investigates.

The study of post-war democratization is a relatively new field, and there is surprisingly little empirical scholarly work devoted to the factors that allow a post-war country to become both stable and democratic. This can partly be explained by the fact that the two bodies of literatures, which are relevant for such an endeavor, are concerned with only one half of the problem. The democratic transition literature is predominantly interested in the democratic outcome of a political transition in countries which were authoritarian, but at peace. The literature on peace building is interested in transitions from civil war to peace. Whether this peace is accompanied by a measure of democracy or not is typically not of interest to this body of literature. This division of labor may explain why there is only a very small literature that is explicitly interested in outcomes which are both peaceful and democratic. But is this division warranted, or is it perhaps a consequence of academic inertia? The answer to this question depends on whether we think that post-war countries are in essence a sub-class of transition cases, or whether we think that post-conflict countries are cases sui generis.

The researchers involved in this project think that post-conflict cases are fundamentally different from transition cases, and they assume that these differences may have an impact on the factors which affect peace and democracy. If this is true, then it is necessary to account for the possibility that the factors which affect a transition to democracy are not necessarily the same, or do not necessarily have the same impact, in a post-conflict setting. We must also account for the possibility that the factors which affect peace and democracy respectively do not necessarily simply add up, but that they may cancel each other out. One
implication of this is then that we have to disaggregate the concept of “success” into sub-concepts. One way of doing this is to individually look at “absence of war”, “democratic quality of the regime” and “state capacities”. While these three concepts may merge in the case of fully established democracies, we argue that for countries emerging from war we need to disaggregate them in order to be able to empirically explore which sequences and combinations are most conducive to the normatively desirable outcome: stable democracies at peace.

### The Research Design

Given these challenges, we opted for a case study oriented research design. Case studies allow for process-tracing, which is indispensable for discovering causal mechanisms. Case studies allow researchers to treat cases a whole, which facilitates the identification of multiple causation and which may lead to the identification of typological sub-classes. Case studies can be arranged into different sets of structured comparisons; and finally, small-n research designs are not dependent on the few available global data sets, because the small number of cases allows researchers to collect the specific original data which they think may be relevant for the explanation of the observed phenomenon.

We collaborated with an international team of country experts, who prepared ten structured cases studies between October 2008 and December 2009. Our sample covers cases on Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Haiti. We deliberately chose cases from the post cold-war period only, because our main interest is the contribution of external actors to post-war democratization, and democracy promotion and massive peace building missions became fashionable and feasible after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s.

### The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases consists, theoretically, of all civil wars that came to an end after 1989. We count 52 cases (Data from Doyle/Sambanis 2000). Our main interests is the
question of whether and how countries that were affected by large-scale violence can emerge as stable and democratic polities, and we are particularly interested in the impact of external support to this outcome. Other outcomes are possible and indeed more probable. Post-conflict countries can relapse into war; post-conflict countries can emerge as stable, yet undemocratic polities; and post-conflict countries could emerge as democratic, yet unstable polities. For comparative purposes, we wanted to include all of these outcomes in our sample. Furthermore, we also want to have variation on the main independent variable, that is, the amount of external support for democracy. Hence, we have four different outcomes, and two different values on our main independent variable. This can be depicted in a table with 2 x 4 cells. In order to group the cases into the cells, we have to define measures for stability, democracy and external support. Because this is not for analytical-descriptive purpose, but for sampling, we do this in a fairly rough and ready way. We classify countries that are still at peace five years after the war ended as stable. We classify countries as democratic when they reach a polity IV score of 10 or higher five years after the war ended. We proxy the amount of external support by the type of UN mission. Countries in which a complex peace building mission, or a peace enforcement mission, took place are coded as having received high external support. For all coding we rely on a data set compiled by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (Sambanis 2000).

The next table groups all cases in the eight cells. Case in bold were included in our sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High external support</th>
<th>Stable democratic and</th>
<th>Stable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable undemocratic and</th>
<th>Unstable democratic and</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Timor</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Haiti 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low or no external support</th>
<th>Bangladesh--Hill</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>n/a</th>
<th>India-Kashmir</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>Ethiopia-ideol</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia-Abkhazia</td>
<td>Congo-Shabba I&amp;II</td>
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<td>Georgia-Ossetia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Ogaden</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indonesia-East Tim.</td>
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In order to generate fine-grained data, we developed a structured research template that consists of 101 questions, divided into four sections. Country experts answered these questions, thereby generating rigidly structured case studies with a tremendous amount of data, which we used for comparative analysis. Only then did the authors shorten the studies turning them into condensed analytical narratives. The original versions of the reports are accessible at the project’s webpage.

The first section is devoted to a description of the outcome. We disaggregate the concepts “security”, “democracy” and “state capacities” into sub-concepts: With regard to democracy, we inquire about various dimensions of democracy. These dimensions are rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability. We also ask how the majority of the population perceives democracy. Is there any cultural bias in favor or against democracy? For example, is it seen as a Western export that suits outsiders more than the local population? By security, we refer to whether the state is able to provide physical security to its population by ensuring the absence of war and providing protection from other forms of

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1 The Template is available here: [http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html](http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/frieden/ib/projekte/democracypromotion/index.html)

organized violence (e.g. criminal violence). By state capacity, we refer to the capacity of the state administration to autonomously make decisions and effectively implement them. In general terms, this implies that stronger states with more capacities can rely on well-developed bureaucratic apparatuses which are staffed by cohesive cohorts of civil servants and steered by flexible elites who have an incentive to hold in check rent-seekers and re-deploy available resources in pursuit of strategic policy objectives. Finally, this section asks whether the regime is seen as legitimate, and we differentiate between procedural input legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because its procedures ensure that society can voice its preferences and feed them into the decision-making process) and output legitimacy (the regime is legitimate because it provides public goods).

The second section asks about long-term structural factors (such as long-term economic development, the structure of the economy, or previous experiences with democracy), about war-related factors (such as duration and type of war, numbers of fractions, level of war-related destruction, and quality of any peace agreement) which may have had an impact on the countries’ capacities for a democratic peace.

The third section inquires about neighborhood effects on democracy such as linkages and integration; it then asks about the scope and characteristics of the external intervention focusing on both military and non-military aspects. We are interested in state-reconstructing and democracy-promoting measures, and in the question of how intrusive these measures were. We also ask whether and how diplomacy, normative pressure and/or persuasion contributed to the democratization process. Another set of questions explores the interaction between the local elites and the interveners, their respective preferences and constraints. These questions allow us to reconstruct the strategic interaction and bargaining which we assume contributed to the outcome.

The fourth and final section covers development aid. Development aid is a specific form of external intervention; we investigate it separately in order to be able to detect its distinct effects. This section is intended to map the resource flows in the conflict country and to assess how they contributed to democratization and stabilization. This section inquires
about the most important donors and about the prevailing modalities of delivery. We also asked country experts to collect disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution of aid where available. Experts provided annual figures for: elections and political processes; rule of law, accountability, anti-corruption, human rights and minority rights; institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, administrative capacity); civil society, media, civic education, empowerment; civil-military relations, DDR, security sector reform. Please note that these are our generic categories which may differ from those used by donors or by the OECD-DAC, and that this data should be treated as illustrative rather than complete for most case studies due to a lack of availability of such information. Finally, we asked our experts to indentify instances of applied aid conditionality and to assess the impacts.

The Case Studies

The case studies are available from our website. We think that they provide a valuable source of fine-grained data which help us to better understand the processes which lead to a much desired, yet rare outcome: A successful transition from war to peace and democracy.
Executive Summary:

Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a state of contradictions. While it has managed to secure basic security and institutional capacities, it has yet to reach the point of being both a democracy on paper and in practice. Ethnic-based politics continued to dominate political space in BiH five as well as ten years after the peace agreement. These politics have distorted the reform process, and often reduced democratization efforts to zero sum games.

The list of reasons why the state has been slow to develop is extensive, but lack of political will by domestic actors should top the list. The intransigence of domestic actors and their pursuit of non-centralized state building agendas have been at odds with the international community since the beginning. Only targeted and sustained international actions have managed to assist, encourage, and coerce domestic elites into some level of cooperation.

This is partially due to the type of peace that was brokered after the violent conflict and the aftereffects of such a war. Major displacement and destruction (framed and then actualized in ethnic terms) resulted in a divided and shattered post-war society. Leaders of this society during the war continued (except for the most infamous war criminals) their monopoly on power in the post-war years. This power was fueled by the economic spoils of the conflict as well as the acquisition of most economically viable resources in the post-war years.

The significant international oversight that has been part of this statebuilding recipe in many ways epitomizes the excesses of good intentions and limitations of internationally directed statebuilding efforts. Whether the international community has stayed too long and has had too heavy of a hand will likely remain a point of debate for many years. But it is clear that even if such complex and multi-year missions are generally well resourced and are brokered by international community consensus, success is not inevitable, at least in the five and ten year timelines. Donor strategies that frontloaded reconstruction over more extensive efforts at institution building and democratization programming are understandable, but also likely contributed to the political malaise five and 10 years after Dayton.
Bosnia Case Study

After the highest per capita aid efforts at its time, Bosnia is no longer at war and is unlikely to again break down in such a bloody way. Without such international intervention more lives would have been lost and further ethnic cleansing likely, resulting in a possible ethnic-based set of state or statelet configurations that we can only imagine. But absence of such conflict works for only so long. Today’s weak and problematic, but officially multi-ethnic state of Bosnia remains in limbo. And it is unclear if the state will eventually gain enough legitimacy from all the necessary domestic actors to make it viable and democratic enough to reach its European integration objectives.

SECTION I: DEFINING INTERVENTION SUCCESS OR FAILURE

A: Democracy: How democratic is the regime that has emerged after the intervention?

The rule of law

Bosnian state structures have progressed greatly since 1996 in instituting and protecting the rule of law. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) at the end of 2006 faced clear challenges in the fair application of rule of law to its citizens, partly due to the structure of the system as well as implementation of the system that has managed to be developed.

Establishment of and professionalization of the judicial system (on all levels) was a key objective in the post-Dayton Bosnia. This required the development of a policing and court system that could take on the challenges of daily domestic legal issues as well as the ability to also address war crime cases. Legislation and institutional reforms by the end of 2006 had put in the structural base for a judicial system reflecting democratic objectives, but implementation of these reforms has been slow and uneven.

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)\(^1\) did not provide for a state-level judicial system, leaving this to the two entities (plus Brcko District) except for issues of international or inter-entity focus which were covered by the state-level BiH Constitutional Court. It also did not provide for a

\(^1\) A copy of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found at: http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/
state-level policing system. These impeded attempts to put a more comprehensive system in place that would allow rule of law follow through or a basic shared justice system.

For the first three years following Dayton, entity level rule of law was dominate and often arbitrary. Laws were often a mishmash of former Yugoslav and war-time state compilations; institutions were functioning at a low level, review of legal decisions was generally not possible on the state level, and political will to harmonize justice systems was low. Frustration at the lack of standards and consistency, led the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to begin issuing specific reform decisions in mid-1999 to improve both the legal framework and the institutions. A heavier OHR hand along with progress in the creation of more state-level institutions – which allowed further judicial oversight on the state level – have gradually improved the basic judicial framework and environment, but the process has been slow; it was only in mid-2002, that the Court of BiH and the state prosecutor’s office were established and legislation on prosecutorial norms for both entities was put forward.

A key early challenge to the efficiency of such a court system was the ability of the judiciary to address the thousands of property law cases related to refugee and displaced persons from the conflict. Initially, the local courts served more as an instrument of obstruction in terms of legal redress for property issues, particularly if the petitioner was an ethnic minority in the court’s jurisdiction. The international community highlighted two key areas of reform to address these inadequacies: professionalization of the judicial system personnel and institutions and specific procedures for cases of property and return issues. The latter issue required the establishment of an inter-agency Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) in October 2000 which having specific internationally provided resources and objectives, managed to solve over 90 per cent property related return cases by the end of 2003. This can be considered a success of the legal system, but not necessarily illustrative of the overall functioning of the rule of law in BiH.

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2 See the OHR history of judicial reform decisions at: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/archive.asp
3 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/key-events/default.asp?content_id=35971
4 For a copy of the plan see: http://www.unhcr.ba/protection/plip/PLIPFRAM.PDF
5 http://www.ohr.int/plip/
For the former issue, professionalization of the police and judicial personnel required a thorough vetting. Following the conflict, political and ethnic affiliations were the key criterion for positions rather than competency. Judicial rulings were often found to be clearly politically or ethnically biased, and police forces reflected the war time victor ethnic composition rather than the pre-war multi-ethnic populations.

Vetting and training of police forces has gone some way towards re-establishing a rule of law rather than an ethnic-ruled state. However efforts to make the forces truly multi-ethnic have not been very successful. Still in 2005, only 8 per cent of Republika Srpska (RS) police were of a minority, and in the Federation, the situation was only slightly better (ICG, 2005). Oversight by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the training/vetting programs did begin to allow an improvement of the security situation after 2000 for minority returnees (which will be covered more in the security section below), but incidents as reported by the Bosnian Helsinki Committee continued to occur still in 2005 and 2006 that at least suggested lack of efficiency if not clear harassment of minorities by police. Still it should be noted, that overall public safety perceptions have become quite favorable as have apprehensions of perpetrators (ESI, 2007). This is somewhat due to better policing and coordination within the justice system (despite lack of agreement on a state-wide police still by the end of 2006), which is a credit to the reform efforts. However, it is likely that general attitudes and levels of public safety are partly due to the fact that many areas of Bosnia are now only populated by a dominant ethnicity.

At the same time a vetting of judges and professionalization of the judiciary officials was attempted. Initially a quite vigorous vetting process was carried out in 2000. However, it appeared to only marginally improve judicial performance. In 2002, a neutral body – the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) – was created to watch over judicial professionalism and allow citizens to have legal redress if they felt procedures or judges were unprofessional, but even this apparently had limited effect; and as a consequence, the OHR took the controversial

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6 http://www.bh-hchr.org/reports.htm
7 http://www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=27659
step of dismissing all judges in order to properly vet qualifications and practices in the rehiring process. Key, here like in the police force, was both competency and an attempt at (re)establishment of multi-ethnic representation at the particular court levels to reverse the mono-ethnic institutions created by the war. International judges have also played a role in specifically shaping the reform. A number of international judges have been part of the court process, particularly in sensitive areas like the establishment of the War Crime Chamber (in 2005) and the special investigation of sensitive organized crime and anti-corruption cases.

