

Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism

Roland Paris

One of the challenges facing the international community in the post-Cold War era is the increasingly pervasive problem of civil conflict.¹ Indeed, all of the thirty major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were *intrastate* wars.² Devising ways of responding to this violence has been a topic of considerable debate among policymakers and students of conflict management in recent years.³ But no less important is the task of determining what to do once the fighting stops.

Operations that aim to prevent violence from reigniting after the initial termination of hostilities—commonly called “postconflict peacebuilding”—have been conducted in eight war-shattered states since the end of the Cold War: Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola,

Roland Paris is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Yale University.

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1. Ted Robert Gurr argues that communal conflicts have become “the major challenge to domestic and international security in most parts of the world” since the end of the Cold War. See Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), p. 314. For an examination of the “new breed” of internal wars, see Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

2. Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, “Major Armed Conflicts,” *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15. These authors define a “major armed conflict” as “prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict.”

3. This literature includes Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41–75; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–175; Joseph R. Rudolf, Jr., “Intervention in Communal Conflicts,” *Orbis*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 259–273; Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations and Civil Wars,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 139–159; Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, “Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 118–142; Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3–20.

Rwanda, and Bosnia.⁴ In the words of former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding missions seek “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁵ These operations have involved a wide variety of international actors—including national relief and development agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions, and other regional and international actors—engaged in a broad range of activities, from disarming former belligerents to providing financial and humanitarian assistance, monitoring and conducting elections, repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure, advising and training security personnel and judicial officials, and even temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country.

The proliferation of peacebuilding operations in recent years has given rise to a burgeoning academic literature on the subject.⁶ Although many of these studies have helped identify the strengths and weaknesses of particular operations, scholars have devoted relatively little attention to analyzing the concept of peacebuilding itself, including its underlying assumptions. What paradigm, or paradigms, of conflict management inform the work of peacebuilding agencies? How do these paradigms shape the conduct of peacebuilding operations

4. I exclude the Haiti operation from this list because it did not follow a civil war. I exclude the Somalia operation because it was primarily a peace-enforcement mission that sought to end the fighting, rather than a peacebuilding mission seeking to consolidate an existing peace.

5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 32, para. 55.

6. More general works on peacebuilding include Krishna Kumar, ed., *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Jarat Chopra, “The Space of Peace-Maintenance,” *Political Geography*, Vol. 15, No. 3–4 (March–April 1996), pp. 335–357; Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, “Making Peace Settlements Work,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 54–71; Jeremy Giniifer, “Development and the UN Peace Mission: A New Interface Required?” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 3–13; Timothy M. Shaw, “Beyond Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: What Links to Sustainable Development and Human Security?” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 36–48; Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, “Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 17–35; Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 387–418; Michael Pugh, “Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (December 1995), pp. 320–346; Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1995), chap. 5; I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 94 (Spring 1994), pp. 69–83; and Sonia K. Han, “Building a Peace That Lasts: The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building,” *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 837–892.

in practice? Are current approaches to peacebuilding well suited to the task of consolidating peace in war-shattered states?⁷ Is there a better alternative? By addressing these questions, this article investigates the conceptual foundations of peacebuilding, and analyzes the relationship between these conceptual foundations and the actual effectiveness of peacebuilding as a method of preventing the recurrence of civil violence.

My argument is straightforward. A single paradigm—liberal internationalism—appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.⁸ Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering—an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.

This paradigm, however, has not been a particularly effective model for establishing stable peace. Paradoxically, the very process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even sparking renewed fighting. In Rwanda and Angola, for example, political liberalization contributed to the resurgence of violence; in Bosnia, elections reinforced the separation of the parties rather than facilitating their reconciliation; and in Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the effects of economic liberalization have threatened to reignite conflict. At best, the liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding has generated unforeseen problems. At worst, peacebuilding missions have had the “perverse effect” of undermining the very peace they were meant to buttress.⁹

The principal flaw in the current approach to peacebuilding is that international agencies have prescribed market democracy as a remedy for civil conflict

7. By “war-shattered states,” I mean countries that have experienced internal wars.

8. By “liberal democratic polity” or “democracy,” I mean a country that possesses all the political institutions characteristic of a modern representative government with universal or near universal suffrage. By “market-oriented economy,” I mean an economic order in which goods and services are predominantly produced and allocated by more or less competitive firms that are predominantly privately owned and strongly influenced by market prices and by the goal of profitability. These definitions are drawn from Robert A. Dahl, “Equality Versus Inequality,” *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 639–648.

9. A policy has “perverse effects” when it generates an outcome that is the opposite of what was intended. Albert O. Hirschman, “Reactionary Rhetoric,” *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 263, No. 5 (May 1989), pp. 63–70.

without adequately anticipating, or taking action to limit, the inherently destabilizing side effects of this remedy. In this sense, contemporary peacebuilding practices seem to be rooted in the same false assumption as modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s: namely, the belief that the natural evolution of developing states is toward market democracy, and that this evolution, once initiated, is self-perpetuating. A more realistic approach to peacebuilding would start from the opposite assumption: that creating a stable market democracy is a tumultuous, conflict-ridden, and lengthy process, particularly in the fragile political environment of a war-shattered state. Peacebuilding exposes the inherently conflictual character of democracy and capitalism, both of which paradoxically encourage societal competition as a means of achieving political stability and economic prosperity. War-shattered states are typically ill equipped to manage societal competition induced by political and economic liberalization, not only because these states have a recent history of violence, but because they typically lack the institutional structures capable of peacefully resolving internal disputes. In these circumstances, efforts to transform war-shattered states into market democracies can serve to exacerbate rather than moderate societal conflicts.

This is not to say that peacebuilding operations have done more harm than good. On the contrary, many of the countries that have hosted such operations might still be at war if not for the help they received from international actors in negotiating and implementing peace accords. If, however, the goal of peacebuilding is not simply to stop the fighting, but to create conditions that will allow peace to endure long after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves—in other words, a self-sustaining peace—then the record of peacebuilding has been mixed at best. All but one of the eight peacebuilding operations I examine in this article have failed to meet this larger goal. Excluding Namibia, which I argue is a special case, every peacebuilding host state has experienced continuing or renewed instability. Although some of these countries (such as Rwanda) have been more unstable than others (such as El Salvador), the broader question is whether peacebuilding operations have placed these states on a path toward lasting peace. I argue that they have not.

Another point of clarification: I do not claim that the process of political and economic liberalization is *solely* responsible for continuing or renewed instability in these states. The causal mechanisms at work in peacebuilding are complex—local conditions vary from one state to the next, and each mission involves a unique constellation of international agencies. Despite this variation, however, most peacebuilding host states have experienced tensions arising

from policies of political and economic liberalization—tensions that have impeded the consolidation of peace. Although this problem is only one of several causes of instability in these states, it is an important one: it recurs across cases, and it suggests fundamental flaws in the design and conduct of peacebuilding operations.

If the current approach to peacebuilding is flawed, what is to be done? One option is to abandon liberal internationalism as a peacebuilding strategy, and promote the establishment of effective political authorities that are capable of maintaining order in war-shattered states, through authoritarianism if necessary. Alternatively, peacebuilders could pursue a strategy of partition—seeking to eliminate the sources of conflict by carving up war-shattered states into separate political entities. In most circumstances, however, both alternatives appear to raise more problems than they solve. Instead of pursuing these dubious strategies, peacebuilding agencies should preserve the principal goal of liberal internationalism—the transformation of war-shattered states into market democracies—but rethink the way in which they pursue this goal, seeking in particular to limit the conflict-inducing effects of political and economic liberalization in war-shattered states.

I offer several ways in which international agencies could accomplish this aim. Together, these recommendations represent a viable alternative to current peacebuilding practices. I label this alternative “strategic liberalization” because it shares the liberal internationalist goals of recent peacebuilding operations—peace through political and economic liberalization—but consciously aims to minimize the destabilizing effects of liberal internationalism. The main elements of this approach include: (1) developing a more gradual and controlled process of democratization in war-shattered states—in particular, by delaying elections until passions have cooled, promoting citizen associations that cut across cleavage lines, excluding extremists from active politics, and controlling the promulgation of inflammatory propaganda; (2) designing electoral arrangements that reward moderation rather than extremism; (3) promoting equitable, growth-oriented adjustment policies rather than destabilizing austerity measures; (4) creating effective, central coordinating bodies for peacebuilding operations; and (5) extending the duration of peacebuilding operations from the current norm of one to three years, to approximately seven to nine years.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I argue that most international peacebuilding agencies, particularly the more influential ones, have been guided in their work by the precepts of liberal internationalism. Second, I demonstrate,

with reference to eight recent peacebuilding operations, that unforeseen problems arising from the process of political and economic liberalization have impeded the consolidation of peace. Third, I describe how such instabilities can be traced to the inherently conflictual character of both democracy and capitalism—a feature of both systems that is rarely noted. Fourth, I develop an alternative peacebuilding strategy that seeks to limit the destabilizing effects of liberal internationalist policies, and thus provides a blueprint for more-effective peacebuilding operations in the future.

