The Theological Metaphysics of Odo Rigaldi

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Odo Rigaldi was Regent Master of Theology at the University of Paris from 1245 to 1248 replacing in that capacity Alexander of Hales and John of la Rochelle who both died in 1245. Odo remained at the University for only three short years after which he was named Bishop of Rouen, a position he occupied for some 20 years, becoming one of the most influential members of the Church of France. He then went on to become an advisor to King Louis IX whom he accompanied to the Crusades and at whose side he stood when Louis died in Tunis in 1270.\(^1\)

Although now largely forgotten by historians, Odo did play an active role in his short tenure as Master Regent of the Franciscan Order in the metaphysical debates of his day.\(^2\) One issue on which he wrote a great deal was the question of divine presence in the world to which he devoted several disputed questions, which make up a hefty chunk of his total output as a Master.\(^3\)

The idea that God is always present to his creatures is of course a commonplace of Christian theology. It is a thesis that goes hand in hand with the belief that God and creature are distinct. The challenge faced by classical theism was to develop a theoretically plausible way of combining these two theses, without either overemphasizing God’s ubiquity—which would blur the distinction between God and creature—or putting too strong an emphasis on man’s ontological or moral independence, thus sundering him from God’s sovereign sway.

The need to address this challenge was felt with particular acuteness in the early decades of the 13th century with the spread of pantheistic doctrines in Paris and their ensuing condemnation in 1210 and again in 1225. Leonardo Sileo has plausibly suggested that Odo’s interest in the subject of divine omnipresence arise out of a concern to provide an orthodox alternative to the concept of divine ubiquity which various authors such as David of Dinand, Amaury of Bène in the early decades of the Thirteenth Century were thought by ecclesiastical authorities—whether rightly or wrongly—to have compromised.\(^4\) Although we cannot say for sure whether Odo’s questions were written as a conscious response to these events, it is striking to notice that much of Odo’s efforts in his DQs consist precisely in trying to show how God can be present in creatures without suppressing their ontological independence. This is most apparent in two lengthy DQs, the De modo essendi Dei in creaturis and the De voluntate Dei. In this paper I will look only at the first of these. It is divided by Sileo in five parts, each divided in a series of subquestions. I will look at part 1 (de modo essendi Dei in creaturis … a parte necessitatis creaturae), and, tangentially, part 4 (Supposito quod Deus sit in omni essentia, quaeritur utrum similiter operetur in omni actione) with a view to uncovering Odo’s strategies for thinking of God as present in creatures as their cause and distinct from them.\(^5\)

1. Divine essence and conservation

The first issue Odo turns to in his discussion of divine presence in things, is the issue of conservation, that is, how God maintains creatures in existence. For the question of divine presence poses itself not so much in the case of creation where the necessity of appealing to God’s causal action is obvious, but in the case of the continued existence of creatures, where the temptation exists to account for such by appealing, as deists do, to natural causes only. In the first sub-question of part 1, Odo asks whether creatures could be conserved in existence without the essential presence of God. Odo lists four separate arguments to show that this is impossible. I will briefly state each in turn and then examine the most important of Odo’s answers to objections he raises against his theory.
The first reason draws on the *Liber de causis*, a text of fundamental importance in the development of the metaphysics of creation in the early 13th century. God is the cause of causes; He acts *intime* in all creatures; if He were to withdraw his causality, the influence of the second universal cause would cease immediately, whereas if the second cause ceases its activity, God does not cease his.6

The next argument makes use of Boethius’s distinction between a thing’s *esse* and its *quod est*, its being and its ‘what it is’, and the fact that a thing’s constitutive parts are distinct from the thing’s being. Given that in created beings the efficient cause of being always precedes the effect, it follows that if a created being derived its being from itself, it would be prior to itself. In answer to this, Odo asserts that a creature owes to God the fact that it is a being, whereas the fact that it is ‘this creature’ is something that follows from its own constitutive principles7. Similarly, a thing whose parts were not always conjoined needs something other than itself to make those parts cohere, and to conserve them.8

Odo’s third argument is much the same as the second, but shows in perhaps a more pointed way why the conserving cause of the created being’s existence must be God. The reason is the fact that ‘being is the first amongst creatures’, a reference to *BoC*, IV, 37. The argument is as follows: no created thing can be its own cause; but the most perfect of created things is *esse*, which as a created thing can not be its own cause, thus the cause must be God.