Both had also institutionalized corruption as a working model. Increases in professional salaries as well as some level of prosecution of proven corrupt officials improved the overall performance of the judicial system. But political and ethnic considerations continued to plague the court systems through 2006, where at least the perception was that all are not equal before the law.

On a broader basis, basic protection of human rights, including socio-economic rights, is present, but not consistent. Access to institutions and state resources is guaranteed in legislations regardless of ethnic etc. identity, but discrimination, at least on a subtle if not blatant basis remains prevalent. While blatant human rights abuses had decreased significantly from a lackluster record in 2000 to the end of 2006, the investigation of past human rights abuses and war crimes has been slow and politically burdened. Despite the decision of the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, to transfer war crimes case to local courts, the ability of these courts to effectively try these cases remains in question.

The establishment of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office in 2000 to represent the population in human rights cases improved access to legal redress for many disenfranchised people. Yet the Dayton blueprint of ethnic-based consociation for institutions in BiH, and the effects of the

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8 High Representative Petritsch, for example, dismissed 11 judges and prosecutors as well as several court presidents in May 2002 for abuse of office. [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002)

9 In majority Bosniak and Croat areas, approximately 48 and 38 per cent respectively viewed the courts as corrupt; in Serb majority areas the figure was at 29% for 2006 (UNDP, 2006).

10 The actual establishment of the Ombudsman office was made possibility through an imposed decision of the OHR in December 2000 after delays by the parliament in passing the necessary legislation. For a copy of the OHR decision, see: [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=364](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=364)
war still complicate the ability of an individual’s protection of legal rights. The Constitutional Court’s ruling in 2000 on the equality of the constituency of three nations in both Entities provided additional legal tools to see legal redress, but the trend towards substantial improvement is slow as implementation of such rulings has also been dependent on the will of government officials to enforce the decisions.\textsuperscript{11} This political will included the ability of a public administration to carry out basic reforms, which largely remained unreformed through 1999 (ICG, 1999). The public administration only started improving citizens services as part of the increased pressure to improve minority return options and demonstrated ability of the Office of the High Representative to remove officials (even on the local level) obstructing basic Dayton implementation and the push for a civil service law and standardized system; it took until early 2003 before a civil service agency and system was in place and functioning.

Finally it should be noted that the extensive ‘violence-prone networks’ described by the U.S. Institute of Peace (Dziedzic, Rozen, and William, 2002) that were established during the conflict have not been completely dismantled, despite efforts to do this by both domestic and international actors. Informal connections between organized crime, veterans’ groups and former soldiers as well as the political elite continue to provide a challenge for transparent and fair decision making that is answerable to the rule of law.

\textit{Participation}

After a rough start, the basic mechanics of free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been entrenched within the system. However, overall engagement with the political process or in civil society remains relatively low, due to both apathy of the populations and structurally legitimized methods of public life that is primarily based on ethnicity.

The heavy international presence has further skewed public participation. Neither the public or political actors have felt a responsibility for their state as politicians tended to see their role as mediators between international powers and local interests. In the fall 2000 election campaign five years after the peace agreement, for example, these politicians tended to campaign on behalf

\textsuperscript{11} For example, one year after the constituency decision, the court’s decision was effectively left unenforced (CEELI, 2001).
Bosnia Case Study

of their ethnic constituencies with representatives of the international community (Papic and Sadikovic, 2008). Ethnic distinctions in attitude to the state and international institutions somewhat converged by 2005 and 2006, but the reasons appear to be general dissatisfaction rather than a more engaged and supportive population (UNDP, 2006).

The issue of participation is tied up in the larger dynamic of external-domestic interaction and responsibility. As suggested by BiH analyst Papic above, looking to the international community to both ‘sort out’ the daily problems and ultimately make sure that the country as such would not fall apart allowed many domestic elite to continue their narrow political agendas without having to take responsibility for larger statebuilding issues. The high level of external power and its level of intrusiveness in BiH arguably was a key factor in keeping the peace after Dayton, but it created a dependency cycle which still continued at the end of 2006.

Participation was also hampered by the manner in which many of the policy decisions continued to be made by external actors in BiH. While the OHR was considered (or at least became the de facto) executive of BiH and still contains many almost unlimited powers, its use of these to either develop and push through legislation for institution building and reform or in dismissing obstructive domestic officials contributed to at least the perception that political participation in BiH started and ended at the line in front of one of the OHR offices.

The Berlin-based think tank, European Stability Initiative (ESI), for example, in their 2003 study of the administrative acts of the OHR suggested that the 1997 Bonn Powers given to the OHR had gradually been racketed up as ‘instruments of bureaucratic convenience’ (Knaus and Martin, 2003) rather than reflective of administration by democratic principles which included proper consultation and negotiation with domestic actors. The realities of an international community trying to encourage and then push and then lead reforms inevitably resulted in this international-domestic knot that hampered much participation in the political process throughout the ten years following Dayton. But this dynamic was at least partially in response to the other key constraint at play: the continued dominance and narrow and often zero sum policy interests of the ethnic-based political parties and their elite
The three main ethnic based political parties – the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the primarily Bosniak-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that emerged from the conflict have consistently remained the key brokers of political power in BiH. During the first five years following Dayton, these three parties dominated political life and continued their process of securing ethnic-based fiefdoms by political means. Elections in the fall of 1996 secured the three ethnic based political parties’ grip on power, and this continued until 2000 elections which brought in a coalition of moderate forces in the Federation. The international decision to hold elections in 1996 before the environment for a ‘fair’ election was in place often has been criticized as cementing through the ballot box rather than the battlefield the dominance of ethnic-based politics in BiH. The major constraint was the issue of voter registration with estimates by OSCE in early 2006 that roughly 50 per cent of eligible voters were outside of BiH, not to mention those displaced from within BiH. International pressure to ‘show progress’ in BiH is likely one reason that the OSCE decided to hold elections at this time.

The first five years following Dayton were not monolith in political developments. The strengthening of Banja Luka based SDS politicians like Biljana Plavsic over the Pale led-SDS of Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajsnik in 1997-1998 was arguably significant to aiding a fragile coalition of ‘moderate nationalists to take power and to mainstream Serbian national interests in BiH. Yet for practical purposes even this development did little to steer parties towards more moderate positions. Alternative parties forming the ‘Alliance for Change’ in 2000 elections expanded the political landscape in the Federation and suggested that issued-based politics was developing in BiH. At the same time, the experiment with more moderate political forces in the RS proceeding from the Plavsic government was traded for more familiar hard-line forces in the 2000 elections, creating a two-year political climate of hope in the Federation, but increased acrimony between entity institutions and on the central government level.

12 Bosniak refers to Bosnians of a Muslim identity.

However the coalition of parties in the Federation was unwieldy and accordingly could not deliver on its proposal, allowing ethnic-based parties to again dominate in the next elections. The impact that this had on the overall population was palpable, with election turnout in 2002, at 55 per cent (down from 64.4 in 2000). As the 2002 elections were the first elections of four, not two years, the impacts of the election victory of the main nationalist groups were even more significant. Since then, ethnic-based parties have taken on more of the Dayton agenda (Dodik’s winning 2006 SNSD party in the RS), have had internal splits (as was the case of the HDZ) and or have had voters go to alternative political parties (like the Social Democrats –SDP), however the general tone of political engagement by the end of 2006 was still based on ethnic identity. The 2006 election of the Croat representative, Zeljko Komsic, for the tri-parte presidency by the SDP including, a good number of Bosniaks, was hailed as an example of new Bosnian politician. Yet the ensuing political criticism that he received from the HDZ and public questioning of whether he could actually represent the interests of the Bosnian Croats illustrated the still entrenched attitudes regarding political power and ethnic identity.

The political dimensions described are generally reflective of national and sub-national levels. While there have been pockets of progressive, multi-ethnic and issue-based politics and engagement (Tuzla area for example), the general assessment is one where participation opportunities have improved, but will to use them has not.

Civil society development has been a much supported endeavor by the international community, yet overall civil society development is still generally more dependent on donor agendas than domestic initiative. Initial development of civil society issued-based organizations focused primarily on conflict, humanitarian, and returns issues. These citizen groups have remained a powerful and grassroots set of forces throughout Bosnia, many crossing ethnic lines to represent issues of mutual concern.

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14 Some experts like ESI would also argue that the coalition was partially undermined by the dominance of the OHR in developing and presenting legislation to the parliament for passage.

The more Western type non-governmental organization has taken longer to develop in BiH. A plethora of organizations sprung up as part of the large donor push to build civil society in the year immediately following Dayton. Yet, few of them have had the institutional capacities or strategic ability to remain relevant to their societies in a way that ensured longer term sustainability. This is partly due to the legacy of Yugoslavia and the war years as well as the donor driven rather than domestically driven agendas. Particularly difficult to develop was a set of organizations which serve as a counterpoint to the rather rigid political party system. Watchdog and related type think tank and research type organizations have required extensive assistance to develop and become sustainable in a political setting that viewed them as opponents rather than contributions to the larger society.

Competition

The election process in Bosnia and Herzegovina has evolved to technically reach OSCE standards of free and fair elections, but the dominance of the three ethnic-based political parties and their political and economic power structures that came out of the conflict has made it difficult for additional parties to effectively compete on the political stage.

On the technical side, BiH institutions were able to effectively take over election implementation by 2002 from OSCE officials. This was seen as a milestone in the ability of the state to both guarantee and carry out free and fair elections. At the same time, the election laws and particularly lack of election campaign transparency safeguards combined with the ethnic quota baselines of most party lists and government compositions has hampered meaningful issue-based political debate to focus on the issues – such as the economy – that a majority of the population views as problematic. Rather in many cases, the informal networks between political parties, their particular political agendas, and dominant control of most formal and informal economic resources has resulted in a campaigns that are more foregone conclusions than competitive opportunities for the citizens to manage their politicians.

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16 For one of the many assessments of domestic NGO and international donor relations and impacts, see the chapter on Bosnian civil society in *Rethinking International Organizations, Pathologies and Promise*. 
The ethnic fear factor has played a dominant part of Bosnian politics. Many view their own respective ethnic leaders as either corrupt or ineffective, but the years of conflict and aftermath in rebuilding and return struggles have continued to provide a deep reservoir of support for nationalist politicians, irrespective of their sketchy political platforms or achieved policies. While at the end of 2006, UNDP Early Warning data suggests that just over 20 per cent of the total population believes that only nationalist/ethnic parties can safeguard their interests, this data is partially countered by the fact that ethnic pride continued to trump civic pride almost two or three times in most Croat and Serb majority areas.\(^{17}\)

In the years directly following Dayton, the fear factor was not only perceived but very real, particularly in terms of allowing people access to vote in elections. Minority returnees were often denied access to their original home voting stations, forced to vote in their temporary accommodations and ceded through the ballet box, the right of choosing local political leaders to the very people that had forced them from their homes. This was partly addressed through OSCE and other international community interventions (election law, its implementation and enforcement, etc), but intimidation to vote in place of origin voting centers as well as discrepancies in voting lists continue to be of concern even in October 2006 parliamentary and presidential elections.

Competition has also been thwarted by the ethnic-based design of the election process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this design was part of the terms needed to agree to a peace agreement, the ethnic-based quota system soon became seen as both undemocratic and cumbersome: it favored the ethnic-based parties, did not easily allowing issue-based politicking and coalitions, and required ethnic quotas for arguably redundant levels of government institutions that further complicated the actual functioning of government institutions. It also effectively left unrepresented those who either did not fit into the three national categories or refused to be classified as such. Paradoxically being classified as an ‘other,’ in many ways locks such individuals out of the political system even as it is often this self-identifying ‘other’ category that exhibits the most interest in the larger multi-ethnic statebuilding project in Bosnia. This ‘lock

\(^{17}\) ‘Civic pride’ was registered at 89.5 per cent in Bosniak majority areas, 32.8 per cent in Croat majority areas, and 16.1 per cent in Serb majority areas (UNDP, 2006).
out’ or segregation has been reinforced by a school system that essentially allows three curriculum of three histories and three languages, etc. which has created a new generation that is ignorant if not distrustful of its fellow citizens. Little change in these dynamics was made by the end of 2006.

**Vertical accountability and Horizontal accountability**

Accountability in BiH needs to be looked at both on an international and a domestic institution level. Ironically, neither the international institutions and actors nor the domestic actors and institutions that they have trained, cajoled, and pushed to be responsible exemplify practices of particularly good accountability. Generally speaking, external actors in BiH have depended on the DPA and their respective roles in implementing this as the legitimacy for their actions. While these institutions are ultimately accountable to the internationally comprised Peace Implementation Council (PIC), checks on decision making powers are relatively weak. This has been exacerbated by the complex set of international actors that have been carrying out similar or joint actions in BiH. Decision-making transparency, accordingly, particularly within OHR structures continues to be a point of criticism by both international watchdogs and some domestic officials. This dynamic combined with a domestic state structure that is inherently complex effectively hamper most efforts to achieve vertical and horizontal accountability.

The Bosnian state\(^\text{18}\) is comprised of the two entities of the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation – itself a combination of Bosniak and Bosnian Croat dominated territories – and initially provided few central government functions. For those functions ceded to the central government, the decision making process that would allow for the institutions to function often was supported by institutional structures or political will.

On top, Dayton created a tri-part rotating presidency comprised of the three constituent nations of BiH. This presidency primarily had control over foreign police and trade issues and general

\(^{18}\) In addition to the two Entities, the 1999 arbitration decision made Brcko a self-governing district administered independently from either entity. For the history surrounding this arbitration process and governing of the Brcko District separately from either Entity, please see: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/history/default.asp?content_id=5530 and http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5367
budgetary for BiH. However the chair of the presidency was designed to change every 8 months among the three representatives of the presidency which has minimized the leadership role that can be played by the representatives. Assisting the presidency, the Council of Ministers (CoM) was tasked with implementing these policies. Eventually the duties of the Council have grown as the central government has taken on increasing tasks, with the Chair of the CoM resembling a prime minister and the council his cabinet. At the same time, tactics to obstruct the functioning of the Council has also increased. For example, the need for all representatives to be present in order to make decisions has resulted in absentee tactics blocking key policies.

The legislative wing of government consists of two parliamentary chambers: the House of Peoples and House of Representatives, each with representatives coming from the relevant Federation or Republika Srpska legislatures. Each was tasked with carrying out legislation on issues of the central government, however disagreement over actual interpretations of the Dayton agreement and constitutional base as well as competencies at the central level have made the parliament focus more on procedural issues than those of substance.

