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Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2005–2009

Final Report

Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2005–2009
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Freie Universität Berlin's research center 700

The following report has been commissioned by the Evaluation and Audit Division of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany. The opinions presented in this study are those of independent external experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of BMZ.

This report is identical to the BMZ Evaluation Report 049, available on the BMZ website, with the exception that it also contains an extensive annex with tables, maps and an overview of the surveyed districts (www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/evaluation/index.html).

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Contents

0. Executive Summary

Geographical and temporal scope

The report is based on two mass surveys among 2000 respondents in about 80 villages in the districts of Taloquan and Warsaj in Takhar Province and Imam Sahib and Aliabad in Kunduz Province. The first survey was conducted in April 2007, the second in March 2009.

Major Trends 2007–2009

1 Development aid continues to reach the communities

Development aid, predominately small infrastructural aid, continues to reach communities in the North East of Afghanistan. Compared to 2007, significantly more communities reported in 2009 having benefited from development aid. As in 2007, a majority of respondents think that international development actors contribute positively to the quality of roads, access to drinking water, and access to schooling. More households have access to piped drinking water and electricity. The disbursement of food aid has also increased. As in 2007, respondents do not think that jobs are being created.

2 The Afghan state is seen as contributing to the provision of basic goods

Very different from 2007, respondents now see the Afghan state as also contributing to the provision of basic goods. In 2007, improvement in roads, schooling, water, and electricity were only attributed to development organizations; in 2009, the Afghan state is seen as contributing at the same level as development organizations.

3 Development actors are met with more caution

Despite this continuing progress, Afghans in 2009 are more distrustful of development organizations than two years ago. Around forty percent think that foreign development organizations are a threat to local and Islamic values.

4 Foreign forces are met with more caution

Compared to 2007, foreign forces are seen as considerably less helpful for increasing security in 2009. In 2007, almost 80% thought that foreign forces contributed to security; in 2009, this figure fell to 60.6%. Hence, the perceived usefulness of foreign forces has been rapidly decreasing over the last two years. Likewise, the percentage of respondents who feel threatened by foreign forces rose from 5% in 2007 to 30% in 2009.

5 Threat perceptions are dramatically on the rise

Compared to 2007, we note a general and dramatic increase in threat perceptions: The percentage of those who did not feel threatened at all fell from 87.3% in 2007 to 21.12% in 2009. The percentage of those who felt highly threatened rose from 3.64% in 2007 to 46.46% in 2009. The highest reported threats in 2009 are perceived as coming from criminal groups, external militias, and the Taliban.

6 Households and communities still remain safe

Despite the rise of threat perception, an overwhelming majority of respondents reported that physical security for households and communities remains intact.

The Impact of Aid

7 Aid positively influences attitudes towards the peacebuilding mission…

For 2005–2007, we find that development aid has a small but statistically significant impact on general attitudes of respondents towards the peacebuilding operation.

8 …but only in a secure environment

This effect vanishes for the period 2007–2009, when threat perceptions were on the rise. In general, the acceptance of the peacebuilding operation is predominantly driven by perceptions about security and threats.

10 Aid has a small and positive impact on how the Afghan provincial and district government is perceived

Both in 2007 and 2009, the perceived level of received aid has influenced the perceived legitimacy of the Afghan government. Respondents who reported having profited from development projects are more likely to think that the Afghan district and provincial government is responsive to the needs of the communities.

11 The positive effect of aid on attitudes and legitimacy is short-term and non-cumulative

The small positive effects of aid on attitudes towards the peacebuilding operation and on perceived responsiveness of the government are short-term and cannot be stock-piled: Higher attitudes in 2007 do not cause higher attitudes in 2009. This implies that acceptance and legitimacy are not slowly accumulated, but rather need to be constantly earned.

12 Aid has no impact on how foreign forces are perceived

The mostly small infrastructural aid projects, which were implemented widely across North East Afghanistan from 2005 to 2009, did not have an impact on attitudes towards foreign forces. Rather, respondents' attitudes towards foreign forces are driven by how respondents rate their own security.

13 Aid has no effect on threat perceptions

More aid does not reduce threat perceptions. We do not find evidence that development aid is positively, consistently, and significantly associated with the level of threat perceptions. More aid does not reduce threat.

1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives

This report presents results of a three-year cooperative research project conducted by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and Freie Universität Berlin's research center 700.[1]

The overall objectives of this project were, first, to develop a method for assessing the impact of development cooperation in conflict zones, and second, to apply this method in North East Afghanistan.

The basic question that we sought to address was whether development cooperation has a positive impact on the stabilization of a conflict zone by positively impacting on general attitudes towards the peacebuilding mission, on the legitimacy of the Afghan state, and on the perceived security threats.

1.2 Methods[2]

Assessing the cumulative impact of aid in conflict zones is methodologically challenging and typically requires a massive amount of original data.[3] We collected data from a multitude of sources, and, in line with the emerging consensus that impact assessments should be based whenever possible on a combination of methods, we used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods for this study.

The core of our data was collected by conducting two mass surveys in April 2007 and March 2009. Interviews were conducted in 77 villages in 2007 and 79 in 2009. The communities are located in four districts in North East Afghanistan: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj and Taloqan within the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar.

Half of the communities were selected by random sampling. The remaining fifty percent were chosen according to their diversity on five criteria: (1) size; (2) remoteness; (3) estimated natural resource base (access to irrigated or rain fed land, access to pastures, forest); (4) estimated vulnerability to natural disasters; (5) ethnic and religious

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[1] http://www.sfb-governance.de/

[2] We detail our methodological approach at length in Zürcher, C.; Koehler, J. (2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Approaches and Methods. *BMZ Evaluation Working Papers.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. (to be updated in 2010). Available online at: http://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/erfolg/BMZ_WP_Methodenbericht_AFG.pdf.

[3] The majority of all impact assessments focus on the impact of a single project, or on a bundle of related projects. Our study undertakes it to capture the aggregated effect of development aid, which requires a broader approach and inevitably generates a tremendous hunger for data.

composition.

Within the communities, households were sampled randomly both in 2007 and 2009.[4] The size of the sample varied according to the size of the community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the community as a whole. In 2007, 2,034 heads of households were interviewed, and 2,132 in 2009.

The surveys were implemented by an Afghan research organization (COAR: Coordination of Afghan Relief). The implementation of a survey in regions in which no population data on community level is available is challenging, because researchers cannot devise a sampling plan beforehand. Before conducting interviews in a community, the interview teams held an initial meeting with *shura* members, elders and other local representatives.[5] During that meeting they established the number of households in the village. Once the teams had this information, they calculated the number of interviews that were needed in order to get a representative sample. Once permission was given by the elders, the team conducted the interviews. Since the team was conducting the interviews with the official blessing of the elders, response rates were very high (above 95% in both waves).

The interviewed heads of households over both waves together were male, on average 45 years old. 35.6% were Uzbek, 31.1% Tajik and 19.3% Pashtu, 5.0 % Hazara, 3.7% Arabs, 3.3% Turkmen and 1.4%Aimaq.

In 2007, the households consisted on average of 10.4 people and of between one and eight core families. Respondents said they went on average 1.3 years to school. 79% of respondents said they were peasants; 80% said they owned some land. In 2009 the households consisted on average of 11.3 people and again of between one and eight core families. Respondents in 2009 said they went on average 2.0 years to school. 71% of the respondents in 2009 indicated they were peasants and 79% said that they owned some land.

The survey was designed to generate data on objective indicators of development cooperation and local capacities. Furthermore, we also asked about subjective perceptions of respondents on topics such as the coverage and usefulness of development cooperation projects within the community, or the perception of everyday security.

In addition to the survey data we also collected data from other sources: For every community we created a community profile, containing information on the history, demography, ethnic composition, political and social organization and resource endowment of the surveyed communities. It should be noted that in other settings much of this data would be readily available from statistics and censuses. In the Afghan context, however, we had to collect this data on our own.

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[4] For mainly logistical reasons, we decided not to collect panel data.

[5] Shura is the village council. The shura traditionally is the body which exercises local, communal governance.

In order to collect information on major events and changes affecting the communities, we installed a continuous reporting system from forty villages. Local correspondents filled in a semi-structured report four times a year. The correspondents were trained in a week-long workshop in Kunduz and Polikhumri.

These reports cover 40 out of 80 communities (a full coverage would have been desirable, but not feasible given the logistical difficulties and the budget constraints).

The quarterly reports record major events and significant changes that affect the dependent variables but that are not captured in village profiles and surveys, such as major new development initiatives, outbreaks of violence, military operations, natural disasters, etc. While the surveys and the profiles provide “snapshots” of a given situation at a given time, the quarterly reports provide information on change. They allow for process-tracing.

Additional qualitative data was collected during field research stays. For many complex social situations it is true that valid information is not easily obtained via standardized questionnaires. Often more subtle qualitative methods are required to understand what drives social change: the incentives of actors, the rules and institutions informing the strategies of actors and possible causal links with political, social and economic framework conditions. This approach is, however, more time-consuming than collecting quantitative data by questionnaire. Researchers associated with this project spent a total of fourteen months in the field, conducting numerous formal and informal interviews with international and Afghan stakeholders, thereby collecting valuable information, which helps us to better understand (“interpret”) the findings from the quantitative analysis.

Finally we complemented our data by mining existing sources of data collections, such as CiMiC village profiles, EON Baseline Survey 2006, ISAF ACSP (Afghanistan Country Stability Picture) as of June 2007, NRVA 2003-05 (National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment), UNAMA “Who does what where” development input mapping North-East (database updated only until 2005), and other sources.

This wealth of data allows us to analyze the major trends in North East Afghanistan with regard to issues such as perception of security, perception of international and local actors by the Afghan rural population, and perceptions about coverage and usefulness of development aid. Using regression models, the data also allows identifying patterns of correlations between these perceptions and the aid that a given community received. These correlations then can be interpreted in the light of our qualitative data in order to infer causation – in other words, in order to learn more about the causal impact of aid.

In order to assess the amount of aid that a community was given, and its perceived usefulness, we relied on different measurements. We asked respondents to indicate in which sectors they thought their community had profited from development aid during the two years preceding the survey. We also collected data on all aid projects imple-

mented within or nearby the communities. This strategy allowed us to identify the specific mix of aid which communities received.

1.3 Scope and Limitations

Every research endeavor has its specific scope and limitations, which stem from conscious choices and constraints.

For this research, we chose to focus on rural Afghanistan, and on the household level. Our justification for these choices is that more than 80% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas. Ultimately, the fate of the international state-building mission in Afghanistan will be decided by the question whether these men and women will accept and deem as legitimate the new Afghan government and its international allies and side with them. Therefore, a focus on the rural population seems appropriate.

We focused on the household rather than the individual, because in the context of rural Afghanistan, households pool resources, and the head of household determines which attitudes and perceptions are appropriate.

We focused predominately on humanitarian and emergency aid and small infrastructural projects (including roads), because such projects are supposed to have a relatively quick and visible impact, so their effects should be measurable shortly after implementation. In addition, this type of aid clearly forms the bulk of all aid which has reached the communities so far.

We limited our sample to four districts within two provinces, because we were primarily interested in identifying causal mechanisms rather than being able to map trends across all Afghan provinces, which would have required a different sampling strategy.

While we think that the tasks at hand warrant these choices and the resulting limitations, we are nevertheless conscious of the fact that our research design is not equipped to capture trends for all of Afghanistan, nor does it capture the perceptions of women, youth, urban dwellers and the political elite. Finally, since we focused mostly on small-scale and infrastructural aid, we are not well equipped to link observed changes on the ground to other types of aid projects (capacity building in the center, for example).

There are also limitations stemming not from choices, but from the many constraints, which a highly complex research endeavor inevitably faces in the challenging environments of conflict zones. As it was to be expected Afghanistan is a particular difficult case. Difficult terrain and road conditions make it often hard to travel. Security concerns dramatically increase the problems of running surveys in rural areas. A near complete lack of basic demographic data requires that all data have to be collected by the researchers themselves. Also, sampling procedures and the establishment of representative sample sizes become difficult when there is no reliable census data. It was extremely difficult to obtain reliable aid data from the myriad of aid organizations,

which are active in the region. The conservative nature of Afghan rural society presented a challenge for conducting a large number of interviews with women and youth. At the same time, the conservative nature of rural society may exacerbate the risks that respondents tend to give the answers, which they think the “authorities” expect them to give.

In planning and implementing such a study, but also in interpreting its findings, researchers have to be conscious of these constraints at every step, both in order to devise the best possible research strategy, and in order to clearly point to the limitations in the scope of the research.

1.4 Related Documents

This report can be read as a stand-alone document. However, readers may also want to consult accompanying documents.

First, we documented our methodological approach in much greater detail in a separate report:

> “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Approaches and Methods” by Zürcher, C.; Koehler, J. (2007), *BMZ Evaluation Working Papers*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. This report contains a full account of our research strategy, the questionnaires used, coding rules, model specifications, and additional descriptive data. An updated version will be published in 2010.