According to the fourth argument, no creature at any time possesses the totality of its *esse*. In the case of corruptible beings neither the *esse* nor the essence is at any time entirely realized; and while incorruptible beings are at all times wholly what they are, their existence is stretched out over time and thus involves a certain succession (*quandam successionem importat*)—and thus, we might add, a certain incompleteness. Creatures thus require something to grant them existence and to conserve them, otherwise they would lapse into non-being, in the same way as motion ceases when the thing in motion stops. God, by contrast, is at any time wholly what he is and wholly existent, and so requires no such conserving principle.

Odo adds one last argument in his *solutio* to the effect that granting creatures the power to conserve themselves would lead to an infinite regress. Since, as had been previously granted, no creature can maintain itself in existence, it follows that a creature could only be conserved if it were conserved by another creature which would itself require to be conserved by another and so on. The only alternative, Odo avers, is to suppose that it is God who directly conserves creatures. Odo’s conclusion, then, is that “properly speaking things are constituted by their principles, but are conserved by God.”

Having shown the necessity of positing God as a conserving agent in order to account for the continued existence of creatures and alluded to the distinction between divine influence with created cause, Odo then sets out to answer objections against his solution. I will mention only three that bear directly on the issue of divine causation. The first one runs as follows: Nothing that is extrinsic to a thing is necessary to its conservation; but all causes besides material and formal causes are extrinsic to a thing’s essence and therefore unnecessary for its conservation. Odo offers another formulation of the same point: “No cause that is solely the cause of a thing’s becoming remains necessarily in the thing after it has been made9;” but causes responsible for a thing’s becoming are causes other than the formal and material causes; these are therefore not necessary for the thing’s conservation. What lends the objection plausibility is the fact that it corresponds to what one observes in animal generation: Although the biological parents are the cause of the becoming of the offspring, they are no longer needed as causes, at least not in the pertinent way under consideration here, once the offspring is born. The objector is suggesting that God’s relation to nature might be analogous to this, that is, that although creatures require God to
create them, they could maintain themselves in existence without God’s help—which of course amounts to deism. Odo tersely responds that a thing’s intrinsic principle could not subsist alone or in the composite unless God conserved them and made them cohere, “for the necessity of the internal causes depends on an extrinsic cause that acts intimately, just as we see light’s presence in the air only when the sun is present…”

Another objection has to do with whether or not a natural being is thinkable independently of God, that is, if the concept ‘creature’ implies or contains that of God, an issue to which Odo will return in somewhat more detail in sub-question 6. The objection suggests that it can: A creature cannot be understood to be good without God’s goodness, because goodness implies some reference to an end; but a thing can be understood to exist, without the idea of its existence involving a concept of God’s essence. The authority here is Boethius who claims that one can understand the concepts ‘white,’ ‘black’ and so forth without this presupposing knowledge of God’s goodness. By the same reasoning, one can conceive of a particular thing’s essence without thinking of God; the thing can therefore subsist without God. The objection then goes on to say that if we suppose that a thing does not contain the contraries of its constitutive principles, in other words, if we suppose a thing to be solely composed of its formal and material principles, then there is no reason why it could not subsist on its own, as the mutual attraction (sese appententia) of its constitutive principles would ensure the thing’s continued existence. To suggest that created things spontaneously tend toward nothingness because they are made from nothing is a bad argument. Nothingness is not some active “nnihilating” principle which could enter into the constitution of things. Being, by contrast, has principles which exist in act and which thus naturally tend toward being.