The majority of political power, however, remained in the two entities. Each entity had its own constitution and set of procedural and territorial divisions. In the Federation, a 10-canton based system was developed with approximately five of the cantons, dominated by Bosniak, three by Croat, and two of mixed populations. Each cantonal was designed to be autonomous (also with its own constitution) and responsible for its municipalities, creating difficulties in making decisions on the Federation basis, despite Federation level parliamentary and executive structures to coordinate this. Effectively, most cantons were left on their own for most areas of social provisions even as the revenue primarily went to entity level where it was subsequently spent on administrative costs or high cost areas such as military spending.

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19 See the Federation government website for more information on the specific Federation level institutions. http://www.fbihvlada.gov.ba/english/index.php

20 As described by Bieber (Nations in Transit, 2003), both entities spent a good part of their budgets on the military and veterans (approximately 6 percent of overall GDP). Estimates were that up to 25% of the budget was spent on war veterans in the Federation, and only after an OSCE led public campaign did attempts to raise this percentage even more fail.
In the RS, the system of municipalities highly controlled under a central government (firstly in Pale) and later in Banja Luka, arguably allowed some level of greater efficiency if not local level democracy in the functioning of the RS. At the same time in the Federation, the creation of 10 cantons, some mixed, some dominated by one ethnicity, which were further divided into municipalities created both a confusing and easily manipulated political system.

To further complicate the system, shadow institutions, specifically in the Croatian dominated areas of the Federation, continued to operate de facto quite openly until 2001 and arguably to some degree in the years following. The 1994 Washington Agreement between Croats and Bosniaks in BiH created the Federation which was a core component of the post-Dayton structure. However, in reality, the ethnic-dominated structures of the Herceg Bosna state did not quickly disappear even with the signing of Dayton at the end of 1995. This not only created parallel systems of governance, but provided little incentive to cooperate or develop common institutions with Sarajevo rather than hang on to their respective political fiefdoms. A stark example of this was the situation in ethnically mixed Central Bosnian Canton. In 1998, the canton officially had 11 municipalities, but due to the continued functioning of the Herceg Bosna structures, there were arguably almost twice that many municipalities if considering the de facto municipalities that had been carved out of the war time territorial acquisitions.

In essence this created one of the most complicated government structures in modern history. Or as described by an Open Society assessment in 2001 (Papic), BiH is a country of 13 constitutions with 13 governments (plus a 14\(^{th}\) with Brcko), 13 assemblies and over 200 ministers, and 13 prime ministers (plus the international community), and few if any talking to each due to unwillingness or institutional inabilities unless forced by the international community.

The structures for democratic government, accordingly, are and have been in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the political will to make the complicated system work, or to reform the system into a more streamlined set of government structures has not had equal levels of interest by the.

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21 However, it was not until 2004 that Mostar, the de facto capital of Herceg Bosna became unified as one city between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation, and the budget for Mostar was not passed until mid 2005.
Bosnia Case Study

domestic political elite. From the RS point of view, the Dayton Agreement should be implemented according to the specific requirements set out in the agreement while many in the Federation rather have viewed Dayton as a basis for further negotiations and development of institutions (the international community shared the latter view). Or as Ms Plavsic famously said to US Secretary of State Albright in 1998 when the international community was attempting to push through reforms to strengthen the state, “we are not interested in implementing in the spirit of Dayton, but the actual aspects of Dayton (Bieber, 2005)

Despite these divergent views, reforming the constitution or ‘getting beyond Dayton’ has slowly become more acceptable to main parties, allowing a real chance at constitutional reform in 2006. However, after much international facilitation, a package of reforms that would help streamline decision making was agreed upon, but ended up narrowly failing in a parliamentary vote; this set the tone for the remainder of the year and politics were as divisive as ever.

European Union integration incentives had helped some in the past years to convince political elite of the rewards for supporting a more centralized Bosnian state eventually making 50 state level institutions, but only to the degree that strategic areas of responsibility are not compromised; disagreement between RS and Federation political elites on a more centralized policing system is just one example of the push and pull dynamics that dominated political space through the end of 2006.

The state building project of a new state from the shell of the Bosnian republic of Yugoslavia and war-time governments – which in many domestic minds is synonymous with democracy – accordingly, has not been one that has been equally prioritized by the key political actors, rather primarily pushed by the international community. By the end of 2006, these efforts have produced something resembling a state, its basic democratic structures, and more and more evidence of democratic practice as some of these institutions have become more functional.

But the ‘stickiness’ of democracy continues to elude Bosnia as has a sense of a shared destiny. Democracy has been more of a buzzword than a standard of governance, making domestic ownership of the democratization process fragile. While there is ‘no other game in town’ and all politicians speak of democratic structures and practices and their place in Europe, the path
towards consolidating institutions and embedding democratic norms in government and society without heavy or even light international oversight will likely last at least another decade.

Security

The relative security of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the success stories of the international intervention. Bosnian police, military, and border patrol now have the capacities through years of technical assistance, mentoring, and oversight to provide basic security in BiH. As is the case in many post-conflict countries, internal security threats are dominant over external and neighborhood concerns. Tellingly, the public perception remains, at least for many, that the presence of international military and police personnel is still required to ‘maintain the peace,’ although their numbers at the end of 2006 were more symbolic than anything.

By the end of 2006 according to UNDP polls, free of movement and citizens’ sense of security is roughly similar to most Western European countries (ESI, 2007). All major security forces were under international or joint domestic oversight, no serious lingering security forces threatened the security of the country, and the State Border Service (SBS) served as a model of how a multi-ethnic state-wide service related institution can function. BiH’s inability to reach political agreement on a state-wide police service has remained a key constraint to better policing. It is likely that inter-entity policing cooperation would only improve with a reformed structure, but the creation of such a structure itself would not substantially improve overall security without further tackling the linking and reform of all law enforcement and rule of law agencies.

Still this presents a quite a drastic difference from the security situation present immediately following Dayton or even several years after. Borders were porous, but internally initially freedom of movement was highly constricted primarily based on territorial and ethnic considerations. Minority return (a key to the reversal of ethnic cleansing during the war and guaranteed by the DPA Annex 7) was initially effective blocked by localized police and military

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22 Official command of the armed forces of BiH was transferred to the presidency in 1999, after which the Defense Commission as set up to begin the process of outlining legislation for a united military (partly as part of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) requirement in 2003. Legislation to make a unified BiH army was passed by the parliament in October, 2005.

23 The SBS took over its first set of border crossings in early 2001.
control, and later by organized or sanctioned acts of violence against minority returnees and their property. And police duties to ‘serve and protect’ were more often understood to ‘serve and protect one’s own kind’ as described by ICG still in 2002.24

Major international efforts to create the necessary legal and security environment for this to happen started to show results by 2000 when, as according to ICG (2000), even spontaneous minority returns (without official UNHCR assistance) increased four-fold during the first four months as compared to 1999. However it should be noted that despite a return of over 1 million of the estimated 2.2 million displaced, still in January 2006 BiH remained on UNHCR’s list for major countries of internally displaced persons (IDP), with 182,700 still listed as IDPs.25 A look at 1991 and 2005 maps below provide a sense of the levels of displacement and return.26

The OHR-decree for standardizing and launching of BiH-wide license plates27 in 1998 some argue was the single most important decision taken by the OHR to allow freedom of movement and its aggressive work with local governments on minority return provided the base for opening up return options.

And the vetting and reformation of multi-ethnic police forces and the decommissioning and professionalization of military forces under IFOR and SFOR supervision has allowed the security situation to stabilize to the point that while 3 military forces are still separate, they share a joint command and have even participated under the BiH flag in several international peacekeeping missions. At the same time, incidents like the 2004 swearing in of troops under the RS rather than BiH oath in Banja Luka, and the impasse over police reform on a state level (it is currently controlled on the entity basis) serve as a reminder of the underlying tensions still

24 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1500&l=1
25 http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3b028097c.html
26 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/ethnic_majorities_bosnia.jpg
27 http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=347
Bosnia Case Study

present in the security related services and the potential impact these could have on the peace process.

State capacity, legitimacy, service provision

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a hybrid protectorate of the international community. Many state institutions have had to be built from scratch and at least initially had high levels of international oversight or engineering in the development and functioning. This high level of assistance was considered necessary both for technical support as well as political will to achieve institutional objectives. While this has resulted in the building up of a number of institutions and their competencies, it has also muddied the process of developing ownership by the domestic officials. As a result, the population often still looks to the OHR and related international officials to solve problems in navigating various institutions rather than its own officials. And where officials have taken ownership, this has sometimes been thwarted by executive powers of the OHR, rendering many citizens and officials to say that they actually have ‘no state and institutions’ in a non-existent state.

Bosnian citizens have a complex relationship with their state. On one side, many feel more allegiance to specific ethnic structures or actors than the state as a whole. On the other side, the modern state of BiH is the same as that of the republic of Bosnia within Yugoslavia, and this arguably (despite the war and its traumas) has a certain point of identification within the population and has also served to help construct some level of civic identity.

Still, the ability of one ethnicity within geographic BiH to represent another certainly has its limits. And depending on the political issue at hand, the rhetoric has often tended towards challenging the legitimacy of decision making powers, authority, and even the state itself. Even at the end of 2006 such issues remained sensitive. After October 2006 elections Bosnian HDZ leadership questioned whether the elected Croatian representative (Zeljko Komsic) to the joint presidency could actually represent Bosnian Croat interests given that his victory was due to non-HDZ and multi-ethnic voters (of his Social Democratic party). Alternatives to the BiH remain on the table, whether a ‘free RS and or joined up with Serbia’ and or a Croatian entity
within BiH and or joined up with Croatia. And as long as both of these visions have some following the legitimacy of BiH state structures will remain in question.

The legacy of living in Yugoslavia has also meant that the population has certain expectations in terms of their government’s ability to provide adequate social and economic opportunities. Many of these expectations have been repeatedly dashed a) partly due to corruption, mismanagement or incompetence of domestic institutions or the influence of informal structures of acquisition, (b) partly due to the late start that domestic and international actors gave to addressing socio-economic issues, and c) partly due to the inherent challenges of transition from a planned and war-time economy(s) to a more market-oriented one. Loyalty, accordingly, has often been given to those that can produce the goods, whether a shadow Herceg Bosna state, connected officials, international agencies, or even at times the actual Bosnian institution. This complex and ever-changing set of loyalties reflects the complex set of international and domestic actors (formal and informal) that have an impact on running the Bosnian state.

The weakness of the state is perhaps best captured by examining the post-conflict economic transition process. Economic transition was repeatedly hindered by political elites’ state capture of most significant economic resources. Control of state industries as well as dodgy privatizations were a primary means of asset accumulation of the war time and post war political elite. Like in many other former communist countries, many companies had their assets stripped while the new owners used the secured funds to build their financial empires. Arguably some of these financial resources were used in the pursuit of ethnic-based political goals at the expense of building up institutions which would provide public goods and services.

The international community initially prioritized the setting up of basic financial institutions – banking, revenue collection, etc. – while allowing the link between the dominant politicians and economic assets to remain strong. However attempts to break this hold on economic resources were boosted after 2000 through punitive actions against some of the political elite as well as

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28 BiH government institutions took up 56 per cent of GDP in 2004 with most of the expenses for maintaining public institutions rather than service provision or other programs (ESI, 2004).
legislative efforts to improve the ability of BiH to function as a joint economic space and streamline the regulatory environment for domestic and foreign investment.

As a result, service provision is only a fraction of the capacity that the population experienced during Yugoslavia. The economic transition and the war years would be a tough enough challenge, but these compounded by lack of political will and accountability made most Bosnians worse or much worse off at the end of 2000 and in 2006 than they were in 1990.

Socially vulnerable individuals in BiH, for example, particularly have been affected by the still inconsistent and re-developing social welfare system. Services exist, but are still developing or not seen as adequate. The UNDP Early Warning Annual for 2006 estimates that approximately 20% of social welfare recipients receive 70% of the resources in a system that is often at least perceived as opaque, bureaucratic, and inefficient. Regardless of status as a welfare recipient, the ‘lack of a social state’ is also one of the main reasons cited for citizens’ interested to emigrate from BiH (UNDP, 2006).

In terms of state capacity milestones, the generally successful introduction of a flat 17% VAT system at the beginning of 2006, while controversial for both political and social impacts, did however, demonstrate that BiH has managed to take on one of the basic attributes of a state in its ability to levy and collect taxes in a new and unified state level system.

Overall institutional capacities vary across the spectrum of BiH structures and the level of international guidance and or implementation involved. The often unclear division of labor between the international community and the specific institutions has contributed to the slow rebuilding and development of state capacities, and this is reflected in the level of confidence that the institutions enjoy. Political institutions, for example, average a bit more then 40 per cent of public confidence in both competency and performance. All manners of corruption have stymied many attempts at further instilling institutional capacities and professionalism. For

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29 State, entity, and municipality institutions enjoy roughly between 45-60 per cent confidence (with the highest level often at the municipal level). This has been a slow, if steady improvement since Dayton (UNDP, 2006).
Example, the health care system – which has recovered to general pre-war levels at least in urban areas – is often cited as one of the most corrupt and inefficient institutions in BiH, but it has a lot of company according to a report commissioned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in 2005 (Devine and Mathisen).

Another factor in assessing capacities is the role or the perceived role that corruption plays in the day to day operations of institutions. According to one study (Lewis, 2006) over 75 per cent of BiH officials, for example, believed that accessing a state job or getting a promotion required a bribe. This apparent ‘selling of public positions’ for connections rather than merit does little to instill confidence or professionalism in public institutions.

**Interdependence**

The links between democracy, security and state capacities are not clearly drawn in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the end of 2000, officially there was democracy, but it still had the face of war time victors and political elite who were seen as more interested in their pockets than their populations. The fact that this was still true at the end of 2006 speaks to the durability of the war victors. Security concerns in 2000, particularly in the issue of safe minority return and travel dominated state building efforts, and little progress could be made in other areas until this basic environment had improved. Since the push to get tough on domestic security and law enforcement, security fears have abated – initially due to international oversight – and more recently due to growing confidence in domestic law and order institutions; yet, successes in security alone has not provided the environment to transcend war time traumas and grievances or tackle the challenge of working together to improve levels of governance, capacity, and a joint future Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World (FIW)* scores for BiH correspond to this complicated reality. In its look at political and civil freedoms, BiH continues to remain only partially ‘free.’ While there has been a steady improvement since the war years (increasing from 5 in 1996 to 3 in 2006), FIW scores reflect the fact that state institutions and other nonstate factors continue to inhibit basic rights of full democratic participation.