Second, in planning this research, we prepared an inception report which contains a conflict assessment of the target area, a brief analysis of the German development projects portfolio in the region, and a first outline of the methods to be developed:

> “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Prestudy” by Koehler, J.; Zürcher, C. (2007), *BMZ Evaluation Working Papers.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

First results of the project were reported in:

> “Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Interim Report“ by Zürcher, C.; Koehler, J.; Böhnke, J. (2007), *BMZ Evaluation Reports 028.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

> “Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Representative Survey“ by Koehler, J.; Zürcher, C. (2007), *SFB-Governance Working Paper Series*, Nr. 7, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin.

“Evaluation von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zur Stabilisierung in Post-Konflikt-Zonen: Anwendung eines Mixed-Methods-Surveys in Nordost-Afghanistan” by Böhnke, J.; Koehler, J.; Zürcher, C. (2009), *Zeitschrift für Evaluation*, 2/2009, 215-235.

Finally, results from related qualitative research are documented in:

"Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan” by Koehler, J. (2008), *SFB-Governance Working Paper Series*, Nr. 17, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin.

2 General Trends in North East Afghanistan 2005–2009

Survey results allow general trends to be mapped in relation to

- security and threat perceptions,
- attitudes towards the presence and activities of international military and civilian actors,
- perceptions regarding the provision of basic services and development aid, and
- perceptions of the Afghan state.

Given the large overall sample, we are confident that our results are generalizable for Kunduz and Takhar Provinces. The next sections describe these trends.

2.1 Security

The provision of security is of paramount importance for the success of peace and state building missions. A peacebuilding mission can only succeed when the overall security situation improves. When the population perceives peacebuilders as contributing to increased security, the overall legitimacy of the mission will also increase. We, therefore, wanted to know how respondents perceive the security situation, both in relation to the overall trends in Afghanistan and more specifically in relation to the security in their villages.

With regard to the **overall security situation in Afghanistan** (*How would you rate the overall security situation in Afghanistan today?*), in April 2009 half of all respondents (50.2%) said that the overall security situation was rather insecure, and 2.7% said it was not secure at all. Only 1.9% said the overall security in Afghanistan was very secure, and 24.1% said it was rather secure. 20.6% did not know how to answer this question, and 0.4% refused to answer. Since we did not include this question in the 2007 survey, no comparison with the situation in 2007 is possible.

Assessing the overall security situation of a country is a rather abstract endeavor, and answers will be influenced by political considerations. In order to grasp the perception of everyday security situations, we then specifically asked about the security situation for villages and households. The following definition was read to respondents before asking them about their assessment of the security situation for communities and for households: “After a long period of instability and war in parts of Afghanistan the physical security of individuals and households may be an issue in your community. By security we mean a situation in which you and your household do not experience violence or are threatened by physical force. “

In 2009, the overwhelming majority of respondents rated **the security of their households** as very secure (42.5%) or rather secure (54.9%). Also, respondents in 2009 saw the **security of their villages** as still increasing. 77.4% of all respondents

said that security in their villages had somewhat or very much increased over the last two years (*Has security increased or decreased over the past two years in your village?*). This is still a remarkably high figure, but it should be noted that in 2007, 98.6% of the respondents indicated that security increased somewhat or very much during the last two years.

To **whom do the respondents attribute the changes** in the security situation in their villages? As in 2007, respondents in 2009 think that positive changes in the security of their villages are attributable to the Afghan government, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and foreign forces. In 2009, 98% of those who said the security improved think that the government had positively contributed, and around 60% think that the ANA and foreign forces had contributed to these changes. The next graph shows which actors contributed to changes in the security situation, in the perception of our respondents.

Graph 1: Who contributed to security changes in the communities in 2009 (percentages)



The following table reports for reference purposes the percentages for the four most important actors for 2007 and 2009:

Table 1: Who contributed to security changes in the communities?

	Contributed negatively (%)	Neither negatively nor positively (%)	Contributed positively (%)	Don't know (%)	Refused to answer (%)
Foreign forces					
2007	0.1	12.0	79.8	6.8	1.4
2009	2.4	25.3	60.6	9.1	2.6
International Development Actors					
2007	0.1	40.7	42.0	16.7	0.6
2009	0.5	49.2	33.4	17.0	0.0
ANA and Afghan Security Forces					
2007	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2009	0.1	30.9	60.8	0.2	7.9
Afghan Government					
2007[6]	0.1	11.0	73.4	14.1	1.5
2009	0.3	2.1	96.7	0.0	0.9

There is some **regional variation.** Our sample allows the comparison of figures from four districts (Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Warsaj and Taloquan). Notably, the perceived usefulness of foreign forces dropped massively in Aliabad. In 2007, Aliabad had the highest percentage of respondents (85.5%) who thought that foreign forces had a positive impact on the improved security level; whereas Warsaj had the lowest percentage (75.1%). In 2009, these figures dropped to 28.95% in Aliabad. In 2009, Imam Sahib (87.6%) is leading in respondents who think that foreign forces had a positive impact on an increased security level. Respondents in Aliabad also rated the security of their households as a bit less secure than respondents in other districts. The mean values are 1.5 for Aliabad (lowest) and 1.83 in Imam Sahib (highest), with 1 = "secure" and 2 = "very secure"). With regard to the rating of overall security, there was no substantial variance between districts.

We also wanted to know specifically about respondents' attitude to the **German PRT** (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Kunduz and the **PAT** (Provincial Advisory Team) in Taloqan. In 2007, only 14.0% of respondents had actually heard about the PRT. Of those who had heard about the PRT, 52.1% rather agreed and 24.7% fully agreed with the statement that the PRT helped to further peace and security. In 2009, 20.7% of respondents said they were aware of the German PRT and PAT, and 81.9% of those respondents indicated that PRT and PAT had helped to further peace and security in

[6] In 2007, we asked separate questions for the central, provincial and local government. The respective figures for "contributed positively" were 73.4% for the central, 92.2% for the provincial and 92.9% for the local government. For 2009, we asked only about "government". Hence, comparisons between 2009 and 2007 should be done with caution.

the area. This echoes the finding that foreign forces are still mainly seen as positively contributing to security.

Summing up, we find that respondents rate the overall security in Afghanistan as rather insecure, but still think that their households and communities are reasonably secure. The Afghan government and foreign forces are seen as contributing most positively to security, but some caution is in order when interpreting these figures. The generally still positive assessment might be influenced by the survey situation in which respondents may be reluctant to give a negative assessment of their government and international actors. It is notable that the government, which is an abstract notion for most Afghans, scores much higher than the Afghan National Army. Because it is difficult to control for the effects of the survey situation, the absolute values may be less trustworthy than the **changes over time**. Here, we find that compared to 2007, foreign forces are seen as considerably less helpful for increasing security in 2009. In 2007, almost 80% thought that foreign forces contributed to security; in 2009, this figure fell to 60.7%, and 25.3% think that foreign forces do not contribute to any security changes at all (in 2007, only 12.0% thought so). Hence, the perceived usefulness of foreign forces has been rapidly decreasing over the last two years.

By whom does the population feel threatened?

Next, we wanted to know about the threat perceptions of households. We asked respondents to indicate which actors were threatening to them. Respondents could choose from a list of eight actors (see table 2): Criminal groups, external militias, Taliban, local militias (these are militias which typically recruit from communities with which the respondents are familiar), foreign forces, district police, Afghan central security forces and Afghan provincial and district security forces. We used the mean value of all answers as an indicator of how much respondents feared one particular group.

Table 2: By whom the population feels threatened (Mean values)
(*Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: 1 = not afraid, 2= somewhat afraid, 3=very afraid*).

Actor	**2007**	**2009**
Criminal groups	1.30	2.51
External armed men	1.16	2.17
Taliban (in 2009 also: “Armed opposition groups”)	1.13	2.10
Local armed men (in 2009 termed “Local Militias”)	1.04	1.64
Foreign forces	1.09	1.36
District police	– (not included)	1.05
Afghan central security forces	1.02	1.04
Provincial and district security forces	1.02	1.02

Compared to 2007, we note a general and dramatic increase in threat perceptions in 2009: All groups with the exception of Afghan security forces are seen as more threatening than in 2007. Most feared are criminal groups followed by external armed groups, and the Taliban. Worrisome are the massive increase of threats stemming from Taliban and external militias, and the slight increase of threats from foreign forces. The next table reports the percentage of responders indicating that they are afraid of the Taliban and foreign forces.

Table 3: Perceived threats stemming from Taliban and foreign forces

	Very afraid (%)	Somewhat afraid (%)	Not afraid (%)	Don't know (%)	Refused to answer (%)
Foreign forces					
2007	3.8	1.0	95.0	0.1	0.1
2009	7.1	21.3	69.0	0.2	2.4
Taliban					
2007	3.2	6.7	89.8	0.1	0.3
2009	44.1	16.3	34.4	0.6	4.6

These figures are based on mean values and frequencies. The figures hence convey no information about different configurations of threat perception. In order to obtain a clearer picture of who is afraid of whom and how much, we run a latent class analysis.[7] This is a statistical procedure that allows for the grouping of respondents into distinct groups ("classes") with **distinct threat profiles**. The analysis identified five such profiles ("classes"). In this analysis, all respondents from both waves are entered to identify meaningful clusters over the full time range.

Class 1: Refused to answer / Threats from non-state armed actors (3.2%; n = 134)

Respondents in this class perceive no threats from Afghan forces and foreign forces. They tend to be threatened by non-state armed actors (Taliban, criminal gangs and militias), but with a very high probability, they refuse to answer this question. Members of class 1 (size: 3.22% / n = 134) show a very high probability to refuse to answer whether they feel threatened by non-state groups such as Taliban, criminals and militias. In the subsequent analysis, this class is not included.[8]

[7] The analysis is based on the 2007 and 2009 respondents, i.e. we run a LCA on the overall sample of 4,166 respondents. We describe the Latent Class Analysis in Böhnke, J.; Zürcher, C.; Koehler, J. (2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Approaches and Methods. *BMZ Evaluation Working Papers.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, available online at http://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/erfolg/BMZ_WP_Methodenbericht_AFG.pdf

[8] A high refusal rate may be caused by fear of disclosing one's real views or by a peculiar coding behavior of the interviewer. We found that this class was only present in 2009. Members of this class are to be found in only 16 villages, 15 of which are in Taloquan. Furthermore, results

Class 2: Medium perceived threat level from all non-state armed actors (12.1%; n = 504)

Members of the second class indicate that they almost never feel afraid of the Afghan military forces (both reaching nearly 100% in the category „not afraid“). For all other groups category 2 “somewhat afraid” is very prominent and so in comparison to the other classes that were identified, respondents in this class are labeled as perceiving a medium threat level from all groups other than the Afghan military forces.

Class 3: Threatened by all groups (5.7%; n = 237)

Members of this class feel threatened by all groups. Most members of this class are “somewhat afraid” or very threatened by foreign forces, external armed men, Taliban, and criminal groups. They are also likely to be somewhat threatened by Afghan forces.

Class 4: No threat (53.5%; n = 2226)

Members of this class in general do not feel threatened.

Class 5: Highly threatened by non-state armed actors (25.6%; n = 1,064)

Members of this class feel clearly threatened by non-state armed actors (Taliban, criminals, and militias).

The next graph shows the distribution of the different classes in 2007 and 2009 (without class 1, see footnote 8. The observable changes are dramatic: In 2007, a vast majority (87.3%) did not feel threatened at all. In 2009, only 21.4% did not feel threatened at all, whereas in 2009, 52.42% felt high threats from non-state armed actors and 7.6% felt threatened by all actors.

Graph 2: Percentage of respondents belonging to the four threat profiles in 2007 and 2009



seem to be contingent on the coding behavior of one special interviewer. In 12 of these villages, the majority of respondents belonged to class 5 (highly threatened by non-state actors). Furthermore, members of class 1 do not seem to belong predominately to one ethnic group, nor is there any other observed association with a factor, which may make this group distinct. We therefore reassigned 128 members of class 1 to class 5, and 6 members, based on their membership probability, to class 4. For further analysis, we use only 4 classes.

This general trend is echoed in all districts, but there is regional variation. Aliabad in 2007 and 2009 was the district with the highest threat level, but in 2007, still nearly 71% of the respondents were grouped into the “No threats” class. In 2009, this figure is down to 12.8%. Most respondents in 2009 belong to class 5 (Threatened by non-state armed actors). Membership in class 3 (general threat) has markedly increased.

Imam Sahib was the district with the lowest threat level in 2007 (No threat class at 96.5%). In 2009, most respondents now belong to class 5 as in Aliabad or to class 2. Taloquan shows mostly a shift of respondents from class 4 to class 5. The percentages for the other classes remain mostly unchanged.

Lastly, Warsaj shows a similar trend as Imam Sahib: in 2007 it was perceived as very secure. In 2009, most respondents belong to class 5 and some to class 2.The following table shows the changes for each of the four districts.