This is an interesting objection, one that relies on what one could term an ontological principle of inertia. The idea is that substances naturally tend to subsist in their state of being unless they are subjected to the influence of some other contrary influence, as it were. Odo will have nothing to do with it though: Even supposing some substance could exist outside of God’s sustaining influence, it would not be able to subsist for even an instant; it would “defect” immediately (deficit) owing to the failure of its constitutive principles—presumably because they require the “intimate” causation of the extrinsic cause. As for the claim that the intrinsic or internal principles of a created substance, that is, its matter and form, are kept in existence by their attraction for each other, Odo responds that the appetite in question presupposes being and does not cause it; it is being that conserves the appetite, not the other way round. Finally, regarding the claim that nothingness, because it is not an intrinsic principle of being, cannot be a cause of a thing’s demise, Odo answers that given that a creature derives its being entirely from some extrinsic principle, it has no right to its own being (nullum ius habebat in suo esse), so that the thing must naturally cease to exist once it has lost its cause. Odo briefly illustrates this point with two examples: a plant naturally grows upwards, but begins to droop when the <power> to grow is withdrawn. There is nothing natural about such failures; they are due, rather, to a defection of nature. Odo puts it thus: “with respect to God’s esse which is esse in the full sense, the esse of creatures is but like a form of becoming.”

As we can see, Odo’s solutio and answers to objections so far allow for no exception as far as natures are concerned to the indispensability of God’s influence as a sustaining cause. While he has asserted that created things have constitutive principles that give them their specificity he has been especially concerned to stress the necessity of appealing to God’s “intimate” mode of causation to explain their persistence in being. Yet God’s very ontological supremacy suggests an objection. Given that God is all powerful and that he can do anything that does not entail a contradiction, could he not also create natural beings in such a way that they could conserve themselves without requiring his causal influx—since such does not seem to entail a contradiction? That is the question put to Odo by another objector who then adds that it won’t do to answer that God could not grant this power to creatures on the ground that they lack the capacity to receive it; that argument would have to be rejected, for given that creatures’ powers and capabilities are granted to them by God, they could have the required power.
to conserve themselves if God increased their capability. God could do this *de potentia absoluta* without granting creatures a degree of perfection equal to his own, for even if creatures did have the power to conserve themselves that power would still be something they got from God; it would be “from another” (*ab alio*), not something they had of themselves (*a se*) by virtue of their essence. Although he grants that such a conferral would indeed be possible, Odo’s position seems to be that creatures are simply not capable of receiving the power to conserve themselves. While he agrees with the idea that even if they could conserve themselves their power to do so would be derived from God (so that they would not equal God in perfection), he seems to hold that it would be incompatible with the status of a creature *qua* creature to have the power to conserve itself.13 One can discern many possible reasons for this belief, though none is really fully developed. One reason Odo gives is that creatures have *determinate* natures which limit their size and growth (35vb), and therefore, presumably, their capacity to receive powers from God. The same idea is brought out elsewhere, where Odo responds to an objection stating that since to receive and to retain are two different actions, it follows that being and being conserved must be distinct as well, with the result that if being is received immediately from God, this cannot be the case of being conserved. Odo responds to this by making a distinction. He points out that from the point of view of God (*a parte dei tribuentis*), there is no difference between the act of bestowing being and conserving it, whereas such a difference does obtain from the perspective of the intrinsic principles of creatures (*a parte tamen principiorum intrinsecorum creaturae*). Thus, it does not follow that because God grants being that he does not conserve creatures; however, what is true is that the mode of conservation will vary according to the creature—presumably according to its intrinsic principles.14 Another argument makes use of the fact that creation and conservation are the same action to argue that “just as it is impossible for God to grant to creatures that they exist of themselves, so too is it impossible for him to make creatures conserve themselves.” (168ra; 36rb).

Odo concludes his discussion on whether creatures can conserve themselves with the assertion that “properly speaking things are constituted by their principles but conserved by God.” Although most of his efforts up to now have gone into showing the necessity of recognizing God as a conserving cause, it is clear that Odo sees both theses as equally vital to a proper understanding of God’s relation to creatures. Whether Odo he is able to do so coherently or persuasively we will now attempt to determine by looking at his discussion in part 1, sub-question 5 where he asks whether God is present to creatures in a more intimate way than their own constitutive principles.