The state has more public officials and levels than nearly any other state, but it consistently falls short of functioning according to domestic expectations. Living standards for most are not
desperate, but are also not good and definitely worse than in pre-war circumstances, and few see
the state as having the ability to change or improve this socio-economic situation. This has
caused a certain resignation among the population; even by the end of 2006, over 40 of the
population felt pessimistic about the future of the state; even more telling over 46 percent wanted
to emigrate, and 71 per cent of youth (18-35) would leave Bosnia if they could (UNDP, 2006).
Such dynamics have done little to improve the democratic participation of citizens in their
government or to ultimately allow people to feel invested in their own country. The result has
been a set of populations living under an EU-ish type Bosnian flag, but mostly exhausted,
unwilling, or skeptical of giving more energy to the state building project and democracy unless
shown more clear rewards for their efforts.

SECTION II: PRE-WAR AND WAR VARIABLES

A: Long-term structural factors

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six socialist republics of Yugoslavia. Tito’s Yugoslavia
as a key Non-Aligned country had a particular hybrid blend of communism which allowed some
level of economic and cultural openness while keeping a heavy hand on political dissent. The
key unifying institution of Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav Army (JNA) which also serviced as one
of the key industries of the country. Favorable loans from both East and West, remittances from
a significant “guest worker” population in Western Europe, and the ability to produce and trade
with all sides allowed the population of Yugoslavia to have a living standard much higher than
the rest of the Eastern Bloc. According to WDI indicators, GDP growth was steady with an average
of 5.6 per cent between 1970 and 1978 and $2380 in 1978. In 1990, GNP was registered at $3060.

Political freedoms were the trade-off for this relatively high standard of living, and for those that
disagreed, it was generally easier to emigrate than to go up against the communist party. After
the death of Yugoslavia’s autocrat, Broz Tito in 1980, political expressions of nationalism
became more possible and were often the vehicle of voicing opposition to the state and the
communist party. At the same time economic woes became harder to suppress during this
decade, and the country was plunged into an economic as well as political whirlwind that most
political elite understood as a zero sum game (Woodward, 1995) Republic-level political elite
Bosnia Case Study

particularly focused on securing their respective political and economic resources; consequently, during the time of massive political change across Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s, Yugoslav elite did less to reform the political and economic system of Yugoslavia than to dismantle it.

The international role during this time remains controversial. The calling-in of IMF loans and demands for massive liberalization reforms (as well as the energy crisis) has been cited many times as a key card in the deck of the fragile post-Tito Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1980’s, much Western attention was focused on the landmark political breakthroughs taking place in East Germany and around the Warsaw Pact region. Interest in democratizing was also present in Yugoslavia, but the domestic political interest was divided over how to democratically develop, whether together or as separate countries. The inability of politicians to find compromise in this dilemma eventually led to the breakup of Yugoslavia.

BiH was not the poorest or the richest republic in Yugoslavia. Sandwiched between wealthier Croatia and Serbia, it had regions of high and low economic development. This is partly reflected in the high number of “guest workers” and their remittances that were connected to BiH.\(^30\) Massive industrialization during the post WWII period drastically changed the economic living standards of most Yugoslavs; urban migration from the primarily village based economies was a wide-spread phenomenon, and basic standards of education and health were a hallmark of the Yugoslav region. BiH as a mountainous and primarily rural population in the 1940’s became like much of the rest of Yugoslavia, a republic existing of two realities: one industrialized and urban, and one with higher standards, but still living a more traditional village and agricultural life.

A number of key industries were built up in BiH including petrochemicals and the steel industry. And perhaps most importantly much of the weapons production and storage for the Yugoslav Army (JNA) was based in BiH, making it a strategic component of Yugoslavia’s not insignificant military industrial complex.

\(^{30}\) Estimates suggest that 9.2 per cent of the Bosnian workforce was employed abroad in 1971 (Donia and Fine, 1994)
Communist party members as well as JNA officers primarily served as the political elite during Yugoslavia. While this class of people did receive more perks than the ordinary citizen, the lifestyle differences between a worker in a factory and its manager were less significant than in other communist systems. Still tensions over political and economic privileges combined with an urban/rural divide arguably served as a component of the ethnic-based frenzy that helped start and keep the war going.

BiH was a multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia and in many ways served as an illustration of the idealized Yugoslav persona. Three major ethnic groups (Serb, Croat and Bosniak\(^{31}\)) plus other minorities and ‘mixed’ ethnicities lived in BiH. The effects of industrialization/urbanization and building of the Yugoslav state had a strong impact on Bosnians’ sense of identity. By 1990 over 40 per cent of urban couples were ethnically mixed (Donia and Fine, 1994), and particularly many of their children saw themselves as ‘Yugoslav’ rather than any other ethnicity. The 1991 census for BiH, identifies 43 per cent as Bosniak, 31 per cent as Serb, 17 per cent Croat and 8 per cent other (Cox, 1998). At the same time, many villages were dominated by a single ethnic group and towns a combination of ethnic areas (Cox, 1998). The map below provides a basic ethnic breakdown of pre-war BiH according to municipality. The white lines are the post-war Inter-Entity Boundary Line.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) Tito’s Yugoslavia did not recognize Muslims as a distinct ethnicity until the 1971 census.

The government’s performance in BiH during Yugoslavia both in terms of regulatory capacities (things were safe and stable) and service provisions (socialist-based and generous) BiH enjoyed the Yugoslav-wide standards of quite high standards (if not necessarily sustainable in the long-term). During the time of Yugoslavia, BiH had republic level institutions which managed most day-to-day affairs of the population in BiH from a republic level media to health care provision to energy supply.
Bosnia Case Study

Yet most strategic level decision making had been taken at the Belgrade level. While the new system had many of the old political elite reborn as the politicians and officials of the day with many standards of governance based on the model of Yugoslavia, the republic level BIH institutions suddenly were tasked with state mandates if not state capacities. Accordingly, both strategic as well as democratic know-how was in short supply in the new country of BiH. This combined with a post war Bosnia that was officially divided into two but, de facto divided into at least three parts (and three systems of war time government) provided a challenging basis for strategizing and managing statewide institutions.\(^{33}\)

**War-related factors**

The violent conflict that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 has been classified by many as an ethnic civil war, but this description does not fully capture the regional dimension or the interests involved. The three main warring parties were roughly divided along ethnic lines of Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniaks, but particularly the Serb and Croat forces received significant support from their ethnic kin in power in Zagreb (Croatia) and Belgrade; Serbs particularly benefitted from the fact that Belgrade had the majority of the JNA resources and military might. As well, fighting in Croatia had an effect on BiH both in terms of military staging grounds for opposing armies (Croat vs. JNA) as well as in terms of refugee flows.

Generally speaking, Bosniaks were fighting to preserve the territorial integrity and multi-ethnic aspects of the BiH state while Serbs and Croats carved out territories for their populations which were adjacent to their patron states. However a good number of Bosnian citizens, particularly from the urban areas, supported the development of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state and fought with the primarily Bosnian Muslim government to preserve this.

The actual political break up of the state of Yugoslavia was started by Slovenia declaring independence, soon followed by Croatia in 1991. JNA attacks on Slovenia and then Croatia soon

\(^{33}\) The DPA provides for eventual state-wide public companies (Annex 9) in a number of key areas, including postal service, electricity, etc. Each was part of the Yugoslav system so compatible, but political will to re-connect such grids has been a slow process.
followed. With Serbia the remaining dominant republic in Yugoslavia, and its president Slobodan Milosevic having used the cause of ethnic Serbs to justify military action in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian politicians had few good options for finding a point of accommodation with Belgrade. Independence was subsequently declared in March 1992 despite disagreement by many of Bosnian Serbs.

At the moment of independence, BiH was a Muslim majority country, but with sizeable minorities of Serbs and Croats. War broke out in BiH after a tense political process surrounding independence broke down. Most of the actors were from ethnic-based nationalist parties that had won 1990 elections (many born out of the breaking apart of the communist party). The political elite of the Bosnian Serbs were particularly against the idea of living in a Muslim majority state, and with the backing of Belgrade (and a sizeable portion of the Yugoslav military resources) raised the political stakes to the point of confrontation, attacking parts of BiH after the declaration of independence to begin to take de facto control particularly of large parts of the east and north of the country.

Officially, Serbs in Bosnia were against the succession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, however as the war progressed, efforts to secure mono-ethnic territories became the main issue of conflict. The Bosnian Croat population, initially siding with the majority Bosnian Muslim Sarajevo-based government, changed sides in the fall of 1992 and began fighting against both Bosniak and Serb forces in order to secure Croat territories, particularly in the Croatian dominant region of Herzegovina and heavily mixed Central Bosnia. This expanded the two-sided into a three-sided war, causing particular devastation in areas of very mixed populations, most notorious of all Sarajevo.

On one level the war was about ethnic identity and power. On another level, it was about securing and dividing the economic spoils of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that became the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the individual level, military forces looted and pillaged most things of value from property that they took over. And on the governmental level, any state asset of value was taken under the new de facto governments and their militaries to assist in the war effort.
Bosnia Case Study

These were supplemented by profits from breaking the international arms embargo\textsuperscript{34} that had been imposed on the entire region in 1991 as well as ‘taxes’ on international aid coming into BiH.\textsuperscript{35} And black market trading between the various front lines particularly kept the criminal elements of each side well financed and consequently well positioned to keep their various positions of power. By the end of 1995, a number of war entrepreneurs on all sides had profited nicely from the conflict. And it was these actors who served as the largest obstruction to building the rule of law in a post-war Bosnian state. They unlike their political counterparts or normal citizens had both the means and interest to cooperate across ethnic lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina and throughout the region.\textsuperscript{36}

Recruitment for the three militaries was initially part of a larger ideological campaign that was waged effectively by the governments and most evident in the state-controlled media(s). However as the war intensified, many took up arms as a means of defense, either having witnessed violent conflict already or imminently fearing its arrival in their part of BiH. It should also be noted that a number of young men left BiH instead of fighting, many of these the educated and multi-ethnic focused portion of the young generation. Along with the domestic military recruitments, each side had soldiers and irregular or paramilitary forces from their patron state or in the case of the Bosniaks, Muslim fighters who came from around the world to take up the cause of the BiH Army.

War variables

Official war broke out in 1992, but this was precipitated by violent events similar to those that led to violent conflict in Croatia; a number of isolated and targeted acts of violence and killings by informal or paramilitary groups sparked larger tensions and provided justifications for an escalation from political rhetoric to one of opposing military forces. At first some of the fighting was done by irregular forces, both as a means of official denial (on the part of the Bosnian Serbs

\textsuperscript{34} UN Security Council Resolution 713

\textsuperscript{35} Particularly Bosnian Serbs, having military superiority, appeared to profit from the delivery of UN humanitarian assistance to the populations. An internal U.S. State Department report released at the end of 1992, for example, suggested that Bosnian Serbs routinely skimmed 23 per cent of all aid delivered during that time (Gordan, 1993).

\textsuperscript{36} For further discussion of the political economy of the war and its aftermath, see Peter Andreas (2004).
but with JNA equipment) and due to the lack of a professional military (an improvised army of BiH) and soon a similar Herceg Bosna Croat army (but funded by Zagreb and Diaspora). These irregular forces were often from the criminal underworld, contributing to a fighting and looting style that did not respect the rules of war. This criminal element continued to have a significant role in subsequent military structures that were established on all three sides during and in the post-war societies.

From the beginning the Serbian forces had the military advantage, and during much of 1992, Serb forces swept through eastern parts of BiH, killing and expelling primarily Bosniak populations. This pattern of expelling citizens based on ethnicity was repeated throughout BiH, initially by Serbs, but eventually by all sides as they attempted to secure territory. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ became a common description of war strategies that caused an estimated 2 million refugees and displaced people from a 4.4 million pre-war population and approximately 100,000 deaths and 14,000 missing.37 Approximately 40 per cent of these deaths were civilians. Accordingly to conclusions reached by Scholars Initiative on the Yugoslav Wars, approximately 70% war displacements and casualties took place between April-August of 1992, with a majority of victims Bosnian Muslim.38

Civilians fled in three major patterns. A number stayed within the territorial border of BiH and became displaced people in a place commonly where they were among the ethnic majority in that region. Secondly populations fled to neighboring countries, with Croatia alone receiving 400,000 refugees by late 1992.39 Serbia received its own set of refugees numbering close to 400,000 of Bosnian Serbs as well as Croatian Serbs fleeing the fighting primarily later in the war.40 The third group of people primarily fled to other European countries, with Germany

37 The Sarajevo Research and Documentation Center has documented 97,207 deaths between 1991-1995 comprised of 39,684 civilians and 57,523 military.
http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm

38 http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/history/facstaff/Ingrao/si/scholars.htm

39 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/balkans-country?country=croatia

40 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/balkans-country?country=serbia%20and%20montenegro
hosting the most refugees estimated at 330,000 in 1996.\(^{41}\) Over a million refugees were taken in across Europe, a number of them eventually integrating into their host societies or emigrating further to a third country (Ibid). In total an estimated 2.2 million people of roughly a population twice that much became refugees or displaced people (UNHCR).\(^{42}\)

While armies primarily fought, the war was personified by its brutality against civilians, particularly targeting civilian males.\(^{43}\) Village-to-village or even house to house (if a multi-ethnic village) fighting and up close and personal fighting meant that many victims knew their assailants. Much of the fighting took place in rural areas, but urban areas were also key battlegrounds. The siege of Sarajevo which started in April 1992 and ended in February 2006 was the longest running siege of a modern European city since World War II. As a result of the siege, much of the city center was damaged or destroyed and much of its population was at the mercy of daily shelling and sniper fire. When the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak populations began fighting in the fall of 1992, a similar scenario was played out in the city of Mostar, which became a front line between the two sides, with the 16th century symbolic Ottoman bridge that connected the city eventually shelled by Croatian forces.

The war was conducted in patterned campaigns. There was not violent conflict everywhere during the entire 1992-1995 time period, but nor was there peace in any area of BiH during this time. Rather as the opposing sides gained or lost territories, their respective populations were affected accordingly. For example, the Bosnian Serbs made the most advances in 1992 and 1993,\(^{44}\) expelling non-Serb populations from territories controlled primarily in the north and eastern portions of the country. When the third front between Bosnian Croats and Muslims was opened, fighting particularly in central Bosnia and parts of Herzegovina was intense. And finally with NATO air power assistance the late 1994 and 1995 united Croat and Muslim campaign

\(^{41}\) [http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4641836a0.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4641836a0.pdf)

\(^{42}\) [http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4444d3cd34.html](http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4444d3cd34.html)

\(^{43}\) Over 76 per cent of civilians killed were males. [http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm](http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm)

\(^{44}\) Research by the Sarajevo Research and Documentation Center suggests that over 46 per cent of killings and missing took place in 1992, followed in intensity with almost 20 per cent in 1993.