Table 4: Threat profiles per district 2007–2009, percentage

	Class 2 **Medium threat / non state actors**	**Class 3** **Threatened by all**	**Class 4** **No threat**	**Class 5** **High threat / non-state armed actors**
Aliabad				
2007	10.0	11.0	71.0	8.1
2009	14.2	23.7	12.8	48.4
Imam Sahib				
2007	2.2	0.2	96.5	1.2
2009	25.1	3.6	21.2	50.1
Taloqan				
2007	6.7	4.1	83.7	5.4
2009	7.3	3.8	28.3	60.6
Warsaj				
2007	3.7	1.4	94.0	0.9
2009	27.3	0.2	21.6	50.8

Summing up, we note a general increase in threat perceptions from 2007 to 2009. The percentage of those who did not feel threatened at all fell from 87.3% in 2007 to 21.4% in 2009. The percentage of those who felt highly threatened rose from 3.7% in 2007 to 52.4% in 2009. The highest reported threats in 2009 are perceived to come from criminal groups, external armed men, and Taliban. All districts report threats from these groups.

Of concern should be the finding that in 2009, 21.3% of all respondents are somewhat afraid of foreign troops and 7.1% are very afraid. The figures for 2007 were 1% (somewhat afraid) and 3.8% (very afraid).

In all four districts, those who did not feel threatened at all are now a clear minority. The percentages range from 12.8% in Aliabad to 28.3% in Taloquan. Respondents from Aliabad feel most threatened in general, are most likely to feel threatened by non-state armed actors and state military actors, and have the lowest percentage of respondents who think that foreign forces contribute positively to security (32.81%.). The next table reports the key figures and summarizes the regional trends.

Table 5: Threat Profiles, Changes 2007–2009: Summary Table

Class	Short Name / Description	Size in 2007 (in %)	Size in 2009 (in %)	Regional concentrations in 2007	Regional concentrations in 2009
1	**Refusers**: Respondents tend to refuse to answer the questions, especially about threats by Taliban	0.1	6.2	(not observed in 2007)	Predominantly in Taloquan
2	**Medium Threat / non-state armed actors:** Respondents are somewhat threatened, predominately by non-state armed actors such as Taliban, criminal organizations, and local militias	5.3	18.6	Somewhat higher in Aliabad and Taloquan	Somewhat higher in Imam Sahib and Warsaj
3	**Threatened by all:** Respondents feel threatened by all groups, but mostly by criminal organizations and local militias.	3.7	7.6	Somewhat concentrated in Aliabad	Massively concentrated in Aliabad
4	**Not threatened:** Respondents do not feel threatened by any of the groups	87.3	21.1	Somewhat underrepresented in Aliabad	Underrepresented in Aliabad
5	**Highly threatened / non-state armed actors:** Respondents feel high threats from Taliban, criminal organizations, and local militias.	3.6	46.5	Higher in Aliabad and Taloquan	High in all district; highest in Taloquan

2.2 Attitudes and Acceptance

Acceptance of the peacebuilding mission also requires that the population perceives the policies of the peacebuilders as essentially compatible with their own value systems. Theoretically, incompatibilities can occur with regard to a wide range of issues and on different levels, but it could be argued that the tensions and frictions will be felt strongest when it comes to issues of daily life. We therefore decided to focus on attitudes with regard to gender equality, schooling for boys and girls, and the presence of foreign development actors and foreign armed forces – issues which lie at the heart of the liberal peacebuilding mission and that will affect local communities. We formulated six statements and asked for respondents' attitudes towards these statements. Specifically, we asked

- whether respondents thought that state schooling for boys has a positive impact for the community,
- whether state schooling for girls has a positive impact for the community,
- whether state schooling is complementary to local customs and Islamic values,
- how respondents valued off-farm job opportunities for both men and women, and
- whether development aid and the presence of foreign troops present a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values.

We assumed that, in general, positive attitudes towards gender equality, state schooling, and the presence of development agencies and foreign troops would signal a higher level of acceptance of the international peacebuilding mission.

With regard to the issues of schooling for boys and girls and wage labor for women, approval rates remained at a very high level. In 2007, all but one respondent fully or rather agreed with the statement that state schooling for boys had a positive impact for the community. In 2009, this figure was 99.8%. Asked whether state schooling for girls had a positive impact for the community, 97.9% rather or fully agreed in 2007, and 98.1% rather or fully agreed in 2009. Asked whether state schooling is "complementary to local customs and Islamic values and has a positive impact on the moral constitution of the community, 87.9% rather or fully agreed in 2007, and 87.6% in 2009. Finally, a large majority of households agreed that it would be good if off-farm job opportunities were increased for both men and women. Asked about how much respondents agree with the statement "Wage labor is becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of households. It would be good for the community if off-farm job opportunities would increase for both men and women," 23.6% rather agreed and 59.7% fully agreed in 2007, and in 2009, 35.5% rather agreed and 51.5% fully agreed.

We then asked about respondents' attitudes toward the presence of international development actors and foreign forces. Specifically, we wanted to know whether

respondents thought that the presence of these actors – their "usefulness" to the community notwithstanding – was seen as a threat to local values and customs. We asked how much respondents agreed with the statement: "*I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits."* In 2007, 11.3% rather agreed and 10.4% fully agreed, whereas in 2009, 33.4% rather agreed 9.8% fully agreed. Hence, the percentage of those who think that the activities of aid organizations may actually threaten local ways of life and Islamic values in the community increased from 21.7% in 2007 to 43.2% in 2009.

We then asked how much respondents agreed with the statement: *"The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community."* In 2007, 14.9% rather agreed and 28.5% fully agreed with this statement. In 2009, 14.3% rather agreed and 13.5% fully agreed. Hence, the percentage of those who think that the presence of foreign troops threatens local ways of life dropped from 43.4% in 2007 to 27.8% by 2009.

Graph 3: Percentage of respondents agreeing with two statements, 2007 and 2009,

"I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits" (Development Aid): rather agree / full agree or rather disagree / fully disagree

"The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community" (Foreign forces): rather agree / full agree or rather disagree / fully disagree



At first sight, this finding seems to contradict our earlier reported results that in 2009 more respondents said that they were afraid of foreign troops, and fewer respondents thought that foreign troops actually positively contribute to security. One way to

interpret these findings is to assume that respondents came to understand over the last two years that foreign troops are rarely interfering with the daily lives of village communities; hence, they pose little threat to local values. Yet, as they become more and more involved in a shooting war, they are seen as more threatening to physical security, and as the overall threat perception is rapidly growing, they are seen as less useful in providing security.

Of concern is also the finding that the activities of aid actors are increasingly seen as interfering with local values. This may point to the fact that development actors in North East Afghanistan are rather present in the communities (see below).

In general, there are stable and high levels of support for schooling and women's off-farm labor, indicating that respondents still value the specific and tangible work that international actors do. Yet this is tempered with an increasingly cautious attitude towards aid actors and their interference in local communities.

Based on answers to these six value statements, we created an index which reflects the attitudes of respondents towards activities and the presence of civilian and international actors. Higher scores indicate that the values and norms of respondents are more compatible with what the peacebuilders do.[9] The next graph depicts the overall changes in attitudes from 2007 to 2009.

[9] Answers to all six value statements were used to create the index. For answers to questions on foreign aid and foreign forces the codes were reversed. Thereby, higher scores indicate higher acceptance of/congruence with Western values and their representatives. Factor analysis leads to satisfying results: the first factor of a principal components analysis extracts 39.8% of the variance in the answers. The measure of internal consistency is Cronbach-α = 0.67 which is acceptable. The following graphs are based on normed scores which range from 0 (little acceptance) to 10 (high acceptance).

Graph 4: Boxplot for the attitudes index, 2007 and 2009[10]



In general, we find that the median value of attitudes has slightly decreased in 2009, and the data is less spread than in 2007. We also investigated the regional distribution of attitudes. We find that there is a rather substantial variation among districts. Taloquan generally shows the most favorable attitudes, followed by Imam Sahib and Warsaj, and Aliabad which has the least favorable attitudes, but also the largest differences between villages with positive and negative attitudes. We also find that Imam Sahib is the district where the attitude index dropped significantly. The observed overall decline in the index is, therefore, to a large extent driven by changes in Imam Sahib.

[10] The grey box stretches from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile and therefore contains the middle half of the scores in the distribution (50% of all observations). The median is shown as a line across the box. The horizontal lines above and below the box depict the full range of data points. Single points are outlier cases.

Graph 5: Boxplot for attitude index in four districts, 2007–2009.



We also investigated whether the perceptions of foreign troops and development actors are related. We found that those who perceive foreign troops as a threat to the local way of life and to Islamic values also tend to perceive development aid as threatening to the local way of life and Islamic values. This relation grew stronger in 2009 (2007: $r = .51$, $p < .001$, 2009: $r = .78$, $p < .001$).

Recall that in 2009, fewer respondents feel that foreign troops threaten local ways of life and Islamic values (27.8% in 2009, compared to 43.4% in 2007) but more respondents think that the activities of aid organizations actually threaten local ways of life and Islamic values (43.2% in 2009, up from 21.7%). Taken together, these findings indicate that respondents distinguish between military actors and development actors, but nevertheless tend to assess them jointly: Those who think that development actors are a threat to local values also tend to think that foreign troops are a threat to local values. Hence, perceptions of military actors and development actors are tied together, but rising negative perceptions of development actors appear not to be driven by rising negative perceptions of foreign troops.

This has implications for the assessment of civil-military cooperation: Our data indicates that winning acceptance of the local population is not a zero-sum game between military and civilian actors, as it is often portrayed by non-governmental organizations who fear that their acceptance might be reduced if they are seen as cooperating too closely with military actors. Our data provides no evidence for such a claim.

2.3 Aid, Basic Services and Infrastructure

The provision of security has to be the first objective of the international presence in Afghanistan. But the mission is likely to fail if the peace dividend is not shared with the population in the form of better provision of basic services. Hence, development cooperation in North East Afghanistan also intends to contribute to better basic infrastructure and services.

Generally speaking, the level of development is very low, even in North East Afghanistan, which has to be considered a relatively wealthy region within the country. Hence, development starts from a very low level. We included a number of questions in the surveys about the overall situation. A series of question aimed to gather the self-assessment of the households. Here we find that, in the eyes of respondents, the economic situation of the households has markedly worsened over the last two years. In 2009, 17.5% of respondents reported that it is hard for them to buy even simple food products (up from 7.1% in 2007), and 39.4% said they can buy food products, but other things are hard to buy (up from 23.4%). We think that this **drop in the self-assessed economic well-being of households** is due to an increase in prices for food, related to the global wheat crisis and exacerbated by a harsh winter in 2007/2008 and a draught in 2008.

On the other hand, we also find that the provision of basic goods has increased. In 2009, **more households** have access to **drinking water** from pipes, and markedly more households have access to **electricity**. The next table reports these findings.

Table 6: Material well-being of the respondents' households

	2007	**2009**
Self-Assessment		
Hard to buy even simple food products	7.1%	17.5%
Can buy food products, but other things are hard to get	23.4%	39.4%
Can buy food products, clothes and pay for social obligations, but it is hard to pay for commodities	56.0%	26.7%
Can buy food products, clothes and pay for social obligations and for commodities	12.4%	14.7%
Can buy almost everything they want	1.1%	1.2%
Objective assessment		
Household has drinking water from piped water schemes (or systems?)	9.5%	12.7%
Household has electricity	25.1%	40.6%

Next, we wanted to learn about how much households and communities thought they had benefited from development cooperation from 2007 to 2009. In other words, we asked about aid coverage. In 2007, we found a surprisingly high coverage. This trend seemed to continue. In 2009, we find that more households reported having benefitted from aid projects than in 2007. Notable are the increases in food aid, which perhaps indicates that development cooperation in North East Afghanistan is still focusing on emergency and humanitarian aid.

Table 7: Percentage of respondents remembering their household being a beneficiary of direct aid

Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years?

Sector	**2007**	**2009**
Food aid	10.8%	27.3%
Training or advice	1.7%	6.7%
Salary or rent	2.0%	3.2%
Credit	3.1%	3.5%
Other	13.3%	6.9%

We also find that more respondents in 2009 than in 2007 indicated that their community had profited from development cooperation across most sectors (with the exception of extension services and drinking water). Notable is the increase in projects related to schooling and, again, in food aid. There are still very few projects that create opportunities to gain access to salaries or rent.

Table 8: Percentage of respondents indicating their community receiving development projects

Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of development cooperation during the last two years?

Sector	**2007**	**2009**
Food aid	5.9%	25.0%
Training, advice, capacity building	5.5%	10.4%
Schooling	46.5%	70.6%
Electricity supplies	14.2%	19.6%
Jobs created	2.5%	2.5%
Extension services	16.0%	9.5%
Roads & bridges	65.9%	68.8%
Drinking water	65.9%	54.7%
Irrigation	24.1%	28.6%

There is strong regional variation, as well as variation over time. In 2007, food aid was most prominent among communities in Warsaj (26.1%, compared to the average of 5.9%). In 2009, especially respondents from Aliabad remembered food aid on the community level (57.8% compared to the mean level of 25.0%). Most projects with regard to electrification were reported from Warsaj, both in 2007 and 2009 (62.7% and 63.6%). Taloquan had the least amount of projects remembered in the sector of roads and bridges both in 2007 and 2009. In 2007, most irrigation projects were reported in Imam Sahib (43.5%). In 2009, Imam Sahib, Taloquan, and Warsaj all reported similar numbers of irrigation projects (around 30%), whereas the least amount of similar projects seem to be received in Aliabad (18.9%)

These figures are based on mean values and frequencies. The figures, hence, convey no information about different configurations of received aid. In other word, these figures tell us little about the **specific mix of aid** which households and communities (according to respondents) received. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the aid mix, we chose the same approach as with the threat profiles: we run a latent class analysis using data from the 2007 and the 2009 survey. The analysis identified six distinct mixes of aid ("classes").[11] Each of these classes represents a distinct mix of aid projects received by communities over the period from 2005 to 2009, as reported by respondents.