2. Divine causation vs. constitutive principles

In typical scholastic fashion, Odo starts by adducing arguments in favor of each position. In favor of God’s being a more prior cause Odo argues that before principles can be related to each other they must come from something, for coming from something (*ab aliquo*) is prior to and more universal than being related to something (else) (*ad aliquid*); but as all things come from God, it follows that God is more directly or intimately related to things than they are to each other. On the other hand, we see that things are related in a more essential way to their form than to their efficient or final cause; so too, they are more essentially related to God as an exemplar than as an efficient or final cause; but given that the form *qua* act is more fundamental than the form *qua* exemplar, it follows that creatures are really related in a more essential way to their form than to anything else.15 Also, two principles would seem to be more intimately related to each other if they form a third thing (substantial unity) than if they do not; yet this is just what happens with form and matter which make up one substance, but not with God and either of the constitutive principles. Here is Odo’s answer:

It must be answered to the question that there is no question, for, as the Philosopher says, there is no comparison between equivocals; for ‘essential’ as in ‘internal principle of some thing’ and ‘essential’ as in ‘what conserves and is not a principle entering the constitution of a thing’ are said equivocally. Now if you
object that it can be reduced to something common because a thing that lacks God’s conservation also lacks internal constitutive principles all the more must it be said that there is no question. For “where one thing is for the sake of (propter) another both are one”, but the lacking of one is by reason (propter) of the other, since form owes it to God that it completes matter. Thus, just as it would be pointless to ask which is needed most for eating, a mouth or bread, since one is useless without the other, likewise in the present question.16

Appealing to Aristotle’s dictum in Physics VII, 4 that equivocals are not commensurable, Odo denies that it makes sense to ask which of divine causality and internal principles is most needed. For ‘essence’ as said of a thing’s intrinsic principles, and as denoting what keeps something in existence are used equivocally. Asking which of the two is more essential is as absurd, he tells us, as asking what is more important for nourishment, food or a mouth. Nor will it do to argue that divine conservation and the essential principles can be reduced to something common on the grounds that whatever lacks one lacks the other. Odo responds to this objection by appealing to a principle found in Aristotle’s Topics III, 2, although it is not entirely clear, as we will see right away, how this principle is supposed to apply to the relation between the necessity of divine causality and internal principles. In any case, in Topics III, 2 Aristotle points out that while a greater number of things is generally more desirable than a smaller number of the same things, this “additive” principle no longer applies when one of the two goods is “for the sake of” the other. For instance, the recovery of health and health are not more desirable taken together than the possession of health alone. The idea is encapsulated in the dictum that “where one thing is for the sake of the other, both are one”. Odo is claiming that this principle applies to the case of the intrinsic principles and God, and he appears to intend this in the following sense: The lack exhibited by matter is “for the sake” of the lack displayed by the principles with respect to God, insofar as the property that matter has of requiring to be completed by form (quod forma materiam complet) is a property it receives from God. If this is the correct reading of the text, the problem it poses is that while one can see how Aristotle’s example constitutes a particular illustration of the principle “where one thing is for the sake of the other, both are one” it is not clear how Odo’s does, all the more so that Aristotle’s principle seems to involve a radical form of univocity (the word ‘health’ in acquiring health and having health is taken in the same sense) that runs counter to Odo’s initial claim that the intrinsic principles and God are equivocals. Yet it is clearly this latter point that represents Odo’s position. We might understand Odo’s position better if we turn to the end of Odo’s objection.

There Odo recalls that there are two ways of referring to a creature: insofar as it has being (esse) or insofar as it is this creature (haec). A creature depends more and in more numerous ways on God from the point of view of esse, because God is a universal cause; however, insofar as it is this creature it depends more on its intrinsic individuating principles, for one could hardly understand a creature to be this creature if one did not grasp its internal principles. He reiterates his position in connection with the previously mentioned objection that things are related in a more essential way to form than to final or efficient causes. God, Odo answers, is present in things as their first formal, efficient and final cause; he is required as a final cause because goodness is present in things. He is also required as the first efficient cause as attested to by John 5:15. It is perhaps in the last capacity, Odo adds, that God is most immediately and intimately related to creatures. “Whatever the case may be, when it comes to making esse, God himself is most intimately (present) in things, but when it comes to making this (thing), it is the individuating principles themselves that concur most intimately.”17

