

Some Remarks on Domain Widening

Ana Arregui
University of Ottawa

1. Introduction

Since Kadmon and Landman's influential 1993 paper (K&L), the insight that *any* serves as a *domain widening indefinite* has proven very productive. My objective in this paper is to discuss how we cash out that intuition. K&L tied *any* to the lifting of restrictions: *In an NP of the form 'any CN', 'any' widens the interpretation of the common noun phrase (CN) along a contextual dimension.*' (K&L: 361). In the domain widening proposal, the lifting of restrictions was associated with a pragmatic constraint requiring strengthening. K&L did not develop a compositional account of this interaction (they kept the discussion at the lexical level). A compositional implementation can be found in Chierchia (2006), and it will be the basis for the discussion here.

According to Chierchia (2006), *any*-effects arise through the interaction of the lexical entry of *any* together with pragmatic enrichment operators present in the structure of the sentence. *Any* is treated as a generalized quantifier, with the denotation in (1) (where D is a contextually salient domain of quantification, w is a possible world, and D_w is the set of members of D that live in w):

$$(1) \llbracket \text{any}_D \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda Q \lambda w [\exists w' \exists x \in D_{w'} [P_{w'}(x) \ \& \ Q_w(x)]]$$

According to (1), *any* quantifies over objects and worlds. The object quantified over satisfies the noun (restrictor) predicate in the world quantified over (we will discuss this further in Section 2.2). Chierchia accounts for the lexical peculiarity of *any* by proposing that it activates a set of alternatives as in (2):

$$(2) \text{ALT}(\llbracket \text{any}_D \rrbracket) = \{\lambda P \lambda Q \lambda w [\exists w' \exists x \in D_{w'} [P_{w'}(x) \ \& \ Q_w(x)]: D' \subseteq D \ \& \ D' \text{ is large}\}$$

The alternatives generated by *any* correspond to the indefinite associated with more restricted domains of quantification available in the context. The alternatives give rise to strengthening when they meet a pragmatic enrichment operator (E for 'even'). The definition is given in (3):

$$(3) E_C(p) = p \ \& \ \forall q \in C [p \subseteq_C q], \text{ where } C = \text{ALT}$$

The E operator combines with a proposition and generates an enriched meaning with the information that the alternatives that have been activated are weaker (not stronger) than the one asserted. The prediction is that *any* will only be coherent if the speaker has made the strongest assertion, resulting in the 'strengthening' intuition.¹

Chierchia (2006) derives a widening account of *any*-effects through the interaction of (1), (2) and (3). The intuitions behind the implementation are discussed in (4):

(4) *I believe that domain widening takes place along two dimensions. First, we pick the largest possible quantificational domain among the reasonable candidates. This means that all entities*

¹ Chierchia (2006) presents a proposal to deal with pragmatic enrichment of various kinds in various contexts. Here we will only consider the details provided for *any* in negative contexts. The details are part of a much bigger picture in Chierchia's proposal.

that for all we know might exist are factored in. Second, our uncertainty about quantificational domains may also have qualitative aspects. (Chierchia 2006: 555)

Before moving on to a discussion of domain widening, let us just note that the idea that *any* generates alternatives is not tied to a domain-widening analysis. Several authors have made use of alternatives without calling on domain widening (e.g. Fauconnier 1985, Heim 1994, Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998). In some accounts of *any* under negation, the alternatives evoked by *any* have been structured in scales to explain the use of *any* in relation to amounts (*any* resulting in a ‘not even a single’ interpretation). In my discussion of domain widening in this paper, I will avoid examples in which *any* under negation is used to exclude ‘even the smallest amount’. It seems that these examples cannot be the core examples in favor of domain widening (domain widening targets a larger set of options, not just widening with respect to amounts). In our discussion of the domain widening hypothesis, we will look for examples in which we can talk about domain widening independently of an ‘amounts’ interpretation.

In this paper we will see that if we put into play the mechanisms we (usually) associate with contextual restrictions to the domain of quantification, we can run into problems when we try to characterize *any* as a domain widener. We will see that regular indefinites in the scope of negation can resist accessing contextually restricted domains, which raises the question of whether restricted domains of quantification are indeed routinely available in the contexts in which *any* shows up. We will also see that when restricted domains of quantification appear to be available, regular indefinites and *any* indefinites seem to access them with similar ease. The discussion points to the need of having more systematic data regarding the availability of reduced domains of quantification for regular indefinites in the scope of negation. A better understanding of how restricted domains of quantification work would lead to a better appraisal of the role of *any* as a domain widener.