Peacebuilding as a Form of Liberal Internationalism

There is no universally accepted definition of liberal internationalism. The concept contains two elements: liberalism and internationalism. The essence of liberalism, writes Stanley Hoffmann, is “the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms.”¹⁰ In the international context, liberal foreign policies are those that promote the principles of liberalism abroad, for example, by seeking to protect individual freedoms in other states. Internationalism is more difficult to define. In its broadest sense, it suggests active engagement in international affairs, that is, the opposite of isolationism; but internationalism also connotes foreign policies that are designed to enhance multilateral cooperation among states, particularly through the vehicle of formal international institutions.¹¹ Taken together, the two concepts comprising liberal internationalism suggest an activist foreign policy that promotes liberal principles abroad, especially through multilateral cooperation and international institutions.

The rationale for promoting liberal principles in other countries dates back at least to the writings of Immanuel Kant, who maintained in *Perpetual Peace* that states with “republican constitutions”—including the legal equality of subjects, representative government, and separation of powers—would tend to be peaceful with one another.¹² More recently, political scientists have tested this proposition and found strong empirical evidence that democracies rarely

10. Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (September 1995), p. 160.

11. See Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990).

12. Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Political Writings*, Hans Reiss, ed. and H.B. Nesbit, trans. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1970).

go to war against each other.¹³ In addition, others have pointed out that democracies are considerably less likely to experience internal violence than nondemocracies, in part because “social conflicts that might become violent are resolved through voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation.”¹⁴ Together, these empirical findings have prompted several commentators to advocate the promotion of democracy as a method of enhancing peace between and within states.¹⁵ Clinton administration officials, attempting to define American foreign policy goals in the absence of any obvious and immediate military threat to the United States, have made the promotion of democracy and free markets a central tenet of U.S. policy, and treat the scholarly finding that democracies rarely fight each other as a supporting argument.¹⁶

Liberal internationalism has also been resurgent in many of the world’s major international organizations. During the Cold War, discord between the West and the Soviet bloc prevented many intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations from taking stands on such ideologically charged issues as the promotion of democracy. Although some states, most notably China, continue to contest Western notions of democracy, the collapse of Soviet communism decisively shifted the balance of power and opinion in many international institutions toward more active support for market democracy. In short, the Western or “procedural” conception of democracy—in Joseph

13. See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24–37; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a critique of this argument, see Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5–49.

14. R.J. Rummel, “Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 4. For a similar argument, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 28.

15. For example, see Fred W. Riggs, “Ethnonational Relations and Viable Constitutionalism,” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 375–404; Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Morton H. Halperin, “Guaranteeing Democracy,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 105–123; Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*; Larry Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World* (New York: Freedom House, 1992); and Graham T. Allison, Jr. and Robert P. Beschel, Jr., “Can the United States Promote Democracy?” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 81–98.

16. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, for instance, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at her January 1997 confirmation hearing that the United States “will continue to promote and advocate democracy” in other countries “because we know that democracy is a parent to peace.” Her statement confirmed the U.S. government’s apparent intention to continue pursuing, in the words of former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, the “enlargement of the world’s free

Schumpeter's words, an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote"—has become increasingly accepted as the correct definition, just as market-oriented economies are now almost universally accepted as the fastest route to prosperity.¹⁷

Evidence of this shift in the policies of international organizations is abundant. The members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, declared in 1990 that "the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe."¹⁸ Similarly, in December 1991 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that was unprecedented in its support for Western democratic principles, declaring that "periodic and genuine elections" are a "crucial factor in the effective enjoyment . . . of a wide range of other human rights."¹⁹ During his tenure as UN secretary-general, Boutros-Ghali explicitly linked Western notions of democracy to the achievement of peace, asserting that "democracy is one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable, and more secure world can be built."²⁰ In addition, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution in June 1991 calling for "the immediate convocation of a meeting . . . in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states."²¹ Even the World Bank, mirroring the policies of the United States

community of market democracies." Federal News Service, "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Consider the Nomination of Madeleine Albright to be Secretary of State," January 8, 1997; and Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 27, 1993), p. 659.

17. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 269.

18. "Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990," reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 29, No. 5 (September 1990), p. 1307. See also Neil J. Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 17–28.

19. "Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections," UN General Assembly Resolution 46/137 of December 17, 1991, reprinted in *Yearbook of the United Nations 1991* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 588–589.

20. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative," *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 3. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

21. Cited in Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 65–66. See also Richard J. Bloomfield, "Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime,"

Agency for International Development (U.S. AID), has since 1990 linked its financial assistance to political liberalization, arguing that the citizens of developing countries should have “a voice in government decisions and activities—not only through voting and representation but also through direct involvement in shaping and implementing programs that affect their lives and well-being.”²²

This ideological shift has had important implications for the character of peacebuilding operations in the post–Cold War period. The international organizations most strongly committed to market democracy have also played the most prominent roles in peacebuilding. They include the United Nations, which has led every peacebuilding mission except the post-Dayton Bosnia operation; the OAS (in Central America); the OSCE (in Bosnia); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which runs the military side of the Bosnia mission and is constitutionally committed to promoting “the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”;²³ and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose structural adjustment programs operate on the premise that Western models of market economics and democracy are optimal, and that market economies and political democracies are mutually reinforcing.²⁴ Conversely, the regional organizations that are least committed to Western models of politics and economics—including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Arab League, and the Islamic Conference—have played little or no role in peacebuilding.²⁵

In addition, most of the international NGOs that engage in peacebuilding are at least sympathetic to the principles of market democracy. Although several of these organizations have criticized aspects of recent operations, such

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 157–169; and Heraldo Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic Governance,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 29–38.

22. World Bank, *Advancing Social Development: A World Bank Contribution to the Social Summit* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995), p. 6. See also David Gillies, “Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank’s Policy Frontiers,” in Jo Marie Gresgaber and Bernhard G. Gunter, eds., *The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale* (London: Pluto, 1996), pp. 101–141; and Richard Jeffries, “The State, Structural Adjustment, and Good Government in Africa,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 20–35.

23. North Atlantic Treaty, preamble, reprinted in *North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, 11th ed. (Brussels: NATO, 1989), p. 376.

24. John W. Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa,” in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 7.

25. ASEAN participated in negotiations leading up to the Cambodian peace agreement, but not in the subsequent peacebuilding mission. In Rwanda, the OAU asked the United Nations to assume responsibility for the peacebuilding operation.

as failure to prosecute accused war criminals,²⁶ they nevertheless tend to support Western conceptions of democracy and economic development. As David Williams and Tom Young write, international NGOs active in the developing world typically share a “common vision of what development means which is rooted in Western notions of the state, ‘civil society,’ and the self. The most radical part of the NGO discourse . . . is their emphasis on ‘grass roots’ participation. . . . But this terminology is always to be understood entirely within Western preconceptions.”²⁷ This is not to say that relations between NGOs and other international agencies are inherently harmonious; on the contrary, they are frequently quite rocky.²⁸ Now more than ever, many international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations seem to share the desire to transform war-shattered states into stable societies that resemble the industrialized market democracies of the West as closely as possible, although they frequently disagree over how best to achieve this goal.

No single manifesto or central authority guides the work of these peacebuilding agencies, but in practice most of them have worked toward a common goal: peace through political and economic liberalization. The eight postconflict peacebuilding operations undertaken since the end of the Cold War have differed in many respects, but they have all promoted free and fair elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economic reforms. In this sense, a single paradigm—liberal internationalism—has governed the conduct of peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period. This is not to say that peacebuilding agencies have been inflexible or mechanistic in the pursuit of liberal internationalist goals: they have occasionally sacrificed liberal internationalist principles in order to gain the cooperation of local actors.²⁹ Nevertheless, the striking fact about the phenomenon of peacebuilding is that most peacebuilding agencies, most of the time, have worked to transform war-shattered states into market democracies.

How effective has this paradigm actually been in establishing self-sustaining peace? In the next section, I examine the record of recent peacebuilding operations, and argue that the process of political and economic liberalization has

26. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993).

27. David Williams and Tom Young, “Governance, the World Bank, and Liberal Theory,” *Policy Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1994), p. 98.

28. See Andrew S. Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?” in Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 67–81.

29. For example, peacebuilders have opted not to pursue indicted war criminals in Bosnia, apparently to avoid antagonizing local parties.

itself generated destabilizing and unforeseen side effects that have impeded the consolidation of stable peace.

Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?

Of the eight war-shattered states that have hosted peacebuilding missions since 1989, only Namibia seems to be on a path toward stable peace. All of the other states have either slipped back into civil war or have experienced problems that threaten to reignite conflict. This article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation for continued or renewed instability in each of these states; suffice it to say, the causal mechanisms generating societal unrest are complex and vary from case to case. No single factor can explain the outcome of every peacebuilding mission—from resurgent violence in Rwanda to relative peace in El Salvador. The record suggests, however, that the liberal internationalist paradigm of peacebuilding has, in various ways, exacerbated social tensions and thus contributed to the continuation or renewal of instability in all but one of these states.