Having asserted the absolute presential primacy of God from the point of view of esse, Odo then turns, in subquestion 6, to the question of whether the concept ‘creature’ implies the concept ‘God.’ Although he has already indicated that the two concepts are distinct, he now provides a more detailed treatment of the issue calling upon both Boethius and Aristotle. Odo starts out by distinguishing two ways in which things may be abstracted
from each other. The first is by mathematical abstraction; the second by ‘verbal abstraction’ (*ex verbo*). One thing is distinct from another in this last sense when one cannot be understood from the strength of the word (*vi verbi*) denoting the other one. For instance, “a (created) thing can be understood without the divine essence being understood”; in other words, one can have the concept of any created thing without this concept involving the concept of God. By contrast, because the concept ‘goodness’ implies that of an end, and because the divine goodness is the end from which all limited goods proceed, one cannot understand the concept ‘goodness’ when applied to a created thing without being referred to God. A different kind of abstraction occurs when certain sorts of accidents possessing proper principles can be abstracted from the substratum in which they inhere in reality. Such is the case of quantity in mathematics: the idea of quantity can be abstracted from that of actual size, whereas neither flesh nor any of the essential properties of flesh can be abstracted from the idea of matter. Mathematical abstraction applies only to quantities with respect to substrata. The being of a creature, for instance, cannot be abstracted from the being of God, for it has no independent principle by reference to which it could be thought (to exist) beyond its dependence on God. That means that a created thing cannot be thought, at least when it comes to mathematical abstraction, independently from God.\(^\text{18}\)

Odo’s point in this last passage is not entirely clear. When explaining why creatures cannot be abstracted according to mathematical abstraction he says that their *being* cannot separated from God, but mathematical abstraction is supposed to be about concepts. Also, by denying that creatures have a being that can be abstracted from God’s in the mathematical sense, Odo appears to be going too far in the direction of asserting God’s causal preponderance. An additional problem presents itself when one turns to the illustration Odo provides in his response to the objection that since things depend more on God than on their principles then, given that they cannot be thought without their principles it must follow that they cannot be conceived without God. This is true as far as being is concerned (*in essendo*), Odo answers, but not in the realm of thought (*in intelligendo*).

For the intellect can distinguish between things that are not really distinct, as when someone thinks (about the fact) that he is an abbot without thinking (about the fact) that he is a monk, although he can’t be the former without being the latter. Likewise, I say here that although a thing cannot be (*esse*) without God, nevertheless the intellect can distinguish between those two things in the aforementioned way. (37vb 169ra)

The illustration is clumsy. If it is a precondition of being an abbot that one be a monk then it is a logically impossible for an abbot not to be a monk, whether or not I consciously acknowledge this fact. If the mere fact that I am able to focus my attention on one thought to the exclusion of another one is sufficient to secure the existence of a distinction in the sense Odo is interested in, then Odo is placing a very weak condition indeed on what is to count as a distinction, for creature and God can count as distinct even if the former *logically* implies the latter as long, as I can focus on the concept ‘creature’ whilst prescinding from the thought ‘God.’ Now, although one might argue that Odo would find nothing wrong with this answer provided creature and God are both considered from the point of view of being (as opposed to being this or that), the problem is that it conflicts with the definition of verbal distinction he provides in his *solutio* where he had expressly stated that “a (created) thing can be understood without the divine essence being understood.”

Odo reiterates his position that creatures cannot exist without God but can be thought without him in an answer to another objection. Suppose, the objection runs, there were a first whiteness from which all other white things derived their whiteness, in the same way as all animals are said to be healthy by virtue of health, that would mean that no whiteness could be conceived without the first whiteness being understood. But the *esse* of the first cause is that from which all existents derive their *esse*, therefore no existent can be conceived without the first *esse*. In his answer, Odo first points out that the commonality between health and things related to health is due to
an ordering (secundum rationem numerandi) as opposed to being due to a commonality of being (secundum rationem essendi). In other words health-relative predicates are related to the healthy individual as posterior to prior—this is presumably what Odo means by numerical—not as effect to cause. This is distinct from the example considered by the objector. Here the supposition is that all white things derive their whiteness from the “first whiteness” by participation. But when something participates something else it is partaking of its essence, as is the case with individuals with respect to universals; what participates can therefore not be thought of independently from that of which it partakes. This entails that whiteness cannot be conceived without the first whiteness through which it exists. All this seems to be leading us to the conclusion that creatures cannot be thought of independently from their cause, but this is not at all what Odo wants to say. He denies that creatures, although they derive their being by participation in the esse of God, participate in the divine essence. His reason for saying this is that esse in God and esse in creature are more dissimilar than similar. For creatures are distinct from their esse whereas God is identical with his esse. So while it is true to say that creatures get their esse from God it is wrong to conclude that they do so by participating in God’s essence. 19