Class 1 (5.1%; n = 214): Schooling & Irrigation

Respondents belonging to the first class report an aid mix that is mostly characterized by schooling as well as irrigation projects. Compared to the general trend, respondents in this class rarely report projects from the sectors "roads & bridges" and "drinking water".

Class 2 (9.0%; n = 377): Medium coverage across all sectors

Respondents belonging to this class report having received projects across all sectors. In line with the general trend, most projects reported being in the sectors of "roads & bridges", "drinking water", and "schooling". The number of reported projects in other sectors is in line with the general trend, or slightly above, which leads us to label this class as "Medium coverage across all sectors".

Class 3 (21.4%; n = 891): Infrastructure with electricity

Respondents belonging to this class report projects in the sectors "road & bridges", "drinking water", "schooling", and "electricity". While the first two sectors show lower probabilities than the general trend, the latter two show higher probabilities. This class is very similar to class five, but has fewer irrigation projects and more electricity projects. We label this aid mix "Infrastructure with electricity".

[11] We describe the Latent Class Analysis in Böhnke, J.; Zürcher, C.; Koehler, J. (2007): Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Approaches and Methods. *Evaluation Working Papers.* Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. Available online at: http://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/erfolg/BMZ_WP_Methodenbericht_AFG.pdf.

Class 4 (35.4%; n = 1476): Low coverage

Respondents belonging to this class recall fewer projects than respondents of other classes. Respondents remember some projects in the sectors “roads & bridges”, “schooling”, and “drinking water”, but clearly below the general trend. For all other sectors, respondents recall only a very few projects. We label this class “Low coverage”.

Class 5 (28.3%; n = 1181): Infrastructure with irrigation

Respondents belonging to this class recall projects in the sectors “roads & bridges”, “drinking water”, “schooling”, and “irrigation” with a higher probability than the mean trend suggests. The probability to remember projects in the other sectors is lower. The pattern is comparable to that of class three, only that the general level of remembered projects is somewhat higher and that in this class nearly no electricity projects were remembered.

Class 6 (0.6%; n = 27): Don’t know

The sixth class is characterized by a clear pattern of “don’t know” on all sectors. There are only 27 respondents belonging to this class; hence we exclude this class from further analysis.

The next graph depicts the distribution of the five aid mixes and changes between 2007 and 2009.

Graph 6: Percentage of respondents belonging to a specific aid mix, 2007 and 2009; respondents were asked to report aid projects for the two years preceding the survey.



A clear trend towards a broader distribution of aid projects can be seen. While in 2007, about 47% of the respondents belonged to the Low coverage class, this number has dropped to 24% in 2009. Membership in class 1 (Schooling & irrigation) and class 2 (Medium coverage across all sectors) has also increased.

Table 9: Percentage of respondents in aid classes, 2007 and 2009 without class 6

	Class 1 Schooling & irrigation	Class 2 Medium coverage across all sectors	Class 3 Infrastructure with electricity	Class 4 Low coverage	Class 5 Infrastructure with irrigation
2007	1.9	1.6	17.6	47.5	31.4
2009	8.3	16.3	25.4	24.2	25.8

There are also clear regional trends. In Aliabad, 63.8% of respondents belonged to the Low coverage class in 2007; this figure dropped to 28.3% in 2009. Membership in class 2 (Medium coverage across all sectors) is up to 34.5% (from 1.2%), and membership in class 3 (Infrastructure with electricity) is up to 22.3% (from 6.9%).

A similar trend can be observed in Imam Sahib: Class 4 (Low coverage) is down, class 2 and 3 are up. Class 5 (Infrastructure with irrigation) is the largest class in both 2007 and 2009.

Taloquan is the district where most respondents belonged to the Low coverage class in 2007 and in 2009. Compared to 2007, Taloquan in 2009 has less Infrastructure with irrigation, but more Schooling and irrigation (indicating that perhaps only the number of schooling projects increased).

In Warsaj, both in 2007 and in 2009, most respondents by far remembered projects in the sectors of Infrastructure with electricity (class 3). Membership in Low coverage has gone down; it is the lowest for all districts in 2007 and 2009. Membership in class 1, 2 and 5 has increased, along with the general trend.

Table 10: Percentage of respondents in aid classes, 2007 and 2009, for four districts

	Class 1 Schooling & irrigation	Class 2 Medium coverage across all sectors	Class 3 Infrastructure with electricity	Class 4 Low coverage	Class 5 Infrastructure with irrigation
Aliabad					
2007	2.4	1.2	6.9	63.8	25.2
2009	0.6	34.5	22.3	28.3	14.4
Imam Sahib					
2007	0.5	0.2	2.5	32.6	64.1
2009	1.5	11.1	12.4	12.7	62.3
Taloquan					
2007	4.9	0.4	2.8	72.2	19.8
2009	22.6	8.0	15.0	51.0	3.4
Warsaj					
2007	0.0	5.8	69.2	23.3	1.6
2009	9.8	14.4	60.7	5.0	10.1

We also wanted to know how much international development actors and the Afghan government were credited for progress in the provision of basic goods and services. We asked respondents to rate the contribution of international development actors and of the Afghan government to the provision of basic services (drinking water, quality of roads, quality of schooling, agricultural production, access to electricity, and more jobs) from 2005 to 2007 and again for 2007to 2009.

With regard to international development actors there has been little change since 2007: Around 60% of respondents think that international development actors contributed positively to the quality of roads and access to drinking water; around 40% see progress in schooling. Only very few respondents credit development actors with creating jobs.

We also asked respondents to rate the government's contribution to progress in the provision of basic goods and services. In 2007, the results showed that the respondents perceived the government as having very little impact, if any at all: 33.9% of respondents thought that the government helped to improve the quality of schooling, only 5.5% of the households reported a positive impact of the government on the provision of drinking water. 12.9% reported a positive impact on the quality of roads. 6.1% reported a positive impact on agricultural production. 3.2% indicated that the government helped to improve access to electricity, and only 0.3% agreed that the government helped to create more jobs. Hence the state got much less credit for progress in these sectors than the international agencies.

This picture has changed. In 2009, respondents think that the Afghan government has contributed to development at about the same level as international development actors. We cannot assess whether this perception indeed reflects the real contribution of each actor. However, it is an important objective of development aid not to bypass the government, because state institutions in fragile states require that they are seen as positively contributing to the provision of public goods. At least in the reported perceptions of the respondents, this seems to happen. The following table reports the figures.

Table 11: Percentage of respondents, rather or fully agreeing with the notion that international development actors and the Afghan Government contributed to better quality / better access in the following sectors:

Development Actors			**Government**		
	2007	**2009**		**2007**	**2009**
Drinking water	61.0	57.0	Drinking water	5.5	50.4
Agricultural production	15.9	39.6	Agricultural production	6.1	42.8
Quality of roads	61.0	67.0	Quality of roads	12.9	65.3
Jobs	2.6	3.7	Jobs	0.0	2.4
Electricity	1.2	19.0	Electricity	2.8	19.7
Schooling	40.1	48.4	Schooling	33.9	67.4

Whereas the government seems to catch up with regard to its perceived contribution to basic services, there seems to be much less progress with regard to other functions. We included in our survey a series of questions about the government's contribution to conflict solving.

In 2007 and in 2009, respondents rated the conflict solving capacity of the state as being very low. When asked to which institutions they would turn if involved in a conflict about natural resources, the majority of respondents said they would turn to the elders or to the village Shura first. Only 2.0% would first approach the district administration. This remains unchanged in 2009.

When asked which institutions most often solved conflicts in a just way, respondents rated elders and local Shura higher than provincial and district administration. 87.6% thought that elders sometimes or always solved conflicts in a just way (94.0% in 2009). 76.5% thought this was true for the local Shura (82.9% in 2009), 38.3% for provincial authorities (33.7% in 2009) and 34% for district administration (up to 60.0% in 2009!).

Echoing findings from previous studies in the East of Afghanistan, we also find that most respondents think that conflicts are often "regulated" by corruption or violent means.[12] In 2007, 84.7% of respondents felt that financial bribes were always or sometimes used to influence an outcome (79.7% in 2009). 67.3% saw kinship ties as influential (74.5% in 2009) and 37.9% thought that force was always or sometimes applied (up to 56.5% in 2009!) Finally, we asked respondents to rate how often the district and provincial administration took care of the needs of the village population. Only 2.8% thought that this always or frequently happened (0.8% in 2009), whereas 31.3% thought it rarely happened (56.3% in 2009) and 36.9% thought it never happened (24.0% in 2009).

Summing up, we find that respondents in 2009 credit the Afghan government with having contributed to basic services at about the same level as international actors. As a problem solver and conflict mediator, state institutions remain virtually absent.

[12] Koehler, J. and Zürcher, C. (2007). Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results from a Representative Survey. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No. 7, October 2007. Berlin, SFB.

3 The Impact of Development Aid

In chapter 2, we described the major trends in relation to development aid and security perceptions in North East Afghanistan between 2005 and 2009. In this chapter, we turn to an investigation of the impact of development aid.

Does aid help peace? While the overarching rationale for giving aid in conflict zones lies in protecting the livelihood of people, development and military actors expect other benefits, too: Aid is thought to convince the population that a prolonged cooperation with international peacebuilders is to be preferred over cooperating with spoilers. Aid is also thought to bolster the legitimacy of the state, either by building the state's capacity for delivering public goods or by directly delivering public goods in the name of the state. A more legitimate state and positive attitudes towards international military and civilian peacebuilders then add up to an environment in which the peacebuilding mission stands a better chance of success and which is conducive to an increased security situation. Furthermore, aid, it is hoped, helps to reduce the risks for military and development personnel in the field, because the material benefits will induce communities to share vital information and intelligence with the peacebuilders rather than with the insurgents. This makes the environment safer and the operations of development actors as well as counterinsurgents more efficient. It is on these assumptions which the international community bases its hope that aid will have an impact on the immediate stabilization of post-war zones.

Our data allows testing of these assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first micro-level, quantitative impact assessment of aid. Our data enables us to assess the impact of aid for the periods 2005–2007, 2007–2009, and the combined time period of 2005–2009. Specifically, we investigated whether

- aid has an impact on general attitudes towards the peacebuilding mission,
- aid has an impact on how the legitimacy of the Afghan state is perceived, and
- aid has an impact on the perceived security threat.

Before we turn to the analysis, we briefly outline our operationalization of the key variables.

Independent Variable: Aid

We used different measures of aid. The first (*Number of Projects*) is based on the number of projects that a community received. Using data from development organizations in the region, and data collected during field visits to the communities, we compiled a list of geo-referenced development projects and attributed them to the communities in the sample. This variable was constructed two times: one for the aid projects between 2005 and 2007 and a second one for aid projects between 2007 and 2009.

We also used two perception-based measures of aid that reflect the perception of respondents in relation to how much the household or community, in a given sector, had profited from aid projects. The first (*Direct Aid)* captures whether individual households, rather than the community as a whole, said that they had directly benefited from

household level development projects (for example food aid, training or advice, salary, rents) during the preceding two years.[13] The answers were summed for every individual yielding a score of in how many sectors direct help was remembered.

The second subjective measure *(Aid-Class)* sought to capture the perceived usefulness of aid to the community according to respondents' perceptions. We asked respondents whether they thought that their community had profited during the last two years from projects related to food aid, training/advice, schooling, electricity supply, jobs, agricultural extension services, roads & bridges, drinking water and irrigation.

Using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), we then grouped the respondents' answers in five categories, reflecting the mix of projects from which the communities had benefited according to respondents' perceptions. We constructed indicator variables for four of the classes and used the "Low coverage"-class (Aid-Class 4) as the reference group. We have described the five aid classes above.

Dependent Variables: Attitudes, state legitimacy, threat perceptions

Attitudes towards the activities of the peacebuilders were proxied by an index that was calculated using answers to six value statements about respondents' perceptions about state schooling for boys and girls, wage labor for women and men, and the presence of civilian and military actors.[14] Factor analysis showed that the first factor of a principal components analysis extracts 39.84% of the variance in the answers. The measure of internal consistency is Cronbach-α = 0.67. The scale ranges from 0–10, 10 being the most positive attitudes.

Attitudes towards foreign forces were proxied by an index (0–10) based on answers to the questions "How afraid are you of the following groups – Foreign forces" (Q12) and the rating of "The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community". Again, higher values represent a more favorable rating.