NAMIBIA

Namibia is the single exception. Following a quarter-century of fighting between the South African army and South African-backed Namibian forces on one side, and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) on the other, the United Nations supervised "free and fair" elections in November 1989, which brought SWAPO to power as the government of a newly independent Namibia. Since then, peace has prevailed, new elections were held according to schedule in 1994, and the economy has been growing strongly.³⁰ Namibia is now, by some accounts, one of Africa's freest and most democratic states.³¹ What makes Namibia a unique case among the peacebuilding operations, however, is that one of the principal belligerents in Namibia's civil war was a foreign party—South Africa—which withdrew its forces from the country as part of the peace process. Although white settlers, many of whom fought with South African-backed forces, have remained in the country, the South African army's departure greatly facilitated the consolidation of peace. By

30. See André du Pisani, "Limited Choice: The 1994 National and Presidential Elections in Namibia," *Africa Institute Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 27, 1995), pp. 1–4. Namibia's real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 1995 was 4.1 percent. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Namibia, Swaziland* (fourth quarter, 1996).

31. Gus Constantine, "Namibia Stands as UN Success Story in Africa," *Washington Times*, June 13, 1996, p. A14.

contrast, in the other seven cases of postconflict peacebuilding, the principal factions involved in earlier fighting continue to inhabit the same state, making the task of peacebuilding considerably more difficult.

CAMBODIA

More typical than Namibia is the case of Cambodia, where stable peace remains a hope rather than a reality. Following the UN-run elections in 1993, two former adversaries—the Cambodian People's Party and the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif—formed a coalition government. Distrust between these parties, however, has prevented their reconciliation. As a result, Cambodia effectively has two parallel national governments, with each party competing for authority and influence. In this unstable setting, the prospect of new national elections in 1998 appears to be having a deleterious influence, exacerbating the split between the parties and increasing the factionalization of Cambodian politics, as each party seeks to bolster its own position and weaken the other in the lead-up to elections—a situation that has apparently provoked several abortive coup attempts.³² If the imminent elections bring this crisis to a head and rekindle open violence between the parties, then the process of political liberalization—which peacebuilders promoted as a way of managing conflict—will have had exactly the opposite effect.

Meanwhile, the process of economic liberalization may also be undermining political stability in Cambodia. Although overall gross domestic product growth was a respectable 6.1 percent per annum from 1991 to 1995 (and 7.6 percent in 1995 alone), the benefits of this growth were felt primarily in the cities, thus widening the already large gap in living standards between cities and rural areas, where most Cambodians live.³³ These inequalities are breeding discontent in the countryside and anger against the government.³⁴ This is not to say that peacebuilding efforts have harmed Cambodia; on the contrary, international assistance seems to have been instrumental in bringing the country's civil war to an end.³⁵ Recent developments suggest, however, that the very process of political and economic liberalization, which is integral to the

32. See "Cambodia's Bitter Partnership," *Economist*, Vol. 342, No. 8002 (February 1, 1997), pp. 37–38; and Michael Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," *IPA Policy Briefing Series* (New York: International Peace Academy, December 1996), p. 9.

33. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cambodia, Laos* (fourth quarter, 1996).

34. Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," p. 12.

35. On the international role in mediating Cambodia's civil war and implementing the peace settlement, see Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Jarat Chopra, *United Nations Authority in*

prevailing paradigm of peacebuilding, has itself generated political instabilities that appear to be eroding Cambodia's fragile peace.

EL SALVADOR

In El Salvador, too, economic liberalization seems to be fueling political instability. Twelve years of civil war between the national government and the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) ended with the signing of a UN-mediated peace accord in 1992. Elections were held in 1994 on schedule and in a relatively peaceful environment. The FMLN, now a legal opposition party, seems committed to peaceful politics, despite its relative lack of influence over government policy. Nevertheless, some observers warn that the proclamation of a peacebuilding "success" in El Salvador may be premature.³⁶ Political and social unrest are on the rise.³⁷ The apparent return of death squads (which reportedly include disgruntled former combatants from both sides), and indications that the new national police force is adopting more authoritarian methods, have raised concerns about the continuation of peaceful cooperation between government and opposition groups, particularly in a country where all previous stirrings of democracy have failed.³⁸

Economic liberalization policies promoted by the IMF and World Bank may be in part to blame for the renewed unrest in El Salvador. Structural adjustment programs—which, in David Plank's words, "seek to restore balance to a government's domestic and international accounts, and thereby put development on a sustainable footing, by devaluing the currency, liberalizing prices, reducing trade barriers, eliminating subsidies, and limiting public-sector employment and expenditure"³⁹—have imposed strict limits on Salvadoran gov-

Cambodia, Watson Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper No. 15 (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute, 1994); and Janet E. Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994).

36. See, for example, Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador," *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May–August 1995), pp. 189–203.

37. The Economist Intelligence Unit summarized the situation in late 1996: "Kidnappings, assaults, gangland-style assassinations and organized, often drug-related, crime appear to be occurring more frequently, as the influence of networks of drug-traffickers and car thieves spreads." Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Guatemala, El Salvador* (fourth quarter, 1996), p. 40. See also Juan Jose Dalton, "El Salvador: The Ideology of Fear," Inter Press Service, November 12, 1996.

38. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Guatemala, El Salvador*, p. 46; Human Rights Watch, *El Salvador: Darkening Horizons: Human Rights on the Eve of the March 1994 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994); and de Soto and del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements," p. 190.

39. David N. Plank, "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 415–416. For an overview of

ernment spending. These austerity measures have impaired the peace process in three ways. First, limitations on public expenditure have prevented the government of El Salvador from fully funding its peacebuilding programs, such as efforts to reintegrate former combatants into civil life and to rebuild war-damaged infrastructure.⁴⁰ Second, spending cuts have undone painstaking efforts to reestablish social services, including public health and schooling,⁴¹ and have apparently contributed to an increase in El Salvador's poverty rate, which many observers link to the spread of violent crime and insecurity.⁴² Third, the government's fiscal austerity policies, combined with a tailing off of foreign assistance since the formal end of the peacebuilding operation, appear to have induced an economic recession.⁴³ Given that economic distress has been a major cause of previous conflicts in El Salvador,⁴⁴ the current combination of increased poverty, widening economic inequalities, recession, inadequate spending on peace-related programs, and growing criminal violence suggests that rising social tensions in the country may soon lead to a further deterioration in political stability.

NICARAGUA

Nicaragua has experienced similar problems. The United Nations and other international actors supervised the implementation of the 1990 peace agreement between the Sandinista government and the "Contras," an armed force that fought the government throughout the 1980s. Elections in February 1990 brought the opposition leader, Violeta Chamorro, to power. The new government immediately implemented structural adjustment policies at the behest of international financial institutions and U.S. AID. A second round of elections

structural adjustment, see James H. Weaver, "What Is Structural Adjustment?" in Daniel M. Schydrowsky, ed., *Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), pp. 3–17.

40. De Soto and del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding"; and de Soto and del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Accords."

41. Erskine Childers, with Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System* (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994), p. 83.

42. Salvadoran government statistics indicate that the number of people living in extreme poverty rose from 23.3 percent of the urban population in 1988–89 to 29.6 percent in 1992–93. Elisabeth Wood and Alexander Segovia, "Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace Accords," *World Development*, Vol. 23, No. 12 (December 1995), p. 2085.

43. GDP growth in El Salvador slowed from 6.1 percent in 1995 to an estimated 3 percent in 1996. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Guatemala, El Salvador*.

44. See Manuel Pastor, Jr. and Michael E. Conroy, "Distributional Implications for Macroeconomic Policy: Theory and Applications to El Salvador," in James K. Boyce, ed., *Economic Policy for Building Peace* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 155–176.

was held in October 1996, and the Sandinistas were again defeated by a conservative candidate. Although peace prevails among the major political parties, Nicaragua has been wracked by increasing levels of criminal and gang-related violence. In the countryside, armed bands including former combatants have fought one another and attacked civilians.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the spread of youth gangs in the cities—a phenomenon unknown even during the country's most violent periods of civil war—has frightened urban dwellers and contributed to a doubling of the crime rate from 1995 to 1996 in Managua, the country's capital.⁴⁶ The growth of criminal violence appears to be directly related to rising levels of unemployment and poverty in Nicaragua.⁴⁷ Even the army commander, charged with controlling the violence, links the problem to poverty and unemployment.⁴⁸

Even though poverty and violence have deep roots in Nicaragua, several commentators have criticized the government's economic liberalization policies for exacerbating these social ills. Major reductions in social expenditures led to a 50-percent drop in real wages in the Chamorro government's first year in office and a 31-percent decline in per capita food consumption between 1990 and 1992.⁴⁹ Cuts in health spending—from \$57.10 per capita in 1988 to \$16.92 in 1993—coincided with the resurgence of diseases such as cholera and measles, and a rise in the infant mortality rate from less than 50 deaths per 1,000 births in the 1980s to 83 deaths per 1,000 births in 1992.⁵⁰ Although the economy has grown stronger since 1993,⁵¹ the manufacturing sector remains stagnant—a problem some observers also attribute to the government's austerity policies.⁵² As in El Salvador, economic liberalization and structural ad-

45. According to Nicaraguan government statistics, these gangs were responsible for 1,000 deaths, and an estimated 600 kidnappings, between 1990 and 1996. "Nicaraguan Army Chief Gives Gangs Ultimatum," Reuters, January 28, 1997.