Conclusion

Odo’s intentions, then, are clear enough. Exploiting ideas found in the first propositions of the Liber de causis, in Boethius’s Hebdomads as well as in various works of Aristotle, Odo wants to defend three theses. First, he wants to say that God is the cause of creatures’ esse such that creatures can neither exist nor be conceived to exist without God’s sustaining presence: In essendo creatures depend directly on God. Odo is very insistent on this point, emphasizing creation’s nihilitas when considered apart from God’s causal action. Second, Odo also wants to say that a creature qua this creature (hanc creaturam or hoc esse) exists more in virtue of its intrinsic principles than because of God. The intrinsic principles represent the creature’s contribution to the causal account of creature’s continued existence. Third, Odo wants to say that there is a distinction at the conceptual level between God and creation, in the sense, at least, that ex vi verbi the concept “creature” does not imply that of God. With these three points taken in their most general sense, Odo can probably feel confident that he has successfully shown that one can defend God’s causal preeminence without compromising creation’s ontological independence. However, problems arise when he tries to spell out the details of his position. His examples are not always particularly convincing, and sometimes even appear to undercut the points he is trying to make (vide the monk and abbot example). Odo also does not give the impression that he fully masters the different theories he uses, or at any rate, he does not develop them sufficiently to show how the different elements he employs, the doctrine of participation, the analogy of being, the distinction between constitutive principles and esse for instance, all cohere into a single doctrinal whole. Still, Odo’s question does represent an important step in the development of medieval theism, not only because of the sheer volume of questions he devotes to the question, but because Odo tries in a more systematic way than his immediate predecessors to provide a rigorous account of the metaphysical underpinnings of divine presence. Although I have focused on part 1 of the Disputed question De modo essendi dei in creaturis which deals with the articulation of divine and created causality at the most abstract level, Odo does go on in later sections of his question, in part 4, for instance, to consider the case of divine causation in human actions. Of course, Odo is chiefly concerned to show that God plays no essential causal role in the production of sinful acts. And if one disagrees with Eduardo Iglesias’ contention that St. Thomas was "the first scholastic doctor to treat th[e] question [of God’s operation in secondary causes in general] in a special place, i.e., detached from the problem of the cause of sin, and to extend it explicitly to all natural operations, whether they be operations of nature or of the will,"20 then we could not consider Odo to be the first to do so. Still, Odo’s questions and treatment of the issue in the DQs do suggest that he was conscious of what was at stake.
esse, quod propter hoc non det conservare, quamvis creatura aliud et aliud recipiat et retineat.” K 36rb T 167ra


“Respondendum est ad quaestionem quod nulla est quia in equivocis nulla est comparatio ut vult Philosophus; essentiale enim alicui cuius est tanquam principium intra, et essentiale quod est conservans et non principium veniens in constitutionem rei, equivoce dicitur, et si obicias quod posset (ou possit) reduci ad aliquod commune quia res indiget Deo conservante indiget etiam principiis ipsum constituentibus quo magis dicendum quod adhuc quae quod nulla est. Ubi enim unum propter alterum utroque tantum unum, et quia indigentia unius est ibi propter indigentiam alterius, quia quod forma materiam compleit hoc habet a Deo. Unde totem illud quod est in forma propter quod ipsa indiget materia habet forma a Deo. Unde sicut nihil esset quaerere, dato quod quod non esset nisi ad comedium et panis similiter si quaeratur quod magis indigeo, an ore vel pane, quia nihil mihi valet unum sine alio, sic in proposito.” (K37rb; T 168vb)