We proxied *State Legitimacy* by satisfaction with government as measured by the rating of the performance of district and provincial governments (Q54). Respondents were

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[13] For the household, the sectors were: food aid; training/advice; salary/rent; credit; others. For the community: food aid; training/advice; schooling; electricity supply; job; agricultural extension services; roads & bridges; drinking water; irrigation.

[14] The statements are:

1) Education of boys in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for boys in our community.
2) Education of girls in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for girls in our community.
3) Wage labor is becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of households. It would be good for the community if off-farm job opportunities would increase for both men and women.
4) State-schooling is complementary to local customs and Islamic values. I think it has a positive impact on the moral constitution of the community.
5) I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits.
6) The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community.

asked to rate to what extent the district government took care of the needs of the communities. Hence, this is a strictly output oriented measure for legitimacy that assesses the state's capacity as a service provider. While we acknowledge that this variable does not capture more subtle procedural-based concepts of legitimacy, we maintain that, in conflict zones, the state´s legitimacy first and foremost depends on its ability to provide basic public services.

Threat perceptions of respondents are based on membership in threat classes. Membership in class 4 (respondents do not feel threatened by any group) is coded as not threatened (for the dummy variable the code "0"); membership in all other classes is coded as threatened (for the dummy variable the code "1").

Control variables

We created several variables that proxy various characteristics of the households and communities which may have an impact on the dependent variables.

We created variables for the ethnic belonging (*Pashtu, Uzbek, Tajik, other*[15]) of respondents. Some scholars argue that attitudes toward foreign presence differ between ethnic groups, and that especially among Pashtu the mistrust towards the international peacebuilders may be greater that among minority groups. Creating indicator variables for ethnic belonging with "Pashtu" as the reference category allowed for testing this assumption.

To control for a household's material well-being we asked the respondents to indicate if it was hard for them to buy even simple food products, if they could spend money for clothes and social obligations, if they could buy luxury goods or even anything they want (*Material well-being*). Based on this, we created an index which reflects the self-reported material situation of the household.

We created a variable (*Periphery*), indicating whether a community was easily accessible or remotely located. One way of thinking about the impact of a peripheral location is that the more remote a village is, the more cautious it may be toward the peacebuilding mission. On the other hand, it could also be that remote villages are more in need of development aid and less exposed to propaganda efforts by anti-Western, or anti-central government forces. Hence we wanted to empirically investigate whether a peripheral location was a valid predictor.

Our survey team also coded the vulnerability of the villages (*Vulnerability*), indicating how much a community is threatened by natural disasters,[16] and a variable indicating the population size (*Size*) of the village.

We also used the districts as a control variable (*Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Taloquan and Warsaj;* represented by effect codings with Warsaj as the reference group). There was

[15] Strictly speaking Nomad is not an ethnic group, but a socio-professional group, defined by the livelihood. Most Nomads are ethnically Pashtu.

[16] The vulnerability score was assigned by our survey teams to each community. It is standard procedure for development work to assess a community's vulnerability to natural disasters. Communities that were deemed prone to natural disasters (mainly mudslides) were coded as 1, other communities as 0.

not one specific hypothesis that we expected to test with the district dummies. Rather, we took the district dummy as a black-box for the combined effect of other, unobserved influences. If one or all district dummies are significant , as we expected it to be, we take this as a marker for an idiosyncratic combination of factors that is intrinsic to this given district and which then requires additional research. At the very least, significant district dummies signal that conditions differ across districts, hence development actors should study these differences and design policies accordingly.

We controlled for the respondents' individual perceptions of the security situation by asking respondents to rate whether security, in their opinion, had increased or decreased during the last two years (*Security Change*). We also included in our model a variable to describe threat groups by including a dummy variable denoting membership in one of four threat profiles (threat class 1 – threat class 4).

The Cross-Sectional Models

All models were estimated with clustered standard errors (by village). We also used a weighting procedure. For every village we assessed the number of households (categorized as: 0–20; 21–50; 51–100; 101–200; 201–300; 300–1,000). Sampling weight was determined by the number of interviews per village divided by the mean of these categories. For all analyses STATA 10 was used.

We used OLS-regression to estimate the impact of aid. We applied five cross-sectional models for the two periods of 2005–2007 and 2007–2009. In model 1, we only entered the measures for perceived aid. In model 2, we added our objective measure for aid (the number of projects). In model 3, we added various measures for the perceived changes in the security situation and for threat perceptions. Model 4 adds ethnicity and the material situation of the household. In model 5, we also controlled for size, location, and district of the community.

The Cross-Sectional / Trend Models

We also constructed two models which include the means of various variables measured in 2007 in order to estimate the dependent variables in 2009. We did this for two reasons. First, these models allow us to capture the lasting impact of structural characteristics and perceptions, measured in 2007, on our depended variables in 2009.

Second, we were interested in finding out whether the characteristics measured in 2007 might explain the massive impact of the district variables on our dependent variables. Recall that we used the four districts in order to capture the impact of unobserved external variables for which we cannot specifically control. These were effect coded, meaning that three of the four districts were entered as dummies using the last one as a reference category. In general, these district variables are significant and explain much of the variance in most models. Our rationale to include some of the 2007 village level predictors was to find out whether it is actually these variables which cause the variation which is picked up by the district variables in 2009. First, we estimated a model that includes all cross-sectional predictors from the 2009 data set as well as estimated mean values for specific characteristics of the villages from 2007 (such as for example mean resource base or mean perceived state legitimacy). In the second model, we then added the variables for the districts. As expected, these variables are

significant in most models. But we also find that they are highly correlated with some of the other variables, resulting in very high variance inflation factors (VIF). Generally, values above 10 are considered to be “high” and to indicate collinearity of predictors. Assuming collinearity, variables that are significant in the first model, but loose significance when adding the district variables may actually account for the variance that the district variables are picking up. This second model therefore could indicate whether variables denoting the aggregated structural characteristics of 2007 are correlated with the district dummies in 2009 and therefore explain the differences we observe between the districts.

Several of the variables measured by the survey in 2007 were aggregated for the trend analyses in every village. These variables are

- the mean material well-being,
- the share of Pashtu in that villages’ responses in 2007,
- the mean probabilities of remembering specific aid mixes in 2007 (i.e. mean membership probabilities for the aid classes),
- the mean legitimacy rating,
- the mean attitudes towards foreign forces,

  the relative frequencies of the threat classes as well as
- the mean rating whether development aid was seen as a threat to local customs.

Since our sampling procedure was intended to yield random samples of heads of households per village, the aggregated statistics should be village-wise representative. For example, the mean legitimacy rating in 2007 represents the general legitimacy rating in 2007 in the village. Also in these analyses we used the aid count between 2005 and 2007 as a predictor which also could be causally related to survey measures in 2009.

The results indicate that characteristics of villages in 2007 have little impact on the dependent variables in 2009. All results are reported in the tables in the appendix.

3.1 The Impact of Aid on Attitudes

The period 2005–2007 (Table I)

For the period of 2005–2007, we find that development aid has a small, but statistically significant impact on general attitudes of respondents towards the peacebuilding operation. In general, respondents who said that their village had profited from development aid projects during the precedent two years were likely to show slightly higher attitudes. This is reflected in the coefficients of the variables for aid classes. The reference class is class 4 (Low coverage). Respondents who belong to any other class are likely to show higher attitudes. All classes show the expected sign, but aid class 3 is not significant in all models; and aid class 5 loses significance once we control for the size, the location, and the district of the village. Model 5 which includes all control vari-

ables is highly significant (p <.001) and explains 51% of the overall variance. Aid alone explains around 10%.

Proxy indicators for security perceptions, threat perceptions and district, however, have more explanatory power than the perception of aid. Respondents in Imam Sahib were much more likely to display more positive attitudes than respondents in other districts. Those who said they were threatened by non-state armed actors and those who thought that the security situation of the village deteriorated also displayed more negative attitudes. Tajik displayed more positive attitudes than Pashtu (Pashtu is the reference category in the model). Finally, richer households showed more positive attitudes and so did larger villages.

The period 2007–2009 (Table II)

During the period 2007–2009, the slightly positive impact of aid which we observed in 2005–2007 almost completely disappear. As soon as we control for security and threat perceptions (model 3), all aid classes with the exception of aidclass1 lose significance. When controlling also for characteristics of the household and the village (models 4 and 5), the coefficient for aid class1 drops to 0.34 and loses significance. The model is highly significant (p <.001) and still explains 39% of the overall variance.

As in the period 2005–2007, proxy indicators for threat perceptions and district have more explanatory power than aid. Belonging to a district becomes the most powerful predictor. Respondents in Aliabad are likely to have more negative attitudes, respondents in Taloquan more positive. Ethnicity is in model five not significant, indicating that compared to 2007 Tajiks have no longer more positive attitudes than other ethnic groups.

As in 2007, threat perceptions help to predict attitudes. Threat class 3 has the largest coefficient of all threat classes, indicating that in 2009 threat perceptions are also driven by fear of state military actors and international military actors. In contrast to 2007, in 2009 it is the richer households and smaller villages that display negative attitudes. Model five is highly significant and explains 39% of the variance.

The period 2005–2009 (Table III)

Model 1 captures the accumulated influence of several variables (as measured in 2007) on attitudes in 2009. We wanted to see whether the levels of aid, which individuals and communities had received by 2007, together with the aid they received between 2007 and 2009, had an impact on attitudes. The results of the trend model 1 (without the districts) is very similar to the cross sectional model 4 (without districts). The aggregated characteristics as measured in 2007 do not predict the dependent variables in 2009. When adding the district variables (model 2), the mean probabilities for aid classes 1 and 2 become significant. So is the variable for Aliabad. Recall that aid classes 1 and 2 were in 2007 phenomena that had very few respondents and that were regionally clustered (cf. table 9 and 10 above). Therefore, these effects should be treated with caution and should be subject of further investigation by case studies.

These findings suggest that the level of attitudes in 2009 is influenced only by developments between 2007 and 2009. Whatever positive impact aid had in 2007 was overridden by events from 2007 to 2009. In other words – a potential long-term effect of aid

on attitudes did not survive what happened between 2007 and 2009. Our data suggests that the dramatically increased threat perception and especially the perceived threats from foreign forces override the small gains in positive attitudes caused by aid.

Summing up, we find that between 2005 and 2007, development aid had a small, but statistically significant impact on general attitudes of respondents towards the peacebuilding operation. This effect vanishes for the period 2007–2009. In general, attitudes are predominantly driven by perceptions about security and threats.

3.2 The Impact of Aid on Attitudes towards Foreign Forces

So far we have discussed the predictors for general attitudes. We also investigated which factors had an impact on how foreign forces are perceived. We created a dependent variable based on answers to the questions "How afraid are you of the following groups – foreign forces" (Q12) and the rating of "The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community." A principal component analysis reveals a strong first component that explains 61% of the variance of the two questions (2007 and 2009 surveys combined). A correspondence analysis reveals that when we map the categories of both questions on one dimension, Q12 is perfectly ordered, but the categories "2" and "3" are reversed. Collapsing these two categories (resulting in a "mixed" middle category) results in a solution with a strong first dimension (explaining 76% of the variance). Therefore we used the sum of both questions as a score to represent the acceptance of foreign troops. Both questions were reverse coded and normed, so higher scores represent more acceptances, with a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 0.

We used the same procedure as described above. We run regressions using data from the 2005–2007 period and from the 2007–2009 period. In an additional model, we also included mean values of variables as measured in 2007 to predict outcomes in 2009. We find no evidence that aid has an impact on how respondents perceive foreign troops.

The period 2005–2007 (Table IV)

In model 1 for 2005–2007, none of the aid classes is significant, and the variables combined explain only 2% of the variance. Only when entering additional variables (model 2–5) does aid class 2 become significant (in model 2) and aid class 1 in model 5 (see table IV). The largest impact is the threat perception of the population. Respondents who did not belong to threat class 4 (not feeling threatened) showed more negative attitudes and so did respondents who thought that security had deteriorated over the last two years. In short, respondents' attitudes towards foreign forces are clearly driven by their security and threat perception.

The period 2007–2009 (Table V)

The findings for 2007–2009 do not substantively differ from the 2005–2007 period (see table V).

The period 2005–2009 (Table VI)

With regard to accumulated effects in 2005–2009, we find that respondents who belonged to aid class 2 (Medium coverage across all sectors) in 2007 were more likely to show more positive attitudes. However, this is a very small class (1.62%) and mostly concentrated in Warsaj. As in all other models, security and threat perceptions drive the results.

We therefore conclude that the mostly small infrastructural projects which were widely implemented across North East Afghanistan from 2005 to 2009 did not have an impact on attitudes towards foreign forces. Rather, respondents' attitudes towards foreign forces are driven by how respondents rate their own security. The military, it appears, is judged by how good it is at its core business – providing security.

3.3 The Impact of Aid on Perceptions of State Legitimacy

One crucial objective of the mission in Afghanistan is to build up state capacities. Increased state capacities will lead to higher state legitimacy and vice versa, and both are required if the peace and state building mission in Afghanistan is to succeed. As reported above, we proxied state legitimacy by respondents' ratings of the question "Do you think the wolliswoli or provincial government take care of the needs of your village's population?" (Never, rarely, sometimes, frequently, always). Less than 1% of respondents chose either "frequently" or "always;" hence we collapsed these categories with "sometimes". Because of the limited number of categories of our dependent variable we used an ordinal probit regression instead of OLS-regression.