46. "Youth Gangs Boom in Nicaragua's Peace," Reuters, October 8, 1996.

47. The combined rate of unemployment and underemployment in 1996 was 52 percent of the economically active population, and an estimated 55 percent of the country's youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four do not work or attend school. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Nicaragua, Honduras* (fourth quarter, 1996); and "Youth Gangs Boom in Nicaragua's Peace." See also Colin McMahon, "Contra War Is Over, But Nicaragua Still Troubled; Joblessness, Crime Plague the Peace," *Chicago Tribune*, News Section, March 22, 1996, p. 1.

48. Joaquin Cuadra, cited in "Nicaraguan Army Chief Gives Gangs Ultimatum."

49. William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 251–252.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

51. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Nicaragua, Honduras*.

52. A. Geske Dijkstra, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Manufacturing: Lessons from Nicaragua," *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 535–547.

justment programs in Nicaragua, which are designed to create the conditions for the development of a prosperous market economy in the long run, seem in the short run to have worsened the living standards of ordinary people, especially the poor. The result has been a deepening of economic inequalities, which have historically precipitated revolutionary movements in Central America.⁵³ If large-scale violence does recur in El Salvador and Nicaragua, then economic liberalization policies—a central component of the prevailing peacebuilding paradigm—will likely share part of the blame.

MOZAMBIQUE

Like the Central American states, Mozambique is widely considered a peacebuilding “success.” The signing of a peace agreement in October 1992 between the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) ended seventeen years of intermittent warfare in the former Portuguese colony.⁵⁴ The United Nations took on the task of implementing key provisions of the agreement, including the demilitarization and democratization of Mozambique. Despite several delays, the UN completed its mandate by holding the country’s first democratic elections in October 1994, with FRELIMO retaining control of the government and RENAMO forming the official opposition. Since then, relations between RENAMO and the government have been largely peaceful. As in El Salvador and Nicaragua, however, economic liberalization policies appear to have made life more difficult for ordinary citizens, increasing absolute levels of poverty, sharpening inequalities between rich and poor, and restricting government efforts to rebuild schools, health clinics, roads, and other infrastructure.⁵⁵ The worsening of living conditions has contributed to the spread of rural banditry⁵⁶ and has increased fears that a growing sense of frustration, anger, and des-

53. See Carlos M. Vilas, “Prospects for Democratization in a Post-Revolutionary Setting: Central America,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (May 1996), p. 464; and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 1995), p. 76.

54. For an overview of the Mozambican peace process, see Chris Alden, “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 103–128.

55. Susan Willett, “Ostriches, Wise Old Elephants, and Economic Reconstruction in Mozambique,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34–55; Joseph Hanlon, *Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique* (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1996); and Joseph Hanlon, “Strangling Mozambique: International Monetary Fund ‘Stabilization’ in the World’s Poorest Country,” *Multinational Monitor*, Vol. 17, No. 7–8 (July–August 1996), pp. 17–21.

56. Suzanne Daley, “In Mozambique, Guns for Plowshares and Bicycles,” *New York Times*, March 2, 1996, p. 3.

peration will spark new uprisings. Much of this anger is directed at the FRELIMO government, which many Mozambicans believe has sacrificed its independence for the sake of appeasing international donors and financial institutions.⁵⁷ Whether Mozambique continues to live up to its reputation as a peacebuilding success story remains to be seen, but recent developments suggest that economic liberalization policies have worked against the consolidation of peace.

ANGOLA

By contrast, Angola illustrates the potential dangers of political liberalization in war-shattered states. International negotiators secured a cease-fire in 1991 between the warring Angolan parties—the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)—including agreement to hold multiparty elections in late September 1992. The elections took place on schedule under international supervision and were judged to be “generally free and fair.” The results gave MPLA presidential candidate José Eduardo dos Santos 49.6 percent of the votes and UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi 40.1 percent, with neither candidate receiving the minimum 50-percent support required for a first-round victory.⁵⁸ Savimbi, apparently fearing defeat in a runoff election, rejected the first-round results and resumed a full-scale civil war in January 1993 that was “as bloody as anything seen since independence.”⁵⁹ Thus Angolan elections did not serve as a basis for reconciliation, but rather helped rekindle war.⁶⁰ Several observers have suggested that the elections would have been less destabilizing if (1) the parties had been fully disarmed before the elections were held, or (2) provision had been made for power-sharing arrangements after the elections, so that the losing party would not be completely shut out of the new government.⁶¹

57. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Mozambique, Malawi* (fourth quarter, 1996), p. 6; David N. Plank, “Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 407–430; and Merle L. Bowen, “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 255–279.

58. Alex Vines, *Angola and Mozambique: The Aftermath of Conflict*, Conflict Studies Series, No. 200 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, May–June 1995), p. 3.

59. Anthony W. Pereira, “The Neglected Tragedy: The Return to War in Angola, 1992–3,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1994), p. 17.

60. See Marina Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States,” in Zartman, *Collapsed States*, p. 236.

61. See Jim Wurst, “Mozambique: Peace and More,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 79–80; Bertram, “Reinventing Governments,” pp. 398–399; Vines, *Angola and Mozambique*, p. 8; Pereira, “Neglected Tragedy,” pp. 15–16; and Virginia Page Fortna, “Success and Failure in South-

Regardless of whether these measures could have averted violence, the fact remains that political liberalization had a negative effect on Angola's peace process, and this effect was not clearly anticipated by the peacebuilding agencies.⁶²

RWANDA

Plans for political liberalization may have also contributed to the collapse of peace in Rwanda. In August 1993 Rwanda's Hutu-led government signed a peace agreement with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi opposition group that had been fighting an insurgency war against the government since 1990. The agreement, dubbed "the Arusha Declaration," formally ended hostilities and initiated a peacebuilding process that involved power-sharing arrangements, integration of the two armies, the return of refugees, and a transition to democracy culminating in multiparty elections scheduled for 1995, all of which were to be supervised by the United Nations.⁶³ Efforts to implement the agreement collapsed in April 1994, however, when Hutu extremists in the Rwandan government orchestrated a mass slaughter of Tutsi civilians that lasted three months and killed up to one million people. The genocide represented a conscious attempt by Hutu officials to thwart the planned elections and other elements of the Arusha Declaration that would have required them to share power with their adversaries.⁶⁴ Although responsibility for the killings rests with the perpetrators, plans for political liberalization in Rwanda not only failed to facilitate reconciliation of the parties, but apparently induced the genocide by threatening Hutu elements with the prospect of losing power.

ern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), pp. 292–295.

62. The international community mediated a new cease-fire in November 1994, and at the time of this writing, a new peacebuilding mission is in Angola, overseeing the demobilization of the belligerents; however, prospects for a lasting settlement remain in doubt.

63. Bruce D. Jones, "Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990–94," *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 225, 241.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 243; Matthew J. Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 372; and Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 32. Some observers contend that it was the power-sharing provisions of the Arusha agreement, not the planned democratic elections, that led to the breakdown in Rwanda, but this seems an artificial distinction: if Hutu extremists were motivated by the fear of losing exclusive control of the Rwandan government, then they would have viewed both power-sharing arrangements and the prospect of free elections as threatening.

Some commentators have argued that greater political liberalization, including a freer press, could have helped avert the tragedy in Rwanda—for instance, by countering the inflammatory propaganda broadcast by Hutu leaders, who incited violence against Tutsi civilians in the period leading up to the genocide.⁶⁵ Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine persuasively argue, however, that the partial liberalization of Rwanda's popular media, which followed the signing of the Arusha Declaration, actually helped reignite the conflict: although the Hutu regime monopolized radio broadcasting, the growth of a vibrant but irresponsible antigovernment press appeared to reinforce the Hutu extremists' determination not to share power with the opposition or permit the elections to proceed.⁶⁶ In other words, greater press freedom may have served to intensify, not moderate, civil violence in Rwanda.