4 “Dalla lectio alla disputatio. Le questioni De modo essendi dei in creaturis, De existentia rerum in Deo 3) De ideis ; 4) De voluntate Dei; 5) De poenis parvulorum decedentium sine baptismo; 6) De peccato veniali; 7) De gratia ; 8) De contritione; 9) De libero arbitrio; 10) De dotibue corporum glorificatorum; 11) De angelis lapsis; 12) De eo quod est psallere sive de psalmo; 13) De providentia; 14) De effectibus divinae providentiae ; 15) De creatione; 16) Quaestio de scientia theologiae 7, 9, 12 and 16 have been entirely edited (See L. Sileo, La Teoria, p. 18 for details), while parts of 1) have been edited by Sileo in “Dalla lectio alla disputatio”, 128-130, and parts of 3) have been edited by Rega Wood (“Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus”, Franciscan Studies, 53 [1993],7-46).

5 Quotations from the solution of question 1 are taken from Sileo’s transcription in “Dalla lectio alla disputatio”, 128-130, and other quotations refer directly to the two manuscripts in which Odo’s Disputed questions have been conserved, viz. Toulouse 737 (=T) and Klosterneuburg 309 (=K). Quotations provided in the footnotes will be transcriptions from T, occasionally supplemented with readings from K

6 Sileo, p. 129.

7 “Quod creatura sit ens, habet a Deo; quod autem sit hoc, habet a principiis intra ipsam concurrentibus, ipsam – ut iam dicam – particularibus sive individuantibus.” (Sileo, p. 129).

8 Sileo, p. 129.

9 “Nulla causa quaem solum est causa rei in fieri manet de necessitate in re post factum esse.” K 35ra; T 167ra.

10 “Ad aliud quod Deus non est de causis intrinsecis rei etc., dicendum quod ista principia intrinseca non essent nec in se nec in participulantibus sive individuantibus.” (Sileo, p. 129).

11 “Nulla causa quae solum est causa rei in fieri manet de necessitate in re post factum esse.” K 35ra; T 167ra.

12 “Quod autem obicitur: ‘nihil nulla natura est in illo etc.’, dicendum quod quia creatura ab alio totaliter habebat suum esse nullum ius habebat in suo esse et propter hoc separat illo a quo habebat suum esse destruitur vel destituitur creatura a suo esse, inde amitit suum esse. Constituta enim esse appetit [T 167vb]; destituta, cadit. Aliud est enim cadere, aliud esse appetere [K 36ra] et ab alio a parte creaturae, sicut planta naturaliter crescendo tendit sursum; ab hac autem virtute destituta, cadit; sic et membrum paraliticum quod cadit a motu statim cum est destitutum a virtute naturali, nec istud est naturale aliquid sed defectus naturae; respectu enim esse illius Dei qui vere est qui est sicut dicitur in Exodi omne esse creaturae est quasi quoddam fieri et propter hoc cum ipse desint conservare, et fieri sive esse creaturae desint.”

13 “…sicut enim creatura inquantum huismodi non potest recipere quod non sit creatura sic nec seipsam conservare nec poterit ad hoc recipere.” [K 36rb &167vb]

14 “Ad aliud quod ab eodem non est recipere aliquid et conservare ilium idem etc., dicendum quod a parte dei tribuentis idem est quod datur esse et quo conservatur in creatura a parte tamen principiorum intrinsecorum creaturae non et propter hoc non sequitur quod si Deus dat esse, quod propter hoc non det conservare, quamvis creatura alii et alii recipiat et retinae.” K 36rb T 168ra