[http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm](http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm)
against the Serbs resulted in a pushback of Serbian forces and territory, primarily through central and western Bosnia, stopping just before the north central city of Banja Luka, the largest city in Bosnian Serb territory.

War crimes were committed on all sides, but according to the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, a majority of war crimes were committed by Bosnian Serb forces, perhaps most well known of crimes include the killing of approximately 7,000 civilians in Srebrenica and the detention camps around Prijedor. Ethnic detention and rape camps, massive destruction of private property and razing of cultural buildings and monuments were hallmarks of the conflict. The map below shows the frontlines in late 1995 and the agreed upon borders from the peace talks.

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The Sarajevo Research and Documentation Center confirms that 6,886 civilians were killed in July, 1995, primarily males. [http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm](http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm)

Bosnia Case Study

War end and Peace Process

Diplomatic attempts at resolving the violent conflict were not successful until late 1995. Four different diplomatic initiatives to stop the fighting were attempted as well as numerous UN Security Council Resolutions. Generally speaking the peace plans were either rejected by the Sarajevo-based government as too conciliatory to what they saw as the war aggressors, the Bosnian Serbs; or on the other side, Bosnian Serbs rejection of different offers was based on the fact that their de facto control of the territory was greater than what was offered as part of the peace plans.

However, one peace plan was successful (to some extent) during this time. The Washington Agreement, which ended the fighting between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim militaries, was signed in March 1994 by representatives from the Bosnian (Muslim-dominated government) and Republic of Herceg Bosna (Croat) president as well as the foreign minister of Croatia. This agreement effectively stopped the fighting between these two sides and allowed the militaries to cooperate in their continued fight against the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, it put in place a political framework for the Federation between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats which would carry over into the Dayton Agreement the following year. A cantonal method of territorial division was put in place that would create ten (10) autonomous cantons with a weak Federation level government in order to avoid ethnic dominance by one nationality. But practically speaking, the complicated arrangement, like Dayton, rather served to allow the continuation of ethnic-

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These include the following:

- The Carrington-Cutileiro plan from February 1992 proposed ethnic power sharing and devolution of power in order to avoid violent conflict. The Bosnian government eventually rejected the plan.
- The Vance-Own peace plan from January-June 1993 advocated for a division of BiH into ten semi-autonomous regions. The Bosnian Serbs rejected this plan
- The Owen-Stoltenberg plan put forward in August 1993 would partition BiH into three ethnic mini-states in which Bosnian Serbs would get 52 per cent of territory; Muslims 30 per cent, and Bosnian Croats 18 per cent. The Bosnian government rejected the plan.
- The Contact Group Plan (U.S., Russia, France, the UK, and Germany) was conducted between February and October 1994 which primarily put pressure on Belgrade to cut support for Bosnian Serbs.
dominated political power at the cost of a functioning federation level government, including the continuation of the war time de facto Bosnian Croat ‘Republic of Herceg Bosna.’

The war ended on December 14, 1995 after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnian and Herzegovina in Paris by all warring parties. The internationally-brokered agreement, known as the Dayton Agreement (hereafter referred to as the DPA) was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio during November 1995 by the main political actors of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the presidents of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. The DPA was possible due to the increased military strength of the Croatian and Muslim Federation (assisted partially by international support) against Bosnian Serb forces.

A string of Federation military victories in central and western Bosnia in 1995 combined with NATO strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets\textsuperscript{48} convinced Bosnian Serb forces that a political settlement would be in their best interest. Arguably the strengthened Federation forces could have made further military gains against the territorial controls of the Bosnian Serb military, however international political pressure to solidify gains rather than take further territory became a determining factor in the timing of holding peace talks. Accordingly while there was not a military victor, per se, Bosnian Serbs still had the most bargaining power.

At the beginning of peace talks, Bosnian Serb forces still controlled roughly half of the territory (down from a war time high of about 70 per cent of territory). This was reflected in the ultimate agreement which ceded 49 per cent of BiH territory under the control of Republika Srpska (RS) and 51 per cent of control to the Federation. Dividing these two entities, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) was the political division of the two entities, primarily representing the military front lines (except in the west and around Sarajevo).

The DPA was the summation of intense peace talks brokered by Contact Group members. Throughout the peace talks, international pressure was a critical element of keeping all sides at the table. The DPA covered not only the cessation of hostilities improving the security situation,

\textsuperscript{48} The NATO bombing was known as “Operation Deliberate Force” and lasted approximately one month, between August 30 and September 20 1995. According to Hendrickson (2005), the targeted strikes were a crucial element of getting Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table.
but it effectively served as a political blue print for the building of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annex IV serving as the constitution. Contained in its annexes was the basic political framework for the setting up of state institutions in BiH, including a tri-partite presidency and related state-level institutions, public corporations, provisions for elections, refugee return and human rights as well as international mandates for military, police, and most notably the civilian implementation of the DPA through the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

On the political side, the decisions made in the DPA determined the ethnic-based politics that have dominated BiH since Dayton. The identifying of three national ethnic constituencies in BiH was reflected in all of the state institution designs as well as elections; this forced citizens of BiH to belong to one of the three ethnicities in order to be properly represented, and it effectively continued the dominance of and secured the legitimacy of the warring nationalist parties in elections (first in 1996 and most subsequent elections). The DPA also provided for the continued existence of the RS, creating a cumbersome state of two entities that had very little shared power at the state level. A number of state-level key institutions were outlined, but additional institutions that would be needed for normal state functioning were left for further negotiation or for a more favorable political climate between the political actors.

The provisions of the DPA represent the ‘best that could be gotten’ at the time, but it did little to transform the politics of BiH from those based on ethnicity and fear to those based on more normalized political and economic issues. Calling the DPA a peace agreement is perhaps itself a misnomer. The agreement froze the gains and losses of the fighting as a ceasefire on the battlefield, asking military actors to take on the role of political actors without any further peace process.

Those Bosnian actors that attended Dayton or those that supported their attendance shepherded their respective constituencies through the peace process, but with vastly different understandings and interpretations of the DPA. While no major subsets of domestic actors

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49 For the full text of the DPA and its annexes, please see: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380
disagreed with the DPA, even the major parties had very different views of the document that they signed.

Bosnian Serbs accepted the DPA as a necessary concession, but were very clear in their stance that the RS was for all practical purposes an independent state. Bosnian Croats had already sided with the Bosnian Muslims in 1994, but key political elite continued to press for a third entity designation, meanwhile running their specifics parts of the Federation without much cooperation with the Federation level or Sarajevo. Bosnian Muslims left Dayton having saved a multi-cultural state, but mostly in name only. They were perhaps the most supportive of the DPA in terms of both specifics and its spirit, but they also had to deal with strong political pressure from their population who felt that they ‘sold out’ to the aggressors. Accordingly, no one side was completely satisfied with the DPA; all sides felt pressured by the international community; and no side had an overwhelming incentive to build bridges as long as it had ethnic-based guarantees for a portion of power in the new BiH state.

External powers involved in the DPA included the principles of the Contact Group, primarily the U.S., Russian and European Union countries as well as Croatia and Serbia. The Contract Group was not unanimous in its strategy to achieve peace in BiH, but it managed to agree on most major provisions of the strategy in order to work together to develop and implement the DPA.

Croatia and Serbia, on the other hand, had very different interests in being involved in the DPA. Both were still lead by nationalist leaders who had managed to further consolidate their power through their war time activities. Each had supported their respective ethnic kin in BiH throughout the conflict, and saw the political settlement as a means for continued influence in BiH. The alleged political agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic to divide BiH was no longer possible by means of war, but both capitals saw possibilities for eventual or de facto control of border territories as a political possibility. Until the death of Tudjman in 1999 and the

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50 At the time of the DPA, Serbia was formally still the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (1992-2003) which consisted of Serbia (Kosovo) and Montenegro. This was later followed by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) followed by the independence of Montenegro and the creation of the Republic of Serbia. For clarity purpose, the text will refer to this state as Serbia since the dominant actors were heading what became the Republic of Serbia or here simply Serbia.

51 The alleged meeting and deal took place in 1991.
Bosnia Case Study

ouster of Milosevic in 2000, both continued to play a dominant role in supporting their respective political elite colleagues in BiH to hamper the implementation of the DPA.

The DPA attempted to address root causes of the war through the national constituency provisions, which allowed the sharing of political and economic power based on ethnicity. This strategy was based on the theory that the war was primarily caused due to ethnic rivalries and ethnic re-disposition towards antagonism rather than a more complex set of issues related to state disintegration, state economic capture, political transition and opportunistic nationalism. Accordingly the DPA allowed those parties that arguably had led their respective populations into violent conflict to emerge as the post-war leaders to dictate and implement the peace.

The DPA contained clear provisions for the demilitarization, demobilization, repatriation, and re-integration of the populations. As part of the DPA, NATO forces under a UN mandate would oversee the ceasefire agreement between warring parties and maintain the security situation. Generally speaking this portion of the DPA was the most successful, with progress markers reached more or less according to schedule in terms of military disengagement, disarmament, and a return of soldiers to barracks. Other security markers such as the establishment of an environment that allowed the safe return of minorities took much longer and more efforts than initially planned. International alarm at the low levels of return already several years after Dayton eventually caused a more concentrated effort of international forces to bring about and enforce the right of return. By 2006, over 1 million of the 2.2 million refugees and displaced had returned to their homes, but it should be noted that a number, particularly returning as minorities to region sold their property rather than remain, many due to lack of economic opportunities.

Most violence following the signing of the DPA was consigned to small incidents, more of a paramilitary or vigilante type variety – beatings, vandalism and destruction of houses or targeted killings – particularly affecting populations as they attempted to travel or return to areas where they were in the minority. Such incidents served as a significant deterrent for free movement of peoples throughout the territory and on a practical level froze individual or community efforts at return and re-integration.
The danger of millions of land mines also served as a deterrent as efforts to accurately map out the many mine fields laid by the opposing militaries were partially stymied by the three military actors who initially feared a loss of military advantage, more generally due to the sheer number of laid mines and the resources and time need to demine large portions of the territory. Mined areas included not only former front lines, but clear civilian use areas including fields that need to be cleared in order to be used as well as houses, many if still intact, were booby-trapped, to discourage return of minority populations to a particular area.52

Economically the country was in a shambles after more than three years at war53; over 30 per cent of housing was destroyed or damaged and 2000km of the road network (WB/EU database). Production of most state industry had halted, and agricultural output was extremely low. Most income in the years immediately following Dayton was provided by the international community in the form of humanitarian and development aid or as remittance or other payments by segments of the Bosnian population outside of the country. As an additional challenge, the transition to a market-based economy really only started with the cessation of hostilities; in addition to losing much of its former Yugoslav market, BiH was economically divided among the three ethnicities in a way that provided few economically viable companies or industries.

SECTION III: EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Parameters of the Intervention

Immediately following the signing of the DPA in December 1995, external actors began actively putting together the military and civilian components of the mission, firstly to keep the cease fire (which had started in October) and secondly to begin to enforce the rest of the DPA. Before the

52 According to data submitted to the International Implementation Force (IFOR) up to 10 per cent of Bosnian territory was thought to be ‘mine contaminated’ by the end of 1995 (http://www.lsndatabase.org/country_landmine.php?country=bosnia).

53 According to estimates by Papic (2001), economic impacts of the war range from 50-60billion USD, but this does not take into account many indirect costs, which he argues would make the total impact even higher.
end of December, additional forces were on the ground, and the UN had laid the legal framework for a mission.  

The United Nations headed up the external intervention to keep and build the peace. On the civilian side, headed up by a special representative of the UN Secretary General, the UN mission served as the lead coordination agency of all humanitarian, human rights, demining, election and reconstruction and economic development efforts as well as securing basic law and order through its International Police Task Force (IPTF). Subsequent UN resolutions added additional duties and resources to the UNMIBH mission as the challenge of actually fulfilling its tasks were better understood.

International support for the UN mission in BiH was broad-based. The key parties at Dayton – the U.S. EU members, and Russia – continued to act as the primary supporters of the post-conflict mandate. While there was general consensus on the mandate, eventual differences over the active search for war criminal suspects (even among EU countries) as well as the level of political power the OHR should use to enforce Dayton emerged and resulted in many mixed messages coming out of Brussels, Washington, and Sarajevo.

The official UN mission closed at the end of 2002, but for all practical purposes the political powers of the UN mission were extended by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which previously had coordinated with the UNMIBH throughout its mandate to assist in the implementation of the peace settlement. The OHR together with the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) launched at the beginning of 2003 were tasked with working together to get BiH compliant with Dayton and to the next step of eventual European Union integration. The mandate for the Office the High Representative was outlined in Dayton (Annex 10), and further

54 However even these few weeks delay fueled further population displacement. For example, Bosnian Serb leaders mobilized much of the populations in areas that were to be retuned to the Bosnian government (part of Sarajevo for example) to damage/destroy their property as they left for Bosnian Serb-held territories.


Bosnia Case Study

empowered at the end of 1997 after the international community’s Peace Implementation Council (PIC)\(^{57}\) gave the OHR powers to remove politicians obstructing the implementation of the DPA and critically to impose laws as necessary if the domestic actors did not in order to fulfill the requirements of Dayton.

The mission was one of the most complex and well resourced peace building missions of the UN’s history.\(^{58}\) As a second generation peace keeping mission, the objective was not only to secure the peace, but to build (or assist the domestic leaders to build) a functioning and democratic multi-ethnic state. UNMIBH was the lead agency (until the end of 2002), but practically speaking a number of agencies worked on similar areas simultaneously. For example, besides elections, the DPA tasked the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with assisting in building up basic government institutions and good governance practices. Or in terms of public works and infrastructure, Wentz (1997) describes how the IFOR and then SFOR CIMIC/Civil Affairs played a central role in coordinating and directly carrying out projects that would have a visible impact, such as road building, repair of hospitals etc. Other UN agencies, like the United Nations Development Agency (UNDP), were also engaged in similar high visibility projects, and inevitably coordination efforts took up a significant amount of initial international efforts.