BOSNIA

In Bosnia political liberalization also seems to have worked against the goal of building a lasting peace. The Dayton Accords, signed in November 1995, provided for multiparty elections to newly created pan-Bosnian political institutions. The agreement also empowered the OSCE to certify whether "social conditions" for "effective" elections existed, and then to administer the elections themselves.⁶⁷ Under considerable pressure from the United States, on June 25, 1996, the OSCE certified that these conditions existed,⁶⁸ despite the warnings of many observers that elections held so soon after the cessation of hostilities would merely consolidate the power of extremist nationalists and reinforce Bosnia's de facto division into separate ethnic enclaves,⁶⁹ which is precisely what happened. The period leading up to the elections triggered renewed low-level conflict among the parties,⁷⁰ and when elections were finally held in September 1996, nationalist political parties dominated the

65. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995).

66. Snyder and Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," pp. 30–34.

67. Annex 3, Article 1(2) of the Dayton Accords, reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 1996), p. 115.

68. Maynard Glitman, "US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1996–97), p. 78.

69. See, for example, Anthony Borden's prediction in Anthony Borden, Slavenka Drakulic, and George Kenny, "Bosnia's Democratic Charade," *The Nation*, Vol. 263, No. 8 (September 23, 1996), p. 14; and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Failure in the Making: Human Rights and the Dayton Agreement," *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report*, Vol. 8, No. 8 (June 1996), p. 2.

70. Krishna Kumar, "The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War*, p. 31.

federal and regional legislative races.⁷¹ As one observer in Sarajevo commented, even though elections were intended as “the first step toward knitting back together the physically and ethnically torn nation,” in practice the results appeared to reaffirm “now with the imprimatur of the democratic process, the ethnic fault lines that tore the country apart.”⁷² For example, the pan-Bosnian parliament, scheduled to hold its first meeting in October, did not convene until January 1997, because Serbian representatives refused to swear allegiance to a united Bosnia (and continue to do so at the time of this writing). Whether these new political institutions will survive—or, perhaps more to the point, whether they will encourage the reconciliation of the Bosnian parties instead of stimulating further hostility—remains to be seen. It seems clear, however, that the September 1996 elections served to drive the parties further apart, not draw them together as was intended.

This brief survey of the peacebuilding record suggests that the prevailing paradigm of peacebuilding—liberal internationalism, or the assumption that the best way to consolidate peace is to transform war-shattered states into market democracies—has been more problematic than anticipated. Policies of political and economic liberalization seem to have generated unforeseen instabilities in most of the states hosting such operations. Only Namibia, where one of the major belligerents withdrew from the country, appears to have escaped the perverse effects of the liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding.

We need to gain a better understanding of *why* the existing peacebuilding paradigm has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states. In the next section, I argue that these instabilities can be traced to tensions in the logic of democracy and capitalism—tensions that are rarely noted in the relatively wealthy and peaceful West.

The Paradoxes of Democracy and Capitalism

If it is true that democracies rarely go to war against each other, and that they are less likely than nondemocracies to experience internal unrest, then democratization would seem, at first glance, to be a sensible solution for states suffering from civil strife. Similarly, if capitalism has generated the highest levels of wealth and economic growth in human history, and if capitalism and

71. Chris Hedges, “Bosnia’s Nationalist Parties Dominate Election Results,” *New York Times*, September 22, 1996, p. 12.

72. Colin Soloway, “Bosnia’s Freely Elected Fanatics: And the Winner Is . . . Ethnic Hatred,” *US News and World Report*, Vol. 121, No. 13 (September 30, 1996), p. 48.

democracy are mutually reinforcing systems of organizing political and economic life—as many Western observers contend—then market democracy should be a promising formula for managing domestic conflict and creating prosperity in war-shattered states.

The problem with this reasoning is that it overlooks another feature of market democracy: both democracy and capitalism encourage conflict and competition—indeed, they thrive on it. Democracy, for example, requires a politically active and involved citizenry, which some commentators call a vibrant “civil society,” to counterbalance and scrutinize the power of the state and to provide channels for political expression.⁷³ An energetic civil society is characterized by a profusion of citizen organizations and associations, such as unions, churches, political parties and movements, cooperatives, neighborhood groups, and schools of thought.⁷⁴ The existence of these organizations presupposes sustained mobilization on the part of a large number of citizens, and serves to stimulate political debate by catalyzing competing societal interests.⁷⁵ This debate in turn feeds into the policymaking process, which in principle permits democratic governments to devise policies and practices that reflect shifting public attitudes. Thus, as Robert Dahl notes, “in democratic countries political conflict is not merely normal, it is generally thought to be rather healthy.”⁷⁶ In other words, democracy paradoxically encourages the public expression of conflicting interests in order to limit the intensity of such conflicts by channeling them through peaceful political institutions before they turn

73. On the importance of an active “civil society” for democratic governance, see Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Uggla, “Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and Donors Do?” *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 10 (October 1996), pp. 1621–1639; Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 1994), p. 12; Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), p. 209; Larry Diamond, “Three Paradoxes of Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 54; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 21; and Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982). For theoretical discussions of the concept of “civil society,” see Robert Fine and Shirin Rai, eds., “Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives,” special issue of *Democratization*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1997); and John A. Hall, ed., *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1995).

74. Michael Walzer, “The Concept of Civil Society,” in Michael Walzer, ed., *Toward a Global Society* (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1995), p. 8.

75. Larry Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World* (New York: Freedom House, 1992), p. 5.

76. Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy, Liberty, and Equality* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), p. 14.

violent. Lewis Coser, who first explored the “stabilizing” effects of societal conflict, explains this paradox: “By permitting the immediate and direct expression of rival claims,” open societies “are able to readjust their structures by eliminating the sources of dissatisfaction.”⁷⁷

Problems arise, however, when political activity generates demands that cannot be channeled through existing institutions. Dahl considers this to be a fundamental problem of pluralist democracy, namely, how to deal with situations in which citizen associations foster parochial exclusiveness among their members at the expense of concerns for the broader public good.⁷⁸ In such circumstances, encouraging political activity can polarize the populace into a number of separated, potentially hostile communities. When a society is divided in this way, holding democratic elections—which are, by definition, moments of intense political activity—may reinforce societal differences and work against the goal of establishing a stable democratic system, particularly if ambitious politicians deliberately exploit intergroup differences to build a following.⁷⁹ This problem has not been limited to Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia, where elections exacerbated divisions and diminished the prospects for stable peace. Other examples abound: in Sudan democratic elections have intensified conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south.⁸⁰ In Sri Lanka voters helped precipitate civil war by turning out in large numbers for radical Sinhala-based parties and Tamil-supported movements.⁸¹ In Ethiopia an attempt by the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front to exclude other ethnic parties from participating in the June 1992 elections elicited renewed violence from the excluded parties.⁸² In Bosnia elections held in 1990 embittered ethnic relations and helped create the conditions that led to civil war.⁸³ The point is not that democracy is inherently violent, as some commentators have argued,⁸⁴

77. Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 154.

78. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, p. 1.

79. On the problem of politicians using coded communal appeals to win support, see Richard Sandbrook, “Transitions Without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African Cases,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1996), p. 76; Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy for the Long Haul,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 6; and Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), pp. 83, 151.

80. Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States,” p. 236.

81. Dennis Austin, *Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 3.

82. Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States,” pp. 238–239.

83. James A. Schear, “Bosnia’s Post-Dayton Traumas,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 104 (Fall 1996), p. 96.

84. See François Furet, Antoine Liniers, and Philippe Raynaud, *Terrorisme et démocratie* (Terrorism and democracy) (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1985).

but that the adversarial politics of democracy can sharpen confrontations and conflicts in divided societies, rather than fostering greater tolerance for different interests and opinions.⁸⁵

Like democracy, capitalism also encourages conflict, not only because it presupposes a society of acquisitive competitors vying for a larger share of the national wealth, but because it creates economic inequalities that have historically fueled resentment and confrontation. Highly unequal distributions of wealth appear to be strongly associated with violent political conflict, regardless of a country's level of economic development.⁸⁶ The advanced industrialized states—all wealthy market economies—have responded to this problem by implementing welfare policies designed to redistribute income to poorer segments of society. In developing countries, however, attempts to create functioning market systems through economic liberalization frequently result in the *widening* of distributional inequalities—largely because such policies often entail reductions in government subsidies, social expenditures, and public-sector employment, which tend to have disproportionately detrimental effects on the poor and the urban working class. For this reason, structural adjustment programs, which promote economic liberalization as a recipe for stable economic growth in the long run, often lead to economic hardship and political instability in the short run.⁸⁷

85. Austin, *Democracy and Violence*, p. 3.

86. See the cross-national study conducted by Kurt Schock, "A Conjectural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship Between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 98–133. For similar arguments, see Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy," in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 342; and J. 'Bayo Adeganye, "Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa," *Development and Change*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 1995), p. 366.

87. Although the causal effects of structural adjustment policies on developing societies are difficult to isolate, the preponderance of evidence indicates that these policies tend to deepen poverty among large segments of the population and widen distributional inequalities. See Gerd Nonneman, "Economic Liberalization: The Debate," in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *Political and Economic Liberalization* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 3–30; Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); Shaw, "Beyond Post-Conflict Peacebuilding"; and Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *The Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 47. On the difficulty of measuring the precise effects of structural adjustment, see Rashid Faruqee and Ishrat Husain, eds., *Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994); and J.J. Thomas, *The Links Between Structural Adjustment and Poverty: Causal or Remedial* (Santiago, Chile: Programa Regional del Empleo para America Latina y Caribe [Regional Employment Program for Latin America and the Caribbean], 1993).