2. Core cases and discussion

2.1 The famous example

To frame the discussion, let us remember K&L’s famous potato example:

- (5) A: Could we make some French fries? / I feel like French fries. Do you have cooking potatoes?
B: I don’t have potatoes. / I don’t have any potatoes /

According to K&L, an utterance of *I don’t have potatoes* in the context of what A has said indicates that B does not have cooking potatoes. Non-cooking potatoes are irrelevant (the potted potato in the room won’t count). On the other hand, an utterance of *I don’t have any potatoes* will indicate that B is not just talking about the cooking potatoes that are relevant in that context. In this case, B is letting A know that she does not have relevant or irrelevant potatoes (the potted potato is no longer there). In this discussion of the exchange in (5), we see the main intuition behind the domain widening analysis: by choosing *any*, instead of a regular indefinite (like the bare plural), the speaker indicates that contextual restrictions on the domain of quantification are lifted (at least some of them). Notice that in this example we have focused on the idea that *any* lifts restrictions on the kinds of potatoes that count (we go from ‘cooking potatoes’ to ‘potatoes’). It would also be possible to interpret the widening idea with respect to amounts, and capture the ‘not even a single’ interpretation of *any*. To do this, we would have to assume that regular indefinites are used to talk about ‘normal’/ ‘salient’ amounts (enough potatoes to make a dinner for two), while *any* is used to lift the restriction on amounts and talk about all amounts (resulting in a ‘not event a single’ interpretation under negation). As was mentioned in the introduction, we will not be interested in an ‘amounts’ implementation of the domain widening analysis, since these cases can be targeted by mechanisms other than domain widening and do not seem to be the core cases in support of the widening hypothesis.

2.2 Epistemic widening?

An important part of the discussion of *any* in the literature has been devoted to its ‘modal connection’. The implementation of domain widening in Chierchia (2006) acknowledges the modal dimension of *any* by allowing the world variable associated with the first argument of the existential quantifier (the noun argument) to be existentially bound. This allows for modal flexibility in interpreting the noun predicate, which may be true in worlds that differ from the worlds in which the second argument of the existential quantifier is true. Though Chierchia does not encode any restrictions on the quantifier over possible worlds in *any*, he does note in the text that existential quantification over worlds needs to be restricted to worlds that are epistemically accessible (Chierchia 2006: 556, footnote 22). Allowing the noun predicate associated with *any* to be true of individuals in epistemically accessible worlds (a set that includes the actual world) accounts for the ‘qualitative’ aspect of domain widening mentioned by Chierchia in (4), and further elaborated in (6):

- (6) *Take Fred again, and consider now his nephew John. We are sure that John exists, but we may be uncertain whether he is a man or still a boy. This means that in some worlds compatible with what we know, he is a boy; and in others, he isn't. Using “any boy”, we might signal that our claim extends to him.* (Chierchia 2006: 555).

While it is clear that there is a modal connection to *any* (Chierchia points to the work of Dayal (1998)) and so Chierchia’s position that this must be derived somehow must be correct, the particular implementation of the modal dimension in (1) seems very strong. Let us follow up on the example in (4): given the existential quantifier in (1) (restricted to epistemically accessible worlds), if we don’t know whether John is a boy or not, our ‘any boy’ claims will extend to him. This means that, for example, if Sara didn’t see him, and she didn’t see any other boys, we would be happy to utter (7):

- (7) *Sara didn't see any boys.*

Once the indefinite *any boys* is put in the scope of negation, a sentence like (7) will be true if it is false that there is some epistemically accessible world in which there is a boy that Sara saw in the actual world. Since the actual world is a world that is epistemically accessible, it cannot have been the case that Sara saw an entity that was actually a boy (which is a good prediction). However, the *any* indefinite will strengthen this to the claim that she didn’t see any entity that (as far as our epistemic state is concerned) could be a boy (this is the qualitative widening mentioned by Chierchia). But this seems very strong for (7). The truth of (7) seems more closely determined by the actual facts. If Sara saw John, and John is not a boy, he shouldn’t count as a counterexample to (7) even if we believe he could be a boy (and so there is some epistemically accessible world in which he is a boy). It is true that if we believe he could be a boy, and we know Sara saw him, we might not want to utter (7). But if he is not a boy, (7) will still be true.