15 Odo adds “formal cause” as well.

16 “Respondendum est ad quaestionem quod nulla est quia in equivocis nulla est comparatio ut vult Philosophus; essentiale enim alii cuius est tanquam principium intra, et essentiale quod est conservans et non principium veniens in constitutionem rei, equivoce dicitur, et si obicias quod posset (ou possit) reduci ad aliquod commune quia res indiget Deo conservante indiget etiam principiis ipsum constituentibus quo magis dicendum quod adhuc quae quod nulla est. Ubi enim unum propter alterum utroque tantum unum, et quia indigentia unius est ibi propter indigentiam alterius, quia quod forma materiam compleit hoc habet a Deo. Unde totem illud quod est in forma propter quod ipsa indiget materia habet forma a Deo. Unde sicut nihil esset quaerere, dato quod quod non esset nisi ad comedium et panis similiter si quaeratur quod magis indigee, an ore vel pane, quia nihil mihi valet unum sine alio, sic in proposito.” (K37rb; T 168vb)
17 “Ad illud quod obicitur quod Deus secundum triplex genus causae comparatur ad res, dicendum quod secundum omnes tres modos
requiritur quod sit in rebus: et secundum quod est finis et efficiens quia exigitur ut finis inquantum bonitas est in rebus et ut efficiens,
quia ut dicitur Io V ‘pater meus usque modo operatur’, et ego operor, et forte ipse ut efficiens immediatius et intimius comparatur ad res.
Quocumque tamen modo sit, dico quod ad faciendum esse simpliciter ipse Deus intimius est in rebus, ad faciendum tamen esse hoc, ipsa
principia ipsam individuantia intimius concurrunt.” (T 168vb K 37rb)
18 “Solutio. Ad hoc dicendum quod duplex est abstractio, quaedam est mathematica, quando extrahitur intelligibiliter res a re, alia est ex
verbo, quando vi verbi alterum non datur intelligi. Dico ergo quod quantum est de abstractione a verbo bene potest intelligi res non
interlecta divina essentia, quia vi verbi non necesse datur intelligi, quia potest intelligi quid est quod significetur per unum aliumque rei licet non intelligatur essentia divina. De bonitate tamen rei quae ad finem respicit, et ad finem ordinatur, non est sic : immo necessario
finem qui est bonitas divina a qua omnis bonitas creata est bona dat intelligere. Sed aliqua est abstractio in qua abstrahitur res a re ut fit in
abstractione mathematica, quia quaedam sunt accidentia quae habent alia propria principia in suo genere; unde quantitates quaedam per
quas possunt intelligi sine comparatione ad subjectum ut sunt magnitudines secundum quod dicit philosophus, quod alius est magnitudo,
alius magnitutinis esse, non sic alius caro, alius carnis esse, unde nec caro nec eius passiones possunt intelligi praeter materia et
similiter etiam de numeris accidentibus propter quod imponit philosophus quod solum de quantitativus sunt mathematice, non tamen de
omnibus. Cum ergo creatura totum esse et totaliter habeat a Deo, nec in essendo habeat aliquod principium sui esse per quod possit
intelligi praeter dependentiam ad deum, ideo loquendo de tali abstractione non potest res intelligi quin intelligatur ipse Deus. Unde
recurrendo ad priorem distinctionem, dicendum quod creaturam esse nec esse aliquod potest intelligi quin intelligatur esse divinum. Licet
tamen esse hoc vel esse hanc [K 37vb] creaturam forte non intellecto Deo possit intelligi.” (T 169ra T 37va)
19 “Ad aliud si esset una prima albedo etc., dicendum quod sanitas secundum analogiam dicitur de omnibus sanitatibus et etiam analogis
magis est communitas secundum rationem numerandi quam essendi, ideo quaelibet sanitas dat intelligere sanitatem animalis ad quan
ordinatur secundum prius et posterius. Sed quod obicitur : si esset una prima albedo, dicendum quod sicut dicit philosophus, participare
est participari rationem suscipere, unde necesse est uti est vera participatio alicuius et essentialis sicut individua dicuntur participare
universale et omnes albedines participare illam primam albedinem, nullo modo possint intelligi quin dent intelligere illud quod
participant quia veritatem illius essentiae participant et non aequivoce, sed si omnia dicuntur habere esse per participationem vel esse a
deo, non dico quod participant eius essentialium quia sic necesse darent ipsum intelligere19 sicut singularis universale, sed quia quicquid
habent ab ipso habent et etiam dicuntur habere esse per participationem [169rb] quia non sunt idem quod suum esse, sicut ipse est suum
esse, et quicquid in ipso est idem quod ipse, unde cum dico quod deus habet esse et quod creaturae habent esse ab ipso, non sumitur esse
uniformiter quia dicit Augustinus quod in omnibus quae dicuntur deo et de nobis plus est dissimilitudinis quam similitudinis.”
Alfred Freddoso in “God’s general concurrence with secondary causes: pitfalls and prospects”, n. 2.