We acknowledge that this is a purely output oriented measure of legitimacy, but we think this choice is appropriate in post-conflict settings.

The period 2005–2007 (Table VII)

For the period 2005–2007, subjective measures for aid (model 1) have a small but significant impact on how respondents perceive their state. Respondents belonging to any aid class other than "Low coverage" are more likely to perceive the state as more legitimate. When adding all other control variables (model 2–5) only the variable for aid class 2 loses significance; all other aid classes remain significant with the expected signs. Objective measures for aid (number of projects) did not have an impact.

Variables for security and threat perceptions are significant and with the expected signs (more threat and less security reduce state legitimacy), but when controlling for village and district characteristics, this effect disappears. Most likely this is due to regional variations that are captured by the district variables.

Material well-being of the respondents' household is positively correlated with perceived legitimacy. Once we control for village characteristics, Tajik show slightly higher ratings of legitimacy than Pashtu. Also, respondents in Imam Sahib are more likely to rate their state higher.

The period 2007–2009 (Table VIII)

During the years 2007–2009, the trend that we observed over the two preceding years becomes stronger, as indicated by much larger coefficients. Subjective measures of aid are clearly associated with perceived legitimacy. Aid classes 2, 3, and 5 are significant in all models with the expected sign. As in 2007, security and threat perceptions also have an impact. But in contrast to 2007, this effect does not vanish once we control for district, indicating that perceived threat from non-state armed actors reduces legitimacy.

The period 2005–2009 (Table IX)

As before, we investigated whether state legitimacy in 2009 is explained by developments that occurred during the period 2005–2007. In model 1, we entered village characteristics estimated in 2007:

- the mean level of the resource base question per household;
- the share of Pashtu in every village;
- the numbers of projects in 2007;
- the mean probabilities per village to belong to any of the aid classes;
- the mean legitimacy level (operationalized by the villages' mean in question 54 in 2007); and
- the mean threat levels in 2007.

In model 2 we added the districts. Assuming collinearity between predictor variables, those predictors which are significant in model 1 but lose significance in model 2 may to be the ones which explain the regional variation.

We find that model 1 is very similar to model 5 of the 2009 cross-sectional data. Of the villages' characteristics assessed in 2007, only two variables have an impact on respondents' ratings in 2009 that lasts even after controlling for other variables. First, the mean resource level in 2007 correlates positively with legitimacy: respondents in villages that had higher resource levels in 2007 had a heightened probability for more positive ratings of legitimacy. Second, the mean level of perceived legitimacy in the respondents' village in 2007 had a negative impact: the higher the mean level in a village the lower was the probability for individual respondents in 2009 to give higher legitimacy ratings. After controlling for districts (model 2) threat class 3 loses significance and the mean probability of belonging to aid class 1 in 2007 gains significance. Recall that aid class 1 is the smallest (1.92% in 2007 and mainly concentrated in Taloquan).

In sum, we conclude that both in 2007 and 2009, the perceived level of received aid has influenced the perceived legitimacy of the state. However, there is no lasting effect. Those who perceived the state as legitimate in 2007 were not more likely to perceive it as legitimate in 2009. This is an interesting finding which seems to indicate that in a volatile conflict zone, the state cannot stockpile legitimacy, but has to earn it constantly.

3.4 The Impact of Aid on Perceptions of Security

(All results are reported in Annex I, tables X, XI and XII)

If aid has an immediate impact on the objective security situation, then we would also expect to see that aid has an impact on perceived threats. In order to test the impact of aid on threat perception, we coded a dichotomous variable. Membership in threat class 4 (no perceived threats) is coded as no threat, membership in all other classes is coded as "threat". Because the dependent variable has only two categories ("0" = no threat; "1" = "threat"), we use a logistic regression. Also, because we cannot use threat classes as independent variables anymore once they are included in the dependent variables, we drop these from the model.

The period 2005–2007 (Table X)

In models 1–3, we find no correlation. Only when controlling for individual and village characteristics, aid class 5, direct aid, and job creating projects become significant. Richer households felt less threatened. Those who thought that the security situation had improved also felt less threatened. The goodness of fit for all models is low (the highest is 0.28 for model 5)

The period 2007–2009 (Table XI)

For the period 2007–2009, we find that subjective measures of aid are consistently associated with treat perceptions, but with the unexpected signs. Being in aid class 1 or aid class 5 instead of "Low coverage" actually correlates with higher threat perceptions. Again, the goodness of fit is low (0.19 for the best model, which is model 5)

The period 2005–2009 (Table XII)

We identified one factor that may have a long-term impact on threat perceptions in 2009. Respondents who in 2007 belonged to aid class 1 ("schooling and irrigation") were less likely to perceive threats. But recall that in 2007, aid class 1 was small and regionally concentrated in Taloquan. Second, respondents from villages who in 2007 had higher percentages of inhabitants belonging to threat class 2 ("Medium perceived threat level from all non-state actors") perceived fewer threats in 2009.

Summing up, we do not find evidence that development aid is positively, consistently, and significantly associated with threat perceptions. More aid does not reduce threats. To the contrary, we find that for the period 2007–2009, the reverse seems to be true. Those who report having received aid also feel more threatened. One possible explanation for this may be that communities who work closer with development organizations also feel more exposed to threats from armed militias.

Annexes

Annex 1: Regression Models

Table I: Regression analysis for "Attitudes"; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between "1 / low congruence with Western values" and "10 / high congruence with Western values"; Regression analyses for "Attitudes"; cross-sectional data in 2007 on the 77 villages assessed (*N* = 1608)

	Model 1 "Subjective Aid"	**Model 2 "Aid"**	**Model 3 "Aid & Security"**	**Model 4 "Respondent Characteristics"**	**Model 5 "Village Characteristics"**
Aid class 1	1.04	1.02*	.75*	.58	.70*
Aid class 2	1.11**	1.33**	.91***	.80**	.81**
Aid class 3	.37	.38	.20	.13	.28
Aid class 5[1]	.82*	1.02**	.91***	.83***	.33
Job Projects	-.45	-.37	-.44	-.04	-.14
Direct Aid Score	-.16	-.23	-.12	-.15	-.04
Number of Projects counted in 2007		-.20*	-.10	-.08	-.09*
"Has security increased over the past two years?"			1.25***	1.06***	.85***
Threat class 2			-1.64***	-1.43***	-1.03***
Threat class 3			-1.51***	-1.30***	-.83***
Threat class 1 or 5 [2]			-1.61***	-1.39***	-1.11***
Material well-being of the household				.44***	.31***
Tajik				.26	.88***

Uzbek				.19	.36
Other ethnicity[3]				.09	.25
Periphery (Village)					.04
Vulnerability (Village)					.07
Size (Village)					.21*
Aliabad					-.12
Imam Sahib					1.40***
Taloquan[4]					.32
Intercept	7.48	7.95	2.17*	1.69*	1.42
r^2	.04	.10	.39	.42	.51
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	p = .05	p <.001	p <.001	p <.001
adjusted r^2	.04	.10	.38	.41	.51
Significance	p = .004	p = .002	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 5 with all variables: VIF = 2.07; ranging from 1.07 to 3.75; Districts 4.08 to 5.25; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

[1] Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

[2] Threat class 4 was used as reference category

[3] "Pashtu" was used as reference category

[4] Warsaj was used as reference district

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table II: Regression analysis for “Attitudes”; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between “1 / low congruence with Western values” and “10 / high congruence with Western values”; Regression analyses for “Attitudes”; cross-sectional data in 2009 on the 79 villages assessed (*N* = 1719)

	Model 1 “Subjective Aid”	**Model 2 “Aid”**	**Model 3 “Aid & Security”**	**Model 4 “Respondent Characteristics”**	**Model 5 “Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	.65*	.62*	.65*	.56*	.34
Aid class 2	-.70*	-.65*	-.25	-.10	-.11
Aid class 3	-.50*	-.47	-.19	-.11	-.13
Aid class 5[1]	-.23	-.15	-.08	.22	.14
Job Projects	-.03	-.05	.02	.06	.17
Direct Aid Score	-.25**	-.25**	-.21**	-.20***	-.01
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007		-.03	-.03	-.01	.04
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			-.16	-.16	-.11
Threat class 2			-.54***	-.36***	-.37**
Threat class 3			-1.30***	-1.02***	-.49***
Threat class 1 or 5 [2]			-.07	-.09	-.02
Security of the household			-.37***	-.25**	-.28**
Material well-being of the household				-.30***	-.22***
Tajik				.29	.27

Uzbek				.56*	.39
Other ethnicity[3]				.07	.24
Periphery (Village)					.01
Vulnerability (Village)					.22*
Size (Village)					-.14**
Aliabad					-.99***
Imam Sahib					.28
Taloquan[4]					.51*
Intercept	8.46***	8.53***	9.75***	9.80***	9.68***
r^2	.13	.13	.24	.31	.39
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	p = .33	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001
adjusted r^2	.13	.13	.23	.30	.38
Significance	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 6 with all variables: VIF = 2.19; ranging from 1.07 to 2.66; Tajik and Districts 3.79 to 4.51; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 "Pashtu" was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table III: Trend model for “Attitudes”; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between “1 / low congruence with Western values” and “10 / high congruence with Western values”; Model 1 cross-sectional data from 2009 with predictors from aggregate village statistics from 2007 on the 77 villages assessed in both waves; Model 2 adds the district dummies (*N* = 1688)

	Model 1 **“Trend”**	**Model 2** **“Trend & District”**
Aid class 1	.40*	.20
Aid class 2	-.19	-.16
Aid class 3	-.19	-.19
Aid class 5[1]	.02	.09
Job Projects	-.05	-.02
Direct Aid Score	-.16**	-.01
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007	-.05	.01
“Has security increased over the past two years?”	-.15	-.12
Threat class 2	-.36**	-.36**
Threat class 3	-.88***	-.49**
Threat class 1 or 5 [2]	-.05	.02
Security of household	-.24*	-.26**
Material well-being of the household	-.28***	-.23***
Tajik	.36	.35*

Uzbek	.74***	.58**
Other ethnicity[3]	.29	.37
Periphery (Village)	.03	.05
Vulnerability (Village)	.06	.25*
Size (Village)	-.08	-.15***
Aliabad	–	-1.00**
Imam Sahib	–	.28
Taloquan[4]	–	.48
2007: Mean resource base of house-holds in village	-.31	-.20
2007: Share of Pashtu in the village	.52	.53
2007: Project count in 2007	.04	< .01
Mean probability for aid class 1 in 2007 per village	1.23	1.55*
Mean probability for aid class 2 in 2007 per village	1.20	1.88**
Mean probability for aid class 3 in 2007 per village	-.04	.20
Mean probability for aid class 5 in 2007 per village[5]	.15	.36
Mean “State Legitimacy” in 2007 per village	.01	.05
Mean Acceptance of foreign troops in 2007 per village	.02	-.08

Mean class 2 threats in 2007 per village	-.03	-.18
Mean class 3 threats in 2007 per village	-.53	-.64
Mean class 5&1 threats in 2007 per village[6]	1.29	.62
Mean for “Has security increased over the past two years?” in 2007 per village	1.31*	.74
Mean “Development Aid as a threat”	-.03	-.03
Intercept	4.33	7.03
r^2	.34	.39
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	$p < .001$
adjusted r^2	.32	.38
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1: VIF = 2.67; ranging from 1.11 to 6.23; for Model 2: VIF = 3.46; ranging from 1.12 to 11.73 (districts: 7.45 to 11.73); villages’ probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 (“Low coverage”) was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 “Pashtu” was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

5 Mean probability for aid class 4 in 2007 per village as reference

6 Mean class 4 threats in 2007 per village as reference

Table IV: Regression analysis for “Acceptance of foreign troops”; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between “1 / very afraid of and threatening to local values” and “10 / not afraid of foreign troops & they are no threat to local values”; cross-sectional data in 2007 on the 77 villages assessed (*N* = 1878)

	Model 1 **“Subjective Aid”**	**Model 2** **“Aid”**	**Model 3** **“Aid & Security”**	**Model 4** **“Respondent Char-acteristics”**	**Model 5** **“Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	1.15	1.15	1.06	.95	1.11*
Aid class 2	.72	.94*	.35	.13	-.26
Aid class 3	.78	.80	.62	.48	.25
Aid class 5[1]	.72	.90	1.11***	1.11***	.25
Job Projects	-.06	<.01	.06	.24	<.01
Direct Aid Score	-.35	-.40	-.24	-.31*	-.19
Number of Projects counted in 2007		-.19	-.07	-.05	-.05
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			.89***	.80***	.39**
Threat class 2			-1.14***	-1.03***	-.44
Threat class 3			-6.37***	-6.33***	-5.57***
Threat class 1 or 5[2]			-1.79***	-1.70***	-1.24**
Material well-being of the household				.22**	.07
Tajik				.29	1.01**