2.3 Regular indefinites like wide domains

The implementation of domain widening in (1), (2) and (3) cashes out the ‘widening’ intuition by relating the quantificational domain of *any* to narrower domains of quantification present in the context. As Chierchia notes: *The only way to measure domain size is by comparison; this entails that the meaning of ‘any’ must be inherently relational. It must involve comparison among D-alternatives* (Chierchia 2006: 555). *Any* functions as a ‘widener’ because it makes use of a domain of quantification that is wider than the other domains available in the context (notice that if *any* simply accessed large domains, it wouldn’t be a ‘widener’). The availability of smaller domains of quantification in the context is part of the explanation. We explain the contrast between *any* and regular indefinites by claiming that regular indefinites would have accessed the more restricted domains.

Given this background on the domain-widening analysis, it is interesting to note that regular indefinites in the scope of negation often don’t like to go with a restricted domain, even when this seems pragmatically reasonable. Consider the example in (8):

- (8) A friend comes in from the rain, soaked, and asks:
- a. A friend: Can you lend me socks?
You have just put every sock you own into the washing machine, and answer:
 - b. You: Sorry, I don't have socks. (Your friend looks at you strangely.)

In the exchange described, your friend will find your answer odd. It is clear that she is interested in dry socks. Notice that she would not have appreciated a 'yes' answer followed by an offer of wet socks. It is also clear that the answer 'Sorry, I don't have dry socks' would have been perfectly fine. So, to simply say 'I don't have socks' in a context in which it is clear to everyone that the only relevant socks are dry socks does not count as saying 'I don't have dry socks'.

Let us examine another example, illustrating the same point:

- (9) A friend approaches you at a barbecue with a plate of veggie burgers he has recently finished cooking. They are burnt.
- Your friend: Do you want veggie burgers?
You: No thanks, I don't want veggie burgers.

If you answered in this way, it would be odd to wait until your friend had gone away, and then turn to someone beside you and say, pointing to a plate of nicely done veggie burgers: *I want veggie burgers*. They would accuse you of lying. You could defend yourself with: *I said that because I didn't want those veggie burgers* (this is the reason you lied). But not with: *I said that I didn't want those veggie burgers* (this is not what you said).

In this section we have seen examples in which regular indefinites ignore restricted domains. They prefer wide domains even though, presumably, it would make sense pragmatically for them to associate with restricted domains. The examples do not show that regular indefinites in the scope of negation don't take restricted domains. All that we have seen is that in these examples, they don't. But the examples do raise the question of how easy it is for regular indefinites to adopt restricted domains in the scope of negation, or indeed, what are the mechanisms that make restricted domains available (common sense doesn't seem to be enough). Since the domain widening view of *any* builds on the idea that there are restricted domains of quantification salient in the context, it would be important to be able to show that those restricted domains of quantification are indeed available in the context. The question arises as to whether it is reasonable to maintain a view of *any* as a domain widener in a context in which we do not see restricted domains of quantification at work (or in contexts in which the conditions for accessing restricted domains of quantification are not satisfied).

3. On restricting domains of quantification

In this section, we will examine the mechanics of domain restriction. How exactly does it come about that regular indefinites access restricted domains? It has been noted there are various mechanisms which in principle could characterize domain restriction (the reader is referred to von Fintel 1998 for an overview). Here we will worry about two possibilities: domains reduced via silent predicates (3.1) and domains reduced via situation arguments (3.3).² We will be interested in the predictions made by each case in relation to the domain widening hypothesis.

In our discussion of domain restriction, we will differentiate between domains restricted by predicates *in general* vs. domains restricted via locations (situational restrictions). We will deal with locational restrictions when dealing with a situations approach to domain restriction (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we will examine restrictions via predicates that are not locational.

² Von Fintel considers also a third option, which is a variant of the predicates view. We will not discuss it separately here as it does not differ in ways that fundamentally affect the discussion.

3.1 Reducing domains with silent predicates

The ‘silent predicates’ proposal explains domain restriction by claiming that quantifiers are associated with silent free variables denoting a predicate. The variables are similar to pronouns and other anaphoric expressions.³ An example from Roberts (1995) is given in (10a) below. The quantifier *everyone* is restricted to the dinner guests. A silent-predicates proposal to capture this restriction is given in (10b) (from von Fintel 1998). A free predicate-variable restricts the first argument of the quantifier (a ‘predicate pronoun’). In this context, the variable could be assigned as denotation the predicate of being a dinner guest (at some relevant dinner), thus leading to the intended restricted interpretation (we might worry that this could be a locational example, but let us set that aside for the moment):

- (10) a. The dinner guests had rhubarb pie for dessert. Everyone developed a rash. (Roberts 1995)
b. Everyone *C* developed a rash. (von Fintel 1998)

(Von Fintel (1994, etc.) has noted that a silent predicate account of domain restriction would actually require more complex domain restrictions to account for ‘bound variable’ interpretation of domain restrictions. We will leave this matter aside here, but will touch upon the more complex examples in Section 3.4.)