El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique are not the only countries in which economic liberalization programs have fueled social unrest. Structural adjustment policies have also exacerbated societal tensions and led to violent strikes and demonstrations in other countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia.⁸⁸ Even some international financial institutions have conceded that structural adjustment generates social tensions. The World Bank, for example, has since the late 1980s pledged to pursue more poverty-sensitive adjustment programs—that is, programs designed to redress some of the destabilizing effects of economic liberalization.⁸⁹ In practice, however, World Bank and IMF policies have continued to place the principal burden of adjustment on the poorest and most vulnerable groups in developing societies, which is a recipe for political instability.⁹⁰ This is not to say, as some commentators do, that violence is an essential and permanent feature of the capitalist economy.⁹¹ Rather, it suggests that the process of economic liberalization can exacerbate distributional inequalities and heighten social tensions.

Moreover, economic liberalization policies may undermine efforts to establish democratic systems of government, not only because the historical record indicates that high levels of income inequality are strongly associated with the breakdown of existing democracies,⁹² but also because these policies exact a high price from precisely those organized urban groups—university students, professionals, civil servants, and workers—who normally form the core of

88. See Ho-Won Jeong, "Managing Structural Adjustment," *S AIS Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall-Summer 1996), pp. 155–167; Paul J. Kaiser, "Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation: The Demise of Social Unity in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 227–237; Sigrun I. Skogly, "Structural Adjustment and Development: Human Rights—An Agenda for Change," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November 1993), pp. 751–778; and Adekanye, "Structural Adjustment."

89. See World Bank, *Poverty Reduction and the World Bank: Progress and Challenges in the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996); Barend A. de Vries, "The World Bank's Focus on Poverty," in Gresgraber and Gunter, *The World Bank*, pp. 65–80; World Bank, *Poverty Reduction and the World Bank: Progress in Fiscal 1994* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995); and World Bank, *Making Adjustment Work for the Poor: A Framework for Policy Reform in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990).

90. Mahmood Monshipouri, *Democratization, Liberalization, and Human Rights in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 3, 54; and Plank, "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty," p. 416.

91. Jamil Salmi, *Violence and Democratic Society* (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 119.

92. For empirical evidence substantiating this claim, see Edward N. Muller, "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 50–68. According to Sanford Lakoff, *Democracy: History, Theory, Practice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), p. 292, "the single most important barrier to the viability of democracy is extreme economic inequality in conditions of significant and widespread poverty."

pro-democracy movements.⁹³ In this sense, economic and political liberalization may not only generate destabilizing side effects by themselves, but they may even work at cross-purposes, thus defying the notion that democracy and capitalism grow together naturally.

All of these problems pose a particular danger to war-shattered states. Poverty, disease, hunger, and dislocated populations are common. Communications and transportation infrastructure may be largely destroyed or damaged. These societies also tend to be heavily armed, and face the problem of demobilizing and reintegrating into civilian life large numbers of former fighters, whose practical skills may be limited to waging war. These features tend to make war-shattered states more fragile and vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of economic and political liberalization than other states at similar levels of economic or political development. Although most developing countries have difficulties coping with the social, political, and economic dislocations or crises of development, war-shattered states are in an even more difficult situation.⁹⁴ Not only are they expected to become democracies and market economies in the space of a few years—effectively completing a transformation that took several centuries in the oldest European states—but they must carry out this monumental task in the fragile political circumstances of states that are just in the process of emerging from civil war.

The liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding has rested on the assumption that “the magic of the market and the ballot box can be achieved merely by changing economic policy and allowing more political participation.”⁹⁵ This assumption is naive and false, particularly in the case of war-shattered states. The process of political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous and disruptive. By assuming that this process does not generate destabilizing side effects, contemporary peacebuilders effectively reproduce the flawed logic of 1950s- and 1960s-era modernization theory, which optimistically but wrongly predicted that economic growth in developing

93. Sandbrook, “Transitions Without Consolidation,” p. 69. Gerald J. Schmitz and David Gillies, in *The Challenge of Democratic Development: Sustaining Democratization in Developing Societies* (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1992), p. 29, similarly point out that economic restructuring along market-oriented lines can easily strain fragile democratic coalitions.

94. On the concept of “crises” in development, see Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

95. Thomas R. Callaghy, “Vision and Politics in the Transformation of Global Political Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third Worlds,” in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 244.

countries would naturally culminate in liberal capitalist economies and stable polities resembling Western democracies.⁹⁶ Samuel Huntington, a prominent critic of modernization theory, argued in 1968 that the very process of economic and political development created instabilities that derailed efforts to establish market economies and democratic systems in many developing countries.⁹⁷ The same criticism applies to the practice of peacebuilding today.

Rethinking Peacebuilding

If, as I have argued, the current approach to peacebuilding is fundamentally flawed, what if anything can be done to correct these flaws? One option is to abandon liberal internationalism as a peacebuilding strategy. Instead of promoting democratic elections, for example, peacebuilders could encourage rival parties to share power in a nondemocratic regime, thereby avoiding the problems associated with political liberalization. This argument has a long pedigree: over the years, many students of development have argued that democracy is an unaffordable luxury for most developing countries, where the need for effective government may outweigh the need for accountable government.⁹⁸ Others have been less willing to embrace authoritarianism, but nevertheless assert that economic liberalization should have a higher priority than democratization in order to avoid the “social chaos” caused by electoral mobilization in developing states.⁹⁹

Authoritarian solutions for war-shattered states should not be rejected out of hand. Even the most stalwart liberal internationalist might support the establishment of an authoritarian regime if the alternative were more abhorrent—a genocide, for example. Promoting authoritarianism as a peacebuilding strategy, however, would raise serious problems in most circumstances. First, authoritarian solutions would in effect institutionalize the political primacy of the factions that fought the war, thereby inhibiting the development of more

96. For an overview of modernization theory, see Alvin Y. So, *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories* (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 17–87.

97. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

98. See, for example, Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1967), chap. 7; Huntington, *Political Order*; Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 338; and Mohammed Ayooob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 195.

99. Monshipouri, *Democratization*, pp. 3, 21.

moderate, cross-factional political groupings in the postconflict period. Second, because democratic governments are popularly elected, they come into existence with a measure of legitimacy or public acceptance that authoritarian regimes generally lack. This inborn advantage enhances the stability of democratic governments during the critically important early phase of a postconflict recovery. Third, democracy provides a mechanism for the formerly warring factions and new parties to compete peacefully for power. Authoritarian arrangements by contrast not only shut out new competitors, but may lack the institutional capacity to manage disputes among the ruling parties themselves. For these and other reasons, authoritarianism seems even more problematic than liberal internationalist approaches to peacebuilding.

A second alternative to liberal internationalism is the strategy of partition: the division of a war-shattered state into territorially discrete, politically independent units. The resulting entities may be sovereign states or autonomous regions within an existing state. The rationale for this strategy is to remove the source of conflict by separating rival communities both physically and politically. Among the eight peacebuilding operations examined in this article, the Bosnia mission comes closest to partition. Although the Dayton Accords contain provisions designed to reverse the territorial fragmentation of Bosnia—such as a guarantee that refugees may return to their homes situated on land conquered by their enemies—most of these provisions have not been enforced, and the result has been an informal partition of Bosnia.¹⁰⁰

Some observers, including Chaim Kaufmann, have endorsed a more definitive partition strategy for Bosnia—and for ethnic civil wars more generally—because violent conflict “hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute.”¹⁰¹ This argument has historical backing: the practice of partitioning rival ethnic groups—by creating new states or autonomous regions—has been more successful in stopping ethnic civil wars than has the strategy of attempting to reconcile warring parties under a common government.¹⁰² Partition may be a sensible solution to civil

100. Radja Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January–February 1997), pp. 22–34.

101. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions,” p. 139. See also John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “Hateful Neighbors,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1996, p. A25. Kaufmann differentiates ethnic civil wars (“disputes between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages”) from ideological civil wars (“contests between factions within the same community”) on p. 138.

102. *Ibid.*, pp. 159–161.

strife, particularly in circumstances where warring groups are already geographically separated. The problem, however, is that this condition rarely exists in practice: civil wars are typically fought among interspersed communities.