Uzbek				.04	.19
Other ethnicity[3]				-.27	-.13
Periphery (Village)					.09
Vulnerability (Village)					-.19
Size (Village)					.24*
Aliabad					-.93*
Imam Sahib					1.87***
Taloquan[4]					.06
Intercept	6.69***	7.12***	3.05**	2.77**	3.86***
r^2	.02	.05	.44	.45	.61
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	p = .13	p < .001	p = .11	p < .001
adjusted r^2	.02	.05	.44	.44	.60
Significance	p = 0.27	p = .07	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 5 with all variables: VIF = 1.99; ranging from 1.05 to 3.71; Districts 4.06 to 4.76; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 "Pashtu" was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table V: Regression analysis for “Acceptance of foreign troops”; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between “1 / very afraid of and threatening to local values” and “10 / not afraid of foreign troops & they are no threat to local values”; cross-sectional data in 2009 on the 79 villages assessed (*N* = 1822)

	Model 1 **“Subjective Aid”**	**Model 2** **“Aid”**	**Model 3** **“Aid & Security”**	**Model 4** **“Respondent Char-acteristics”**	**Model 5** **“Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	1.28*	1.32*	1.05*	.69	.26
Aid class 2	-.52	-.58	-.21	-.13	-.11
Aid class 3	-.15	-.19	.13	-.03	-.21
Aid class 5[1]	.21	.12	.37	.55	.40
Job Projects	-.91	-.89	-.30	.02	.21
Direct Aid Score	-.66***	-.67***	-.48***	-.38**	-.06
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007		.04	.04	.06	.14**
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			.12	.08	.11
Threat class 2			-1.74***	-1.45***	-1.52***
Threat class 3			-5.13***	-4.65***	-3.81***
Threat class 1 or 5 [2]			-.79**	-.77***	-.64**
Security of household			-.49**	-.34*	-.38*
Material well-being of the household				-.46***	-.31***

Tajik				1.02*	.65
Uzbek				.91*	.61
Other ethnicity[3]				.04	.32
Periphery (Village)					-.09
Vulnerability (Village)					.49*
Size (Village)					-.24*
Aliabad					-2.10***
Imam Sahib					-.04
Taloquan[4]					.17
Intercept	7.44***	7.36***	8.43***	8.58***	9.12***
r^2	.11	.11	.35	.41	.47
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	p = .42	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001
adjusted r^2	.10	.10	.35	.40	.46
Significance	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 6 with all variables: VIF = 2.17; ranging from 1.10 to 2.57; Tajik and Districts 4.09 to 4.49; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 "Pashtu" was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table VI: Trend model for “Acceptance of Foreign Troops”; coefficients for OLS regression model predicting the aggregated score between “1 / very afraid of and threatening to local values” and “10 / not afraid of foreign troops & they are no threat to local values”; Model 1 cross-sectional data from 2009 with predictors from aggregate village statistics from 2007 on the 77 villages assessed in both waves; Model 2 adds the district dummies (*N* = 1781)

	Model 1 **“Trend”**	**Model 2** **“Trend & District”**
Aid class 1	.34	-.10
Aid class 2	-.27	-.22
Aid class 3	-.31	-.39
Aid class 5[1]	.25	.26
Job Projects	-.09	-.01
Direct Aid Score	-.32**	-.08
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007	-.01	.07
“Has security increased over the past two years?”	.05	.08
Threat class 2	-1.50***	-1.49***
Threat class 3	-4.44***	-3.83***
Threat class 1 or 5[2]	-.70**	-.55**
Security of household	-.31*	-.36*
Material well-being of the household	-.37***	-.32***
Tajik	.69*	.57
Uzbek	.92**	.69*

Other ethnicity[3]	.01	.26
Periphery (Village)	.02	.01
Vulnerability (Village)	.24	.55**
Size (Village)	-.08	-.17
Aliabad	–	-1.98**
Imam Sahib	–	.15
Taloquan[4]	–	.18
2007: Mean resource base of house-holds in village	-.53	-.26
2007: Share of Pashtu in the village	< .01	.08
2007: Project count in 2007	.09	.04
Mean probability for aid class 1 in 2007 per village	.51	1.39
Mean probability for aid class 2 in 2007 per village	2.81*	3.57**
Mean probability for aid class 3 in 2007 per village	.51	.54
Mean probability for aid class 5 in 2007 per village[5]	.22	.48
Mean “State Legitimacy” in 2007 per village	-.10	-.01
Mean Acceptance of foreign troops in 2007 per village	.05	-.15
Mean class 2 threats in 2007 per village	2.08	2.07

Mean class 3 threats in 2007 per village	-.86	-1.05
Mean class 5&1 threats in 2007 per village[6]	2.16	1.05
Mean for “Has security increased over the past two years?” in 2007 per village	2.26*	1.42
Mean “Development Aid as a threat”	.17	.14
Intercept	-1.54	3.12
r^2	.43	.47
Significance of increase in r^2 compared to previous model	–	p = .002
adjusted r^2	.42	.46
Significance	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1: VIF = 2.67; ranging from 1.11 to 6.23; for Model 2: VIF = 3.41; ranging from 1.15 to 6.57 (districts: 8.03 to 11.43); villages’ probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 (“Low coverage”) was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 “Pashtu” was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

5 Mean probability for aid class 4 in 2007 per village as reference

6 Mean class 4 threats in 2007 per village as reference

Table VII: Regression analysis for “State Legitimacy”; coefficients for ordinal probit regression model predicting “Do you think the wollis-woli or provincial government take care of the needs of your villages population” with “1” = “Never”, “2” = “Rarely”, “3” = “Sometimes”, and “4” = “Frequently/Always”; Model 1 to Model 5 present cross-sectional data in 2007 on the 77 villages assessed (*N* = 1963)

	Model 1 “Subjective Aid”	**Model 2 “Aid”**	**Model 3 “Aid & Security”**	**Model 4 “Respondent Characteristics”**	**Model 5 “Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	1.03**	1.05**	1.06***	.99***	1.11***
Aid class 2	.46*	.55*	.48*	.32	.19
Aid class 3	.52**	.54**	.53**	.48**	.45*
Aid class 5[1]	.57**	.64***	.68***	.67***	.29*
Job Projects	-.50*	-.47	-.46	-.28	-.38
Direct Aid Score	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.06	-.02
Number of Projects counted in 2007		-.07	-.05	-.04	-.05
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			.38**	.30*	.17
Threat class 2			-.65***	-.54**	-.33
Threat class 3			-.52*	-.40	-.08
Threat class 1&5 [2]			-.55*	-.45*	-.21
Material well-being of the household				.24***	.19**
Tajik				.19	.50**
Uzbek				.09	.16

Other ethnicity[3]				-.06	-.07
Periphery (Village)					-.04
Vulnerability (Village)					-.16
Size (Village)					.09
Aliabad					-.15
Imam Sahib					.87***
Taloquan[4]					-.06
threshold 1	.10	-.07	1.70	2.06	1.73
threshold 2	.91	.75	2.56	2.93	2.67
Pseudo r^2	.03	.04	.07	.08	.13
Model comparison[5]	–	p = .07	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001
Significance	p = 0.002	p = .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 5 with all variables: VIF = 1.99; ranging from 1.07 to 3.83; Districts 3.96 to 4.67; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 "Pashtu" was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

5 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table VIII: Regression analysis for “State Legitimacy”; coefficients for ordinal probit regression model predicting “Do you think the wollis-woli or provincial government take care of the needs of your villages population” with “1” = “Never”, “2” = “Rarely”, “3” = “Sometimes”, and “4” = “Frequently/Always”; Model 1 to Model 5 present cross-sectional data in 2009 on the 79 villages assessed (*N* = 1884)

	Model 1 **“Subjective Aid”**	**Model 2** **“Aid”**	**Model 3** **“Aid & Security”**	**Model 4** **“Respondent Char-acteristics”**	**Model 5** **“Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	.26	.26	.35	.33	.32
Aid class 2	1.00***	.99***	.91***	.88***	.84***
Aid class 3	.88***	.88***	.81***	.75***	.73***
Aid class 5[1]	.76***	.76***	.71***	.69***	.58***
Job Projects	<.01	<.01	.15	.18	.21
Direct Aid Score	.01	.01	.05	.06	.08
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007		<.01	<.01	<.01	-.01
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			.05	.04	.04
Threat class 2			-.21	-.23	-.20
Threat class 3			-.54**	-.52**	-.48*
Threat class 1 or 5 [2]			-.34**	-.33**	-.32**
Security of household			.28**	.27**	.23*
Material well-being of the household				.04	.03
Tajik				.19	.21

Uzbek				.07	.09
Other ethnicity[3]				.11	.12
Periphery (Village)					.02
Vulnerability (Village)					-.07
Size (Village)					.01
Aliabad					-.01
Imam Sahib					.12
Taloquan[4]					-.06
threshold 1	-.06	-.06	.31	.42	.30
threshold 2	1.74	1.74	2.14	2.25	2.14
Pseudo r^2	.06	.06	.07	.07	.07
Model comparison[5]	–	p = .99	p = .001	p = .67	p = .86
Significance	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 6 with all variables: VIF = 2.16; ranging from 1.09 to 2.58; Tajik and Districts 4.04 to 4.29; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 "Pashtu" was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

5 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table IX: Trend model for “State Legitimacy”; coefficients for ordinal probit regression model predicting “Do you think the wolliswoli or provincial government take care of the needs of your villages population” with “1” = “Never”, “2” = “Rarely”, “3” = “Sometimes”, and “4” = “Frequently/Always”; Model 1 cross-sectional data from 2009 with predictors from aggregate village statistics from 2007 on the 77 villages assessed in both waves; Model 2 adds the district dummies (*N* = 1842)

	Model 1 **“Trend”**	**Model 2** **“Trend & District”**
Aid class 1	.31	.23
Aid class 2	.91***	.84***
Aid class 3	.84***	.76***
Aid class 5[1]	.70***	.61***
Job Projects	.27	.26
Direct Aid Score	.05	.07
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007	-.01	-.02
“Has security increased over the past two years?”	.04	.03
Threat class 2	-.13	-.10
Threat class 3	-.53*	-.45
Threat class 1 or 5[2]	-.30*	-.26*
Security of household	.26**	.21*
Material well-being of the household	-.01	-.02
Tajik	.20	.14
Uzbek	<.01	.02

Other ethnicity[3]	.01	.03
Periphery (Village)	.05	.01
Vulnerability (Village)	<.01	.02
Size (Village)	<.01	.01
Aliabad	–	-.45
Imam Sahib	–	.01
Taloquan[4]	–	-.47
2007: Mean resource base of house-holds in village	.69**	.80***
2007: Share of Pashtu in the village	-.32	-.36
2007: Project count in 2007	-.03	-.03
Mean probability for aid class 1 in 2007 per village	1.24	2.02*
Mean probability for aid class 2 in 2007 per village	<.01	-.13
Mean probability for aid class 3 in 2007 per village	.18	.05
Mean probability for aid class 5 in 2007 per village[5]	.58*	.50
Mean “State Legitimacy” in 2007 per village	-.49*	-.58**
Mean Acceptance of foreign troops in 2007 per village	<.01	-.05
Mean class 2 threats in 2007 per village	.65	.96

Mean class 3 threats in 2007 per village	-.12	.03
Mean class 5&1 threats in 2007 per village[6]	-.28	-.21
Mean for “Has security increased over the past two years?” in 2007 per village	.06	.11
Mean “Development Aid as a threat”	-.07	-.05
Threshold 1	1.44	1.16
Threshold 2	3.32	3.06
Pseudo r^2	.09	.10
Model comparison[7]	–	p = .19
Significance	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1: VIF = 2.61; ranging from 1.14 to 6.11; for Model 2: VIF = 3.41; ranging from 1.14 to 11.59 (districts: 7.91 to 11.59); villages’ probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 (“Low coverage”) was used as a reference class

2 Threat class 4 was used as reference category

3 “Pashtu” was used as reference category

4 Warsaj was used as reference district

5 Mean probability for aid class 4 in 2007 per village as reference

6 Mean class 4 threats in 2007 per village as reference

7 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table X: Regression analysis for “Perceived Threat”; coefficients for logistic regression model predicting “0” = “Member of threat class 4 / not afraid of any of the groups in question” and “1” otherwise; cross-sectional data in 2007 on the 77 villages assessed (*N* = 2013)

	Model 1 **“Subjective Aid”**	**Model 2** **“Aid”**	**Model 3** **“Aid & Security”**	**Model 4** **“Respondent Char-acteristics”**	**Model 5** **“Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	-1.01	-1.00	-1.07	-1.03	-1.28
Aid class 2	-1.01	-1.25	-1.26	-.76	.30
Aid class 3	-.28	-.27	-.19	-.15	.62
Aid class 5[1]	.52	.34	.44	.75	1.25**
Job Projects	-.37	-.41	-.83	-1.62**	-1.63*
Direct Aid Score	.42	.49	.61	.63*	.55*
Number of Projects counted in 2007		.20*	.17*	.17*	.16
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			-1.53***	-1.23***	-.97***
Material well-being of the household				-.93***	-.77***
Tajik				.08	-.13
Uzbek				.04	-.10
Other ethnicity[2]				-.79	-1.03
Periphery (Village)					.21
Vulnerability (Village)					.12
Size (Village)					-.45