3.2 Discussion

In Section 2.3 we saw examples with regular indefinites in the scope of negation that did not associate with restricted predicates (they did not operate on reduced domains of quantification). We set up contexts that plausibly favored restricted domains of quantification, but the pragmatic pressure was not enough. The indefinites did not associate with reduced domains of quantification simply because common sense pointed in that direction. In this section we will examine similar examples. As before, we will consider non-locational predicates. The difference will be that now we will explicitly mention the predicates that are meant to restrict the indefinite.

A silent predicates approach to domain restrictions could make it reasonable to claim that domain restriction will only take place in contexts in which the relevant predicate has been explicitly mentioned, and has thus become appropriately salient. A silent predicates approach postulates that regular indefinites are (can be) associated with predicate pronouns. We know that in the case of regular pronouns there are constraints regarding saliency, and that mere common sense may fail to be enough for a pronoun to find an antecedent/ referent (recall the examples of marbles hiding under the sofa: *A: I dropped 10 marbles and found 9. B: It is under the sofa.* (ref. Heim 1990)). In this section we will examine two kinds of examples in which a regular indefinite appears in a context in which an antecedent to a predicate pronoun has been made salient.

We will begin with simple examples and appeal to the cases we have already seen in Section 2.3. This time we will make explicit mention of a predicate that could be used to restrict the regular indefinite:

- (11) You have just washed all your socks, and are currently hanging them up to dry on the line.
a. A friend: Do you have dry socks?
b. You: #No, I don’t have *C* socks (where *C* is interpreted as the predicate of being dry)
- (12) a. Your friend: Do you want veggie burgers just off the barbecue?
b. You: #No thanks, I don’t want *C* veggie burgers (where *C* is interpreted as the predicate of being ‘just off the barbecue’)

³ See also Stanley and Szabó (2000) and Stanley (2002).

In these examples, we do not see a silent predicate pronoun making reference to a property that has been explicitly mentioned (and is thus appropriately salient) in the nearby discourse. These examples do not follow the pattern we would expect if the predicate pronoun were a regular pronoun. Instead of understanding the regular indefinite as a restricted indefinite, we understand it as associating with a domain of quantification completely unrestricted by the previously mentioned predicate. These examples are interesting to us because we see that we lift the restriction that has been made salient by the previous discourse with a regular indefinite. Looking at these examples, it would not be possible to argue that the contrast between *any* and regular indefinites arises because *any* lifts domain restrictions, whereas regular indefinites associate with salient reduced domains.

We can expand the discussion by considering examples in which we have added a presupposition trigger:

- (13) a. You: I don't have front-row tickets
b. Me: i. #I don't have tickets either
ii. I don't have front-row tickets either

In order for the presuppositions of *either* to be satisfied, my reply has to be about front-row tickets. Yet, as we see in (13b.i) the presuppositions of *either* do not facilitate a restricted domain for the indefinite. Yet, if there was indeed a silent predicate able to restrict the indefinite to front row tickets (a variable picking up its denotation from the previous utterance) we might expect it to contribute here and lead to a felicitous interpretation for *either*.

The examples above seem to suggest that a silent predicate pronoun is not actually able to pick up a property that has been previously mentioned (which would make it a very strange pronoun). However, we should worry that there could be a confound in these examples, which I will describe informally. Consider (11), for instance. Maybe what happens in (11) is that when you reply *No, I don't have socks* that answer is compared to another answer that you could have given *No, I don't*. This other answer is, in a sense, 'more anaphoric' than the previous one (making greater use of ellipsis). If there are constraints that favour anaphora and disfavor repetition, it may be that when faced with the answer *No, I don't have socks* we are simply not willing to interpret it in a way that would make it equivalent to *No, I don't*. After all, if that was what was meant, the more anaphoric version would have been used.