Recognizing this problem, Kaufmann advocates “separation campaigns” in which international intervenors would forcibly transfer civilian populations to create ethnically homogeneous regions.¹⁰³ But he does not spell out the full implications of this proposal, including the possibility that international forces would be called upon to remove innocent civilians from their homes, presumably using force against those who actively resisted mandatory resettlement—in short, “ethnic cleansing.” As long as international actors remain unwilling to perform this odious task, partition strategies will be impractical for warring states in which rival communities are not already separated into homogeneous enclaves.¹⁰⁴

Upon consideration, liberal internationalism appears to be a less problematic peacebuilding strategy in most foreseeable circumstances than either of these alternatives. This observation, however, does not alter the fact that the current approach to peacebuilding remains fundamentally flawed. Accepting the broad objective of liberal internationalism—peace through political and economic liberalization—does not preclude criticism of the methods that peacebuilders have employed to pursue this objective. In the following section, I suggest ways in which international agencies could learn from the mistakes of previous missions and design new peacebuilding techniques that consciously seek to minimize the destabilizing effects of political and economic liberalization in host countries.

A Sensible Peacebuilding Formula: Strategic Liberalization

A new, more realistic approach to peacebuilding is needed—one that preserves the liberal internationalist goal of transforming war-shattered states into market democracies, but recognizes that tensions in the internal logic of democracy and capitalism pose a potential threat to the domestic peace of these states.

103. “After enemy forces are driven out of each locality, civilians of the enemy ethnic group who remain behind are interned, to be exchanged after the war.” *Ibid.*, p. 166.

104. Even a very limited partition strategy—applied only to states in which communities were already physically separate—would raise serious problems: it might create incentives for ethnic nationalists elsewhere to launch ethnic cleansing campaigns in the hopes of gaining international support for the creation of new, ethnically based states.

Below I describe an approach to peacebuilding that is designed to limit the conflict—inducing effects of economic and political liberalization policies on war-shattered states. The main elements of this approach include: (1) a more gradual and controlled process of democratization; (2) a greater emphasis on electoral arrangements that reward political moderation; (3) more equitable and growth-oriented economic adjustment policies; (4) the creation of effective, central coordinating bodies for peacebuilding missions; and (5) more realistic timetables for peacebuilding operations. Some of these proposals have been put forward elsewhere, and some have been partially implemented by peacebuilding agencies or are currently under review. Others have not yet been considered in the context of peacebuilding. Together, these proposals represent a coherent alternative to current peacebuilding practices: strategic liberalization.

GRADUAL AND CONTROLLED DEMOCRATIZATION

Recent peacebuilding operations have suffered from what Terry Lynn Karl calls the “fallacy of electoralism,” or the faith that “the mere holding of elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites, the winners of which are accorded public legitimacy.”¹⁰⁵ As I have shown, elections can actually work against the consolidation of peace by driving parties apart rather than reconciling them. To avoid this outcome, peacebuilding agencies should take the following steps.

First, they should delay elections until passions have cooled and former belligerents have been disarmed.¹⁰⁶ Second, peacebuilders should use the time leading up to elections to promote political moderation by establishing, and if necessary directly funding, citizen organizations and associations that cut across cleavage lines in war-shattered states—in order to prevent ethnic nationalists and other exclusionist groups from monopolizing political life, and to build what Robert Putnam calls “social capital.”¹⁰⁷ International agencies have begun experimenting with such programs in recent years, but these

105. Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” p. 73.

106. On the utility of delaying elections, see Crocker and Hampson, “Making Peace Settlements Work,” pp. 63–67; and Michael Walzer, “The Hard Questions: Vote Early,” *New Republic*, Vol. 215, No. 18 (October 28, 1996), p. 29.

107. According to Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 67, social capital “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation . . . [and] can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration.”

programs have yet to become a centerpiece of peacebuilding operations, where they belong.¹⁰⁸

Third, peacebuilders should exclude extremists—individuals who clearly and repeatedly advocate violent action against other individuals or groups in the society—from participating in active politics. In certain cases, such as Bosnia, prohibitions on the incitement of violence have been written into electoral rules, but not vigorously enforced. Peacebuilding agencies should make clear to local parties at the earliest stages of involvement that international assistance is contingent on agreement that no individual identified as an “extremist” by international authorities will be permitted to contest or hold public office.

Fourth, prior to liberalizing the popular media in a war-shattered state, peacebuilders should establish mechanisms to limit the promulgation of inflammatory propaganda, including ethnic “hate media.”¹⁰⁹ As Snyder and Ballentine argue, international agencies—including NGOs and aid donors—can support “media that strive to attract a politically and ethnically diverse audience, invite the expression of various viewpoints, and hold news stories to rigorous standards of objectivity.”¹¹⁰ The goal of such policies would be to reduce the danger that malevolent and erroneous journalism might spark renewed conflict in the fragile period following the cessation of hostilities. In cases where incendiary broadcasts or publications appear to be inciting large-scale violence, international authorities should have both the means and the mandate to block the distribution or transmission of these messages.¹¹¹

108. The OECD, for example, has launched a number of “culture of peace” programs, including in El Salvador and Rwanda, whose goals have included increasing dialogue between formerly warring communities. See UN General Assembly Document A/51/395, September 23, 1996, annex, for an overview of OECD activities in this area. The Tajikistani Dialogue Program, jointly sponsored by U.S. and Russian NGOs, is another interesting model of this kind of program. See Randa M. Slim and Harold H. Saunders, “Managing Conflict in Divided Societies: Lessons from Tajikistan,” *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 31–46. See also the discussion of “independent people’s peace councils” in the Philippines, in Edmundo Garcia, “Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict in the Philippines,” in Edmundo Garcia and Carol Hernandez, eds., *Waging Peace in the Philippines* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 1989), p. 37.

109. Reporters Sans Frontières, *Les médias de la haine* (Hate Media) (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1995).

110. Snyder and Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” pp. 39–40.

111. In Rwanda, for example, radio broadcasts by Hutu extremists on *Radio Rwanda* and *Radio-télévision libre des mille collines* (RTML) are considered by many observers to have played a key role in inciting ethnic hatred and initiating the genocide. See Holly J. Burkhalter, “The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter

ELECTORAL RULES THAT REWARD MODERATION

"For most leaders, most of the time," writes Donald Horowitz, "there are greater rewards in pursuing ethnic conflict than in pursuing measures to abate it. One of the great challenges of political engineers is to make moderation rewarding and to penalize extremism."¹¹² Building such incentives into the electoral rules of war-shattered societies would help ensure that postconflict elections promote reconciliation rather than further violence. Presidential elections in Nigeria, for example, have in the past required presidential aspirants to win not only an absolute majority of national votes, but at least 25 percent of votes cast in no fewer than two-thirds of the nineteen states—a requirement that in practice encouraged serious candidates to "reach out and conciliate and propitiate the interests of groups other than the ones [that they were] accustomed to appealing to."¹¹³

Some mechanisms have been less effective: the Bosnian experience, for instance, suggests that institutionalized power-sharing arrangements are insufficient to promote cooperation and reconciliation among former enemies. Bosnia's new constitution, signed at Dayton, established institutional mechanisms to encourage consensual decision making among the ethnic factions represented in the Bosnian presidency: each faction was given a veto over decisions deemed to be "destructive of a vital interest,"¹¹⁴ but in practice these provisions were neutralized by the electoral rules, which did not require candidates to seek support from voters in opposing camps, and therefore rewarded nationalist extremists, many of whom explicitly rejected compromise. In the end, the most successful parties were those that based their appeals on exclusive nationalist militarism, which did little to rebuild moderate political ground in Bosnia.

The challenge for peacebuilders is to devise electoral rules that compel serious candidates to secure significant cross-factional support. There is no magic formula to achieve this goal: electoral arrangements must be adapted to the circumstances of each state. In Bosnia an alternative to the Dayton plan

1994–95), pp. 44–54; Bill Berkeley, "Rwanda's Killer Radio," *New Republic* (August 22 and 29, 1994), pp. 18–19; and Michael Chege, "Africa's Murderous Professors," *National Interest*, No. 46 (Winter 1996–97), pp. 32–40.

112. Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 452.

113. Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers," in Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking*, p. 127.

114. Article V, Sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

might have been a *one-person* presidency, with a dual requirement for victory: a plurality of votes cast in the entire country and a given percentage of votes cast in each of the ethnic communities or geographical regions of Bosnia.¹¹⁵ Like the Nigerian election rules, these requirements would have likely created strong incentives for candidates to appeal to moderate voters in each ethnic camp, which might have ultimately encouraged the growth of cross-factional political movements.