Beside UN agency and military actors (described in the section below), international non-government organizations (INGOs) became a major international player in post-Dayton BiH. Many were tasked with humanitarian related projects, again some which overlapped with UN or other mandates. The significant presence of INGOs required traditional intra-organizational coordination mechanisms to be expanded to include this sector. While not without its

\(^{57}\) The PIC was established as a result of a London Peace Implementation Conference held shortly after the signing of Dayton. The PIC has 55 member countries and organizations plus a number of observers that have directly been leading or contributing to the peace building effort in BiH. Following the first London meeting at the end of 1995, the PIC met on the ministerial level met five more times, with the last meeting in 2000. The steering board, comprised of key implementing nations, regularly provides meets and provides guidance to the OHR. http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38563

\(^{58}\) The budget for the maintenance of UNMIBH from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 alone amounted to $168.2 million, which was a decrease from previous yearly amounts.
challenges, the situation forced international actors to attempt to bridge their organizational structures in order to coordinate efforts and in many ways served as a model of military-UN-civil society coordination for future missions such as Kosovo, etc.

In this sense, the model was successful, but there were many situations where too much money and too little coordination rebuilt or repaved the same bridge a couple of times. And the amount of effort and time coordination took, particularly in the first several years, detracted energies from the actual mission(s). Such a plethora of international actors also allowed domestic actors to play the agencies off against each other, which even with the best coordination intentions, often resulted in a less than united international approach.

Part of the difficult from the beginning was the fact that the DPA outlined objectives, but did not provide clear guidance for what would be considered a ‘functioning and democratic multi-ethnic’ state or a clear timeline for exiting. On the security side the scale-down has been a gradual progression towards only a lightly armed monitoring mission, however, on the political side the end goal has been less clear. Consolidation of the peace and emergency assistance dominated the first years, however even with the May 2000 PIC\textsuperscript{59} meeting marking a clear shift in focus to institution building or ‘institutionalizing the state,’ creation of state agencies and frameworks for a functioning state was easier than assessing when it was functioning to a point that it did not require international oversight.

As long as a number of Dayton annexes remained unfulfilled, the remaining tasks were clear. However, as the checklist has been filled (or partially filled) it has become more difficult to articulate how ‘stable’ and how ‘democratic’ is good enough for the international community to disengage. It was thought, for example, that after the energetic use of extraordinary powers by the High Representative (HR) Paddy Ashdown during his time in office from May 2002 December 2005 that his successor Christian Schwarz-Schilling, charged to be less interventionist by the PIC, would be the last HR in BiH. This coupled with the beginning of European Union agreement for a Feasibility Study for BiH at the end of 2003 and plans for OHR downsizing seemed to set the course for an exit strategy. However, the political stalemate that accompanied

\textsuperscript{59} \url{http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5200}
Schwarz-Schilling’s time in office convinced the PIC of the need for an extension of the OHR mission beyond 2006 and again a personality at its head to be a bit more aggressive in the mandate starting in 2007. This extension of mandate together with the increasing profile of the EUSR has been designed to try to more and more frame international oversight and engagement within EU related accession processes, both in order to plan an eventual exit and to focus domestic attention on finding common European if not Bosnian points of policy.

Confusion about the role and legitimate mandate of the OHR has not only been amongst international circles. Domestically, the OHR has been seen as a substitute government for the Bosnian government, and if something does not work correctly, citizens often look to the OHR to sort out the problem. This has both served to allow Bosnian actors and institutions to shirk their duty and created a dependency on internationals that does not have a clear end in sight. It is worth noting, for example, that the UNDP early warning report routinely asks citizens for their satisfaction level related to government institutions as well as the OHR. In 2006, both government and OHR institutions received approximately 40 per cent approval ratings (UNDP, 2006).

**Election monitoring**

Despite safety concerns for freedom of movement and inaccurate registration lists, the first post-Dayton elections were held in September 1996 as organized by the OSCE. The OSCE oversaw all the elections until 2002, when the BiH state took over direct management with OSCE monitoring. However it was only in mid 2005 that the BiH Election Commission was fully nationalized.

The insecure environment of the 1996 elections discouraged many displaced and refugee populations for returning to their home of origin and accordingly were forced to register in their temporary accommodation. Consequently, election results, not surprisingly, reflected the domination of ethnic based parties in their areas of de facto majority.\(^6\) Subsequent elections continued this trend (1997 municipal, 1998 general) until a slight break in the Federation with

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\(^6\) Ethnic composition data from the pre-war census of 1991 was used as the basic for creating registration lists, etc for the election process even as many had to register in their temporary accommodation.
nationalist parties in 2000, only to be replaced again by dominant nationalist parties in 2002 and
again in 2006.

International organizations also closely monitored the human rights situation. The UNMIBH
firstly had its human rights team which was added by the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) as well as other UN and INGOs in the field. The OSCE also worked closely with the
UN agencies to push the human rights agenda, particularly with local government officials. One
key human rights issue was the right of return which was bundled up in complex legal issues of
right of accommodation and return of property; often returnees faced one of several situations if
attempting return: their private or socially owned property had been heavily damaged or
destroyed during the war; their property had been ‘taken over’ by the local government in power
in order to house displaced persons of the now majority ethnic constituency, or if the property
was available, intimidation sanctioned if not orchestrated by local authorities kept returnees
away. To tackle this complexity, the inter-agency Return and Reconstruction Task Force
(RRTF)\(^{61}\) was set up to streamline plans for rebuilding with return strategies, legal pressure, etc.
Reporting on these aspects of human rights was done constantly to both the domestic authorities,
media and international authorities and media. As a result, much of the population knew about
their human rights even if they could not secure them. The human rights situation in terms of
return and general respect for human rights in the narrow sense of personal safety gradually
improved as international efforts succeeded in improving the local environment. However
broader social and economic rights were more difficult to secure for minority returnees in a
country with reported if not the actual 40 per cent unemployment (still in 2006)\(^{62}\). Inevitably the
lack of economic options has had an impact on sustainable return and integration of minority
populations.

**Military Aspects**

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\(^{61}\) For more information see: [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/)

\(^{62}\) As assessed by UNDP, unemployment was at 31 per cent in 2006. Official unemployment was registered at over
40 per cent, however taking into consideration the grey economy, the figure is likely closer to 20 per cent.

Bosnia Case Study

External interaction in the form of a UN military force, UNPROFOR, was officially started in 1992. However the UN force was primarily tasked with relieving the humanitarian situation of the civilian populations and could not actively attempt to enforce the peace. The ‘middle of the road’ mandate as described by Hillen (2005) neither adequately provided humanitarian assistance nor got the warring parties more interested in peace. Rather the UN mission was often used and abused in a way that showed its own weakness (including the holding of UN soldiers as human shields) and ultimately the aim of being neutral was undermined by the field reality that doing nothing in the face of military superiority of one side was actually taking sides.

Lessons learned from the ill-fated UNPROFOR mission were applied when constructing the UN Security Council Resolution for an UN-led post-Dayton mission. The NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) security component of Dayton included clear language for taking action against obstructionist parties as well as the right of the IFOR soldiers to defend themselves militarily if necessary. Along with a more robust mandate, the troops were equipped with the necessary heavy armament, tanks, etc. to immediately make their presence known and to enforce the peace between the warring parties; NATO effectively had control of land, skies, and sea around the country.

Initially 54,000 soldiers from 32 countries were deployed under NATO command to take on the task of implementing the peace during a one year mandate. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) of 32,000 took over in 1997 and gradually reduced in numbers and focused more efforts on creating an environment to build a sustainable security situation. By, December 2004 SFOR had reduced to 12,000 and EUFOR with 7,000 troops as primarily staffed by EU countries took over with a mission to continue monitoring the security situation and assist the security services in reform towards European standards.

63 The UN Security Council issued Resolution 1035 on December 21, 1995 which established the UN Civilian Mission for BiH (UNMIBH) to oversee the post-conflict reconstruction and re-integration process as outlined in the Dayton Agreement as well as the International Police Task Force (IPTF).


64 Total troop numbers reached 80,000 when including personnel deployed in Croatia and around the region to support the BiH operation.
Throughout the five years following Dayton and through the end of 2006, resource support for the troops as well as political support internationally and domestically to have the troops present in BiH remained relatively high. Estimates of IFOR/SFOR implementation costs just through the end of 1999 are at 14-15 billion USD (Papic, 2001). Domestically many came to see the troops as a guarantee for peace; and having at least a symbolic U.S. component continued to remain politically important even in the much scaled down EUFOR deployment. The troops had heavy military equipment suitable for their mission, had the necessary backup support regionally, and were close to the main NATO members so very close to the actual NATO Theater. Few if any incidents against the troops were taken by the Bosnian population; rather most military casualties were due to road accidents, land mines, etc.

The troops drawn – primarily from NATO country and potential NATO countries – notably included soldiers from Russia as part of the continued joint diplomatic effort to keep and build the peace. Initially most efforts were focused on strict implementation of the cease fire between the three armies and providing security as well as related duties such as general border control, manning of the IEBL, enforcing the zone of separation and removal of troops and weapons to agreed points or barracks, exchange of prisoners, etc. Notable in the actual agreement was the decision to not disband the militaries; rather the DPA allowed the militaries to withdraw back to their agreed regions and to help contribute to keeping the peace with heavy IFOR/SFOR oversight. Fulfilling these objectives reduced the threat of a resumption of violent conflict, but it did not stop the continued efforts by some political elite to keep the environment tense and unsafe for normal travel or return.

Addressing these less clear and less military threats (even if outlined in Dayton) was partly a matter of interpretation. SFOR’s action to take over the Serbian Radio-Television transmitters in October 1997, for example, was seen as necessary for improving access to reliable information that could assist in reconciliation rather than continued hostilities. Capturing of war criminals, on the other hand, was hotly contested during the course of the IFOR and SFOR and even EUFOR mandates. Early on a number of countries with troops and the ability to capture or at

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65 By the end of 2006, concern over NATO or EUFOR withdrawal had substantially lessened with only 22 per cent of the population on average fearing that a military withdrawal could allow new fighting (UNDP, 2006).
least search for indicted war criminals thought that such actions could both upset the delicate security balance and unduly endanger their own troops. Other countries more vigorously cooperated with the ICTY and through commando type actions assisted the ICTY to capture and arrest indicted criminals.

A similar issue of interpretation made the international police force (IPTF) mission difficult. Within the specific confines of the mandate, ITPF performed quite satisfactorily, but when taking into account the larger dynamics of domestic elite obstruction, corruption within the domestic ranks, and collusion between officers and political or war time elite, IPTF’s mandate for oversight and training was not strong enough. Accordingly, pushing for real reforms in the domestic police was often up to the personality of the international in charge of the local office, and the quality of this staffing was not consistent.

**Intrusiveness**

The role of international actors in the DPA was designed to assist and shepherd – if need be - domestic political actors through the process of institution and state building. High levels of intrusiveness at the beginning were thought necessary to put in place the necessary institutions and legal frameworks. The international role in development of everything from the constitution (Annex 4 of the DPA) to the first legislative frameworks on developing the economy and court system was intense and ongoing. Key tasks in the period immediately following the signing of the DPA were undertaken by the UNIMBH or OHR.

This ‘setting of the stage’ role was not overly controversial. A number of domestic actors clearly were not interested to cooperate in these actions, but few could formally protest the role of the international community as it had been quite clearly agreed to in the DPA and subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions. The more controversial situation began after domestic institutions began some level of functioning, particularly after fall 1996 elections when war time elite had been legitimized at the ballet box. Frustrated with the lack of progress on the part of domestic actors, the international community enhanced the international mandate in 1997 with the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’ which effectively made the OHR the last-stop executive that could develop laws or remove politicians at will if it decided they were not acting in accordance with the DPA.
Bosnia Case Study

(and later due to corruption or aiding on the run war criminals or their support networks). The dismissal of politicians has been particularly controversial\(^\text{66}\), partly due to the lack of ‘due process’ in their removal and partly due to the fact that a number were allowed to return to some level of public life at a later point; this at least created the perception that the OHR was not above making a few deals for the sake of keeping all parties more or less willing to continue to cooperate.\(^\text{67}\)

These powers were generally used strategically from 1997 through 2006 only after attempts to find consensus between local parties, but the threat of such use served to make the OHR rather than the tri-partite presidency the executive of the country. On one hand, the OHR’s holding of this executive power has been a key constraint to the development of democratic institutions in BiH, but on the other it has been the OHR that has pushed through most of the critical legislation that has created a certain level of state functionality if not democracy (from license plates, to a state court system, to a joint VAT and military command).

Diplomacy

The process of statebuilding and democratizing was heavily dependent on external diplomatic pressure. Initially diplomatic pressure was mostly applied through rhetoric even while the same actors provided resources for humanitarian assistance and (re)building of the country, particularly in the Federation. The RS boycotted the first donors’ conference, and significant international funds did not begin to flow to the RS until after a change in power from Pale to Banja Luka took place in mid 1997.

However after successive donor conferences and a still very fragile state, external actors began to apply more sticks with their carrots. For example the use of the Bonn Powers to remove obstructive officials spread into the ability of the OHR to investigate financial corruption and mismanagement of key officials. This along with the freezing of assets of indicted war criminals

\(^{66}\) 161 officials had been removed by the OHR by the end of 2005 (Miller and Isser, 2005).

\(^{67}\) A look at OHR related dismissal decisions in 2005 illustrates one of the OHR’s most interventionist periods in relation to focusing on specific individuals and their role in DPA obstruction. 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp?m=&yr=2005
and refusing travel documents\textsuperscript{68} and their suspected networks of support attempted to bring officials (as well as specific municipalities) in line, with varying degrees of success. The key weakness in this strategy was that even if domestic and OHR prosecutorial powers were sufficient for conviction, gaps in the judicial process often failed to fully follow through.

Throughout the process, but particular after the beginning of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) mission as housed with OHR in early 2003, diplomatic efforts to entice local politicians to enact reforms often were couched within future rewards as part of getting closer to the European Union accession process. Early on the Southeast Europe Stability Pact (1999) and similar initiatives to improve the level of democracy and state functioning in BiH and the region had few visible impacts beyond specific projects completed within the pact framework.

However as neighbors also began to take seriously and be seen as real candidates for the EU, BiH officials also began to respond to efforts to reach ‘European standards’ as key arguments (combined with economic assistance structural funds etc.) for finding a common ground. This regional peer pressure was not only positive given Serbia’s back and forth with Brussels over the Kosovo status; but generally speaking it put forward a stage for pro-Europe actors throughout the region to work towards a common goal and have better cooperation.

Bilateral pressure or persuasion also played a role in getting parties to follow Dayton. At different points throughout the decade, diplomatic overtures by one or two specific EU countries, like France or the UK, or specific US attention assisted the OHR to convince domestic actors to cooperate or alternatively set the tone for the rest of the PIC to take more punitive actions.