I am not sure whether this discussion is convincing as a (preliminary) account of the interpretation of (11)-(12). However, to control for this, I have constructed more complex examples, in which there isn't a more elliptical answer equivalent to the answer that could be obtained with a regular indefinite restricted by a silent predicate pronoun. In the more complex cases, we see restrictions at work in a manner that better fits the expectations raised by a silent predicates view of domain restriction:

- (14) You: Do you know French writers or singers?
Me: I don't know writers, but I know singers.

In this example, my ignorance of writers can be understood as restricted to French writers. In this case, the information in the answer could not be provided by a more elliptical form (*No, I don't /Yes, I do*), and this seems to help in recovering the restriction. Further examples following this pattern are provided in (15) and (16):

- (15) You: Do you have older brothers or sisters?
Me: I don't have brothers but I have sisters. (= *I don't have older brothers*)

- (16) You: Do you have dry shoes or sneakers?
Me: I don't have shoes, but I have sneakers. (= *I don't have dry shoes*)

In these examples it seems easier for the regular indefinite to be associated with a restricted domain of quantification. We might consider these examples the cases that are truly relevant to show the predicate pronoun at work in restricting the domain of quantification of the regular indefinite.

However, in examples like these it also seems relatively easier for the *any* indefinite to be associated with a reduced domain of quantification:

(17) You: Do you know French writers or singers?

Me: I don't know any writers, but I know singers. (= *I don't know any French writers*)

(18) You: Do you have older brothers or sisters?

Me: I don't have any brothers, but I have sisters. (= *I don't have any older brothers*)

(19) You: Do you have dry shoes or sneakers?

Me: I don't have any shoes, but I have sneakers. (= *I don't have any dry shoes*)

Further work will be required to offer a systematic overview of the mechanisms that allow domain restriction in the form made available by silent predicates. Of interest to us here is that there doesn't seem to be a very clear difference between the regular indefinites cases and the *any* indefinites cases we have examined. In the simple examples (11)-(12), the regular indefinites are similar to the *any* indefinites in targeting wide domains of quantification. And in the complex examples (14)-(19), the *any* indefinites seem as happy as the regular indefinites with restricted domains of quantification.

In this section we have seen that it is not trivial for a regular indefinite to associate with a domain of quantification restricted by a predicate that has been mentioned in the nearby discourse (and thus might be thought of as appropriately salient). In some cases, regular indefinite systematically widen the domain. This is something that needs to be considered when claiming that *any* indefinites differ from regular indefinites in acting as domain wideners. In other cases (the disjunction cases), regular indefinites seem more content to associate with a restricted domain of quantification. But here, *any* indefinites are not radically different in preferring a wider domain of quantification.

3.3 *Reduced domains as situations*

In this section we will focus on examples in which domain restriction is related to the location of things. In our discussion so far, we have stayed away from examples in which domain restriction was tied to the location / situation of things. Yet, some of the clearest cases of domain restriction discussed in the literature are 'situational'. Here is Lewis's famous beer example:

(20) (...) *just like when I look in my fridge and say there is no beer. I do not say that there is no beer outside the fridge, but I ignore it in my speech.* (Lewis 1986: 136-137)

Locational restrictions could be encoded as silent predicate pronouns (in the same way other restrictions are). But they can also be thought of as encoded by situation variables. In a situation-based approach to domain restriction, quantifiers are associated with silent (free) variables denoting situations (there are various versions, a.o. Barwise and Perry 1983, Recanati 1996, 2004, Kratzer 2006). The quantificational claim is restricted to the individuals in the situation under consideration (the 'topic' situation, see Kratzer (2006)). Consider the examples in (21):

(21)a. No one is asleep. (Barwise and Perry 1983)

b. Every tree was laden with wonderful fruit. (Kratzer 1989)

In (21a) the claim made by *no one* is restricted to the individuals in the relevant situation (e.g. no one in our house is asleep). In (21b) the claim made by *every* is restricted to the individuals in the relevant situation (e.g. every tree in my garden was laden with wonderful fruit).

In what follows we will examine domain-widening with the hypothesis that domain restriction takes place because a situation argument restricts quantification to a topic situation. What would widening mean in this case? We will consider the possibility that widening means that the restriction to the topic situation is lifted. The *any* indefinite would then be allowed to make a claim about a 'bigger'

situation (or more situations) than a regular indefinite and potentially access more individuals. We will examine this possibility in Section 3.4.

3.4 Discussion

We will begin by considering examples of regular indefinites that seem associated with topic situations:

(22) In his French class, John didn't give students their grades.