PEACE-ORIENTED ADJUSTMENT POLICIES

Structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies should be customized to meet the particular needs of war-shattered states. As noted earlier, the World Bank has been more sensitive in recent years to the often negative impact of adjustment on the poor. It has also begun conducting country-specific poverty assessments to make adjustment programs more sensitive to local conditions.¹¹⁶ Despite this progress, economic liberalization programs promoted by the World Bank and IMF have continued to exacerbate instabilities in war-shattered states by increasing poverty and widening distributional inequalities. Although it is true that the delay of reforms could ultimately make economic conditions worse, the imperative of economic reform must be balanced against the danger of provoking renewed violence in war-shattered states. Economist Jeffrey Sachs writes that Poland and Russia are being treated as though they were patients in an “economic emergency room.”¹¹⁷ If so, then war-shattered states belong in an intensive care unit. Rapid economic and political liberalization—sometimes called “shock therapy”—may or may not be appropriate for the countries of Eastern Europe, but it appears to be a particularly dangerous and unsuitable treatment for states just emerging from civil wars. First, in war-shattered states, reconstruction and rapid growth

115. In addition, using an alternative vote system could have helped preclude the possibility of no candidate meeting the minimum requirements for electoral victory. This system—the current method of electing Australia’s House of Representatives—requires voters to rank candidates on the ballot in order of preference. If no candidate meets the conditions for election after counting all the first preferences, then the last-place candidate is eliminated and all of his or her votes are transferred to the remaining candidates according to second preferences indicated on the ballots, and so on, until a winner emerges with the required levels of support. See Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 24; and Claire Palley, *Constitutional Law for Minorities* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1978), pp. 16–17.

116. World Bank, *Progress in Fiscal 1994*, p. 2.

117. Jeffrey Sachs, “Life in the Economic Emergency Room,” in John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 503–523.

should take precedence over rapid disinflation in the immediate postconflict period. International financial institutions have insisted on delaying reconstruction programs or extending them over longer periods to reduce their inflationary effects. Rapid economic growth, however, is essential to the peacebuilding process, not only to stimulate reconstruction activities but to underscore the material benefits of peace to ordinary citizens and local elites. War-shattered states should be permitted to generate higher levels of inflation in exchange for economic growth in the short run. If necessary, international lenders should establish clear criteria to identify states in need of this type of intensive care treatment.

Second, to reduce the destabilizing effects of increased poverty and widening economic inequalities, peacebuilders should devote more resources to programs aimed at improving the living conditions of those segments of the population hardest hit by structural adjustment. Well-run safety-net programs, such as Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund, have helped alleviate poverty by subsidizing projects to improve housing, education, and health care for the poor in several states.¹¹⁸ These programs provide a model that should be routinely incorporated into the planning of peacebuilding operations.

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

One of the most interesting aspects of peacebuilding is its decentralized character—a panoply of international agencies, each pursuing its own respective goals in war-shattered states, yet in broad terms sharing a common vision of the kind of society they would like to nurture in those states: market democracy. The decentralized nature of peacebuilding, however, also reduces its effectiveness and creates problems in the field.¹¹⁹ The United Nations and the IMF, for example, not only lack a formal system for harmonizing their activi-

118. For an analysis of the Bolivian program and other countries' efforts to soften the effects of adjustment, see Carol Graham, "The Politics of Safety Nets," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 142–156; Carol Graham, *Safety Nets, Politics, and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); Carl Jayarajah, William Branson, and Binayak Sen, *Social Dimensions of Adjustment: The World Bank Experience, 1980–93* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), chap. 5; and Ke-Young Chu and Sanjeev Gupta, "Protecting the Poor: Social Safety Nets During Transition," *Finance and Development*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 24–27.

119. On the coordination problem, see Ginifer, "Development and the UN Peace Mission," p. 7; Stedman and Rothchild, "Peace Operations," pp. 26–28; Nicole Ball, with Tammy Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996), pp. 6–7, 94–101; Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations at Fifty: Recent Lessons," *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 592 (May 1995), p. 226; and Weiss, "The United Nations and Civil Wars," p. 144.

ties, but rarely even consult each other.¹²⁰ As a result, these organizations have sometimes worked at cross-purposes. In El Salvador and Mozambique, for instance, while the United Nations was urging the governments of war-shattered states to increase spending on peacebuilding-related programs, the IMF was demanding fiscal restraint.¹²¹ In the absence of central coordinating mechanisms, such contradictions are addressed only after they become obvious problems, and sometimes not at all. To manage the instabilities of political and economic liberalization, improved coordination is imperative.

As Thomas Weiss wryly observes, the principal obstacle to better coordination is that, even though there is widespread agreement on the need for greater coordination, no one particularly wants to be “coordinated.”¹²² The various agencies of the UN system, that have been the principal players in most peacebuilding operations are notorious for fighting turf battles among themselves—even in the midst of emergencies.¹²³ Moreover, NGOs are often particularly reluctant to be associated with governmental and intergovernmental agencies in field operations.¹²⁴ Although modest efforts at better coordination have helped in some cases, the obvious disinclination of so many international agencies to relinquish even a small portion of their autonomy suggests that bolder measures are needed, namely, political direction from state governments. To this end, I propose that executive committees be established for each peacebuilding operation, comprised of representatives from the states whose national agencies are most deeply involved in the operation, and from states that exert the greatest influence over the intergovernmental organizations engaged in peacebuilding, along with officials of the organizations themselves.

This would be only a partial solution to the coordination problem: many actors, including NGOs, will likely insist on preserving their complete independence. Turning the executive committees into actual policymaking bodies would, however, shape the policies of intergovernmental agencies, and may ultimately induce other nongovernmental actors to cooperate, particularly if they are offered substantive input into the policymaking process.

120. See Childers and Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System*, p. 83.

121. On Mozambique, see Willett, “Ostriches”; on El Salvador, see de Soto and del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding.”

122. Weiss, “The United Nations at Fifty,” p. 226.

123. Ginifer, “Development and the UN Peace Mission,” p. 7.

124. See François Jean, ed., *Life, Death, and Aid: The Médecins Sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention* (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Thomas G. Weiss, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Internal Conflict,” in Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, pp. 457–458.

REALISTIC TIME FRAMES

Most peacebuilding missions have lasted from one to three years. This time frame is too short to ensure a stable outcome. The U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II formally lasted ten years and seven years respectively, during which time the institutional structures of democracy and capitalism were built. Peacebuilding agencies are not conquering powers: their influence is limited because they generally lack the capability to impose peace, and must therefore rely on the continuing cooperation, or at least acquiescence, of local parties. Yet, even with limited leverage, peacebuilders are expected to achieve goals similar to those of the postwar occupation forces in Japan and Germany—the establishment of stable market democracies—in a fraction of the time.

Translating the terms of a democratic settlement into institutional roles and routines is, in the words of Larry Diamond, “gradual, messy, fitful, and slow.”¹²⁵ The recent cases of peacebuilding demonstrate that problems arising from this process rarely dissipate after the first round of free and fair elections—when most peacebuilding operations have been scheduled to terminate. Peacebuilding’s period of intensive care needs to be extended well beyond this point—ideally, until after the second round of elections. This means that peacebuilding operations might on average last a total of seven to nine years. During this period, peacebuilders should continue to provide financial, humanitarian, technical, and administrative assistance, and monitor the parties’ compliance with the peace settlement.¹²⁶

Financial constraints may be cited as reason not to extend these missions, or to avoid implementing the other proposals I have put forward. However, scrimping on peacebuilding is a false economy if fighting resumes because operations have failed to create conditions for a durable peace. Unless international agencies adopt a more strategic approach to peacebuilding, which necessarily involves a larger commitment of time and resources to rehabilitating war-shattered states, then the Bosnias and Cambodias of the world will gain few lasting benefits from the well-meaning but ill-conceived peacebuilding operations offered to them by the international community.

125. Diamond, cited in Samuel Decalo, “The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 362 (January 1992), p. 35.

126. For additional arguments in favor of longer-term commitments to peace operations, see Stedman and Rothchild, “Peace Operations.”

Conclusion

The paradigm of liberal internationalism, which assumes that the best way to consolidate peace in war-shattered states is to transform these states into stable market democracies, has implicitly guided the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of this approach has been limited, however, by the destabilizing effects that the process of political and economic liberalization itself generates. Because peacebuilding agencies have not adequately anticipated or addressed these problems, most peacebuilding operations have not yielded stable peace. At best, these countries have experienced instabilities that threaten to undermine a tenuous peace. At worst, the liberal-internationalist approach to peacebuilding has had the perverse effect of inciting renewed violence. Although it is true that these problems are in some measure unavoidable given the nature of democracy and capitalism (which paradoxically encourage conflict and competition in order to achieve peace and prosperity), these problems can nevertheless be minimized, particularly if planning for peacebuilding operations starts from the assumption that political and economic liberalization is an inherently lengthy and conflict-ridden process. By setting out the main elements of a new approach to peacebuilding, this article suggests several ways in which international agencies could meet this goal.

The success or failure of peacebuilding has implications reaching far beyond the borders of the states that host such operations. At the end of the twentieth century, one of the principal problems facing the world is the increasingly pervasive phenomenon of violent civil conflict. Responding to this problem requires that the international community at least develop the capacity to ensure that violence does not reignite once hostilities have ended. Without this capacity, efforts to end ongoing conflicts will have little prospect of achieving stable peace in the long run—even if they succeed in convincing local parties to stop fighting for the time being. Making peacebuilding more effective is therefore an essential, if modest, first step in countering the broader problem of civil conflict in the post-Cold War era.