Domestically the only real alternative to nationalist rhetoric became the one of ‘going to Europe.’ However Brussels on-and-off again interest in the region has had the expected affects on both politicians and the populations; each time Brussels has backed away from a firmer commitment to BiH in Europe, subsequent diplomatic efforts to convince domestic politicians to

\textsuperscript{68} One of the most dramatic set of actions occurred in December 2004 when the OHR backed by the EU and the US announced additional punitive measures on the Rs and the US announced asset freezes and a travel ban of the SDS party and its officials in the RS and other related to the war criminal support networks. For more details, see Skrbic (2004).
do something for the sake of reaching the EU have had less impact. Hype and genuine excitement over the initializing (finally) of the Stabilization and Association Process by the end of 2006 should be tempered with the local population’s general exhaustion with promises of a better future and the power such promises give to external actors when the populations’ present reality to remain bleak in terms of everyday socio-economic life.

Modes of interaction

Keeping the peace and building a democratic and multi-ethnic state in BiH were the stated objectives of the international community, and generally speaking these objectives were agreed to quite equally within the international community, except as mentioned earlier in terms of the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia until changes of their authoritarian governments in 2000. But in reality, the external actors prioritized the keeping of the peace, then building up of state institutions and finally democratization. From the start, basic structures for democratic development were put in place, but the difficulty in getting nationalist parties firstly to share power and secondly to work towards objectives which reduced their power caused the external actors to somewhat modify at least their working if not official objectives. Or as Principal Deputy HR Hayes described in a 2004 lessons learned speech, emergency recovery efforts and political tradeoffs resulted in the OHR paying too little attention to reforming and strengthening the structure of the state which only served to retard meaningful gains in the rule of law.69

State elite, on the other hand, saw the DPA and state building project primarily as an opportunity to continue and in some cases to further legitimize their hold on power. The often criticized 1996 elections, for example, were supported by the domestic elite as they endorsed the three main parties (SDA Muslims, HDZ Croats, and SDS Serbs) to emerge from the war. While retailing political power was a key for each of the three parties, each had different time horizons and views of how to work within the BiH state. The RS initially under SDS and later SNSD rule went about building up the institutions of the RS as a de facto state while seeing the BiH state as a shell that they would use for the purpose of international legitimacy. Bosnian Croats spent

69 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=33642
much effort in trying to get a better deal in power sharing both within the Federation and on the state level (some wanting a third entity) while also consolidating the power bases that they had (partly continuing de facto or shadow structures of the Herceg Bosna state). Bosniaks primarily through the SDA saw the state building project as its only avenue to power.

Rural elites general followed the party line of their respective parties, and while there were clearly distinctions throughout the country with some local and some urban power centers more cooperative with the DPA than others, the distinction between rural and urban was not as great as that between RS and Federation, and within the Federation, ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-cooperative’ cantons and municipalities. The one exception, has been the District of Brcko, which becoming independently administrated after the 1999 arbitration decision, in many ways could and should be the model for a multi-ethnic BiH with its mixed population, but faster levels of reform on almost all levels than the state average.70

Despite having a strong mandate, external actors were under a constant time constraint to reach their objectives. No specific timeline for pullout was public (except the much publicized downsizing of the OHR in mid-2004). But frustration at the slow progress on the political side and few ideas of how to improve this situation except direct international community action, made those enacting the mandate constantly justify their actions.

This was partly due to the more scheduled out portion of the military mandate as well as particularly U.S. pressure to reduce troop numbers. And partly this was pressure was due to U.S. and EU foreign policy strategies which could no longer focus as many efforts on BiH and the Balkans: when Kosovo was also taken on by the international community (1999 forward), when 9/11 happened, when the EU needed to focus on getting the 10 new EU countries ready for accession (and its own constitutional crisis), as well as the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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70 Clark – former international District Supervisor -- (2004) describes the large military base presence, rapid judicial and legal reforms, and the need for local politicians to directly work together (as not part of the BiH system) as partly responsible for the ‘success’ of Brcko. See: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=53214&fuseaction=events.event_summary
State elites, on the other hand, in some ways had all the time in the world. As long as one or another did not ‘go too far,’ the international community appeared to be willing to both continue to supply resources to build their state and take the unpopular decisions on itself that state elite would rather not make. Clearly state elite started to feel pressure from their constituencies over the low level of service delivery provision and related issues, but as long as ethnic fear could continue to be a major campaign theme, political power remained relatively secure for them.

Compromise and co-option were the general set of bargaining tools between external and internal actors. An attempt at compromise was usually the starting point, but often, particularly in the dealings with RS politicians, confrontation or the threat of it was necessary for carrying out many reforms. For example, the removal of RS president Nikola Poplasen in 1999 is illustrative of the most confrontational portion of international actions. At the same time, the international need for success and use of such executive powers allowed both domestic and international actors to give the appearance of a functioning system or as Papic and Sadikovic (2008) describes, (it became a) “symbiosis between the OHR and nationalist parties.

All three ethnic actors at one time or another served as spoilers in the state building project, but the RS officials were most consistent in this role. The election of a more moderate set of officials led by PM Dodik served to somewhat improve RS cooperation with other state institutions and between the entities, but only as long as strategic areas (internal police) were not compromised.

Organized crime in all parts of BiH and its links to security and former security services as well as embedded in many of the institutions also stymied efforts of internationals and domestic reformers. These informal networks often were much more effective and official efforts at intra or inter-entity cooperation, and as a result it too redoubled international efforts to deal with some of these actors.

Some domestic civil society and some domestic media attempted to support the democratic change. Heavily funded and developed by the international donor community, only a few domestic groups have managed to have the credibility and relevance to effect change in their societies beyond normal donor funding cycles. Most influential have been a number of groups related to missing persons, return, and victims rights groups as well as some policy and or
watchdog type civil society organizations. However neither these groups nor the few influential print media (Dani, etc) that have maintained a strong-pro democratic or pro-Dayton stance have the power to change their society to the extent that the politicians and officials do. Public apathy and disappointment in public officials has been high, but not high enough to mobilize an ethnically divided and exhausted population.

Maintaining and getting more political and economic power have been key incentives for the state elite. This was ‘allowed’ by the OHR as long as some basic standards were followed, but unwillingness to play by basic rules, raised the stakes for some of the actors. A number of state elite were indicted for war crimes or some level of corruption. Most big fish (except Karadzic and Mladic) have been handed over to the ICTY for war crimes prosecution, and some level of corruption related prosecutions have been undertaken on the domestic level (with OHR oversight). However for all practical purpose ‘everyday corruption’ and low level ethnic politics which keep most political and economic resources in the same hands have been allowed to continue without serious sanctions.

**Linkage, integration, and convergence**

The most immediate neighbors, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro were not democratic until 2000. This affected BiH in a number of ways, but particularly through the ability of Croats and Serbs in BiH to receive political and economic support for their sustenance without fully buying into the state-building project through Sarajevo. This included the ability of Bosnian Croats, for example, to receive Croatian passports and effectively be dual citizens with all of the rights of being a citizen of Croatia allowed – war/pension benefits, university placement, etc.\(^71\) Similar rights were part of the Bosnian Serb connection to Serbia. Common passports for all Bosnians were not introduced until 2000.

The pledge of the new governments in 2000 to respect the borders and integrity of BiH provided more opportunity for international and reformed minded actors within BiH to refocus efforts on

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\(^71\) Since holders of Croatian passports did not need visas for most European countries, obtaining such a passport was not only a matter of national identity. Croatian passports became an important commodity that were bought and sold around the region, regardless of ethnicity.
integrating Bosnian Serbs and Croats into the state building project. Still, large portions of the populations of both continued to see the institutions and culture of the neighboring countries as more reflective of their interests. BiH has been a member of a number of Southeast Europe initiatives to improve regional standards of democracy as well as re-integration of the region and the region with Europe. The Southeast Europe Stability Pact, as mentioned previously, was one of the key initiatives put together by the international community to improve and ready the states, including BiH, for eventual European integration through initiatives on regional energy, transportation, infrastructure, cultural and youth issues, etc. Being part of this club and being close to the EU, BiH was part of the larger Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) trade area negotiations as well as having exports, mostly to European countries with investors mainly coming from the EU, particularly Germany, Austria, Slovenia, and Italy and to some extent Croatia, focusing on telecom and banking sectors initially and later other large and heavy industry, which attracted a wider band of economic linkages with Turkey and the Middle East and Asian companies.

Finance wise, BiH worked closely with the World Bank, the EBRD, and the IMF as part of the international package to reform and to revive the economy, particularly focusing on getting the basic banking system in order, SME development, and putting in place a framework to attract direct foreign investment. In the first years following the DPA, it was over 50% aid dependent with a decrease in funding, partly assisted by remittances, and partly due to economic growth of roughly 4-5 per cent per years. However part of this growth was an international funding bubble with international actors spending, hiring, and living in BiH in a way that distorted real economic growth.

72 Already by the end of 2000, the ‘Igman Initiative’ brought together heads of state from Croatia, BiH, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to pledge diplomatic efforts at improving relations and regional cooperation. This was an important symbolic if not immediately concrete set of actions that continued beyond 2006. See: http://www.igman-initiative.org/pages/sessions.htm

73 For example, the main regional daily newspaper of Croatia, Slobodna Dalmacija, has had a substantial readership in majority Croatian areas of BiH. Croatia’s national television, HTV, is also a main source of information in these regions. Similarly, Belgrade-based media has been popular in Bosnian Serb areas.

74 For example, near the RS town of Doboj, investment in industry and mining has allowed some level of economic revival and multi-ethnic re-integration (ESI, 2007).
The Bosnian population understands itself as European and accordingly sees its ability to be (a) democratic (state) as part of Europe both possible and a necessary part of its future. When polling the average citizen of Bosnia, most cite their European identity as equaling their ability to be democratic even if these two descriptions are not necessarily linked and they don’t necessarily see the Sarajevo-based state as their state in Europe. Accordingly, the OHR and related international missions were at least initially seen as assisting to achieve what Yugoslavia and the war had kept them from previously achieving. However the more that ‘democracy’ has been cited as both a solution and a prescription for improving life in Bosnia, the less the population has seen being democratic as directly beneficial to them.

Most Bosnians tended to have better access (and an interest) for interaction and news in neighboring countries or in Europe than news from the other entity. Cross-Bosnia and inter-entity news programs were developed (the first inter-entity TV went on the air in mid 1996) and helped to bridge this information gap, but intra-entity or ethnically-dominant media have been more popular, causing many in Sarajevo to have little idea of what life is really like in Banja Luka and vice versa.

Regular bus lines or other communication have developed in stages: the first inter-entity telephone lines were re-established in 1997 by the OHR and the first bus line from Sarajevo to Brcko and Bijeljina (RS) started in early 1999. However still by the end of 2006, telltale signs of identity and separation could be seen by chose of mobile phone operator, car insurance company, etc.

Internet and mobile phone use have improved vastly in the past decade, but these have not necessarily served to create a shared social space for the general population. On the other hand, the use particularly of the internet, has been critical for the development of a ‘civil society space’ in BiH

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75 Over 75 per cent of all Bosnians viewed European integration positively and as important for political stability (UNDP, 2006).

76 In 2000 fixed phone and mobile phone usage was 23 out of 100 people; in 2006 it was 73 out of every 100. Internet use was 1 in every 1000 in 2000 and 24 of every 100 in 2006 (WDI indicators).
Key immediately following the war, was the use of basic internet through the ‘Zamir net’ (peace net) set of hubs in every small city around BiH. This mode of communication was critical for civil society groups to be able to begin to share information and cooperate.

Domestic civil society was probably the best connected and most technologically advanced in the immediate time following the war. Donor-financed placement of computers and internet infrastructure allowed even modest groups access to not only each other, but international sponsors or likeminded organizations. Often NGOs had more advanced technology than local governments or institutions, also often having the most computer literate staff. This medium also was very important for the distribution of independent media reports, particularly from neighboring countries where most of the publishing houses were controlled by the government.

Domestic staff working in either international NGOs or international organizations also became an important asset for the development of the country. Generally the most educated and most interested in a Bosnian state, this sector of the population received valuable management and computer training as well as exposure to Western professional standards. The international community trained up a new generation of ‘internationally aware’ citizens in Bosnia through normal working relations rather than specific projects for this. At the same time, international organizations attracted the best and the brightest away from possible government positions primarily through the difference in salaries and working conditions. This arguably weakened the pool of potential civil servants and political elite willing and able to work within Bosnian institutions. Few of these Western trained Bosnians appear to have chosen to enter Bosnian institutions once the international positions have left; rather, the trend, anecdotally at least seems to have been to find another international job, enter the private sector or to try to emigrate.

The international recognition of BiH immediately made it a full member of the United Nations as well as a member of other global organizations. Perhaps most important in the post-conflict environment was the relationship that BiH established with inter-governmental organizations and

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77 This is not to suggest that all international missions and organizations performed their duties without scandal. Pressure on international actors to be more transparent in decision making and work practices as well as in dealings with domestic staff eventually improved the situation, but a ‘double standard’ was also very much a part of working with international staff.
international financial institutions like the EBRD and the World Bank where it could access funds and begin the transition to a market-based economy.

**International events**

The change of regimes in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 probably had the most significant effect on domestic politics. On a macro level, the acceptance by the European Union of 10 new accession countries of Central Europe (including the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia) and their formal accession in May 2004 served as a strong signal to BiH that eventual membership could be possible.

At the same time, more Brussels focus and resources on expansion and getting the new members ready reduced (at least diplomatically) some focus and efforts on the SEE region, including BiH. It also increased member state unease over the slow progress in BiH and EU responsibilities for the region.

Events following 9/11 readjusted U.S. priorities dramatically towards the Middle East and its ‘war on terrorism’ and as a result, U.S. patience and attention for the region, particularly BiH also decreased dramatically.

Finally, the Kosovo status issue, initially just a backdrop issue, but as status talks started in 2004 more and more politically relevant, has particularly allowed Bosnian Serbs to raise (at least) the rhetorical stakes on declaring a referendum each time that other domestic politicians or international officials pressure the RS for some type of further reforms; the issue reached a head particularly in 2006 around police reform. While not backing down, the international community clearly wanted to avoid a full confrontation with the RS and found a way to diffuse the tensions until a deal could be sorted out.
Bosnia Case Study

SECTION IV: AID

International community efforts to physically and politically reconstruct Bosnia and Herzegovina were one of largest per capita assistance programs of its time with an initial price tag of $5.1bn for the planned Priority Reconstruction Program through the end of 2000. According to ODA data, this climbed steadily to cover more than $8.4bn during the ten year period of 1996-2005 and just under $9bn if including 2006.