Aliabad					1.28
Imam Sahib					-.49
Taloquan[3]					1.60
Intercept	-1.86***	-2.38***	4.69***	5.53***	4.41**
Pseudo r²	.03	.06	.15	.22	.28
Model comparison[4]	–	p = .03	p < .001	p < .001	p = .001
Significance	p = .71	p = .17	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 5 with all variables: VIF = 2.10; ranging from 1.06 to 3.80; Districts 3.93 to 4.65; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

² "Pashtu" was used as reference category

³ Warsaj was used as reference district

4 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table XI: Regression analysis for “Perceived Threat”; coefficients for logistic regression model predicting “0” = “Member of threat class 4 / not afraid of any of the groups in question” and “1” otherwise; cross-sectional data in 2009 on the 79 villages assessed (*N* = 1977)

	Model 1 “Subjective Aid”	**Model 2 “Aid”**	**Model 3 “Aid & Security”**	**Model 4 “Respondent Characteristics”**	**Model 5 “Village Characteristics”**
Aid class 1	2.32***	2.28***	2.21***	2.37***	2.47***
Aid class 2	.85**	.92**	.39	.44	.46
Aid class 3	.96***	1.00***	.37	.54*	.50
Aid class 5[1]	1.43***	1.52***	1.01**	.99**	1.51***
Job Projects	1.00	.98	1.34*	1.19	.83
Direct Aid Score	.39*	.40*	.47**	.39*	.17
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007		-.04	-.06	-.06	-.07
“Has security increased over the past two years?”			.32	.33	.33
Security of households			1.47***	1.46***	1.64***
Material well-being of the household				.07	.08
Tajik				-.44	-.87
Uzbek				-.13	-.14
Other ethnicity[2]				.10	-.12
Periphery (Village)					-.08
Vulnerability (Village)					-.27

Size (Village)					.05
Aliabad					.39
Imam Sahib					-1.32
Taloquan[3]					-.47
Intercept	.30	.38	-2.65***	-2.67***	-2.38*
Pseudo r^2	.08	.08	.16	.17	.19
Model comparison[4]	–	p = .26	p < .001	p = .47	p = .001
Significance	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 5 with all variables: VIF = 2.16; ranging from 1.08 to 4.29; Tajik and Districts 3.88 to 4.29; villages' probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 ("Low coverage") was used as a reference class

² "Pashtu" was used as reference category

³ Warsaj was used as reference district

4 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Table XII: Trend model for “Perceived Threat”; coefficients for logistic regression model predicting “0” = “Member of threat class 4 / not afraid of any of the groups in question” and “1” otherwise; Model 1 cross-sectional data from 2009 with predictors from aggregate village statistics from 2007 on the 77 villages assessed in both waves; Model 2 adds the district dummies (*N* = 1930)

	Model 1;“Trend”	**Model 2:“Trend & District”**
Aid class 1	2.80***	3.11***
Aid class 2	.42	.60
Aid class 3	.44	.64*
Aid class 5[1]	1.16**	1.46***
Job Projects	1.20	1.11
Direct Aid Score	.36*	.13
Number of Projects counted in 2009 since 2007	.01	-.03
“Has security increased over the past two years?”	.38*	.38*
Security of household	1.58***	1.80***
Material well-being of the household	.15	.15
Tajik	-.50	-.53
Uzbek	-.04	.03
Other ethnicity[2]	.26	.06
Periphery (Village)	-.21	-.14
Vulnerability (Village)	-.15	-.33
Size (Village)	-.06	-.07

Aliabad	–	1.45*
Imam Sahib	–	-1.26
Taloquan[3]	–	.48
2007: Mean resource base of households in village	-.19	-.59
2007: Share of Pashtu in the village	.56	.91
2007: Project count in 2007	-.06	.02
Mean probability for aid class 1 in 2007 per village	-4.58*	-7.52***
Mean probability for aid class 2 in 2007 per village	.59	.48
Mean probability for aid class 3 in 2007 per village	-.05	-.32
Mean probability for aid class 5 in 2007 per village[4]	-.99	-.39
Mean “State Legitimacy” in 2007 per village	.16	.44
Mean Acceptance of foreign troops in 2007 per village	.02	.26*
Mean class 2 threats in 2007 per village	-2.39	-3.25*
Mean class 3 threats in 2007 per village	-.62	-1.53
Mean class 5&1 threats in 2007 per village[5]	.32	.54
Mean for “Has security increased over the past two years?” in 2007 per village	-.66	-.64

Mean “Development Aid as a threat”	-.30	-.39
Intercept	1.69	.39
Pseudo r^2	.20	.23
Model comparison[6]	–	p = .001
Significance	p < .001	p < .001

Note. Mean Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1: VIF = 2.65; ranging from 1.13 to 5.95; for Model 2: VIF = 3.47; ranging from 1.14 to 11.02 (districts: 7.86 to 11.02); villages’ probability weighted; standard errors clustered by villages

1 Aid class 4 (“Low coverage”) was used as a reference class

² “Pashtu” was used as reference category

³ Warsaj was used as reference district

4 Mean probability for aid class 4 in 2007 per village as reference

5 Mean class 4 threats in 2007 per village as reference

6 Likelihood Ratio Test comparing the current model with the previous model with fewer variables

*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001

Annex 2: Map of the Surveyed Districts and Villages



Annex 3: Overview of Surveyed Districts

Aliabad

The district of Aliabad is located to the south of Kunduz District along both sides of the Kunduz River. The main road connecting Kunduz via Baghlan and the Salang Pass with Kabul runs through this district.

Aliabad's problems and potential are linked to the road and the river: the majority of the ethnically-mixed population resides along the river valley with its narrow strip of irrigated agricultural land. The land beyond the river valley is rain-fed agriculture on loess soil. This area is particularly vulnerable to draughts and severe drinking water shortages. The district is home to a majority of Tajiks (or Aimaq) and significant minorities of Pashtuns, Hazara and Uzbeks as well as a small group of Baluch tribesmen. Up until 2007, the district used to be a main target for GTZ development-oriented emergency aid.

In the qualitative interviews, three subjects have been recurrent in Aliabad: vulnerability to draught, insecurity and discrimination along ethnic lines, and the road as a major source of both economic opportunity and security concerns.

The Pashtun (and to some extent the Baluch) minorities claim that the non-Pashtun dominated district administrations and former Northern Alliance commanders discriminate against them and are a threat to their interests. They relate this feeling of vulnerability to what they view as examples of administrative discrimination and negative propaganda against the Pashtun settlements as well as to the experience of violent collective punishment of the Pashtun minority at the hands of Northern Alliance militias after the ousting of the Taliban in 2001/02. There is a general feeling that development aid is bypassing the Pashtun settlements because of this administrative discrimination. Some non-Pashtun communities, on the other hand, voice security concerns with regard to their Pashtun neighbors and claim that many Pashtuns supported and still support the Taliban. Attacks on the main road and threats to schools and clinics are usually attributed to the local Pashtun communities.

The road as a strategic asset linking North and South Afghanistan and connecting Kunduz to Tajikistan has been the scene of insurgency attacks and military action since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. From the perspective of the local communities living by the road, insecurity is the result of two interdependent dynamics. Insurgents attack government and military targets on the road (sometimes using sympathetic or simply intimidated communities along the road to facilitate the attacks), and the government responds with reprisals, using mopping up or sweep operations to drive out the insurgents. While state or foreign military responses to sporadic insurgency attacks remained rather restrained up until 2008, the tactics on both sides have escalated since the autumn of 2008.

Imam Sahib

Imam Sahib District is located to the north of Kunduz District and borders Tajikistan. The border follows the Amu Dari River, the main source of irrigation in the district. Imam Sahib is one of the best agricultural districts in this region of Afghanistan. Most agricultural land is irrigated. Road communication used to be a problem until the main road leading from the border crossing at Sher Banda south to Kunduz was finished and connected to the district centre of Imam Sahib. Communities in the north are sometimes still difficult to reach, not the least because of seasonal damages from flooding and land denudation. Imam Sahib has been a target district for German development cooperation since 2005.

The district is densely populated. The population is ethnically mixed and, different from most other districts in Kunduz and Takhar, most of the settlements are also ethnically mixed. Uzbeks are the relative majority, but Pashtuns and Tajiks are significantly large minorities next to smaller groups of Turkmen and Arab tribes. Imam Sahib was at times subject to state-sponsored population resettlements (mostly an influx of tribal Pashtuns from the south and east of Afghanistan sponsored by the central government in three main waves since the late 18th century).

Over the past decades, political loyalties in Imam Sahib have been diverse and adaptive. Communities changed support apparently relatively easily between the powers of the time. The backing of different groups here has not always followed ethnic lines. For example, Pashtuns are not the only supporters of Hekmatyars Hizb-e Islami and the Taliban. Also, some of the ethnic Uzbek leaders changed affiliation between Jumbesh, Hizb, and the Taliban rather freely.

Since the ousting of the Taliban, local politics have been dominated by one family clan of Uzbek commanders who gained power and wealth (including large landholdings) during the civil war in the 1990s – the Ibrahimi brothers. Most official positions in the districts are occupied or controlled by this clan (the head of which is the former Governor of Kunduz and today governor of Takhar). Up until the strengthening of insurgency activities in Imam Sahib most recently, the control of the Ibrahimi clan went mostly unchallenged.

Because of the value of scarce irrigated land (in comparison to the population density) and because of significant numbers of returnees who fled during various periods of insecurity during or prior to the ousting of the Taliban, competition for arable land is a contentious issue in both Imam Sahib and Aliabad districts.

Taloqan

Taloqan is the district around the provincial capital of Takhar and Taloqan City. Like Aliabad, the district is divided into two principally different forms of agriculture, namely the irrigated lands of the Taloqan river oasis and the rain-fed areas of the loess soil surrounding the oasis. The settlements in the irrigated zone tend to be more ethnically mixed than those in the rain-fed areas. The Uzbeks are Taloqan district's largest ethnic group (they clearly dominate in the rain-fed areas). Tajiks, Pashtuns and Hazara are the main minority groups. Taloqan has not been a target district of German development cooperation.

Takhar is one of the districts that suffered significantly from the conflict between the Taliban de-facto government and the Northern Alliance forces. The frontline between the two groups moved repeatedly within the district. The Taliban ruled Taloqan City for roughly one year and used it as a hub to continue their push into the remaining strongholds of their enemy in the south (Farhar, Warsaj) and East (Badakhshan). Hence, the Taliban never managed to establish themselves in this district as a pacifying power.

In Taloqan District and especially in the provincial center, local politics are still dominated by former commanders and leaders of the different factions that formed the Northern Alliance, most importantly Dostums Jumbesh, Hekmatyars Hizb, and Jamiat (of Rabbani and the late Ahmed Shah Massoud). Up until the recent increase of Taliban activity in neighboring Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces, the rule of the former commanders-turned politician or entrepreneur was not challenged by the outside. There were occasional confrontations between different factions within the governing elite, but no military confrontations. Interview partners credited this in significant part to the ISAF presence (until 2008 only in Kunduz; since 2008 also in Taloqan) and the strengthening influence of the central state agencies. With the dete-

rioration of the security situation and possible re-emergence of local militias, this relatively non-violent equilibrium of local power might come under stress.

Warsaj

Warsaj used to be one of the most remote districts of Afghanistan. Very basic road connections were established during the 1980s but ended in the district centre. The Mujaheddin under Ahmed Shah Massoud improved some tracks and elementary roads in this district which they controlled and used as safe haven since 1984. Due to the NSP-Programme, AKF, and GTZ infrastructure projects, the high-altitude district is now more accessible than ever before. The economy consists of very basic farming, including high-altitude agriculture, life stock, and horticulture. The natural environment strictly limits the economic potential of this region.

Warsaj is inhabited by Tajiks of two different sects of Islam: a larger group of Sunnis and a small minority of Ismailis.

In political and military terms the district enjoyed exceptional stability and relative peace since Massoud unified his command (against initial Hizb Hekmatyar competition) and professionalized the Mujaheddin under his control as early as 1984. Except for a brief episode of some common violence during the Taliban offensive in 1999/2000 when Massoud decided to hand out weapons to the population to protect themselves against the Taliban, Warsaj has enjoyed relative peace.

Politically the district has been dominated by the clients of one powerful network of kin relations close to Dr. Mushaheed, a former Jamiat commander who secured for himself the influential position of Head of Independent Administrative Reform Commission in Kabul. The network includes the influential elder and former Wazir of Warsaj, Haji Muhammad Ayub, the Deputy Minister of the MRRD, Azimullah, and the Head of NDS of the North Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan, Abdul Jabar, as one the most prominent members.

Between 2007 and 2009, however, a power struggle emerged between the wolliswol of Warsaj (client of the aforementioned network) and a younger protégée of the governor of Takhar, Latif Ibrahimi. During this period, the qualitative research showed evidence of increasing interference by the district administration in local affairs, aimed basically at the extortion of money and increased control over development inputs.

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