In (22) we understand the claim made by the regular indefinite to be restricted to the situation of John's French class: John didn't give the students in his French class their grades. The example in (23) shows that with *any* it is possible to access students outside the French class situation, suggesting that *any* can indeed shift the topic situation (or abstract from the topic situation) and thus widen the domain:

(23) It was worse! John didn't give any (ANY) students their grades.

However, this is not a very conclusive observation, since here we could just be dealing with a 'not a single' (amounts) interpretation, which would include this possibility. To tell apart the amounts interpretation from the possibility of shifting the topic situation, we will examine the example in (24):

(24) Me: In his French class, John was horrible to the male students.

You: Actually, he didn't give any (ANY) students their grade.

In (24) we observe the effect of *any*, but the topic situation does not change. You are still talking about John's French class (at least, potentially!). By choosing *any* you indicate that all students in the class were badly treated (though it is hard to tell whether we have lifted the restriction to male students or whether we are dealing with an amounts interpretation restricted to the French class). What is important to us is that the *any*-effect arises without shifting the topic situation. Example like this suggest that we cannot explain the contrast between regular indefinites and *any* indefinites by claiming that *any* widens the domain by lifting the restriction to the topic situation.

A final example against the idea that the effect of *any* can be explained as a shift in the topic situation can be given with a version of von Stechow's argument in favor of the syntactic representation of domain variables. Von Stechow (1994) discusses examples which show that domain variables need to be syntactically visible (the examples are attributed to I. Heim). This is because the domain variables in the examples receive a bound-variable interpretation:

- (25)a. In five of John's classes, he failed exactly three Frenchmen.
b. In five *s*: *s* is a class of John's, John failed exactly three Frenchmen in *s*.

(25) tells us that in five classes John failed three Frenchmen per class (that he failed them and that they were in his class points to them being students). The situation variable associated with *three Frenchmen* is bound by *in five of John's classes*. These examples are interesting to us because it is possible to find *any* with a bound domain restriction:

- (25)a. In five of John's classes, he didn't tell students that they were hopeless.
b. In five of John's classes, he didn't tell any students that they were hopeless.

(26) In five *s*: *s* is a class, John didn't tell (any) student in *s* that they were hopeless.

The contrast between the regular indefinite case and the *any* indefinite in (25) seems to be the usual one. However, given the bound nature of the variable associated with the domain restriction, it would be difficult to explain this straightforwardly in terms of 'widening' of the topic situation. In what sense

could we talk about a ‘wider’ situation when the domain variable is bound and does not refer to any situation? In examples like these we seem to find the usual *any* effect but a widening solution with situation arguments seems harder to maintain.

4. Conclusion

In this paper we have discussed the characterization of the effect of *any* in the scope of negation as *domain widening* (appealing to the compositional presentation of the domain-widening hypothesis in Chierchia (2006)). Our strategy has been to worry about that part of the widening hypothesis that requires that *any* operate in contexts in which there are more restricted domains of quantification available. We concerned ourselves with the evidence that more restricted domains of quantification are indeed available. We observed that common sense is not enough to make restricted domains salient in a context. We examined two possible strategies for domain restriction: silent predicate pronouns and situation arguments. With neither did we see a clear categorical difference between regular indefinites and *any* indefinites. If we cannot predict how regular indefinites associate with restricted domains, or indeed show that in the contexts in which we see *any*-effects, regular indefinites would indeed associate with restricted domains of quantification, the characterization of *any* as widening domains of quantification is left a bit incomplete.

This discussion leads us back to K&L’s original potato example (though inconclusively). Suppose you say you want to make French fries, we open my fridge and find a whole bag of quite rotten potatoes. Looking at it, I could say: *Oh..., I don’t have potatoes*. It may be that in this context this could be acceptable, and that it would be harder to get away with saying: *Oh..., I don’t have any potatoes* (it would be helpful to have some systematically collected data at this point). This is the data originally used to support the widening hypothesis. But imagine now that you tell me you want to make an amusing potato tortilla, and ask me if I have blue potatoes. We open the fridge and find a whole bag of regular white potatoes. It would be hard for me to say: *Oh..., I don’t have potatoes* (remember the examples in (11)-(12)). Which in turn makes it difficult to argue that if my fridge had been empty and I had replied *Oh..., I don’t have any potatoes*, I would have chosen *any* to indicate that it wasn’t only blue potatoes that I lacked (that *any* would have lifted the color restriction otherwise operative in the context).

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