Some of the major bilateral donors included the U.S., Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway and Turkey; and major multi-lateral donors included the European Union, the World Bank (WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations Development Program.

In line with the objectives the DPA, aid priorities were focused on providing immediate humanitarian and reconstruction assistance while also pouring resources and technical assistance into building up the new state institutions. However the general pattern of assistance contrasted with the general pattern of international intervention (in terms of state building). Initial assistance

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78 According to ODA data, per capita aid in 1996 was 246USD, reducing to 126USD by 2006.

79 Aid figures are for a 10 year period of time, but if taken through 2006, the levels of total funding and its proportion of democracy related funding present in 2005 is sustained or even increased for 2006 as part of overall funds.

80 In total 59 donor nations and international or intergovernmental organizations were significant players in providing assistance to BiH: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03980t.pdf
gradually reduced while international intervention increased. The humanitarian related focus was a continuation of aid assistance that had started in 1992 at around $10mn and overall aid grew to over $900mn (presumably including some of the costs of the military intervention) in 1995.\textsuperscript{81} Over $800mn was given in 1996 right after Dayton; aid peaked in 1999 at over $1bn per annum, and then gradually was reduced to around $700mn in 2000 and approximately $750mn in 2005 (and $500mn in 2006).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{ODA Percentages}
\end{figure}

Most resources were initially focused on massive reconstruction efforts of individual homes as well as basic infrastructure and efforts to jump start the economy. For example a quick look at ODA data in the peak year 1999, shows substantial expenditures on ‘reconstruction’ as well as debt relief.\textsuperscript{82} The chart above illustrates well this general focus on reconstruction over other issues.\textsuperscript{83} Pressure was particularly great on EU countries to assist in this area in order to provide some level of viable return option for the many refugees residing in their countries. For example,

\textsuperscript{81} 1992 assistance was $9,680,000; 1993 assistance was $41,170,000; 1994 assistance was $394,600,000; and 1995 assistance was $924,520,000 (WDI).

\textsuperscript{82} These fall into the ‘other category’ of methodology used here.

\textsuperscript{83} Some ‘reconstruction’ likely also falls in the humanitarian category, but most is capture in the ‘other.’ ODA CRS of humanitarian assistance for the purposes of this study include: 72010,72040,72050,73010, and 74010.
Sweden, one of the largest bilateral donors, disbursed over 135mn euro to reconstruct approximately 15,000 houses which allowed 50,000 to return to BiH.  

Most focus on this physical reconstruction and economic revival meant that initial assistance to general institution building/technical assistance and related types of capacity building was less prioritized. A general assessment released by the EU/WB to examine lessons learned in the first years of the reconstruction reflects these challenges. Disbursement of the $4.2bn collected was highest in the area of reconstruction (54%), then economic development projects (around 20%), and democratization and institution building only had 18% disbursement rate by the end of 1998, three years after the signing of Dayton (WB/EU Database).

Or as Bieber (2002), described, it was only after more intense intervention in overseeing the building of domestic institutions did the donor community begin to put more resources into specifically building up the capacities of the institutions. For example, a special donor conference in October 2003, raised 15.7mn euro specifically to build up a domestic war crimes chamber in the BiH Court. Improvement of institutions related to social service provision, etc., was also an area of recommended focus for donors following initial donor assessments (UNDP, 2003).

A good portion of the money pledge for BiH was in the form of grants. At least initially up to 70 per cent of pledged money was given as grants. This raised concerns that resources were being targeted towards specific projects as ‘in kind assistance’ rather than cash assistance that could cover general operating or other costs (European Parliament, 1996).

Trust fund allocations were also common as part of the World Bank $1bn in funds through 2003 as well as from bilateral donors (like Japan).

84 http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/97/52/1141af02.pdf
85 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/key-events/default.asp?content_id=35971
**Bosnia Case Study**

Like in many post-conflict aid situations, the actual amount of aid that reached recipients is estimated at only a fraction of overall funds pledged. In the case of BiH, four donor conferences, initially/formally pledged $4.68bn, yet according to an Open Society Institute domestic assessment only 40-50 percent actually reached the recipients, with the rest spent on overhead and administrative costs; as well up to 25 percent of expenditures for service and labor went back to home country donors (Papic and Sadikovic, 2008).

In the first years following Dayton, BiH received over half of its economic activity through external assistance. Aid was initially a significant portion of the Bosnian economy with over 50 per cent of the GNI in 1996 as aid and 13.1% in 2000 (WDI). Part of this aid, as described by ICG (2001) needed to go directly to government institutions to make up for the shortfall in revenues; an estimated $360mn in 2000, for example was needed to shore up the budgets for both Entity governments.

The aid percentage of GNI fell to 5.2 per cent in 2005, (WDI) but it is useful to also note that remittances, primarily from the over 1 million Bosnians outside the country, most in EU countries, accounted for 22.5% of GNI according to 2006 data, (Lierl, 2007) suggesting that while aid has dropped off, remittances have taken the place of this aid rather than other domestic economic activities and development; foreign direct investment has improved, but the increase to $241mn in 2002 cited by UNDP, was still only a small percentage of GNI. (UNDP, 2004)

It is also worth noting that still in 2005, 15 per cent of central government expenditures was dependent on aid. This does not include the resources put forward to run the international

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87 The first donor conference sponsored by the EU/World Bank was held in December, 2005 and resulted in pledges of $600mn.

The second conference in April 1996 raises $1.6bn, but was boycotted by the RS officials.

The third conference held in July 1997 raised $1.24bn.

The fourth donor conference in May 1998 also raised $1.24bn.

The fifth donor conference was held in May 1999 with a pledge of $1.05bn.

http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/key-events/default.asp?content_id=35971

88 2007 World Development Indicators
institutions that work closely with the domestic institutions (and to some extent carried a portion of the local administrative responsibilities). Given that the government is one of the most multi-layered and complex in Europe, maintenance fees for just keeping the institutions running, not to mention providing services have been high. Estimates of public expenditure from 1996-2000 were $9.2bn, the highest in the region (the regional average was $1.6bn less). But despite this expenditure, impacts were minimal, partly due to misallocations and corruption within the system (UNDP, 2004).

External assistance was and remains an essential component of (re)building BiH. Most of the reconstruction efforts were completed by 2000, allowing at least the option of return and travel around the country. Without the massive funds first put into the country, even this level of (re)development would not have been possible. Further efforts to create an environment for economic, institutional, and democratic development have been vigorous if less clear in their impacts. This has been partly due to the shorter amount of time many of these programs have been working and partly due to the fact that democracy development programs were not done in a vacuum, rather within a politically divided environment where incentives to actually democratize were not necessarily as great as to keep the status quo.

It is particularly difficult to assess the impact and exact levels of assistance aimed at building up state institutions, professionalizing political parties, developing civil society, and embedding general democratic practices. In some donor lingo, ‘institution building’ is the same as ‘democracy development’ or aid for the state budgets or even a portion of the international missions. In others, democracy development related programming merges with ‘peace and reconciliation’ projects. However categorized, this general area of democracy related assistance was the ‘icing on the cake’ for everything else to work. It is not useful to rebuild a bridge if no one or organized set of government institutions will maintain it. Nor is it useful to speak of a vibrant third sector of civil society and media if most of the population is overwhelmed by what they see as basic economic survival even while the political elite refuse to talk issues of substance.

89 The OHR budget, for example, is funded through the PIC and paid for by members of the PIC, with the EU the largest financial contributor.
Yet democracy development assistance aimed to change the political culture of the country. It attempted to democratize institutions that were still lacking power and legitimacy. Or as Sabic (2003) describes its attempts at ‘norm building’ were stymied by the lack of agreement that the political institutions should actually be empowered to represent elite interests. Its tools of trainings, technical assistance, targeted NGO and media projects, etc. have made some inroads, but most impacts have been on the fringes. Better and earlier sequencing and tighter coordination/conditionality with OHR led initiatives might have resulted in different levels of democracy in 2006, but only if the overall international mandate would have accordingly modified itself to be more frontloaded and tough on domestic actors.

Assistance patterns for democracy related development started out modestly only increasing to more substantial portions of total aid after 2000. ODA figures rather started out modestly with just over 2 percent in 1996 and only reached 10 percent of all funding in 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year after conflict</th>
<th>Total Aid</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These funding and portfolio figures are not in accordance with a domestically-generated report by OSI for the funding period 1995-2000 and estimates for 2005. This can at least be partially

90 ODA figures are somewhat different than the OSI study which suggests that between 1995-2000, aid totaled $7-8bn in humanitarian aid, $10-12bn in reconstruction, economic and recovery (including the initial $5.1bn), and $5-6bn in ‘other’ assistance (including democratization, media, civil society, etc.) for a grand total of between $22-24bn. This would suggest that democracy related aid (at 23%) was higher than ODA percentages (Papic, 2001).

91 Categories included were based on the agreed upon research project methodology categories.
attributed to the lack of standardized categorization of ‘democracy’ related funding as well as the difference potentially between whether the funds were both committed (ODA data) and disbursed. Yet regardless of total sums and general breakdowns, the larger picture that emerges regarding overall priority sequencing between humanitarian, economic and reconstruction, and democracy assistance and approximate proportions generally correspond. Accordingly, for the sake of comparability and time series, the proportional breakdowns described below are based on only on ODA figures. While these figures likely do not take into account all democracy related programming, they provide a sense of how the assistance portfolio changed (from major reconstruction to a concentration on institutions) over the ten plus years. For example, by 2006 the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) as one of the largest bilateral donors appropriated 37.5 per cent of funding to ‘human rights and democratic governance.’

General democracy promotion as understood in the Bosnian context includes a good portion of the Dayton objectives. Within the democracy portfolio, elections and the electoral process, for

example were an early and well funded part of the mission. As well, the immediate security sector reform in relation to decommissioning and disarming was adequately funded while ODA data shows that heightened landmine related funding waited several years. Human rights, in terms of return were also a priority, but did not receive heightened attention (and funding) until several years after Dayton (1998 onward). Rule of law issues in relation to general judicial reform and anti-corruption programming had less immediate funding with most substantive initiatives happening after 2000. Similarly heightened focus on institutional capacities, whether the building up of institutions, or the decentralizing of institutional power did not receive substantial funding until most of the major reconstruction was completed. After 2000, institutional infrastructure increasingly gained a significant share of democracy assistance as well as a larger portion of overall assistance; it is the substantial increase in institution building (or institutional infrastructure) combined with rule of law funding that dominate the democracy portfolio and increase this portfolio’s overall percentage of donor assistance.

EU CARDS funding, for example, started in 2002 and spent just over 20 per cent (of 200m euro) on ‘administrative capacity building’ between 2002-2004 and 28 per cent (of 100mn euro) in 2005-2006. During this same time period, approximately 25 per cent of total funding was for ‘democratic stabilization’ and 30 per cent o ‘justice and home affairs.’ At the same time, it should be noted that general funding for civil society, media, etc was available from the beginning of the post-Dayton mission, but was generally considered a smaller portion of overall democracy funding as well as general donor priority levels at least through ODA funds.

**Democratic conditionality in the aid sector**

Conditionality was a key component of the international community’s tool box for statebuilding in BiH, however some types of conditionality were more successful than others. Outlined to some extent within the DPA, mechanisms were set up along with the first donor conference on BiH to begin to reward domestic actors for following Dayton. One of the most well known programs was the so called ‘Open Cities’ program which provided UNHCR reconstruction assistance to the municipal level to those local governments that allowed minority displaced

persons and refugee return. As Boyce (2004-5) describes, the objective of such funding was to reward willing municipalities, to penalize obstructionists, and to convince those that were undecided. On a larger scale, the withholding of funds to the RS government combined with a threat of force were likely key reasons why Biljana Plavsic broke with Karadzic related hardliners in 1997 and (re)engaged the RS government with state and international institutions in BiH, allowing a ‘pro-Dayton’ government to take over from its base in Banja Luka.

Frustration over war crimes cooperation and prosecution also led to conditionality for this area of Dayton cooperation. Most significantly, the US made any international financial institution (IFI) decisions dependent on war crimes cooperation, effectively limiting IMF, World Bank and related assistance to neighbors (Croatia and Serbia), and within BiH, tying continued disbursement to better cooperation and purging of indicted officials from their posts.

However it should be noted that conditionality like issues of international intervention politics has not be consistently applied nor was one ethnic group too much pressured for fear that they would completely bow out of their Dayton obligations. Specific commando or political/economic actions against domestic officials and members of the population could and did inflict some pain. And on the community level, obstructionist officials and community did not get as many resources as others. But on the macro level, at no time did either internationals or domestic actors believe that internationals would completely pull out militarily or economically given BiH’s geopolitical position and the inevitable effects more violent conflict would have on the region and the rest of Europe. Accordingly, domestic actors often used these dynamics to their advantage.

Overall conditionality has been most effective as a punitive rather than an incentivizing tool. OHR seizure of resources from corrupt, obstructionist, and or indicted (or assisting) indicted individuals allowed the OHR to keep domestic actors from getting too out of line, but not necessarily more proactively following Dayton in the spirit of state building.

The key incentive for statebuilding that appears to have more positive effect has been the promise of closer European Union ties. From late 2003, when the EU agreed on a Feasibility Study for BiH through 2004 and the beginning of the Stabilization and Association Process until
the initializing of the SAA at the end of 2006, the use of the EU as a standardizing mechanism as an alternative to ‘pushing Dayton’ has begun to make an impact. Rather than the normal nationalist political rhetoric, these same politicians began speaking in terms of ‘EU future (if not exactly together, not necessarily apart) and this larger diplomatic initiative led by Brussels has allowed international and pro-Dayton domestic actors to push reforms which to some extent have then been matched by additional revenue streams from CARDS and related technical assistance programs.94

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Bibliography


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Ethnic composition according to 1991 census

Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991)

1991
- Croats - more than 60%
- Croats - 50-65%
- Croats - up to 50%
- Bosniacs - more than 60%
- Bosniacs - 50-65%
- Bosniacs - up to 50%
- Serbs - more than 66%
- Serbs - 50 - 65%
- Serbs - up to 50%

Ethnic composition at the end of 1995

LEGEND
- Bosniaks
- Serbs
- Croats

95 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps
**Bosnia Case Study**

*Ethnic composition at the end of 1998*[^97]

![Map of ethnic composition at the end of 1998](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/)

*Ethnic composition in 2005*[^98]


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[^97]: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/